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  1. William Alston (1999). Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning. Cornell University Press.
    William P. Alston. difference in the scope of the rule reflects the fact that I-rules exist for the sake of making communication possible. Whereas their cousins are enacted and enforced for other reasons. We could distinguish I-rules just by this ...
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  2. William P. Alston (1963). Meaning and Use. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (51):107-124.
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  3. Christian Barth & Holger Sturm (eds.) (2012). Brandoms Expressive Vernunft. Historische und Systematische Untersuchungen. Mentis.
  4. Anna Bergqvist (2009). Semantic Particularism and Linguistic Competence. Logique Et Analyse 52 (208):343-361.
    In this paper I examine a contemporary debate about the general notion of linguistic rules and the place of context in determining meaning, which has arisen in the wake of a challenge that the conceptual framework of moral particularism has brought to the table. My aim is to show that particularism in the theory of meaning yields an attractive model of linguistic competence that stands as a genuine alternative to other use-oriented but still generalist accounts that allow room for context-sensitivity (...)
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  5. Corine Besson, Understanding the Logical Constants and Dispositions. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication (2010).
    Many philosophers claim that understanding a logical constant (e.g. ‘if, then’) fundamentally consists in having dispositions to infer according to the logical rules (e.g. Modus Ponens) that fix its meaning. This paper argues that such dispositionalist accounts give us the wrong picture of what understanding a logical constant consists in. The objection here is that they give an account of understanding a logical constant which is inconsistent with what seem to be adequate manifestations of such understanding. I then outline an (...)
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  6. Robert Brandom (2000). Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Harvard University Press.
    This new work provides an approachable introduction to the complex system that Making It Explicit mapped out.
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  7. Darragh Byrne (2000). Critical Notices: Horwich's Semantic Deflationism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (3):371 – 391.
  8. H. G. Callaway (2006). Review of Eve Gaudet, Quine on Meaning: The Indeterminacy of Translation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (8).
    The book contains twelve chapters, prefaced by acknowledg­ments, and followed by a short index. It derives from the author's doctoral dissertation in philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis, and thanks are offered to committee members Robert B. Barrett, Joseph Ullian and Roger Gibson. The reader who is not inclined to review the large related literature on Quine's view of cognitive meaning and translation may also be attracted to this book for concise summaries and treatment of the Quinean view from (...)
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  9. H. G. Callaway (1992). Does Language Determine Our Scientific Ideas? Dialectica 46 (3/4):225-242.
    This paper argues that the influence of language on science, philosophy and other field is mediated by communicative practices. Where communications is more restrictive, established linguistic structures exercise a tighter control over innovations and scientifically motivated reforms of language. The viewpoint here centers on the thesis that argumentation is crucial in the understanding and evaluation of proposed reforms and that social practices which limit argumentation serve to erode scientific objectivity. Thus, a plea is made for a sociology of scientific belief (...)
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  10. Cesare Cozzo (2008). On the Copernican Turn in Semantics. Theoria 74 (4):295-317.
    Alberto Coffa used the phrase "the Copernican turn in semantics" to denote a revolutionary transformation of philosophical views about the connection between the meanings of words and the acceptability of sentences and arguments containing those words. According to the new conception resulting from the Copernican turn, here called "the Copernican view", rules of use are constitutive of the meanings of words. This view has been linked with two doctrines: (A) the instances of meaning-constitutive rules are analytically and a priori true (...)
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  11. Cesare Cozzo (1994). Ruolo argomentativo immediato. Lingua E Stile:241-65.
    The author presents a theory of meaning centred upon the notion of "immediate argumental role", which distinguishes between understandability and correctness of a language. First, the theoretical and quasi-empirical criteria of adequacy and the relevant data for such a theory are described. Then the sense of a word is defined as given by a set of argumentation rules. The immediate argumental role of a sentence is determined by its syntactic structure and by the senses of the component words. The immediate (...)
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  12. Edward Craig (1982). Meaning, Use and Privacy. Mind 91 (364):541-564.
