This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
71 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 71
  1. Joanna Odrowa˛Z. -Sypniewska (2001). Quantum Indiscernibility Without Vague Identity. Analysis 61 (269):65–69.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Ken Akiba (2002). Review of Terrence Parsons, Indeterminacy Identity. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 52 (1):262--5.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Ken Akiba (2000). Identity Is Simple. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (4):389 - 404.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Ken Akiba (2000). Indefiniteness of Mathematical Objects. Philosophia Mathematica 8 (1):26--46.
    The view that mathematical objects are indefinite in nature is presented and defended, hi the first section, Field's argument for fictionalism, given in response to Benacerraf's problem of identification, is closely examined, and it is contended that platonists can solve the problem equally well if they take the view that mathematical objects are indefinite. In the second section, two general arguments against the intelligibility of objectual indefiniteness are shown erroneous, hi the final section, the view is compared to mathematical structuralism, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Elizabeth Barnes (2009). Indeterminacy, Identity and Counterparts: Evans Reconsidered. Synthese 168 (1):81 - 96.
    In this paper I argue that Gareth Evans’ famous proof of the impossibility of de re indeterminate identity fails on a counterpart-theoretic interpretation of the determinacy operators. I attempt to motivate a counterpart-theoretic reading of the determinacy operators and then show that, understood counterpart-theoretically, Evans’ argument is straightforwardly invalid.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Elizabeth Barnes & J. R. G. Williams (2009). Vague Parts and Vague Identity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):176-187.
    We discuss arguments against the thesis that the world itself can be vague. The first section of the paper distinguishes dialectically effective from ineffective arguments against metaphysical vagueness. The second section constructs an argument against metaphysical vagueness that promises to be of the dialectically effective sort: an argument against objects with vague parts. Firstly, cases of vague parthood commit one to cases of vague identity. But we argue that Evans' famous argument against will not on its own enable one to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. John Broome (1997). Is Incommensurability Vagueness? In Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. John Broome (1984). Indefiniteness in Identity. Analysis 44 (1):6 - 12.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. J. A. Burgess (1989). Vague Identity: Evans Misrepresented. Analysis 49 (3):112 - 119.
    In 'Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood' David Lewis defends Gareth Evans against a widespread misunderstanding of an argument that appeared in his article 'Can There be Vague Objects?'. Lewis takes himself to be 'defending Evans' and not just correcting a mistake; witness his remark that, 'As misunderstood, Evans is a pitiful figure: a "technical philosopher" out of control of his technicalities, taken in by a fallacious proof of an absurd conclusion'. Let me say at the outset that I take Lewis to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Hugh Chandler (1985). Indeterminate People. Analysis 45 (3):141-145.
    Here is the paper that was attacked by George Rea in his “How many minds…?” paper. Has this issue been resolved? Can there be entities such that there is no definite answer to the question “Are there 13 minds at work here, or 14?” -/- .
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Monte Cook (1986). Indeterminacy of Identity. Analysis 46 (4):179 - 186.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. B. Jack Copeland (2000). Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity, and Property Identity, Aristotelian-Style. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):11-25.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. B. Jack Copeland (1997). Vague Identity and Fuzzy Logic. Journal of Philosophy 94 (10):514-534.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Jack Copeland (2002). Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity and Property Identity. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):11--23.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. David Cowles (1994). On Van Inwagen's Defense of Vague Identity. Philosophical Perspectives 8:137-158.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Matti Eklund (2004). Personal Identity, Concerns, and Indeterminacy. The Monist 87 (4):489-511.
    Let the moral question of personal identity be the following: what is the nature of the entities we should focus our prudential concerns and ascriptions of responsibility around? (If indeed we should structure these things around any entities at all.) Let the semantic question of personal identity be the question of what is the nature of the entities that ‘person’ is true of. A naive (in the sense of simple and intuitive) view would have it that the two questions are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Crawford Elder (2004). Real Natures and Familiar Objects. Mit Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Crawford L. Elder (2000). Familiar Objects and the Sorites of Decomposition. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):79 - 89.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Gareth Evans (1985). Collected Papers. Oxford University Press.
