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  1. Chrisoula Andreou (2013). Agency and Awareness. Ratio 26 (2):117-133.
    I focus on the idea that if, as a result of lacking any conscious goal related to X-ing and any conscious anticipation or awareness of X-ing, one could sincerely reply to the question ‘Why are you X-ing?’ with ‘I didn't realize I was doing that,’ then one's X-ing is not intentional. My interest is in the idea interpreted as philosophically substantial (rather than merely stipulative) and as linked to the familiar view that there is a major difference, relative to the (...)
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  2. Chrisoula Andreou & Mariam Thalos (2007). Sense and Sensibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):71 - 80.
    We consider two versions of the view that the person of good sense has good sensibility and argue that at least one version of the view is correct. The version we defend is weaker than the version defended by contemporary Aristotelians; it can be consistently accepted even by those who find the contemporary Aristotelian version completely implausible. According to the version we defend, the person of good sense can be relied on to act soundly in part because, with the guidance (...)
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  3. Peter Århem, Hans Liljenström & B. I. B. Lindahl (2001). Unconsciousness—Consciousness: Tools for Exploring the Transition: Report on a Workshop in Sigtuna, Sweden on 24-27 August 2000. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (1):77-81.
  4. Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni, A. Sant'Angelo, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, C. Gagliardo & G. Galardi (2014). Long-Lasting Coma. Functional Neurology 29 (3):201-205.
    In this report, we describe the case of a patient who has remained in a comatose state for more than one year after a traumatic and hypoxic brain injury. This state, which we refer to as long-lasting coma (LLC), may be a disorder of consciousness with significantly different features from those of conventional coma, the vegetative state, or brain death. On the basis of clinical, neurophysiological and neuroimaging data, we hypothesize that a multilevel involvement of the ascending reticular activating system (...)
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  5. Thomas Baldwin (ed.) (2003/2012). The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1870-1945. Cambridge University Press.
    The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870-1945 comprises over sixty specially commissioned essays by experts on the philosophy of this period, and is designed to be accessible to non-specialists. The first part of the book traces the history of philosophy from its remarkable flowering in the 1870s through to the early years of the twentieth century. After a brief discussion of the impact of the First World War, the second part of the book describes further developments in philosophy in the first (...)
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  6. Lewis White Beck (1966). Conscious and Unconscious Motives. Mind 75 (April):155-179.
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  7. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (1990). Conscious and Unconscious States. Philosophical Studies 44:44-62.
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  8. Rudolf Bernet (2002). Unconscious Consciousness in Husserl and Freud. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):327-351.
    A clarification of Husserl's changing conceptions of imaginary consciousness ( phantasy ) and memory, especially at the level of auto-affective time-consciousness, suggests an interpretation of Freud's concept of the Unconscious. Phenomenology of consciousness can show how it is possible that consciousness can bring to present appearance something unconscious, that is, something foreign or absent to consciousness, without incorporating it into or subordinating it to the conscious present. This phenomenological analysis of Freud's concept of the Unconscious leads to a partial critique (...)
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  9. Alexandre Billon (2011). Have We Vindicated the Motivational Unconscious Yet? A Conceptual Review. Frontiers in Psychoanalysis and Neuropsychoanalysis 2.
    Motivationally unconscious (M-unconscious) states are unconscious states that can directly motivate a subject’s behavior and whose unconscious character typically results from a form of repression. The basic argument for M-unconscious states claims that they provide the best explanation to some seemingly non rational behaviors, like akrasia, impulsivity or apparent self-deception. This basic argument has been challenged on theoretical, empirical and conceptual grounds. Drawing on recent works on apparent self-deception and on the ‘cognitive unconscious’ I assess those objections. I argue that (...)
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  10. Ned Block (2011). The Anna Karenina Theory of the Unconscious. Neuropsychoanalysis 13 (1):34-37.
