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  1. Ken Akiba (2004). Vagueness in the World. Noûs 38 (3):407–429.
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  2. Torin Alter (2001). Vague Names and Vague Objects. Dialogue 40 (03):435-.
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  3. Elizabeth Barnes, Conceptual Room for Ontic Vagueness.
    This thesis is a systematic investigation of whether there might be conceptual room for the idea that the world itself might be vague, independently of how we describe it. This idea – the existence of so-called ontic vagueness – has generally been extremely unpopular in the literature; my thesis thus seeks to evaluate whether this ‘negative press’ is justified. I start by giving a working definition and semantics for ontic vagueness, and then attempt to show that there are no conclusive (...)
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  4. Elizabeth Barnes (2005). Vagueness in Sparseness: A Study in Property Ontology. Analysis 65 (288):315–321.
    In recent literature on vagueness, writers have noted that more ‘plentiful’ theories of properties – those that postulate genuine properties corresponding to the classically vague predicates like ‘bald’ and ‘heap’ – appear straightforwardly committed to ontic vagueness. In this paper, however, I will argue that worries of ontic vagueness are not specific to ‘plentiful’ accounts of properties. The classically ‘sparse’ theories of properties – Universals and tropes – will, I contend, be subject to similar difficulties.
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  5. Jiri Benovsky (2014). Vague Objects with Sharp Boundaries. Ratio 27 (1).
    In this article I shall consider two seemingly contradictory claims: first, the claim that everybody who thinks that there are ordinary objects has to accept that they are vague, and second, the claim that everybody has to accept the existence of sharp boundaries to ordinary objects. The purpose of this article is of course not to defend a contradiction. Indeed, there is no contradiction because the two claims do not concern the same ‘everybody’. The first claim, that all ordinary objects (...)
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  6. Jiri Benovsky (2008). There Are Vague Objects (in Any Sense in Which There Are Ordinary Objects). Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (3):1-4.
    Ordinary objects are vague, because either (i) composition is restricted, or (ii) there really are no such objects (but we still want to talk about them), or (iii) because such objects are not metaphysically (independently of us) distinguishable from other 'extra-ordinary' objects. In any sense in which there are ordinary objects, they are vague.
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  7. J. A. Burgess (1990). Vague Objects and Indefinite Identity. Philosophical Studies 59 (3):263 - 287.
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  8. Ross Cameron, Vagueness: It's Only Natural.
    I attempt to accommodate the phenomenon of vagueness with classical logic and bivalence. I hold that for any vague predicate there is a sharp cut-off between the things that satisfy it and the things that don’t; I claim that this is due to the greater naturalness of one of the candidate meanings of that predicate. I extend the view to give an account of arbitrary reference and a solution to Benacerraf problems. I end by exploring the idea that it is (...)
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  9. Chad Carmichael (2011). Vague Composition Without Vague Existence. Noûs 45 (2):315-327.
    David Lewis (1986) criticizes moderate views of composition on the grounds that a restriction on composition must be vague, and vague composition leads, via a precisificational theory of vagueness, to an absurd vagueness of existence. I show how to resist this argument. Unlike the usual resistance, however, I do not jettison precisificational views of vagueness. Instead, I blur the connection between composition and existence that Lewis assumes. On the resulting view, in troublesome cases of vague composition, there is an object, (...)
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  10. Hugh Chandler (1985). Indeterminate People. Analysis 45 (3):141-145.
    Here is the paper that was attacked by George Rea in his “How many minds…?” paper. Has this issue been resolved? Can there be entities such that there is no definite answer to the question “Are there 13 minds at work here, or 14?” -/- .
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  11. Mark Colyvan (2001). Russell on Metaphysical Vagueness. Principia 5 (1-2):87-98.
    Recently a fascinating debate has been rekindled over whether vagueness is metaphysical or linguistic. That is, is vagueness an objective feature of reality or is it merely an artifact of our language? Bertrand Russell's contribution to this debate is considered by many to be decisive. Russell suggested that it is a mistake to conclude that the world is vague simply because the language we use to describe it is vague. He argued that to draw such an inference is to commit (...)
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  12. B. Jack Copeland (1995). On Vague Objects, Fuzzy Logic and Fractal Boundaries. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):83-96.
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  13. David W. Cowles & Michael J. White (1991). Vague Objects for Those Who Want Them. Philosophical Studies 63 (2):203 - 216.
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  14. George Darby (2010). Quantum Mechanics and Metaphysical Indeterminacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):227-245.
    There has been recent interest in formulating theories of non-representational indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to clarify the relevance of quantum mechanics to this project. Quantum-mechanical examples of vague objects have been offered by various authors, displaying indeterminate identity, in the face of the famous Evans argument that such an idea is incoherent. It has also been suggested that the quantum-mechanical treatment of state-dependent properties exhibits metaphysical indeterminacy. In both cases it is important to consider the details of (...)
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  15. Maureen Donnelly (2009). Mereological Vagueness and Existential Vagueness. Synthese 168 (1):53 - 79.
