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  1. G. E. M. Anscombe (1979). Under a Description. Noûs 13 (2):219-233.
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  2. V. P. J. Arponen (2013). The Human Collective Causing of Environmental Problems and Theory of Collective Action. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (1):47-65.
    A range of multidisciplinarily arguments and observations can and have been employed to challenge the view that the human relationship to nature is fundamentally a cognitive matter of collectively held cultural ideas and values about nature. At the same time, the very similar cognitivist idea of collective sharing of conceptual schemes, normative orientations, and the like as the engine of collective action remains the chief analytic tool offered by many influential philosophical and sociological theories of collective action and human sociality (...)
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  3. A. Y. Aulin-Ahmavaara (1977). A General Theory of Acts, with Application to the Distinction Between Rational and Irrational 'Social Cognition'. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 8 (2):195-220.
    A general theory of acts leads to a theory of cognition distinguishing between formation of apriorical knowledge about values, norms, and cognitive beliefs, based on conditioning by means of rewards and punishments, and formation of aposteriorical knowledge based on conscious, theoretical analysis of observations. The latter, rational layer of consciousness can be built on the former, irrational layer only, if certain conditions are fulfilled. It is shown that rational cognition of values presupposes a notion of aposteriorical value, which challenges some (...)
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  4. Annette Baier (1971). The Search for Basic Actions. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (2):161 - 170.
  5. Kurt Baier (1965). Acting and Producing. Journal of Philosophy 62 (21):645-648.
  6. Lynne Rudder Baker (1981). Why Computers Can't Act. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):157-163.
    To be an agent, one must be able to formulate intentions. To be able to formulate intentions, one must have a first-person perspective. Computers lack a first-person perspective. So, computers are not agents.
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  7. A. Zvie Bar-on (1991). A Problem in the Phenomenology of Action: Are There Unintentional Actions. Analecta Husserliana 35:377.
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  8. Vincent Blok (2013). The Power of Speech Acts: Reflections on a Performative Concept of Ethical Oaths in Economics and Business. Review of Social Economy 71 (2):187-208.
    Ethical oaths for bankers, economists and managers are increasingly seen as successful instruments to ensure more responsible behaviour. In this article, we reflect on the nature of ethical oaths. Based on John Austin's speech act theory and the work of Emmanuel Levinas, we introduce a performative concept of ethical oaths that is characterised by (1) the existential self-performative of the one I want to be, which is (2) demanded by the public context. Because ethical oaths are (3) structurally threatened by (...)
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  9. Jean Beer Blumenfeld (1980). Acting Intentionally and Acting Voluntarily. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1/2):228-231.
  10. Michael Bratman (2009). Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149 - 165.
    Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these (...)
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  11. Michael E. Bratman (2004). Three Forms of Agential Commitment: Reply to Cullity and Gerrans. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):327–335.
  12. Michael E. Bratman (2001). Two Problems About Human Agency. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309–326.
    I consider two inter-related problems in the philosophy of action. One concerns the role of the agent in the determination of action, and I call it the problem of agential authority. The other concerns the relation between motivating desire and the agent's normative deliberation, and I call it the problem of subjective normative authority. In part by way of discussion of work of Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard, I argue that we make progress with these problems by appeal to certain (...)
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  13. D. H. M. Brooks (1981). Joint Action. Mind 90 (357):113-119.
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  14. Brian J. Bruya (2010). The Rehabilitation of Spontaneity: A New Approach in Philosophy of Action. Philosophy East and West 60 (2):pp. 207-250.
    Scholars working in philosophy of action still struggle with the freedom/determinism dichotomy that stretches back to Hellenist philosophy and the metaphysics that gave rise to it. Although that metaphysics has been repudiated in current philosophy of mind and cognitive science, the dichotomy still haunts these fields. As such, action is understood as distinct from movement, or motion. In early China, under a very different metaphysical paradigm, no such distinction is made. Instead, a notion of self-caused movement, or spontaneity, is elaborated. (...)