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  13. Stephen Crain & Drew Khlentzos (2010). The Logic Instinct. Mind and Language 25 (1):30-65.
    We present a series of arguments for logical nativism, focusing mainly on the meaning of disjunction in human languages. We propose that all human languages are logical in the sense that the meaning of linguistic expressions corresponding to disjunction (e.g. English or , Chinese huozhe, Japanese ka ) conform to the meaning of the logical operator in classical logic, inclusive- or . It is highly implausible, we argue, that children acquire the (logical) meaning of disjunction by observing how adults use (...)
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  14. Marian David (2007). Review of P. Horwich: From a Deflationary Point of View. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (462):427-434.
    The review of this collection is primarily concerned with essays pertaining to Horwich's deflationary approaches to truth and meaning.
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  15. Michael Devitt, Meaning: Truth-Referential or Use?
    In Coming to Our Senses (1996), I argued for a certain truth-referential theory of meaning and against various other theories, both truth-referential and not.[1] In this paper I shall consider some subsequent developments. I shall start by summarizing my theory. I will then consider some of the latest from direct-reference theorists, particularly from Scott Soames. Finally, I will consider the use theory proposed by Paul Horwich.
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  16. Michael Devitt (2002). Meaning and Use. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):106-121.
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  17. Daniel Dohrn, Following Rules of Nature, Not the Pedestrian Muse: Reply to Yamada.
    I criticize Yamada's account of rule-following. Yamada's conditions are not necessary. And he misses the deepest level of the rule-following considerations: how meaning rules come about.
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  18. Nissim Francez & Roy Dyckhoff (2010). Proof-Theoretic Semantics for a Natural Language Fragment. Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (6):447-477.
    The paper presents a proof-theoretic semantics (PTS) for a fragment of natural language, providing an alternative to the traditional model-theoretic (Montagovian) semantics (MTS), whereby meanings are truth-condition (in arbitrary models). Instead, meanings are taken as derivability-conditions in a dedicated natural-deduction (ND) proof-system. This semantics is effective (algorithmically decidable), adhering to the meaning as use paradigm, not suffering from several of the criticisms formulated by philosophers of language against MTS as a theory of meaning. In particular, Dummett’s manifestation argument does not (...)
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  19. Hannah Ginsborg (2012). Meaning, Understanding and Normativity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):127-146.
    I defend the normativity of meaning against recent objections by arguing for a new interpretation of the ‘ought’ relevant to meaning. Both critics and defenders of the normativity thesis have understood statements about how an expression ought to be used as either prescriptive (indicating that speakers have reason to use the expression in a certain way) or semantic (designating certain uses as correct in a sense explicable in terms of truth). I propose an alternative view of the ‘ought’ as conveying (...)
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  20. Anil Gupta (2003). Deflationism, the Problem of Representation, and Horwich's Use Theory of Meaning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):654–666.
    This paper contains a critical discussion of Paul Horwich’s use theory of meaning. Horwich attempts to dissolve the problem of representation through a combination of his theory of meaning and a deflationism about truth. I argue that the dissolution works only if deflationism makes strong and dubious claims about semantic concepts. Horwich offers a specific version of the use theory of meaning. I argue that this version rests on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles that are fundamental to an (...)
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  21. Oswald Hanfling (1973). Philosophy of Language. Open University Press.
    1. Meaning and use in Wittgenstein's Blue and Brown books.
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  22. Richard Heck (2007). Use and Meaning. In R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Open Court. 531--57.
    Many philosophers have been attracted to the idea that meaning is, in some way or other, determined by use—chief among them, perhaps, Michael Dummett. But John McDowell has argued that Dummett, and anyone else who would seek to draw serious philosophical conclusions from this claim, must face a dilemma: Either the use of a sentence is characterized in terms of what it can be used to say, in which case profound philosophical consequences can hardly follow, or it will be impossible (...)
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  23. Paul Horwich (2010). Truth-Meaning-Reality. Oxford University Press.