    The Anna Karenina Theory says: all conscious states are alike; each unconscious state is unconscious in its own way. This note argues that many components have to function properly to produce consciousness, but failure in any one of many different ones can yield an unconscious state in different ways. In that sense the Anna Karenina theory is true. But in another respect it is false: kinds of unconsciousness depend on kinds of consciousness.
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  11. A. M. Bodkin (1907). The Subconscious Factors of Mental Process Considered in Relation to Thought (I). Mind 16 (62):209-228.
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  12. A. M. Bodkin (1907). The Subconscious Factors of Mental Process Considered in Relation to Thought (II). Mind 16 (63):362-382.
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  13. Louise Brink (1918). How the Concept of the Unconscious is Serviceable. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (15):405-414.
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  14. Tim Crane & Sarah Patterson (eds.) (2000). History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge.
    This collection of new essays put the debates on the mind-body problem into historical context.
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  15. Ilham Dilman (1959). The Unconscious. Mind 68 (October):446-473.
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  16. Fred Dretske (2006). Perception Without Awareness. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 147--180.
  17. Charles E. M. Dunlop (2000). Searle's Unconscious Mind. Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):123-148.
    In his book The rediscovery of the mind John Searle claims that unconscious mental states (1) have first-person "aspectual shape", but (2) that their ontology is purely third-person. He attempts to eliminate the obvious inconsistency by arguing that the aspectual shape of unconscious mental states consists in their ability to cause conscious first-person states. However, I show that this attempted solution fails insofar as it covertly acknowledges that unconscious states lack the aspectual shape required for them to play a role (...)
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  18. Abraham Edel (1964). The Concept of the Unconscious: Some Analytic Preliminaries. Philosophy of Science 31 (January):18-33.
    To illustrate one way in which philosophy may be helpful rather than merely critical in the present state of psychoanalytic theorizing, an attempt is made to disentangle issues in controversies about the unconscious. Eleven questions are distinguished and discussed. Logical, linguistic, methodological, metaphysical, empirical, and pragmatic components are set apart. It is found that there are no logical barriers to a construct of the unconscious, that it is linguistically feasible, need violate no methodological concepts, nor foreclose a metaphysical issue, nor (...)
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  19. Matthew Elton (2000). Consciousness: Only at the Personal Level. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):25-42.
    I claim that consciousness, just as thought or action, is only to be found at the personal level of explanation. Dennett's account is often taken to be at odds with this view, as it is seen as explicating consciousness in terms of sub-personal processes. Against this reading, and especially as it is developed by John McDowell, I argue that Dennett's work is best understood as maintaining a sharp personal/sub-personal distinction. To see this, however, we need to understand better what content (...)
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  20. Simon J. Evnine (1989). Freud's Ambiguous Concepts. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 3 (2):86 - 99.
    In this paper I propose to say something about why certain key psychoanalytic concepts, particularly that of the unconscious, are special because of a studied, and therapeutically important, ambiguity or paradoxicality which affects them. Before I examine these concepts, however, the first section of this paper discusses some of Sartre's views on psychological explanation. On the one hand, this gives me a way of introducing the dichotomy of self-evident irreducibility and existential lucidity which underlies my account of the unconscious. On (...)
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  21. A. Bronson Feldman (1959). The Unconscious In History. New York: Philosophical Library.
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  22. G. C. Field, F. Aveling & John Laird (1922). Is the Conception of the Unconscious of Value in Psychology? Mind 31 (124):413-442.
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  23. Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2013). The Value of Spontaneous EEG Oscillations in Distinguishing Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. In Eror Basar & et all (eds.), Application of Brain Oscillations in Neuropsychiatric Diseases. Supplements to Clinical Neurophysiology. Elsevier 81-99.
    Objective: The value of spontaneous EEG oscillations in distinguishing patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states was studied. Methods: We quantified dynamic repertoire of EEG oscillations in resting condition with closed eyes in patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states (VS and MCS). The exact composition of EEG oscillations was assessed by the probability-classification analysis of short-term EEG spectral patterns. Results: The probability of delta, theta and slow-alpha oscillations occurrence was smaller for patients in MCS than for VS. Additionally, only (...)
