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  1. Vuko Andrić (2015). Objective Consequentialism and the Rationales of ‘ “Ought” Implies “Can” ’. Ratio 29 (2).
    This paper argues that objective consequentialism is incompatible with the rationales of ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’ – with the considerations, that is, that explain or justify this principle. Objective consequentialism is the moral doctrine that an act is right if and only if there is no alternative with a better outcome, and wrong otherwise. An act is obligatory if and only if it is wrong not to perform it. According to ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’, a person is morally (...)
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  2. Vuko Andrić (2013). Objective Consequentialism and the Licensing Dilemma. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):547-566.
    Frank Jackson has put forward a famous thought experiment of a physician who has to decide on the correct treatment for her patient. Subjective consequentialism tells the physician to do what intuitively seems to be the right action, whereas objective consequentialism fails to guide the physician’s action. I suppose that objective consequentialists want to supplement their theory so that it guides the physician’s action towards what intuitively seems to be the right treatment. Since this treatment is wrong according to objective (...)
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  3. Joanna M. Burch-Brown (2014). Clues for Consequentialists. Utilitas 26 (1):105-119.
    In an influential paper, James Lenman argues that consequentialism can provide no basis for ethical guidance, because we are irredeemably ignorant of most of the consequences of our actions. If our ignorance of distant consequences is great, he says, we can have little reason to recommend one action over another on consequentialist grounds. In this article, I show that for reasons to do with statistical theory, the cluelessness objection is too pessimistic. We have good reason to believe that certain patterns (...)
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  4. Robert F. Card (2004). Consequentialism, Teleology, and the New Friendship Critique. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):149-172.
  5. Timothy Chappell (2001). Option Ranges. Journal of Applied Philosophy 18 (2):107–118.
    An option range is a set of alternative actions available to an agent at a given time. I ask how a moral theory’s account of option ranges relates to its recommendations about deliberative procedure (DP) and criterion of rightness (CR). I apply this question to Act Consequentialism (AC), which tells us, at any time, to perform the action with the best consequences in our option range then. If anyone can employ this command as a DP, or assess (direct or indirect) (...)
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  6. Tyler Cowen (2006). The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism. Utilitas 18 (4):383.
    “Perhaps the most common objection to consequentialism is this: it is impossible to know the future…This means that you will never be absolutely certain as to what all the consequences of your act will be…there may be long term bad effects from your act, side effects that were unforeseen and indeed unforeseeable…So how can we tell which act will lead to the best results overall – counting all the results? This seems to mean that consequentialism will be unusable as a (...)
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  7. Dale Dorsey (2012). Consequentialism, Metaphysical Realism and the Argument From Cluelessness. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):48-70.
    Lenman's ‘argument from cluelessness’ against consequentialism is that a significant percentage of the consequences of our actions are wholly unknowable, so that when it comes to assessing the moral quality of our actions, we are without a clue. I distinguish the argument from cluelessness from traditional epistemic objections to consequentialism. The argument from cluelessness should be no more problematic for consequentialism than the argument from epistemological scepticism should be for metaphysical realism. This puts those who would reject consequentialism on the (...)
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  8. Mathieu Doucet (2013). Playing Dice with Morality: Weighted Lotteries and the Number Problem. Utilitas 25 (2):161-181.
    In this article I criticize the non-consequentialist Weighted Lottery (WL) solution to the choice between saving a smaller or a larger group of people. WL aims to avoid what non-consequentialists see as consequentialism's unfair aggregation by giving equal consideration to each individual's claim to be rescued. In so doing, I argue, WL runs into another common objection to consequentialism: it is excessively demanding. WL links the right action with the outcome of a fairly weighted lottery, which means that an agent (...)
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  9. Fred Feldman (2012). True and Useful: On the Structure of a Two Level Normative Theory. Utilitas 24 (02):151-171.
    Act-utilitarianism and other theories in normative ethics confront the implementability problem: normal human agents, with normal human epistemic abilities, lack the information needed to use those theories directly for the selection of actions. Two Level Theories have been offered in reply. The theoretical level component states alleged necessary and sufficient conditions for moral rightness. That component is supposed to be true, but is not intended for practical use. It gives an account of objective obligation. The practical level component is offered (...)
