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  1. William Alston (1999). Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning. Cornell University Press.
    William P. Alston. difference in the scope of the rule reflects the fact that I-rules exist for the sake of making communication possible. Whereas their cousins are enacted and enforced for other reasons. We could distinguish I-rules just by this ...
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  2. William P. Alston (1963). Meaning and Use. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (51):107-124.
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  3. Christian Barth & Holger Sturm (eds.) (2012). Brandoms Expressive Vernunft. Historische und Systematische Untersuchungen. Mentis.
  4. Arvid Båve (2015). A Deflationist Error Theory of Properties. Dialectica 69 (1):23-59.
    I here defend a theory consisting of four claims about ‘property’ and properties, and argue that they form a coherent whole that can solve various serious problems. The claims are (1): ‘property’ is defined by the principles (PR): ‘F-ness/Being F/etc. is a property of x iff F’ and (PA): ‘F-ness/Being F/etc. is a property’; (2) the function of ‘property’ is to increase the expressive power of English, roughly by mimicking quantification into predicate position; (3) property talk should be understood at (...)
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  5. Arvid Båve (2015). Conceptual Role Semantics. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Contents: 1. Introduction , 2. Overviews , 3.History and major works, 3.1 Gerhard Gentzen and proof-theory, 3.2 Wilfrid Sellars, 3.3 Gilbert Harman, 3.4 Christopher Peacocke, 3.5 Robert Brandom , 3.6 Paul Horwich, 3.7 Major works by other authors, 4. Mental content first vs. linguistic meaning first, 4.1 Content-first views, 4.2 Meaning-first views, 5. Wide vs. narrow CRS, 5.1 Overviews and major works about externalism/internalism, 5.2 Discussions about externalism within CRS, 6. Descriptive vs. normative CRS, 6.1 Overviews and major works about (...)
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  6. Anna Bergqvist (2009). Semantic Particularism and Linguistic Competence. Logique Et Analyse 52 (208):343-361.
    In this paper I examine a contemporary debate about the general notion of linguistic rules and the place of context in determining meaning, which has arisen in the wake of a challenge that the conceptual framework of moral particularism has brought to the table. My aim is to show that particularism in the theory of meaning yields an attractive model of linguistic competence that stands as a genuine alternative to other use-oriented but still generalist accounts that allow room for context-sensitivity (...)
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  7. Corine Besson (2010). Understanding the Logical Constants and Dispositions. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5 (1):1-24.
    Many philosophers claim that understanding a logical constant (e.g. ‘if, then’) fundamentally consists in having dispositions to infer according to the logical rules (e.g. Modus Ponens) that fix its meaning. This paper argues that such dispositionalist accounts give us the wrong picture of what understanding a logical constant consists in. The objection here is that they give an account of understanding a logical constant which is inconsistent with what seem to be adequate manifestations of such understanding. I then outline an (...)
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  8. Robert Brandom (2000). Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Harvard University Press.
    This new work provides an approachable introduction to the complex system that Making It Explicit mapped out.
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  9. Robert Briscoe (2014). Review of Christopher Gauker, Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. [REVIEW] Mind 123 (491):902-096.
  10. Darragh Byrne (2000). Critical Notices: Horwich's Semantic Deflationism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (3):371 – 391.
  11. H. G. Callaway (2006). Review of Eve Gaudet, Quine on Meaning: The Indeterminacy of Translation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (8).
    The book contains twelve chapters, prefaced by acknowledg­ments, and followed by a short index. It derives from the author's doctoral dissertation in philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis, and thanks are offered to committee members Robert B. Barrett, Joseph Ullian and Roger Gibson. The reader who is not inclined to review the large related literature on Quine's view of cognitive meaning and translation may also be attracted to this book for concise summaries and treatment of the Quinean view from (...)
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  12. H. G. Callaway (1992). Does Language Determine Our Scientific Ideas? Dialectica 46 (3/4):225-242.
    This paper argues that the influence of language on science, philosophy and other field is mediated by communicative practices. Where communications is more restrictive, established linguistic structures exercise a tighter control over innovations and scientifically motivated reforms of language. The viewpoint here centers on the thesis that argumentation is crucial in the understanding and evaluation of proposed reforms and that social practices which limit argumentation serve to erode scientific objectivity. Thus, a plea is made for a sociology of scientific belief (...)
