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Summary This category includes works examining the relationship between values, in the sense of claims about value, and norms, in the sense of ethical principles concerning what is right, wrong, or there is reason to do. In a famous expression owed to David Ross's homonymous book, the category covers the relation between 'the right and the good'. Consequentialism provides a clear view of such relation: the good determines the right. In other words, what is right and wrong to do is determined on the basis of a ranking of actions on an evaluative scale. Certain forms of virtue ethics provide a different example of how the good determines the right. Here the relevant good is the goodness of the motive that an action would manifest, or the goodness of the agent. The question then is: What would a good (virtuous) agent do? On the other hand, deontological theories are often defined as rejecting this unilateral direction of explanation. One way to be a deontologist is to deny that all the right is determined by the good: W. D. Ross held such a view. E.g. the duty to keep promises is independent from the good that promise-keeping brings about. Another deontological approach claims that, in fact, the right determines the good. A good example here is Kant's claims about happiness: happiness is good, only on condition that is deserved, i.e. as a reward for acting rightly. A connected but in principle distinct debate that falls into this category is whether evaluative concepts should be defined in normative terms, or viceversa. This debate is distinct for two reasons: 1) it is a 'definitional' debate rather than one in normative ethics; 2) the relevant normative terms need not be moral ones, but simply the concept of a reason for acting and having attitudes. See the category on the buck-passing account of value. Yet another area of questions that can fall in this category is how values can justify norms: e.g. Does the value of knowledge (or some other value) justify epistemic norms? Does the value of coherence justify rational requirements?
Key works Chapters 5 and 6 of Moore 1903 contain classic statements of a consequentialist approach, where the good (understood as intrinsic value) not only grounds but even defines the right. Ross 2002 as pointed out provides a clear example of a deontological view on the value-norms relation. The papers contained in Prichard 2002 provide much of the background for Ross's view, although arguing for a mixed view whereby the good is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the right. Within contemporary literature, Audi 2005 also proposes a non-consequentialist view, but takes fundamental moral norms to be ultimately grounded on the value of human flourishing. Baron 1997 puts consequentialism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics in dialogue, with an emphasis on how they answer the 'right and the good' question--interestingly Marcia Baron claims the centrality of value to Kant's ethics.
Introductions Zimmerman 2007 Wedgwood 2009
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  1. Marcus Arvan (2013). Groundwork for a New Moral Epistemology. Klesis 27:155-190.
    This paper argues that virtue ethics and prevailing epistemic norms in moral and political philosophy more generally both support a new kind of empirically-informed moral-virtue epistemology, or “experimental ethics” – an epistemology according to which disputed normative premises in moral and political philosophy should be epistemically evaluated on the basis of empirically-observed relationships they bear to morally admirable and morally repugnant psycho-behavioral traits, as defined by cross-cultural, cross-historical, and cross-debate agreement on the moral valence of particular traits and behaviors.
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  2. Robert Audi (2005). The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton Up.
    "Robert Audi's magisterial "The Good in the Right" offers the most comprehensive and developed account of rational ethical intuitionism to date."--Roger Crisp, St. Anne's College, University of Oxford "This is an excellent book.
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  3. Carla Bagnoli (2006). Breaking Ties: The Significance of Choice in Symmetrical Moral Dilemmas. Dialectica 60 (2):157–170.
  4. Carla Bagnoli (2002). Moral Constructivism: A Phenomenological Argument. Topoi 21 (1-2):125-138.
  5. Carla Bagnoli (2000). La Pretesa di Oggettività in Etica. In Gabriele Usberti (ed.), Modelli di oggettività. Bompiani.
    Sembra esserci almeno un punto di accordo tra i filosofi morali: i giudizi etici, così come li usiamo nelle nostre conversazioni quotidiane, condividono una certa aspirazione all’oggettività. Vi è invece un disaccordo piuttosto acerbo rispetto alla questione se questa aspirazione sia giustificata o non sia invece una mera pretesa. Il disaccordo filosofico riguarda, cioè, la questione se i giudizi etici debbano e possano aspirare all’oggettività. Ma ancor più fondamentale è il disaccordo rispetto ai criteri con cui valutare se questa aspirazione (...)
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  6. Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon & Giovanni Sartor (2003). A Model of Legal Reasoning with Cases Incorporating Theories and Values. Artificial Intelligence 150 (1-2):97-143.