  20. Gareth Evans (1978). Can There Be Vague Objects? Analysis 38 (4):208.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Steven French & Décio Krause (2003). Quantum Vagueness. Erkenntnis 59 (1):97 - 124.
    It has been suggested that quantum particles are genuinelyvague objects (Lowe 1994a). The present work explores thissuggestion in terms of the various metaphysical packages that areavailable for describing such particles. The formal frameworksunderpinning such packages are outlined and issues of identityand reference are considered from this overall perspective. Indoing so we hope to illuminate the diverse ways in whichvagueness can arise in the quantum context.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. B. J. Garrett (1988). Vagueness and Identity. Analysis 48 (3):130 - 134.
    The thesis that there can be vague objects is the thesis that there can be identity statements which are indeterminate in truth-value (i.e., neither true nor false) as a result of vagueness (as opposed, e.g., to reference-failure), "the singular terms of which do not have their references fixed by vague descriptive means". (if this is "not" what is meant by the thesis that there can be vague objects, it is not clear what "is" meant by it.) the possibility of vague (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Brian Garrett (1991). Vague Identity and Vague Objects. Noûs 25 (3):341-351.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2011). Can Persistence Be a Matter of Convention? Axiomathes 21 (4):507-529.
    This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-cum-semantic (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Richard Heck, Is Indeterminate Identity Incoherent?
    In "Counting and Indeterminate Identity", N. Ángel Pinillos develops an argument that there can be no cases of `Split Indeterminate Identity'. Such a case would be one in which it was indeterminate whether a=b and indeterminate whether a=c, but determinately true that b≠c. The interest of the argument lies, in part, in the fact that it appears to appeal to none of the controversial claims to which similar arguments due to Gareth Evans and Nathan Salmon appeal. I argue for two (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Richard Heck (1998). That There Might Be Vague Objects (So Far as Concerns Logic). The Monist 81 (1):277-99.
    Gareth Evans has argued that the existence of vague objects is logically precluded: The assumption that it is indeterminate whether some object a is identical to some object b leads to contradiction. I argue in reply that, although this is true—I thus defend Evans's argument, as he presents it—the existence of vague objects is not thereby precluded. An 'Indefinitist' need only hold that it is not logically required that every identity statement must have a determinate truth-value, not that some such (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Bruce Johnsen (1989). Is Vague Identity Incoherent? Analysis 49 (3):103 - 112.
    Two purported proofs of the incoherence of vague identity are considered. First gareth evans's attempt is criticized and reformulated to overcome certain formal difficulties. Despite the reformulation, However, Evans's proof is demonstrated invalid in accord with a supervaluational approach. Next nathan salmon's attempt is evaluated. Here the problem is salmon's implicit assumption of a version of leibniz's law which is stronger than that strictly guaranteed by the law as it is given in classical logic. The question is raised on what (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Rosanna Keefe (1995). Contingent Identity and Vague Identity. Analysis 55 (3):183 - 190.
    Evan's influential argument against vague objects (_Analysis, 1978) has a parallel directed against contingent identity. I argue that Noonan failed in his attempt to accept Evans's argument but save contingent identity by establishing a disanalogy between the two arguments (in The Philosophical Quarterly 1991). Instead, I suggest an alternative way to block the argument against contingent identity and argue that its analogue provides a satisfactory response to Evans's original argument.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Daniel Z. Korman (2011). Ordinary Objects. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An encyclopedia entry which covers various revisionary conceptions of which macroscopic objects there are, and the puzzles and arguments that motivate these conceptions: sorites arguments, the argument from vagueness, the puzzles of material constitution, arguments against indeterminate identity, arguments from arbitrariness, debunking arguments, the overdetermination argument, and the problem of the many.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. D. Lewis (1993). Many but Almost One. In K. Campbell, J. Bacon & L. Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. David Lewis (1993). Many, but Almost One. In Keith Cambell, John Bacon & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality, and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press. 23-38.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. David Lewis (1988). Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood. Analysis 48 (3):128-130.