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  13. Harvey J. Cormier (2006). Hilary Putnam. In John R. Shook & Joseph Margolis (eds.), A Companion to Pragmatism. Blackwell Pub.
  14. Cesare Cozzo (2008). On the Copernican Turn in Semantics. Theoria 74 (4):295-317.
    Alberto Coffa used the phrase "the Copernican turn in semantics" to denote a revolutionary transformation of philosophical views about the connection between the meanings of words and the acceptability of sentences and arguments containing those words. According to the new conception resulting from the Copernican turn, here called "the Copernican view", rules of use are constitutive of the meanings of words. This view has been linked with two doctrines: (A) the instances of meaning-constitutive rules are analytically and a priori true (...)
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  15. Cesare Cozzo (1994). Ruolo argomentativo immediato. Lingua E Stile:241-65.
    The author presents a theory of meaning centred upon the notion of "immediate argumental role", which distinguishes between understandability and correctness of a language. First, the theoretical and quasi-empirical criteria of adequacy and the relevant data for such a theory are described. Then the sense of a word is defined as given by a set of argumentation rules. The immediate argumental role of a sentence is determined by its syntactic structure and by the senses of the component words. The immediate (...)
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  16. Edward Craig (1982). Meaning, Use and Privacy. Mind 91 (364):541-564.
  17. Stephen Crain & Drew Khlentzos (2010). The Logic Instinct. Mind and Language 25 (1):30-65.
    We present a series of arguments for logical nativism, focusing mainly on the meaning of disjunction in human languages. We propose that all human languages are logical in the sense that the meaning of linguistic expressions corresponding to disjunction (e.g. English or , Chinese huozhe, Japanese ka ) conform to the meaning of the logical operator in classical logic, inclusive- or . It is highly implausible, we argue, that children acquire the (logical) meaning of disjunction by observing how adults use (...)
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  18. Adam M. Croom (2014). Remarks on The Semantics of Racial Slurs. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 13:11-32.
    In “The Semantics of Racial Slurs,” an article recently published in Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations, Hedger draws upon Kaplan’s distinction between descriptive and expressive content to argue that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content. Here I review the key considerations presented by Hedger in support of his purely expressive account of slurs and provide clear reasons for why it must ultimately be rejected. After reviewing the key cases Hedger offers for consideration in support of his view that slurs are (...)
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  19. Adam M. Croom (2014). Spanish Slurs and Stereotypes for Mexican-Americans in the USA: A Context-Sensitive Account of Derogation and Appropriation. Sociocultural Pragmatics 8:145–179.
    Slurs such as spic, slut, wetback, and whore are linguistic expressions that are primarily understood to derogate certain group members on the basis of their descriptive attributes (such as their race or sex) and expressions of this kind have been considered to pack some of the nastiest punches natural language affords. Although prior scholarship on slurs has uncovered several important facts concerning their meaning and use –including that slurs are potentially offensive, are felicitously applied towards some targets yet not others, (...)
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  20. Marian David (2007). Review of P. Horwich: From a Deflationary Point of View. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (462):427-434.
    The review of this collection is primarily concerned with essays pertaining to Horwich's deflationary approaches to truth and meaning.
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  21. Michael Devitt, Meaning: Truth-Referential or Use?
    In Coming to Our Senses (1996), I argued for a certain truth-referential theory of meaning and against various other theories, both truth-referential and not.[1] In this paper I shall consider some subsequent developments. I shall start by summarizing my theory. I will then consider some of the latest from direct-reference theorists, particularly from Scott Soames. Finally, I will consider the use theory proposed by Paul Horwich.
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  22. Michael Devitt (2002). Meaning and Use. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):106-121.
    Part I argues that the usc theory in Horwich’s Meaning does not give sufficient attention to the relation between language and thought. A development of the theory is proposed that gives explanatory priority to the mental. The paper also urges that Horwich’s identification of a word’s meaning by its role in explaining the cause of sentences should be broadened to include its role in explaining the linguistic and non linguistic behavior that sentences cause. Part II argues that Horwich greatly overstates (...)
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  23. Daniel Dohrn, Following Rules of Nature, Not the Pedestrian Muse: Reply to Yamada.