    Reasoning with cases has been a primary focus of those working in AI and law who have attempted to model legal reasoning. In this paper we put forward a formal model of reasoning with cases which captures many of the insights from that previous work. We begin by stating our view of reasoning with cases as a process of constructing, evaluating and applying a theory. Central to our model is a view of the relationship between cases, rules based on cases, (...)
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  7. Thomas M. Besch (2011). Factualism, Normativism and the Bounds of Normativity. Dialogue 50 (02):347-365.
    The paper argues that applications of the principle that “ought” implies “can” (OIC) depend on normative considerations even if the link between “ought” and “can” is logical in nature. Thus, we should reject a common, “factualist” conception of OIC and endorse weak “normativism”. Even if we use OIC as the rule ““cannot” therefore “not ought””, applying OIC is not a mere matter of facts and logic, as factualists claim, but often draws on “proto-ideals” of moral agency.
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  8. John Bigelow & Michael Smith (1997). How Not to Be Muddled by a Meddlesome Muggletonian. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (4):511 – 527.
    Holton, we acknowledge, has given a good counter-example to a theory, and that theory is interesting and worth refuting. The theory we have in mind is like Smith's, but is more reductionist in spirit. It is a theory that ties value to Reason and to processes of reasoning, or inference - not to the recognition of reasons and acting on reasons. Such a theory overestimates the importance of logic, truth, inference, and thinking things through for yourself independently of any ideas (...)
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  9. Michael Brady (ed.) (2011). New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Metaethics occupies a central place in analytical philosophy, and the last forty years has seen an upsurge of interest in questions about the nature and practice of morality. This collection presents original and ground-breaking research on metaethical issues from some of the very best of a new generation of philosophers working in this field.
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  10. Elizabeth Brake (2002). Norms and Values: Essays on the Work of Virginia Held (Review). Hypatia 17 (1):200-203.
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  11. Kimberley Brownlee (2012). Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience. Oxford University Press.
    This book shows that civil disobedience is generally more defensible than private conscientious objection. -/- Part I explores the morality of conviction and conscience. Each of these concepts informs a distinct argument for civil disobedience. The conviction argument begins with the communicative principle of conscientiousness. According to this principle, having a conscientious moral conviction means not just acting consistently with our beliefs and judging ourselves and others by a common moral standard. It also means not seeking to evade the consequences (...)
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  12. Marc Champagne (2011). Axiomatizing Umwelt Normativity. Sign Systems Studies 39 (11):9-59.
    Prompted by the thesis that an organism’s umwelt possesses not just a descriptive dimension, but a normative one as well, some have sought to annex semiotics with ethics. Yet the pronouncements made in this vein have consisted mainly in rehearsing accepted moral intuitions, and have failed to concretely further our knowledge of why or how a creature comes to order objects in its environment in accordance with axiological charges of value or disvalue. For want of a more explicit account, theorists (...)
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  13. Ruth Chang (forthcoming). &Quot;commitment, Reasons, and the Will&Quot;. Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    This paper argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model – as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you (...)
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  14. Ruth Chang (forthcoming). &Quot;practical Reasons: The Problem of Gridlock&Quot;. In Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson (eds.), Companion to Analytic Philosophy. Continuum Press.
    The paper has two aims. The first is to propose a general framework for organizing some central questions about normative practical reasons in a way that separates importantly distinct issues that are often run together. Setting out this framework provides a snapshot of the leading types of view about practical reasons as well as a deeper understanding of what are widely regarded to be some of their most serious difficulties. The second is to use the proposed framework to uncover and (...)
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  15. Ruth Chang (2013). Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.
    In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the (...)
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  16. Ruth Chang (2012). Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability? Philosophical Issues 22 (1):106-126.
    This paper presents an argument against the widespread view that ‘hard choices’ are hard because of the incomparability of the alternatives. The argument has two parts. First, I argue that any plausible theory of practical reason must be ‘comparativist’ in form, that is, it must hold that a comparative relation between the alternatives with respect to what matters in the choice determines a justified choice in that situation. If comparativist views of practical reason are correct, however, the incomparabilist view of (...)
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  17. Ruth Chang (2002). The Possibility of Parity. Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
    This paper argues for the existence of a fourth positive generic value relation that can hold between two items beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’: namely ‘on a par’.