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  24. Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2012). EEG Oscillatory States as Neuro-Phenomenology of Consciousness as Revealed From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):149-169.
    The value of resting electroencephalogram (EEG) in revealing neural constitutes of consciousness (NCC) was examined. We quantified the dynamic repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in eyes-closed rest in relation to the degree of expression of clinical self-consciousness. For NCC a model was suggested that contrasted normal, severely disturbed state of consciousness and state without consciousness. Patients with disorders of consciousness were used. Results suggested that the repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in resting condition quantitatively (...)
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  25. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2016). Long-Term (Six Years) Clinical Outcome Discrimination of Patients in the Vegetative State Could Be Achieved Based on the Operational Architectonics EEG Analysis: A Pilot Feasibility Study. The Open Neuroimaging Journal 10:69-79.
    Electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings are increasingly used to evaluate patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) or assess their prognosis outcome in the short-term perspective. However, there is a lack of information concerning the effectiveness of EEG in classifying long-term (many years) outcome in chronic DOC patients. Here we tested whether EEG operational architectonics parameters (geared towards consciousness phenomenon detection rather than neurophysiological processes) could be useful for distinguishing a very long-term (6 years) clinical outcome of DOC patients whose EEGs were registered (...)
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  26. David H. Finkelstein (1999). On the Distinction Between Conscious and Unconscious States of Mind. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (2):79-100.
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  27. Sebastian Gardner (2003). The Unconscious Mind. In Thomas Baldwin (ed.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870-1945. Cambridge University Press 1--9.
    Baldwin, T. (ed.) Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870 -1945.
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  28. Eric Gillett (1996). Searle and the "Deep Unconscious". Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (3):191-200.
  29. Logi Gunnarsson (2005). Trapped in a Secret Cellar: Breaking the Spell of a Picture of Unconscious States. Philosophical Investigations 28 (3):273-288.
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  30. Herman K. Haeberlin (1917). The Concept of the Unconscious. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (20):543-550.
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  31. Gary Hatfield (2010). Psychology and Philosophy. In Dean Moyar (ed.), Routledge Companion to Nineteenth Century Philosophy. Routledge 522-53.
    This chapter first discusses psychology in the eighteenth century as the background to nineteenth-century psychology. It then recounts developments within German psychology, British psychology, evolutionary psychology, and American psychology, followed by a discussion of introspective methods in the laboratory. The final three sections discuss conflicting opinions on the existence of unconscious mental states, review relations between philosophy and psychology, and survey the state of psychology in the early twentieth century.
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  32. George Henry Lewes (1877). Consciousness and Unconsciousness. Mind 2 (6):156-167.
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  33. Ernest R. Hilgard (1958). Unconscious Processes and Man's Rationality. University of Illinois Press.
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  34. Wolfgang Huemer & Christoph Landerer (2010). Mathematics, Experience, and Laboratories: Herbart's and Brentano's Role in the Rise of Scientific Psychology. History of the Human Sciences 23 (3):72-94.
    In this article we present and compare two early attempts to establish psychology as an independent scientific discipline that had considerable influence in central Europe: the theories of Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776—1841) and Franz Brentano (1838—1917). While both of them emphasize that psychology ought to be conceived as an empirical science, their conceptions show revealing differences. Herbart starts with metaphysical principles and aims at mathematizing psychology, whereas Brentano rejects all metaphysics and bases his method on a conception of inner (...)
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  35. Robert H. Kettell, A Model Of Consciousness.
    It has been difficult to define human consciousness because of its many differing qualities and because of various views people have of consciousness. It is proposed that these multiple vantage points be united into a single three-dimensional model utilizing breadth, time and depth. This model could provide a more comprehensive definition of consciousness and encourage an exploration of the interplay of consciousness’ many features. Such a model may also help answer some of the many questions that the concept of consciousness (...)