    I criticize Yamada's account of rule-following. Yamada's conditions are not necessary. And he misses the deepest level of the rule-following considerations: how meaning rules come about.
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  24. Gheorghe-Ilie Farte (2006). Semnificatie si intelegere. Hermenia 6:27-34.
    La signification est un phénomène social qui ne peut être compris de manière satisfaisante que par rapport à deux entités duales : une communauté et un langage. Elle se manifeste dans la sphère publique en tant que réponse discriminative à un stimulus sémiotique, c'est-à-dire en tant que réaction typique à un stimulus vicariant (qui rend possibles les expériences indirectes). Les modèles ou les schémas d’action sémiotique émergent de la conformité générale des membres d’une communauté à certaines conventions de langage. Si (...)
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  25. Nissim Francez & Roy Dyckhoff (2010). Proof-Theoretic Semantics for a Natural Language Fragment. Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (6):447-477.
    The paper presents a proof-theoretic semantics (PTS) for a fragment of natural language, providing an alternative to the traditional model-theoretic (Montagovian) semantics (MTS), whereby meanings are truth-condition (in arbitrary models). Instead, meanings are taken as derivability-conditions in a dedicated natural-deduction (ND) proof-system. This semantics is effective (algorithmically decidable), adhering to the meaning as use paradigm, not suffering from several of the criticisms formulated by philosophers of language against MTS as a theory of meaning. In particular, Dummett’s manifestation argument does not (...)
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  26. Manuel García-Carpintero (2012). Foundational Semantics I: Descriptive Accounts. Philosophy Compass 7 (6):397-409.
    Descriptive semantic theories purport to characterize the meanings of the expressions of languages in whatever complexity they might have. Foundational semantics purports to identify the kind of considerations relevant to establish that a given descriptive semantics accurately characterizes the language used by a given individual or community. Foundational Semantics I presents three contrasting approaches to the foundational matters, and the main considerations relevant to appraise their merits. These approaches contend that we should look at the contents of speakers’ intuitions; at (...)
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  27. Hannah Ginsborg (2012). Meaning, Understanding and Normativity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):127-146.
    I defend the normativity of meaning against recent objections by arguing for a new interpretation of the ‘ought’ relevant to meaning. Both critics and defenders of the normativity thesis have understood statements about how an expression ought to be used as either prescriptive (indicating that speakers have reason to use the expression in a certain way) or semantic (designating certain uses as correct in a sense explicable in terms of truth). I propose an alternative view of the ‘ought’ as conveying (...)
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  28. Anil Gupta (2003). Deflationism, the Problem of Representation, and Horwich's Use Theory of Meaning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):654–666.
    This paper contains a critical discussion of Paul Horwich’s use theory of meaning. Horwich attempts to dissolve the problem of representation through a combination of his theory of meaning and a deflationism about truth. I argue that the dissolution works only if deflationism makes strong and dubious claims about semantic concepts. Horwich offers a specific version of the use theory of meaning. I argue that this version rests on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles that are fundamental to an (...)
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  29. Oswald Hanfling (1973). Philosophy of Language. Open University Press.
    1. Meaning and use in Wittgenstein's Blue and Brown books.
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  30. Richard Heck (2007). Use and Meaning. In R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Open Court 531--57.
    Many philosophers have been attracted to the idea that meaning is, in some way or other, determined by use—chief among them, perhaps, Michael Dummett. But John McDowell has argued that Dummett, and anyone else who would seek to draw serious philosophical conclusions from this claim, must face a dilemma: Either the use of a sentence is characterized in terms of what it can be used to say, in which case profound philosophical consequences can hardly follow, or it will be impossible (...)
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  31. Paul Horwich (2009). Truth-Meaning-Reality. Oxford University Press.
    What is truth? -- Varieties of deflationism -- A defense of minimalism -- The value of truth -- A minimalist critique of Tarski -- Kripke's paradox of meaning -- Regularities, rules, meanings, truth conditions, and epistemic norms -- Semantics : what's truth got to do with it? -- The motive power of evaluative concepts -- Ungrounded reason -- The nature of paradox -- A world without 'isms' -- The quest for reality -- Being and truth -- Provenance of chapters.
