Professor John Elliott has spent the last 30 years researching, thinking and writing about some of the key and enduring issues in Education Research and Action Research. He has contributed over 25 books and 600 articles to the field. In this book, he brings together over 16 of his key writings, in one place. Starting with a specially written Introduction, which gives an overview of Professor Elliott's career and contextualizes his selection, the chapters cover: · Rethinking Educational Research · Doing (...) Classroom Action Research · Pedagogy ad Form of Action Research · The Challenge of Action Research This must-have book for anyone wishing to know more about the development of Action Research and Educational Research and John Elliott's contribution to these exciting fields. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate the role of intention and joint attention in joint actions. Depending on the shared intentions the agents have, we distinguish between joint path-goal actions and joint final-goal actions. We propose an instrumental account of basic joint action analogous to a concept of basic action and argue that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action. Furthermore, we discuss the functional role of intentional joint attention for successful cooperation in complex joint actions. Anika Fiebich is PhD (...) student in Philosophy at the Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany. Shaun Gallagher is Lilian and Morrie Moss Professor of Philosophy at the University of Memphis, USA. (shrink)

What are the cognitive mechanisms that underlie selfless conduct, both ‘thinking’ and unthinking? We first consider deliberate selflessness, a manner of selecting acts in which, in evaluating options, one expressly chooses not to weigh the potential consequences for oneself (though this formulation is seen as needing some qualification). We then turn to unthinking behavior in general, and whether we are responsible for it, as the foundation for analyzing the unthinking variety of selflessness. Using illustrative cases (Grenade Gallantry, The Well-Meaning Miner, (...) Ignorant Ilya, Self-Disregarding Sally) we explore just what is involved in setting aside one's self-interests unthinkingly. Eventually, this account links up with work on mental compartmentalization, as it becomes apparent that unthinking selflessness encompasses both unthinking behavior (calling upon inexplicit cognitive utilization of stored images) that is selfless, and thinking behavior (calling upon reasoning with sentences) that is unthinkingly selfless (by virtue of an unreasoned, automatic shift of cognitive standpoint to a ‘compartment’ that omits information about one's self-interests). The analysis points toward a practical program for generating increased selflessness in ourselves and others. (shrink)

Although Kirsh and Maglio's work on ?epistemic? and ?pragmatic? action provides us with some valuable insights, the degree of overlap, or interpenetration, between these two terms suggests that there is something problematic in the distinction. On one analysis, it might be suggested that epistemic and pragmatic actions are not both ?types of action? in the same sense and, perhaps, that there may not be a strong sense in which ?pragmatic actions? are a type of action at all. Things are further (...) complicated by definitional issues. In the case of ?epistemic action?, if the conception of what counts as such is too wide-ranging the term ceases to be useful. (shrink)

Social action is central to social thought. This centrality reflects the overwhelming causal significance of action for social life, the centrality of action to any account of social phenomena, and the fact that conventions and normativity are features of human activity. This book provides philosophical analyses of fundamental categories of human social action, including cooperative action, conventional action, social norm governed action, and the actions of the occupants of organizational roles. A distinctive feature of the book is that it applies (...) these theories of social action categories to some important moral issues that arise in social contexts such as the collective responsibility for environmental pollution, humanitarian intervention, and dealing with the rights of minority groups. Avoiding both the excessively atomistic individualism of rational choice theorists and implausible collectivist assumptions, this important book will be widely read by philosophers of the social sciences, political scientists and sociologists. (shrink)

The causal theory of action (CTA) is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency--the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources while (...) others focus on recent developments; some rely on the tools of analytic philosophy while others cite the latest empirical research on human action. All agree, however, on the centrality of the CTA in the philosophy of action. The contributors first consider metaphysical issues, then reasons-explanations of action, and, finally, new directions for thinking about the CTA. They discuss such topics as the tenability of some alternatives to the CTA; basic causal deviance; the etiology of action; teleologism and anticausalism; and the compatibility of the CTA with theories of embodied cognition. Two contributors engage in an exchange of views on intentional omissions that stretches over four essays, directly responding to each other in their follow-up essays. As the action-oriented perspective becomes more influential in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, this volume offers a long-needed debate over foundational issues. Contributors: Fred Adams, Jesus H. Aguilar, John Bishop, Andrei A. Buckareff, Randolph Clarke, Jennifer Hornsby, Alicia Juarrero, Alfred R. Mele, Michael S. Moore, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Josef Perner, Johannes Roessler, David-Hillel Ruben, Carolina Sartorio, Michael Smith, Rowland Stout. (shrink)

At a time of acute danger, people commonly petition God for help for themselves or their loved ones; such as praying that an avalanche heading in one's direction be diverted, or that an organ donor be found for one's dying child. Such prayer seems natural and, indeed, for believers, reasonable and acceptable. It seems perverse to condemn such typical prayer, as wrong. But once we closely examine what is actually happening in such situations, we shall see that frequently prayer of (...) this sort is morally problematic. I argue that such prayer ought to be seen as a form of action (rather than, say, mere hope), thereby needing to meet the higher moral standards that apply to actions; and that the assumption of the benevolence of the deity does not suffice to make such prayer legitimate. (shrink)

Among the sources of Hannah Arendt's philosophy of action is an unexplored one: the account of agency in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Drawing on a consideration of what has been called the 'dramaturgical' character of Arendt's philosophy of action, the article compares the accounts of action in Arendt's Human Condition and in the 'Spirit' chapter of the Phenomenology. Both works share a similar overall structure: in each case, the account of action begins with the opening-up of previously unseen or unexpected (...) tragic consequences within action and concludes with an exploration of what can be forgiven or reconciled in action. The Arendtian and Hegelian appropriations of tragedy and forgiveness reveal nonetheless important differences in their view of what counts as action and how its tragic elements are to be understood. Key Words: action • agency • Arendt • forgiveness • Hegel • tragedy. (shrink)

In 1996, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal of United States ruled that a Washington law banning physician-assisted suicide was unconstitutional. In the same year, the 2nd Circuit found a similar law in New York unconstitutional. One year later, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed both rulings, saying that there was no constitutional right to assisted suicide. However, the Court also made plain that they did not reject such a right in principle and that “citizens are free to press for permissive (...) reforms… through legislation or referendums” (Dworkin 1997: 6). (The unanimity of the vote was therefore, as Dworkin notes (1997:1), deceptive.) Oregon chose to do so and legalized physician-assisted suicide in 1997. Oregon’s “Death with Dignity Act” is one of the latest expressions of a medical and legal consensus that has gradually emerged in U.S. and some European countries over the past two decades, that is, the consensus that recognizes the right of terminally ill and competent patients to receive assistance with suicide. (shrink)