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  15. Brian James Bruya (2004). Aesthetic Spontaneity: A Theory of Action Based on Affective Responsiveness. Dissertation, University of Hawai'i
    This dissertation is an attempt to analyze an indigenous concept of early Chinese Philosophy in its own context, interpreting it outside of a contemporary Western philosophical framework , then to comb the history of Western philosophy for related concepts, in order to finally enrich the contemporary philosophical landscape by incorporating this concept through a useful and familiar set of conceptual tools. ;The concept in question is ziran, rendered spontaneity, a central notion of early Chinese philosophy but one that has not (...)
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  16. David K. Chan (1999). A Not-so-Simple View of International Action. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):1–16.
  17. Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst (2007). Group Intentions as Equilibria. Philosophical Studies 133 (1):95 - 109.
    In this paper, we offer an analysis of ‘group intentions.’ On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in economics and formal epistemology.
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  18. Ewing Y. Chinn (1977). Intentional Actions and Their Side Effects. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):161-171.
  19. Michael J. Costa (1986). Acting Intentionally and Minimal Abilities. Analysis 46 (3):144 - 147.
  20. Arthur C. Danto (1979). Causality, Representations, and the Explanation of Actions. Tulane Studies in Philosophy 28:1-19.
  21. Brian Davies (2010). The Action of God. In John Cottingham & Peter Hacker (eds.), Mind, Method, and Morality: Essays in Honour of Anthony Kenny. OUP Oxford
  22. R. Dunn (2000). BRATMAN, ME-Faces of Intention. Philosophical Books 41 (2):127-128.
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  23. Gerald Dworkin, Allen E. Buchanan & Dan W. Brock (1991). Deciding for Others. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (162):118.
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  24. Ed Elbers (2008). Learning in Social Settings : Challenges for Sociocultural and Activity Theory. In B. van Oers (ed.), The Transformation of Learning: Advances in Cultural-Historical Activity Theory. Cambridge University Press
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  25. Lester Embree (1992). Some Noetico-Noematic Analyses of Action and Practical Life. In John Drummond & Lester Embree (eds.), The Phenomenology of the Noema. Springer 157--210.
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  26. Yrjö Engeström (2009). Expansive Learning : Toward an Activity-Theoretical Reconceptualization. In Knud Illeris (ed.), Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning Theorists -- In Their Own Words. Routledge
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  27. Yrjö Engeström (2005). Developmental Work Research: Expanding Activity Theory in Practice. Lehmanns Media.
    FOREWORD Yrjö Engeström is one of the most self-directed but certainly also most interesting representatives of contemporary activity theory. ...
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  28. Luca Ferrero (2009). Action. In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell
    We are agents. Not only are we capable of acting, but considerable portions of our lives are taken up by our doings, by exercises of our agency. Our actions and doings are essential to much of what we cherish most in our lives, and—arguably—our death can be equated with the permanent loss of our agency. Under these respects, we differ from inanimate objects, artifacts, chemical substances, and natural phenomena such as—for instance—planets, tables, acids, and lightning-storms. When we speak of the (...)
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  29. L. Fields (1989). Deciding to Act. Philosophical Inquiry 11 (3-4):1-17.
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  30. J. L. A. Garcia (1990). The Intentional and the Intended. Erkenntnis 33 (2):191 - 209.
    The paper defends the thesis that for S to V intentionally is for S to V as (in the way) S intended to. For the normal agent the relevant sort of intention is an intention that one's intention to V generate an instance of one's V-ing along some (usually dimly-conceived) productive path. Such an account allows us to say some actions are intentional to a greater or lesser extent (a desirable option for certain cases of wayward causal chains), preserves the (...)
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  31. Margaret Gilbert (2002). Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings. Journal of Ethics 6 (2):115-143.
    Among other things, this paper considers what so-called collective guilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimes appropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed be guilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collective to intend to do something and to act in light of that intention. An account of collective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting. Finally, a "plural subject" account of collective guilt feelings is (...)
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  32. Carl Ginet (2004). Intentionally Doing and Intentionally Not Doing. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):95-110.
  33. Michael Gorr & Terence Horgan (1982). Intentional and Unintentional Actions. Philosophical Studies 41 (2):251 - 262.
  34. Donald Gustafson (1975). The Range of Intentions. Inquiry 18 (1):83 – 95.
    Four groups of intentional action sentences can be distinguished. An intentional action sentence belongs in a given group as a consequence of the range of intentions, i.e. it may record an action in which someone intends that he should intentionally do something in a particular manner, for a particular purpose, to a particular object, or it may record an action in which someone intends that he should intentionally do something though he intends no particular manner or no manner at all (...)