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  36. Susan Krantz (1990). Brentano on 'Unconscious Consciousness'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):745-753.
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  37. Charles Landesman (1965). Reply to Professor Whallon. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (March):404-405.
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  38. Byeong D. Lee (2004). Finkelstein on the Difference Between Conscious and Unconscious Belief. Dialogue 43 (4):707-716.
    ABSTRACT: In a recent article, D. H. Finkelstein offers a new proposal about the distinction between conscious and unconscious belief On his proposal, someone’s belief is conscious if he has an ability to express it simply by self-ascribing it; and someone’s belief is unconscious if he lacks such an ability. In this article, I argue that his proposal is inadequate, and then offer a somewhat different proposal. On my proposal, someone’s belief is conscious if he has self-ascribed this belief without (...)
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  39. Craig K. Lehman (1981). Conscious and Unconscious Mental States. Philosophy Research Archives 1451.
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  40. Dan Lloyd (1996). Commentary on Searle and the 'Deep Unconscious'. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (3):201-202.
  41. Kevin Lynch (2015). Subliminal: How Your Unconscious Mind Rules Your Behavior, by Leonard Mlodinow (Vintage Books, 2013). [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):229-234.
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  42. Graham F. Macdonald (1999). Folk-Psychology, Psychopathology, and the Unconscious. Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):206-224.
    There is a 'philosophers' assumption that there is a problem with the very notion of an unconscious mental state.The paper begins by outlining how the problem is generated, and proceeds to argue that certain conditions need to be fulfilled if the unconscious is to qualify as mental. An explanation is required as to why we would ever expect these conditions to be fulfilled, and it is suggested that the Freudian concept of repression has an essential role to play in such (...)
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  43. Alasdair MacIntyre (2004). The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis (Revised Edition). New York: Routledge.
    This new edition includes a substantial new preface by the author, in which he discusses repression, determinism, transference, and "practical rationality," and ...
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  44. Neil Campbell Manson (2005). Consciousness-Dependence, and the Conscious/Unconscious Contrast. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 126 (1):115-129.
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  45. Neil Campbell Manson (2000). 'A Tumbling-Ground for Whimsies'? The History and Contemporary Role of the Conscious/Unconscious Contrast. In Tim Crane & Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge
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  46. Eric Matthews (2005). Unconscious Reasons. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (1):55-57.
  47. Patrick McKee (1972). Non-Conscious Seeing. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (October):319-326.
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  48. John McLoughlin (1999). Unwittingly Recapitulating Freud: Searle's Concept of a Vocabulary of the Unconscious. Ratio 12 (1):34-53.
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  49. Anthonie W. M. Meijers (2000). Mental Causation and Searle's Impossible Conception of Unconscious Intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2):155-170.
    In my article I evaluate Searle's account of mental causation, in particular his account of the causal efficacy of unconscious intentional states. I argue that top-down causation and overdetermination are unsolved problems in Searle's philosophy of mind, despite his assurances to the contrary. I also argue that there are conflicting claims involved in his account of mental causation and his account of the unconscious. As a result, it becomes impossible to understand how unconscious intentional states can be causally efficacious. My (...)
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  50. Vitor Manuel Dinis Pereira (2015). Occipital and Left Temporal EEG Correlates of Phenomenal Consciousness. In Quoc Nam Tran & Hamid Arabnia (eds.), Emerging Trends in Computational Biology, Bioinformatics, and Systems Biology. Elsevier 335–354.
    Phenomenal consciousness is “what is it like to be” a mental state: the stinging sharpness of a pin prick, the taste of chocolate or the vibrant red of a fire truck. “Access consciousness” refers to the possibility of a mental state to be available to the rest of the cognitive system (to be available, for example, to our production system language like when we try to describe the stinging sharpness of a pin prick, the taste of chocolate or the vibrant (...)
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