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  18. Roger Crisp (2005). Value, Reasons and the Structure of Justification: How to Avoid Passing the Buck. Analysis 65 (285):80–85.
  19. Dan Demetriou (forthcoming). What Should Realists Say About Honor Cultures? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-19.
    Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen’s (1996) influential account of “cultures of honor” speculates that honor norms are a socially-adaptive deterrence strategy. This theory has been appealed to by multiple empirically-minded philosophers, and plays an important role in John Doris and Alexandra Plakias’ (2008) antirealist argument from disagreement. In this essay, I raise four objections to the Nisbett-Cohen deterrence thesis, and offer another theory of honor in its place that sees honor as an agonistic normative system regulating prestige competitions. Since my (...)
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  20. Dan Demetriou (2013). There’s Some Fetish in Your Ethics: A Limited Defense of Purity Reasoning in Moral Discourse. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:377-404.
    Call the ethos understanding rightness in terms of spiritual purity and piety, and wrongness in terms of corruption and sacrilege, the “fetish ethic.” Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues suggest that this ethos is particularly salient to political conservatives and non-liberal cultures around the globe. In this essay, I point to numerous examples of moral fetishism in mainstream academic ethics. Once we see how deeply “infected” our ethical reasoning is by fetishistic intuitions, we can respond by 1) repudiating the fetishistic impulse, (...)
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  21. Steven M. Duncan, Pain and Evil.
    In this paper I defend the thesis that, considered simply as certain sorts of bodily sensations, pleasure is not the good nor is pain intrinsically evil. In fact, the opposite is largely the case: pursuit of pleasure is generally productive of ontic evil, and pain, when heeded, directs us toward the ontic good.
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  22. Robert Ellis (1997). Revelation, Wisdom, and Learning From Religion. British Journal of Religious Education 19 (2):95-103.
    D.G Attfield's article "Learning from Religion" in BJRE 18:2 raises a number of difficulties in the treatment of truth claims in Religious Education. He argues that these claims should limit the acceptable goals of non-confessional R.E. to teaching about religion and not cross a threshold of faith-commitment beyond which a child may learn from religion. His arguments rest on a questionable understanding of religions as entirely defined by their irreconcilable revelations, which actually condemns R.E to an ineffectual relativism. Attfield also (...)
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  23. Robert Ellis (1997). Revelation, Wisdom, and Learning From Religion. British Journal of Religious Education 19 (2):95-103.
    D.G Attfield's article "Learning from Religion" in BJRE 18:2 raises a number of difficulties in the treatment of truth claims in Religious Education. He argues that these claims should limit the acceptable goals of non-confessional R.E. to teaching about religion and not cross a threshold of faith-commitment beyond which a child may learn from religion. His arguments rest on a questionable understanding of religions as entirely defined by their irreconcilable revelations, which actually condemns R.E to an ineffectual relativism. Attfield also (...)
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  24. Federico L. G. Faroldi (2012). Fallacia Deontica. From "Ought" to "is&Quot;. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia Del Diritto 89 (3):413–418.
  25. Danny Frederick (2013). Hoppe’s Derivation of Self-Ownership From Argumentation: Analysis and Critique. Reason Papers 35 (1):92-106.
    Hans-Hermann Hoppe contends that the fact that a person has the capacity to argue entails that she has the moral right of exclusive control over her own body. Critics of Hoppe’s argument do not appear to have pinpointed its flaws. I expose the logical structure of Hoppe’s argument, distinguishing its pragmatic-contradiction and its mutual-recognition components. I provide three counterexamples to show that Hoppe’s mutual-recognition argument is invalid and I argue that the truth that appears to motivate the argument is simply (...)
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  26. Espen Gamlund (2010). Supererogatory Forgiveness. Inquiry 53 (6):540-564.
    While forgiveness is widely recognised as an example of a supererogatory action, it remains to be explained precisely what makes forgiveness supererogatory, or the circumstances under which it is supererogatory to forgive. Philosophers often claim that forgiveness is supererogatory, but most of the time they do so without offering an adequate explanation for why it is supererogatory to forgive. Accordingly, the literature on forgiveness lacks a sufficiently nuanced account of the supererogatory status of forgiveness. In this paper, I seek to (...)
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  27. Jon Garthoff (2012). Review of Christian Miller (Ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Review.