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  35. Adrian Haddock (2005). At One with Our Actions, but at Two with Our Bodies. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):157 – 172.
    Jennifer Hornsby's account of human action frees us from the temptation to think of the person who acts as 'doing' the events that are her actions, and thereby removes much of the allure of 'agent causation'. But her account is spoiled by the claim that physical actions are 'tryings' that cause bodily movements. It would be better to think of physical actions and bodily movements as identical; but Hornsby refuses to do this, seemingly because she thinks that to do so (...)
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  36. Morrill Hall, What Do You Have In Mind?
    Consider the difference between reaching over to the desk to grab your copy of Kant’s first Critique and reaching over to grab some book or other. This is the difference between an action directed on a specific thing and an action directed on something, but no one thing in particular. In the first case, you will be successful only if you grab your copy of Kant—only one book will do; in the second, you will be successful if you grab a (...)
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  37. Alicia Juarrero (2000). Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System. Emergence: Complexity and Organization 2 (2):24-57.
  38. Mikael M. Karlsson (2002). Agency and Patiency: Back to Nature? Philosophical Explorations 5 (1):59 – 81.
    The distinction between acting and suffering underlies any theory of agency. Among contemporary writers, Fred Dretske is one of the few who has attempted to explicate this distinction without restricting the notion of action to intentional action alone. Aristotle also developed a global account of agency, one which is deeper and more detailed than Dretske's, and it is to Aristotle's account (with some modifications) that the bulk of this paper is devoted. Dretske's sketchier theory faces at least two ground-level problems. (...)
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  39. Lottie Kendzierski (1950). Problem : Object and Intention in the Moral Act. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 24:102.
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  40. Eric Russert Kraemer (1978). Intentional Action, Chance and Control: [Analysis "Problem" No. 16]. Analysis 38 (3):116 - 117.
  41. George T. Ladd (1903). Direct Control of the Retinal Field. Philosophical Review 12:464.
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  42. Daniel Laurier (2009). À la Défense du Déontologisme Doxastique. Dialogue 48 (01):37-.
    ABSTRACT: I offer a refutation of the standard argument according to which we have no doxastic obligation because we do not have the kind of voluntary control over our beliefs required for having obligations. I then propose an interpretation of the distinction between epistemic and practical reasons for belief which can be generalised to other attitudes such as intention, and seems to imply (i) that mental acts such as judgements and decisions never count as intentional actions, and (ii) that these (...)
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  43. Shenbai Liao (2009). Aristotle's View on “the Right of Practice”: An Investigation Into Aristotle's Theory of Action. [REVIEW] Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (2):251-263.
    The concept of right or fit is an important element entailed, but not fully articulated, in the concept of action or practice in Aristotle’s theory of virtue; which, however, turns to be of the utmost importance in later Western ethics. Right is concerned with both feelings and actions, and is not the same for all individuals. It lies in between the two extremes of the spectrum of practical affairs, yet by no means equidistant from them. This account of the concept (...)
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  44. Paisley Livingston (1996). Arguing Over Intentions. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 50 (198):615-633.
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  45. Charles Grant Luckhardt (1973). Does 'Thinking One Ought' Entail Action? Dissertation, Emory University
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  46. Paul P. Maglio & David Kirsh (1996). Epistemic Action Increases with Skill. In Garrison W. Cottrell (ed.), Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawrence Erlbaum 16--391.
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  47. D. S. Mannison (1969). Doing Something on Purpose but Not Intentionally. Analysis 30 (2):49 - 52.
  48. Eric Marcus (2012). Rational Causation. Harvard University Press.
    Introduction -- Rational explanation of belief -- Rational explanation of action -- (Non-human) animals and their reasons -- Rational explanation and rational causation -- Events and states -- Physicalism.
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  49. J. W. Meiland (1963). Are There Unintentional Actions? Philosophical Review 72 (3):377-381.
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  50. Alan Meisel (1990). Deciding for Others. Hastings Center Report 20 (5):48.
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