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  10. Fred Feldman (2006). Actual Utility, the Objection From Impracticality, and the Move to Expected Utility. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):49 - 79.
  11. Caspar Hare (2011). Obligation and Regret When There is No Fact of the Matter About What Would Have Happened If You Had Not Done What You Did. Noûs 45 (1):190 - 206.
    It is natural to distinguish between objective and subjective senses of.
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  12. Frank Jackson (1991). Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection. Ethics 101 (3):461-482.
  13. Dale Jamieson (1987). Book Review:Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism. Michael Slote. [REVIEW] Ethics 98 (1):168-.
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  14. Gerald Lang (2008). Consequentialism, Cluelessness, and Indifference. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (4):477-485.
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  15. James Lenman (2000). Consequentialism and Cluelessness. Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (4):342–370.
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  16. Brian Lightbody (2008). Indecidability and Undecidability: Does Derrida’s Ethics Depend on Levinas’ Notion of the Third? In Neal DeRoo & Brian Lightbody (eds.), The Logic of Incarnation. James K.A. Smith’s Critique of Postmodern Religion.
  17. Joel Marks (2009). Ought Implies Kant: A Reply to the Consequentialist Critique. Lexington Books.
    Ought Implies Kant defends Kantianism via a critical examination of consequentialism. The latter is shown to be untenable on epistemic grounds; meanwhile, the charge that Kantianism is really consequentialism in disguise is refuted. The book also presents a novel interpretation of Kantianism as according direct duties to other animals.
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  18. Elinor Mason (2004). Consequentialism and the Principle of Indifference. Utilitas 16 (3):316-321.
    James Lenman argues that consequentialism fails as a moral theory because it is impossible to predict the long-term consequences of our actions. I agree that it is impossible to predict the long-term consequences of actions, but argue that this does not count as a strike against consequentialism. I focus on the principle of indifference, which tells us to treat unforeseeable consequences as cancelling each other out, and hence value-neutral. I argue that though we cannot defend this principle independently, we cannot (...)
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  19. Elinor Mason (2002). Against Blameless Wrongdoing. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):287-303.
    I argue against the standard view that it is possible to describe extensionally different consequentialist theories by describing different evaluative focal points. I argue that for consequentialist purposes, the important sense of the word act must include all motives and side effects, and thus these things cannot be separated.
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  20. D. Miller (2003). Axiological Actualism and the Converse IntuitionResponse to Parsons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):123.
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  21. Dale E. Miller (2006). Utilitarianism and the Headache That Just Won't Go Away. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (2):147-149.
  22. Dale E. Miller (2003). Actual-Consequence Act Utilitarianism and the Best Possible Humans. Ratio 16 (1):49–62.
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  23. Alastair Norcross (1990). Consequentialism and the Unforeseeable Future. Analysis 50 (4):253 - 256.
    If consequentialism is understood as claiming, at least, that the moral character of an action depends only on the consequences of the action, it might be thought that the difficulty of knowing what all the consequences of any action will be poses a problem for consequentialism. J. J. C. Smart writes that in most cases..
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  24. Philip Pettit (1994). Consequentialism and Moral Psychology. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (1):1 – 17.
    Consequentialism ought not to make an impact, explicit or implicit, on every decision. All it ought generally to enjoy is what I describe as a virtual presence in the deliberation that produces decisions. [...] The argument that we have conducted suggests that the virtuous agent ought in general to remain faithful to his or her instincts and ingrained habits, only occasionally breaking with them in the name of promoting the best consequences.
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  25. Roy Sorensen (1995). Unknowable Obligations. Utilitas 7 (2):247-271.
    You face two buttons. Pushing one will destroy Greensboro. Pushing the other will save it. There is no way for you to know which button saves and which destroys. What ought you to do? Answer: You ought to make the correct guess and push the button that saves Greensboro. Second question: Do you have an obligation to push the correct button?
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  26. Rob van Someren Greve (2014). The Value of Practical Usefulness. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):167-177.
    Some moral theories, such as objective forms of consequentialism, seem to fail to be practically useful: they are of little to no help in trying to decide what to do. Even if we do not think this constitutes a fatal flaw in such theories, we may nonetheless agree that being practically useful does make a moral theory a better theory, or so some have suggested. In this paper, I assess whether the uncontroversial respect in which a moral theory can be (...)
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