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  1. E. M. Adams (1966). A Defense of Value Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):163-175.
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  2. Carla Bagnoli (2007). Deliberare, Comparare, Misurare. Ragion Pratica 26:65-80.
    © Carla Bagnoli DELIBERARE, COMPARARE, MISURARE É opinione ampiamente condivisa che l’incommensurabilità e la commensurabilità sono ipotesi sulla natura del valore che pongono delle condizioni pesanti sulla deliberazione e sulla nostra capacità di compiere scelte ragionate. Pragmatisti e pluralisti si sono adoperati ad argomentare che la commensurabilità non è un requisito necessario alla scelta razionale. In questo articolo sosterrò che vi è un argomento ancora più radicale di quello pluralista e pragmatista secondo il quale la commensurabilità, così come l’incommensurabilità, non (...)
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  3. Ernesto V. Garcia (2004). Value Realism and the Internalism/Externalism Debate. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):231-258.
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  4. Irwin Goldstein (2000). Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States. Philosophy 75 (291):89-104.
    By what types of properties do we specify twinges, toothaches, and other kinds of mental states? Wittgenstein considers two methods. Procedure one, direct, private acquaintance: A person connects a word to the sensation it specifies through noticing what that sensation is like in his own experience. Procedure two, outward signs: A person pins his use of a word to outward, pre-verbal signs of the sensation. I identify and explain a third procedure and show we in fact specify many kinds of (...)
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  5. Alison Hills (2008). Kantian Value Realism. Ratio 21 (2):182–200.
    Why should we be interested in Kant's ethical theory? One reason is that we find his views about our moral responsibilities appealing. Anyone who thinks that we should treat other people with respect, that we should not use them as a mere means in ways to which they could not possibly consent, will be attracted by a Kantian style of ethical theory. But according to recent supporters of Kant, the most distinctive and important feature of his ethical theory is not (...)
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  6. Guy Kahane (2009). Pain, Dislike and Experience. Utilitas 21 (3):327-336.
    It is widely held that it is only contingent that the sensation of pain is disliked, and that when pain is not disliked, it is not intrinsically bad. This conjunction of claims has often been taken to support a subjectivist view of pain’s badness on which pain is bad simply because it is the object of a negative attitude and not because of what it feels like. In this paper, I argue that accepting this conjunction of claims does not commit (...)
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  7. Justin Klocksiem (2011). Perspective-Neutral Intrinsic Value. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):323-337.
    Is it possible to do a good thing, or to make the world a better place? Some argue that it is not possible, because perspective-neutral value does not exist. Some argue that ‘good’ does not play the right grammatical role; or that all good things are good ‘in a way’; or that goodness is inherently perspective-dependent. I argue that the logical and semantic properties of ‘good’ are what we should expect of an evaluative predicate; that the many ways of being (...)
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  8. Harold N. Lee (1940). A Precise Meaning for Objective and Subjective in Value Theory. Journal of Philosophy 37 (23):626-637.
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  9. Olivier Massin (2011). On Pleasures. Dissertation, Geneva
    This thesis introduces and defends the Axiological Theory of Pleasure (ATP), according to which all pleasures are mental episodes which exemplify an hedonic value. According to the version of the ATP defended, hedonic goodness is not a primitive kind of value, but amounts to the final and personal value of mental episodes. Beside, it is argued that all mental episodes –and then all pleasures– are intentional. The definition of pleasures I arrived at is the following : -/- x is a (...)
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  10. Nicholas Maxwell (2013). Taking the Nature of God Seriously. In Jeanine Diller Diller & Asa Kasher (eds.), Models of God and Other Ultimate Realities. Springer
    Once it is appreciated that it is not possible for an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-loving God to exist, the important question arises: What does exist that is closest to, and captures the best of what is in, the traditional conception of God? In this paper I set out to answer that question. The first step that needs to be taken is to sever the God-of-cosmic-power from the God-of-cosmic-value. The first is Einstein’s God, the underlying dynamic unity in the physical universe which (...)
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  11. Nicholas Maxwell (1999). Are There Objective Values? The Dalhousie Review 79 (3):301-317.
    In this paper I demolish three influential arguments - moral, metaphysical and epistemological - against value realism. We have good reasons to believe, and no good reasons not to believe, that value-features, value-facts, really do exist in the world.
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  12. Adam Morton (1996). Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being, Jon Elster and John E. Roemer . Cambridge University Press, 1991, X + 400 Pages and The Quality of Life, Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen . Oxford University Press, 1993, Xi + 453 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 12 (1):101.
  13. Graham Oddie (2001). Hume, the BAD Paradox, and Value Realism. Philo 4 (2):109-122.
    A recent slew of arguments, if sound, would demonstrate that realism about value involves a kind of paradox-I call it the BAD paradox.More precisely, they show that if there are genuine propositions about the good, then one could maintain harmony between one’s desires and one’s beliefs about the good only on pain of violating fundamental principles of decision theory. I show. however, the BAD paradox turns out to be a version of Newcomb’s problem, and that the cognitivist about value can (...)
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  14. Maria Teresa Pringle, Elementos de una filosofía realista-personalista: Método fenomenológico con seguimiento iterativo triple. Academia.Edu.
    Abstracto: Notas introductorias a la fenomenología realista de la persona, fundada en el seguimiento del saber del corazón y de la voluntad además del intelecto. Se presenta un método iterativo triple de seguimiento filosófico que corresponde con las facultades humanas y la vida intencional. Sentido trascendente de la verdad, valor y virtud y visión espiritual de la persona. Escrito inspirado en la filosofía de von Hildebrand.
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  15. Joseph Raz (2003). The Practice of Value. Oxford University Press.
    The Practice of Value explores the nature of value and its relation to the social and historical conditions under which human agents live. At the core of the book are the Tanner Lectures delivered at Berkeley in 2001 by Joseph Raz, who has been one of the leading figures in moral and legal philosophy since the 1970's. Raz argues that values depend importantly on social practices, but that we can make sense of this dependence without falling back on cultural relativism. (...)
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  16. Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi (forthcoming). What is Value? Where Does It Come From? A Philosophical Perspective. In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), The Value Handbook: The Affective Sciences of Values and Valuation.
    Are values objective or subjective? To clarify this question we start with an overview of the main concepts and debates in the philosophy of values. We then discuss the arguments for and against value realism, the thesis that there are objective evaluative facts. By contrast with value anti-realism, which is generally associated with sentimentalism, according to which evaluative judgements are grounded in sentiments, value realism is commonly coupled with rationalism. Against this common view, we argue that value realism can be (...)
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  17. Erik Wielenberg (2005). Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe. Cambridge University Press.