    What is truth? -- Varieties of deflationism -- A defense of minimalism -- The value of truth -- A minimalist critique of Tarski -- Kripke's paradox of meaning -- Regularities, rules, meanings, truth conditions, and epistemic norms -- Semantics : what's truth got to do with it? -- The motive power of evaluative concepts -- Ungrounded reason -- The nature of paradox -- A world without 'isms' -- The quest for reality -- Being and truth -- Provenance of chapters.
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  24. Paul Horwich (2005). Reflections on Meaning. Oxford University Press,Clarendon Press ;.
    Paul Horwich's main aim in Reflections on Meaning is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental symbols are able to capture the world--that is, how words and sentences (in whatever medium) come to mean what they do, to stand for certain things, to be true or false of reality. His answer is a groundbreaking development of Wittgenstein's idea that the meaning of a term is nothing more than its use. While the chapters here have appeared as individual essays, (...)
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  25. Paul Horwich (1998). Meaning. Oxford University Press.
    In this new book, the author of the classic Truth presents an original theory of meaning, demonstrates its richness, and defends it against all contenders. He surveys the diversity of twentieth-century philosophical insights into meaning and shows that his theory can reconcile these with a common-sense view of meaning as derived from use. Meaning and its companion volume Truth (now published in a revised edition) together demystify two central issues in philosophy and offer a controversial but compelling view of the (...)
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  26. Pedro Diego Karczmarczyk (2012). Materialismo, Ideología y juegos de lenguaje. Ideas Y Valores 61 (150):127-143.
    La discusión sobre las consecuencias políticas del pensamiento de L. Wittgenstein ha girado sobre la posibilidad de construir miradas críticas sobre lo social, su legitimidad, amplitud, fuerza, etc. Sin embargo, aproximar a Wittgenstein a una posición materialista, como la entendía L. Althusser, conduce a una comprensión diferente de la crítica, vinculada a la tarea de deconstruir el discurso filosófico que intenta unificar y organizar jerárquicamente las evidencias (certezas) constitutivas de los diferentes juegos de lenguaje en los que se despliega lo (...)
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  27. Joel Katzav (2004). Horwich on Meaning and Use. Ratio 17 (2):159–175.
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  28. Nils Kürbis (2012). How Fundamental is the Fundamental Assumption? Teorema 2 (2):5-19.
    The fundamental assumption of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justification of deduction is that ‘if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator’. I argue that the assumption is flawed in this general version, but should be restricted, not to apply to arguments in general, but only to proofs. I also argue that Dummett’s and Prawitz’ project of (...)
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  29. David Lauer (2012). Expressivism and the Layer Cake Picture of Discursive Practice. Philosophia 40 (1):55-73.
    Robert Brandom defends the intelligibility of the notion of a fully discursive practice that does not include any kind of logical vocabulary. Logical vocabulary, according to his account, should be understood as an optional extra to discursive practice, not as a necessary ingredient. Call this the Layer Cake Picture of the relation of logical to non-logical discursive practices. The aim pursued in this paper is to show, by way of an internal critique, that the Layer Cake Picture is in fact (...)
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  30. David Lauer (2009). Genuine Normativity, Expressive Bootstrapping, and Normative Phenomenalism. Etica and Politica / Ethics & Politics 11 (1):321-350.
    In this paper, I offer a detailed critical reading of Robert Brandom’s project to give an expressive bootstrapping account of intentionality, cashed out as a normative-phenomenalist account of what I will call genuine normativity. I claim that there is a reading of Making It Explicit that evades the predominant charges of either reductionism or circularity. However, making sense of Brandom’s book in the way proposed here involves correcting Brandom’s own general account of what he is doing in it, and thus (...)
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  31. Paolo Leonardi (2003). Denotación y uso. In J. J. Acero, L. Flores & A. Flórez (eds.), Viejos y nuevos pensamientos. Editorial Comares.
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  32. David Lewis (1992). Meaning Without Use: Reply to Hawthorne. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):106 – 110.
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  33. Colin McGinn (1984/1989). Wittgenstein on Meaning. Blackwell.