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  32. Paul Horwich (2005). Reflections on Meaning. Oxford University Press,Clarendon Press ;.
    Paul Horwich's main aim in Reflections on Meaning is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental symbols are able to capture the world--that is, how words and sentences (in whatever medium) come to mean what they do, to stand for certain things, to be true or false of reality. His answer is a groundbreaking development of Wittgenstein's idea that the meaning of a term is nothing more than its use. While the chapters here have appeared as individual essays, (...)
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  33. Paul Horwich (1998). Meaning. Oxford University Press.
    In this new book, the author of the classic Truth presents an original theory of meaning, demonstrates its richness, and defends it against all contenders. He surveys the diversity of twentieth-century philosophical insights into meaning and shows that his theory can reconcile these with a common-sense view of meaning as derived from use. Meaning and its companion volume Truth (now published in a revised edition) together demystify two central issues in philosophy and offer a controversial but compelling view of the (...)
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  34. Pedro Diego Karczmarczyk (2012). Materialismo, Ideología y juegos de lenguaje. Ideas Y Valores 61 (150):127-143.
    La discusión sobre las consecuencias políticas del pensamiento de L. Wittgenstein ha girado sobre la posibilidad de construir miradas críticas sobre lo social, su legitimidad, amplitud, fuerza, etc. Sin embargo, aproximar a Wittgenstein a una posición materialista, como la entendía L. Althusser, conduce a una comprensión diferente de la crítica, vinculada a la tarea de deconstruir el discurso filosófico que intenta unificar y organizar jerárquicamente las evidencias (certezas) constitutivas de los diferentes juegos de lenguaje en los que se despliega lo (...)
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  35. Joel Katzav (2004). Horwich on Meaning and Use. Ratio 17 (2):159–175.
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  36. Nils Kürbis (forthcoming). Bilateralist Detours: From Intuitionist to Classical Logic and Back. Logique Et Analyse.
    There is widespread agreement that while on a Dummettian theory of meaning the justified logic is intuitionist, as its constants are governed by harmonious rules of inference, the situation is reversed on Huw Price's bilateralist account, where meanings are specified in terms of primitive speech acts assertion and denial. In bilateral logics, the rules for classical negation are in harmony. However, as it is possible to construct an intuitionist bilateral logic with harmonious rules, there is no formal argument against intuitionism (...)
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  37. Nils Kurbis (2015). What is Wrong with Classical Negation? Grazer Philosophische Studien 92:51-86.
    The focus of this paper are Dummett's meaning-theoretical arguments against classical logic based on consideration about the meaning of negation. Using Dummettian principles, I shall outline three such arguments, of increasing strength, and show that they are unsuccessful by giving responses to each argument on behalf of the classical logician. What is crucial is that in responding to these arguments a classicist need not challenge any of the basic assumptions of Dummett's outlook on the theory of meaning. In particular, I (...)
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  38. Nils Kürbis (2012). How Fundamental is the Fundamental Assumption? Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):5-19.
    The fundamental assumption of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justification of deduction is that ‘if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator’. I argue that the assumption is flawed in this general version, but should be restricted, not to apply to arguments in general, but only to proofs. I also argue that Dummett’s and Prawitz’ project of (...)
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  39. David Lauer (2012). Expressivism and the Layer Cake Picture of Discursive Practice. Philosophia 40 (1):55-73.
    Robert Brandom defends the intelligibility of the notion of a fully discursive practice that does not include any kind of logical vocabulary. Logical vocabulary, according to his account, should be understood as an optional extra to discursive practice, not as a necessary ingredient. Call this the Layer Cake Picture of the relation of logical to non-logical discursive practices. The aim pursued in this paper is to show, by way of an internal critique, that the Layer Cake Picture is in fact (...)
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  40. David Lauer (2009). Genuine Normativity, Expressive Bootstrapping, and Normative Phenomenalism. Etica and Politica / Ethics & Politics 11 (1):321-350.
    In this paper, I offer a detailed critical reading of Robert Brandom’s project to give an expressive bootstrapping account of intentionality, cashed out as a normative-phenomenalist account of what I will call genuine normativity. I claim that there is a reading of Making It Explicit that evades the predominant charges of either reductionism or circularity. However, making sense of Brandom’s book in the way proposed here involves correcting Brandom’s own general account of what he is doing in it, and thus (...)