  28. Jon Garthoff (2011). Meriting Concern and Meriting Respect. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (2).
  29. Irwin Goldstein (1996). Ontology, Epistemology, and Private Ostensive Definition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):137-147.
    People see five kinds of views in epistemology and ontology as hinging on there being words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions, through direct acquaintance with his own sensations: skepticism about other minds, 2. skepticism about an external world, 3. foundationalism, 4. dualism, and 5. phenomenalism. People think Wittgenstein refuted these views by showing, they believe, no word is learnable only by private ostensive definition. I defend these five views from Wittgenstein’s attack.
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  30. Irwin Goldstein (1989). Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional Intrinsic Values. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276.
    That all pleasure is good and all pain bad in itself is an eternally true ethical principle. The common claim that some pleasure is not good, or some pain not bad, is mistaken. Strict particularism (ethical decisions must be made case by case; there are no sound universal normative principles) and relativism (all good and bad are relative to society) are among the ethical theories we may refute through an appeal to pleasure and pain. Daniel Dennett, Philippa Foot, R M (...)
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  31. Irwin Goldstein (1988). The Rationality of Pleasure-Seeking Animals. In Sander Lee (ed.), Inquiries Into Value. Edwin Mellen Press.
    Reason guides pleasure-seeking animals in leading them to prefer pleasure to pain.
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  32. Irwin Goldstein (1983). Pain and Masochism. Journal of Value Inquiry 17 (3):219-223.
    That pain and suffering are unwanted is no truism. Like the sadist, the masochist wants pain. Like sadism, masochism entails an irrational, abnormal attitude toward pain. I explain this abnormality.
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  33. Robert E. Goodin & Christian Barry (2014). Benefiting From the Wrongdoing of Others. Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (2).
    Bracket out the wrong of committing a wrong, or conspiring or colluding or conniving with others in their committing one. Suppose you have done none of those things, and you find yourself merely benefiting from a wrong committed wholly by someone else. What, if anything, is wrong with that? What, if any, duties follow from it? If straightforward restitution were possible — if you could just ‘give back’ what you received as a result of the wrongdoing to its rightful owner (...)
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  34. Iwao Hirose & Andrew Reisner (forthcoming). Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome. Oxford University Press.
    This book is a collection of 15 new papers celebrating the work and career of John Broome. Publication is expected in autumn 2014.
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  35. Richard Holton (1996). Reason, Value and the Muggletonians. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):484 – 487.
    Michael Smith has argued that to value an action is to believe that if one were fully rational one would desire that one perform it. I offer the Muggletonians as a counter-example. The Muggletonians, a 17th century English sect, believed that reason was the path of the Devil. They believed that their fully rational selves - rational in just Smith's sense - would have blasphemed against God; and that their rational selves would have wanted their actual selves to do likewise. (...)
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  36. Daniel Jacobson, Fitting Attitude Theories of Value. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  37. Andrew J. I. Jones & Xavier Parent (2008). Normative-Informational Positions: A Modal-Logical Approach. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 16 (1):7-23.
    This paper is a preliminary investigation into the application of the formal-logical theory of normative positions to the characterisation of normative-informational positions, pertaining to rules that are meant to regulate the supply of information. First, we present the proposed framework. Next, we identify the kinds of nuances and distinctions that can be articulated in such a logical framework. Finally, we show how such nuances can arise in specific regulations. Reference is made to Data Protection Law and Contract Law, among others. (...)
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  38. Azevedo Marco Antonio (2013). Commands and Claims. In Bartosz Wojciechowski, Karolina M. Cern & Piotr W. Juchacz (eds.), DIA-LOGOS, VOL 15: Legal Rules, Moral Norms and Democratic Principles. Peter Lang.
    Notwithstanding the widely accepted view that rights establish normative constraints on authority’s powers, command is still a core notion in modern philosophical jurisprudence. Nevertheless, if Herbert Hart is correct in his analysis on the deficiencies of the traditional command theories, a command is binding only if there is a right of being obeyed implying authority. My main objective in this paper is to make explicit the semantical and normative relations between rights and commands. In the first part, after some remarks (...)
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  39. Andrew Moore (2012). The Buck-Passing Stops Here. In Rationis Defensor.