    In his note "can there be vague objects?" ("analysis", 1978), Gareth evans presents a purported proof that there can be no vague identity statements. Some readers think that evans endorses the proof and its false conclusion. Not so. His point is that those who put vagueness in the world, Rather than in language, Will have no way to fault the proof and no way to escape the false conclusion.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. E. J. Lowe (2005). Identity, Vagueness, and Modality. In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Clarendon Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. E. J. Lowe (2001). Ontic Indeterminacy of Identity Unscathed. Analysis 61 (271):241–245.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. E. J. Lowe (1999). Vague Identity and Quantum Indeterminacy: Further Reflections. Analysis 59 (264):328–330.
  36. E. J. Lowe (1997). Objects and Criteria of Identity. In R. Hole & C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Basil Blackwell.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. E. J. Lowe (1997). Reply to Noonan on Vague Identity. Analysis 57 (1):88–91.
    Harold Noonan concedes the force of an objection I raise against Gareth Evans's argument that there cannot be ontically indeterminate identity statements, but tries to establish the same conclusion by another line of reasoning which does not appeal to identity-involving properties. However, it can be seen that Noonan's new argument is no more satisfactory than Evans's, once due account is taken of the tensed character of properties of the kind to which Noonan appeals.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. E. J. Lowe (1995). The Problem of the Many and the Vagueness of Constitution. Analysis 55 (3):179 - 182.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. E. J. Lowe (1994). Vague Identity and Quantum Indeterminacy. Analysis 54 (2):110 - 114.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Ofra Magidor (2011). Arguments by Leibniz’s Law in Metaphysics. Philosophy Compass 6 (3):180-195.
    Leibniz’s Law (or as it sometimes called, ‘the Indiscerniblity of Identicals’) is a widely accepted principle governing the notion of numerical identity. The principle states that if a is identical to b, then any property had by a is also had by b. Leibniz’s Law may seem like a trivial principle, but its apparent consequences are far from trivial. The law has been utilised in a wide range of arguments in metaphysics, many leading to substantive and controversial conclusions. This article (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Kristie Miller (2006). Vagueness, Persistence and Indeterminate Identity. Erkenntnis 64 (2):223 - 230.
    I argue that for those who follow Evans in finding indeterminacy of de re identity statements problematic, ontic vagueness within a three-dimensionalist metaphysics will raise some problems that are not faced by the four-dimensionalist. For the types of strategies used to avoid de re indeterminacy within the context of ontic vagueness at-at-time, that is, spatial vagueness, are problematic within a three-dimensionalist framework when put to use within the context of ontic vagueness across-time, that is temporal vagueness.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. H. W. Noonan (1984). Indefinite Identity: A Reply to Broome. Analysis 44 (3):117 - 121.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Harold W. Noonan (1995). E. J. Lowe on Vague Identity and Quantum Indeterminacy. Analysis 55 (1):14 - 19.
    The paper defends Gareth Evan's argument against vague identity "de re" from a criticism that quantum mechanics provides actual counter-examples to its validity. A more general version of Evans's argument is stated in which identity involving properties are not essential and it is claimed that the scientific facts as so far known are consistent with the Evansian thesis that indeterminacy in truth-value must always be due to semantic indecision.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Harold W. Noonan (1991). Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity and Abelardian Predicates. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163):183-193.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Harold W. Noonan (1990). Vague Identity Yet Again. Analysis 50 (3):157 - 162.
    The paper defends Gareth Evans's argument against vague identity. It appeals to a principle I name the principle of the diversity of the definitely dissimilar to defend the thesis that vague identity statements owe their indeterminacy to vagueness in language.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Harold W. Noonan (1980). Objects and Identity: An Examination of the Relative Identity Thesis and its Consequences. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada [by] Kluwer Boston.
    ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE IDENTITY On the classical, or Fregean, view of identity it is an equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law (so<alled), ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Joanna Odrowaz-Sypniewska (2001). Quantum Indiscernibility Without Vague Identity. Analysis 61 (269):65--69.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. D. E. Over (1989). Vague Objects and Identity. Analysis 49 (3):97 - 99.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Derek Parfit (1971). Personal Identity. Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
  50. Derek A. Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 71