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  41. P. L. Lecis, V. Busacchi & P. Salis (eds.) (2015). Realtà, Verità, Rappresentazione. FrancoAngeli.
    Nel dibattito teorico, la metafora della mappa è stata spesso usata per esplorare il ruolo della nozione di verità nel rapporto tra linguaggio, rappresentazioni, realtà. Le mappe sono sempre prospettiche, legate a interessi (cognitivi e non cognitivi) di chi le elabora; come ha osservato Michael Lynch, "il mondo non si mappa da sé". Per quanto diverse esse siano, assumiamo in genere che le pratiche descrittive possano aspirare a qualche forma di verità e corrispondere al modo in cui le cose stanno. (...)
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  42. Paolo Leonardi (2003). Denotación y uso. In J. J. Acero, L. Flores & A. Flórez (eds.), Viejos y nuevos pensamientos. Editorial Comares
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  43. David Lewis (1992). Meaning Without Use: Reply to Hawthorne. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):106 – 110.
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  44. Colin McGinn (1984). Wittgenstein on Meaning. Blackwell.
  45. Sally Parker Ryan (2010). Reconsidering Ordinary Language Philosophy: Malcolm’s (Moore’s) Ordinary Language Argument. Essays in Philosophy 11 (2):123-149.
    The ‘Ordinary Language’ philosophy of the early 20th century is widely thought to have failed. It is identified with the broader so-called ‘linguistic turn’, a common criticism of which is captured by Devitt and Sterelny (1999), who quip: “When the naturalistic philosopher points his finger at reality, the linguistic philosopher discusses the finger.” (p 280) The implication is that according to ‘linguistic’ philosophy, we are not to study reality or truth or morality etc, but the meaning of the words ‘reality’, (...)
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  46. Sally Parker-Ryan (2012). Ordinary Language Philosophy. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    For Ordinary Language philosophy, at issue is the use of the expressions of language, not expressions in and of themselves. So, at issue is not, for example, ordinary versus (say) technical words; nor is it a distinction based on the language used in various areas of discourse, for example academic, technical, scientific, or lay, slang or street discourses – ordinary uses of language occur in all discourses. It is sometimes the case that an expression has distinct uses within distinct discourses, (...)
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  47. Jaroslav Peregrin (2011). The Use-Theory of Meaning and the Rules of Our Language Games. In K. Turner (ed.), Making semantics pragmatic. Emerald
    While most theoreticians of meaning in the first half of the twentieth century subscribed to a representational theory (viewing meanings as entities stood for by the expressions), the second half of the century was marked by the rise of various versions of use-theories of meaning. The roots of this ‘pragmatist turn’ are detectable in the writings of the later Wittgenstein, the Oxford speech act theorists (Austin, Grice) and the American neopragmatists (Quine, Sellars). Though it is now rather popular (and sometimes (...)
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  48. Gustavo Picazo (2015). Meanings and Processes. Imprimátur (Ápeiron. Estudios de Filosofía, Supplementary Volume) 3:37-59.
    In this paper, I present a conception of meaning in natural language that I call the ‘process model’. According to this conception, meaning must be regarded as the result of a process of interaction in a community of cognitive-linguistic agents, with one another and with the environment. Drawing on this understanding, I argue that the study of meaning should no longer focus on logical analysis, but rather on an empirical perspective similar to the one in the other social sciences. I (...)
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  49. Antonio Rauti (2010). How Use Theories of Meaning Can Accommodate Shared Meanings: A Modal Account of Semantic Deference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):285-303.
    Use theories of meaning (UTMs) seem ill-equipped to accommodate the intuition that ignorant but deferential speakers use natural kind terms (e.g. 'zinc') and technical expression (e.g. 'credit default swap') with the same meanings as the experts do. After all, their use deviates from the experts', and if use determines meaning, a deviant use ordinarily would determine a deviant meaning. Yet the intuition is plausible and advocates of UTMs believe it can be accommodated. I examine Gilbert Harman's and Paul Horwich's views, (...)
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  50. Francois Recanati (1998). Meaning and Force: An Introduction. In Asa Kasher (ed.), Pragmatics: Critical Concepts. Routledge 126-143.
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