    It is often assumed that indeterminacy in mereological relations—in particular, indeterminacy in which collections of objects have fusions—leads immediately to indeterminacy in what objects there are in the world. This assumption is generally taken as a reason for rejecting mereological vagueness. The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between mereological vagueness and existential vagueness. I hope to show that the connection between the two forms of vagueness is not nearly so clear-cut as has been supposed.
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  16. Dorothy Edgington (2000). Indeterminacy de Re. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):27--44.
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  17. Matti Eklund (2008). Deconstructing Ontological Vagueness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):117-140.
    I will here present a number of problems concerning the idea that there is ontological vagueness, and the related claim that appeal to this idea can help solve some vagueness-related problems. A theme underlying the discussion will be the distinction between vagueness specifically and indeterminacy more generally (and, relatedly, the distinction between ontological vagueness and ontological indeterminacy). Even if the world is somehow ontologically indeterminate it by no means follows that it is, properly speaking, ontologically vague.1..
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  18. Crawford L. Elder (2000). Familiar Objects and the Sorites of Decomposition. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):79 - 89.
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  19. Gareth Evans (1978). Can There Be Vague Objects? Analysis 38 (4):208.
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  20. Anthony Everett (1996). Qualia and Vagueness. Synthese 106 (2):205-226.
    In this paper I present two arguments against the thesis that we experience qualia. I argue that if we experienced qualia then these qualia would have to be essentially vague entities. And I then offer two arguments, one a reworking of Gareth Evans' argument against the possibility of vague objects, the other a reworking of the Sorites argument, to show that no such essentially vague entities can exist. I consider various objections but argue that ultimately they all fail. In particular (...)
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  21. Brian Garrett (1991). Vague Identity and Vague Objects. Noûs 25 (3):341-351.
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  22. Christopher S. Gifford (2013). Against the Modal Argument. Erkenntnis 78 (3):627-646.
    The relationship between alethic modality and indeterminacy is yet to be clarified. A modal argument—an argument that appeals to alethic modality—against vague objects given by Joseph Moore offers a potential clarification of the relationship; it is proposed that there are cases for which the following holds: if it is indeterminate whether A = B then it is possible that it is determinate that A = B. However, the argument faces three problems. The problems remove the argument’s threat against vague objects (...)
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  23. Katherine Hawley (2004). Borderline Simple or Extremely Simple. The Monist 87 (3):385-404.
    In his Material Beings, Peter van Inwagen distinguishes two questions about parthood. What are the conditions necessary and sufficient for some things jointly to compose a whole? What are the conditions necessary and sufficient for a thing to have proper parts? The first of these, the Special Composition Question (SCQ), has been widely discussed, and David Lewis has argued that an important constraint on any answer to the SCQ is that it should not permit borderline cases of composition. This is (...)
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  24. Katherine Hawley (2002). Vagueness and Existence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):125-140.
    Vague existence can seem like the worst kind of vagueness in the world, or seem to be an entirely unintelligible notion. This bad reputation is based upon the rumour that if there is vague existence then there are non-existent objects. But the rumour is false: the modest brand of vague existence entailed by certain metaphysical theories of composition does not deserve its bad reputation.
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  25. Richard Heck (1998). That There Might Be Vague Objects (So Far as Concerns Logic). The Monist 81 (1):277-99.
    Gareth Evans has argued that the existence of vague objects is logically precluded: The assumption that it is indeterminate whether some object a is identical to some object b leads to contradiction. I argue in reply that, although this is true—I thus defend Evans's argument, as he presents it—the existence of vague objects is not thereby precluded. An 'Indefinitist' need only hold that it is not logically required that every identity statement must have a determinate truth-value, not that some such (...)
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  26. Mark Heller (1996). Against Metaphysical Vagueness. Philosophical Perspectives 10:177--85.
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  27. Mark Heller (1990). The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter. Cambridge University Press.
    This provocative new book attempts to resolve traditional problems of identity over time. It seeks to answer such questions as "How is it that an object can survive change?" and "How much change can an object undergo without being destroyed?" To answer these questions Professor Heller presents a completely new theory about the nature of physical objects and about the relationship between our language and the physical world. According to his theory, the only actually existing physical entities are what the (...)
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  28. Mark Heller (1988). Vagueness and the Standard Ontology. Noûs 22 (1):109-131.
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  29. David Hershenov (2001). The Thesis of Vague Objects and Unger's Problem of the Many. Philosophical Papers 30 (1):57-67.
    Although the predominant view is that vagueness is due to our language being imprecise, the alternative idea that objects themselves do not have determinate borders has received an occasional hearing. But what has failed to be appreciated is how this idea can avoid a puzzle Peter Unger named “The Problem of the Many.”[i].
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  30. Dominic Hyde, How to Count Clouds.
    Can identity be vague? More exactly, can there be objects x and y such that it is vague whether x = y, and the vagueness is due to the objects themselves as opposed to vagueness in language used to denote the objects? The question has been extensively discussed since Evans (1978) where it was claimed that an affirmative answer was a necessary condition for the thesis that there could be vague objects. A recent, ingenious argument in Pinillos (2003) seeks to (...)
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  31. Olli Koistinen & Arto Repo (2002). Vague Objects and Phenomenal Wholes. Acta Analytica 17 (1):83-99.