  34. Sally Parker Ryan (2010). Reconsidering Ordinary Language Philosophy: Malcolm’s (Moore’s) Ordinary Language Argument. Essays in Philosophy 11 (2):123-149.
    The ‘Ordinary Language’ philosophy of the early 20th century is widely thought to have failed. It is identified with the broader so-called ‘linguistic turn’, a common criticism of which is captured by Devitt and Sterelny (1999), who quip: “When the naturalistic philosopher points his finger at reality, the linguistic philosopher discusses the finger.” (p 280) The implication is that according to ‘linguistic’ philosophy, we are not to study reality or truth or morality etc, but the meaning of the words ‘reality’, (...)
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  35. Sally Parker-Ryan, Ordinary Language Philosophy. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    For Ordinary Language philosophy, at issue is the use of the expressions of language, not expressions in and of themselves. So, at issue is not, for example, ordinary versus (say) technical words; nor is it a distinction based on the language used in various areas of discourse, for example academic, technical, scientific, or lay, slang or street discourses – ordinary uses of language occur in all discourses. It is sometimes the case that an expression has distinct uses within distinct discourses, (...)
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  36. Jaroslav Peregrin (2011). The Use-Theory of Meaning and the Rules of Our Language Games. In K. Turner (ed.), Making semantics pragmatic. Emerald.
    While most theoreticians of meaning in the first half of the twentieth century subscribed to a representational theory (viewing meanings as entities stood for by the expressions), the second half of the century was marked by the rise of various versions of use-theories of meaning. The roots of this ‘pragmatist turn’ are detectable in the writings of the later Wittgenstein, the Oxford speech act theorists (Austin, Grice) and the American neopragmatists (Quine, Sellars). Though it is now rather popular (and sometimes (...)
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  37. Antonio Rauti (2010). How Use Theories of Meaning Can Accommodate Shared Meanings: A Modal Account of Semantic Deference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):285-303.
    Use theories of meaning (UTMs) seem ill-equipped to accommodate the intuition that ignorant but deferential speakers use natural kind terms (e.g. 'zinc') and technical expression (e.g. 'credit default swap') with the same meanings as the experts do. After all, their use deviates from the experts', and if use determines meaning, a deviant use ordinarily would determine a deviant meaning. Yet the intuition is plausible and advocates of UTMs believe it can be accommodated. I examine Gilbert Harman's and Paul Horwich's views, (...)
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  38. Rush Rhees (1998). Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse. Cambridge University Press.
    Four years after the publication of Wittgenstein's Investigations, Rush Rhees began writing critical reflections on the masterpiece he had helped to edit. In this edited collection of his previously unpublished writings, Rhees argues, contra Wittgenstein, that although language lacks the unity of a calculus it is not simply a family of language games. The unity of language is found in its dialogical character. It is in this context that we say something, and grow in understanding: notions not captured in Wittgenstein's (...)
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  39. Angus Ross (1989). Why Content Must Be a Matter of Truth Conditions. Philosophical Quarterly 39 (156):257-275.
    It is argued that if, with Dummett, we see assertion as an act governed by conditions of correctness which makes a claim to the effect that these conditions are met, then the conditions of correctness that determine its content must have the impersonal character of a requirement of truth, rather than the speaker-relative character of a requirement of justification or assertibility. For otherwise it would be impossible for different speakers to use the same words to make an assertion with the (...)
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  40. Sergeiy Sandler, The Possibility of Dialogic Semantics.
    This paper outlines and demonstrates the viability of a consistent dialogic approach to the semantics of utterances in natural language. Based on the philosophical picture of language as dialogue, adumbrated by Mikhail Bakhtin and incorporating work in conversation analysis and cognitive-functional linguistics, I develop a method for analyzing both the function and the content of human utterances within a unified philosophical framework. I demonstrate the viability of this method of analysis by applying it to a brief conversational exchange (in Hebrew), (...)
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  41. Sergeiy Sandler (2011). Reenactment: An Embodied Cognition Approach to Meaning and Linguistic Content. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):583-598.