    Thomas Scanlon influentially argues that, in the provision of reasons to act or believe, goodness and value ‘pass the buck’ to other properties. This paper first extends his arguments: if Scanlon shows that goodness and value pass the buck, then relevantly analogous arguments show that, contrary to Scanlon, duty and wrongness too pass this same buck. The paper then reverses Scanlon’s buck-passing arguments: if they show that goodness and value pass the reason-providing buck, then reasons themselves also pass the buck (...)
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  40. Nedim Nomer (2013). Fichte's Separation Thesis. Philosophical Forum 44 (3):233-254.
  41. Dawn Nothwehr (2008). From Ontology, Ecology, and Normativity to Mutuality : The Attitude and Principle Grounding the Ethic of Life. In Thomas A. Nairn (ed.), The Consistent Ethic of Life: Assessing its Reception and Relevance. Orbis Books.
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  42. Susana Nuccetelli (2010). Two Puzzles in Metaethics. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Ethics 1 (1):15-16.
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  43. Susana Nuccetelli (2007). What Is an Ethnic Group? In Jorge J. E. Gracia (ed.), Race or Ethnicity? On Black and Latino Identity. Cornell University Press.
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  44. Peter Olsthoorn (2013). Virtue Ethics in the Military. In Stan van Hooft (ed.), The Handbook of Virtue Ethics. Acumen. 365-374.
  45. Peter Olsthoorn (2006). Honor and the Military. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (1):159-172.
    This article deals with the notion of honor and its role in today’s military as an incentive in combat, but also as a check on the behavior on both the battlefield and in modern “operations other than war.” First, an outline will be given of what honor is and how it relates to traditional views on military courage. After that, the Roman honor-ethic, stating that honor is a necessary incentive for courageous behavior and that it is something worth dying for, (...)
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  46. Francesco Orsi (2013). Fitting Attitudes and Solitary Goods. Mind 122 (487):687-698.
    In this paper I argue that Bykvist’s recent challenges to the fitting-attitude account of value (FA) can be successfully met. The challenge from solitary goods claims that FA cannot account for the value of states of affairs which necessarily rule out the presence of favouring subjects. I point out the modal reasons why FA can account for solitary goods by appealing to contemplative attitudes. Bykvist’s second challenge, the ‘distance problem’, questions the ability of FA to match facts about the intensity (...)
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  47. Francesco Orsi (2013). How to Be a Friend of Absolute Goodness. Philosophia 41 (4):1237-1251.
    This paper critically examines Richard Kraut’s attack on the notion of absolute value, and lays out some of the conceptual work required to defend such a notion. The view under attack claims that absolute goodness is a property that provides a reason to value what has it. Kraut’s overall challenge is that absolute goodness cannot play this role. Kraut’s own view is that goodness-for, instead, plays the reason-providing role. My targets are Kraut’s double-counting objection, and his ethical objection against absolute (...)
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  48. Francesco Orsi (2013). What's Wrong with Moorean Buck-Passing? Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746.
    In this paper I discuss and try to remove some major stumbling blocks for a Moorean buck-passing account of reasons in terms of value (MBP): There is a pro tanto reason to favour X if and only if X is intrinsically good, or X is instrumentally good, or favouring X is intrinsically good, or favouring X is instrumentally good. I suggest that MBP can embrace and explain the buck-passing intuition behind the far more popular buck-passing account of value, and has (...)
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  49. Francesco Orsi (2006). Naturalism and the Buck-Passing Account of Value. Philosophical Writings 32:58-77.
    It has been thought that the prospects for non-naturalism about normativity may be significantly advanced if non-naturalists take the relation of being a reason as the basic normative entity, and so if, inter alia, they endorse a buck-passing account of value. This is thought to yield theoretical benefits regarding (i) the open question argument, (ii) the defence against the charge of queerness, and (iii) demands of parsimony. In the paper I contest these claims. Non- naturalists need not focus on reasons, (...)
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  50. Stanley L. Paulson & Bonnie Litschewski Paulson (eds.) (1998). Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes. Oxford University Press.
    Hans Kelsen's efforts in the areas of legal philosophy and legal theory are considered by many scholars of law to be the most influential thinking of this century. This volume makes available some of the best work extant on Kelsen's theory, including papers newly translated into English. The book covers such topics as competing philosophical positions on the nature of law, legal validity, legal powers, and the unity of municipal and international law. It also throws much light on Kelsen's intellectual (...)
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