    We consider the so-called problem of the many, formulated by Peter Unger. It arises because ordinary material things do not have precise boundaries: it is always possible to find borderline parts of which it is not true to say either that they are parts or that they are not. Unger’s conclusion is that there are no ordinary things at all. We describe the solutions of Peter van Inwagen and David Lewis, and make some critical comments upon them. After that we (...)
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  32. Daniel Z. Korman (2010). The Argument From Vagueness. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):891-901.
    A presentation of the Lewis-Sider argument from vagueness for unrestricted composition and possible responses.
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  33. Kathrin Koslicki (2003). The Crooked Path From Vagueness to Four-Dimensionalism. Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):107 - 134.
  34. David S. Levin (1985). Abortion, Personhood, and Vagueness. Journal of Value Inquiry 19 (3):197-209.
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  35. Dan López de Sa (2006). Is 'Everything' Precise? Dialectica 60 (4):397–409.
    There are certain metaphysically interesting arguments ‘from vagueness’, for unrestricted mereological composition and for four-dimensionalism, which involve a claim to the effect that idioms for unrestricted quantification are precise. An elaboration of Lewis’ argument for this claim, which assumes the view of vagueness as semantic indecision, is presented. It is argued that the argument also works according to other views on the nature of vagueness, which also require for an expression to be vague that there are different admissible alternatives of (...)
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  36. E. J. Lowe (2005). Identity, Vagueness, and Modality. In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Clarendon Press.
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  37. E. J. Lowe (1997). Objects and Criteria of Identity. In R. Hole & C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Basil Blackwell.
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  38. E. J. Lowe (1995). The Problem of the Many and the Vagueness of Constitution. Analysis 55 (3):179 - 182.
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  39. Ned Markosian (2000). Sorensen's Argument Against Vague Objects. Philosophical Studies 97 (1):1-9.
    In his fascinating and provocative paper, "Sharp Boundaries for Blobs," Roy Sorensen gives several arguments against the possibility of "vague objects," or objects with indeterminate boundaries.1 In what follows, I will examine the main argument given by Sorensen in his paper. This argument has a great deal of initial plausibility. Moreover, I happen to sympathize with its conclusion. Nevertheless, it seems to me that Sorensen's argument fails to establish that conclusion. The purpose of this paper is to show why. I (...)
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  40. Ned Markosian (1998). Brutal Composition. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):211-249.
    According to standard, pre-philosophical intuitions, there are many composite objects in the physical universe. There is, for example, my bicycle, which is composed of various parts - wheels, handlebars, molecules, atoms, etc. Recently, a growing body of philosophical literature has concerned itself with questions about the nature of composition.1 The main question that has been raised about composition is, roughly, this: Under what circumstances do some things compose, or add up to, or form, a single object? It turns out that (...)
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  41. Neil McKinnon (2003). Vague Simples. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):394–397.
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  42. Joseph G. Moore (2008). A Modal Argument Against Vague Objects. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (12):1-17.
    There has been much discussion of whether there could be objects A and B that are “individuatively vague” in the following way: object A and object B neither determinately stand in the relation of identity to one another, nor do they determinately fail to stand in this relation. If there are objects of this type, then we would have a genuine case of metaphysical vagueness, or “vagueness-in-the-world.” The possibility of vague objects in this sense strikes many as incoherent. The possibility’s (...)
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  43. Michael Morreau (2002). What Vague Objects Are Like. Journal of Philosophy 99 (7):333-361.
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  44. Harold W. Noonan (2004). Are There Vague Objects? Analysis 64 (282):131–134.
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  45. Harold W. Noonan (1982). Vague Objects. Analysis 42 (1):3-6.
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  46. Harold W. Noonan (1980). Objects and Identity: An Examination of the Relative Identity Thesis and its Consequences. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada [by] Kluwer Boston.
    ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE IDENTITY On the classical, or Fregean, view of identity it is an equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law (so<alled), ...
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  47. Joanna Odrowaz-Sypniewska (2001). Quantum Indiscernibility Without Vague Identity. Analysis 61 (269):65--69.
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  48. D. E. Over (1989). Vague Objects and Identity. Analysis 49 (3):97 - 99.
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  49. Elisa Paganini (2011). Vague Objects Without Ontically Indeterminate Identity. Erkenntnis 74 (3):351-362.
    The supporter of vague objects has been long challenged by the following ‘Argument from Identity’: 1) if there are vague objects, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3) there are no vague objects. Some supporters of vague objects have argued that 1) is false. Noonan (Analysis 68: 174–176, 2008) grants that 1) does not hold in general, but claims that ontically indeterminate identity is indeed implied by the assumption that there are vague (...)
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  50. Peter Pagin, Vagueness and Domain Restriction.
    This paper develops an idea of saving ordinary uses of vague predicates from the Sorites by means of domain restriction. A tolerance level for a predicate, along a dimension, is a difference with respect to which the predicate is semantically insensitive. A central gap for the predicate+dimension in a domain is a segment of an associated scale, larger than this difference, where no object in the domain has a measure, and such that the extension of the predicate has measures on (...)
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