    A central finding in experimental research identified with Embodied Cognition (EC) is that understanding actions involves their embodied simulation, i.e. executing some processes involved in performing these actions. Extending these findings, I argue that reenactment – the overt embodied simulation of actions and practices, including especially communicative actions and practices, within utterances – makes it possible to forge an integrated EC-based account of linguistic meaning. In particular, I argue: (a) that remote entities can be referred to by reenacting actions performed (...)
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  42. Sarah Sawyer (ed.) (2009). New Waves in the Philosophy of Language. Palgrave.
  43. Stephen Schiffer (2000). Horwich on Meaning. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):527–536.
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  44. Whit Schonbein (2010). Can Computational Simulations of Language Emergence Support a 'Use' Theory of Meaning? Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):59-74.
    Some researchers claim that simulations of the emergence of communication in populations of autonomous agents provide empirical support for 'use' theories of meaning. I argue that this claim faces at least two major challenges. First, the empirical adequacy of such simulations must be justified, or the inference from simulation results to real-world linguistic behavior must be dropped; and second, the proffered simulations are in fact compatible with all of the competing theories of meaning surveyed, suggesting that theories of meaning are (...)
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  45. David Simpson (2006). Renewing Meaning: A Speech-Act Theoretic Account by Stephen J. Barker. Philosophical Books 47 (3):275-277.
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  46. Jeff Speaks (2009). Introduction, Transmission, and the Foundations of Meaning. In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language. Palgrave Macmillan.
    The most widely accepted and well worked out approaches to the foundations of meaning take facts about the meanings of linguistic expressions at a time to be derivative from the propositional attitudes of speakers of the language at that time. This mentalist strategy takes two principal forms, one which traces meaning to belief, and one which analyzes it in terms of communicative intentions. I argue that either form of mentalism fails, and conclude by suggesting that we can do better by (...)
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  47. Marc Staudacher (2010). Use Theories of Meaning. Dissertation, University of Amsterdam
    This dissertation is a contribution to the philosophy of language. Its central question is: In virtue of which facts do linguistic expressions mean what they do? E.g. why does “apple” mean apple in English? The question receives a systematic answer; in short: Linguistic expressions mean what they do because among their users, there are linguistic conventions and social norms to use and understand them in certain ways. The answer is clarified and defended as a central thesis. For in this form, (...)
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  48. Eric Swanson (2009). Review of Reflections on Meaning, by Paul Horwich. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 118 (1):131-134.
    Reflections on Meaning refines Paul Horwich’s use theory of meaning. Horwich holds that the meaning of a word is constituted by the nonsemantic property that best explains a certain law. For a given word, the law to be explained governs that word’s use by specifying the “acceptance conditions” of a privileged class of sentences containing the word (26). Horwich devotes considerable energy to details in Reflections on Meaning and focuses on especially pressing problems for his use theory of meaning. As (...)
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  49. Eike von Savigny (2006). Use, Meaning, and Theoretical Commitment. Grazer Philosophische Studien 71 (1):175-204.
    This paper is on theoretical commitments involved in connecting use and meaning. Wittgenstein maintained, in his Philosophical Investigations, that meaning more or less 'is' use; and he more or less proclaimed that in philosophy, we must 'not advance any kind of theory' (PI § 109). He presented a connection between use and meaning by describing a sequence of language-games where richness of vocabularies and complexity of embedding behaviour grow simultaneously. This presentation is very impressive in the sequence of PI §§ (...)
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  50. Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). Languages, Language-Games, and Forms of Life. In H.-J. Glock & J. Hyman (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein. Wiley-Blackwell.
    In this paper, after outlining the methodological role Wittgenstein's appeal to language-games is supposed to play, I examine the picture of language which his discussion of such games and their relations to what Wittgenstein calls forms of life suggests. It is a picture according to which language and its employment are inextricably connected to wider contexts—they are embedded in specific natural and social environments, they are tied to purposive activities serving provincial needs, and caught up in distinctive ways of life (...)
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