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  1. Tyler Cowen (2011). Rule Consequentialism Makes Sense After All. Social Philosophy and Policy 28 (02):212-231.
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  2. Vasil Gluchman (2007). Human Dignity and Non-Utilitarian Consequentialist "Ethics of Social Consequences". The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 1:159-165.
    The main objective of my paper is to show that human dignity has a significant position in my ethics of social consequences (I defend a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism), arguing for a particular theory of the value of human dignity. I argue that my ethics of social consequences is capable of accepting human dignity and all authentic human moral values without exception. I think that my ethical theory of social consequences (as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism) can provide the essential (...)
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  3. John C. Harsanyi (1980). Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior. Theory and Decision 12 (2):115-133.
  4. Frances Howard-Snyder (2012). Book Reviews Portmore , Douglas . Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. 266. $74.00 (Paper). [REVIEW] Ethics 123 (1):179-183.
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  5. Gerald Lang (2013). Should Utilitarianism Be Scalar? Utilitas 25 (1):80-95.
    Scalar utilitarianism, a form of utilitarianism advocated by Alastair Norcross, retains utilitarianism's evaluative commitments while dispensing with utilitarianism's deontic commitments, or its commitment to the existence or significance of moral duties, obligations and requirements. This article disputes the effectiveness of the arguments that have been used to defend scalar utilitarianism. It is contended that Norcross's central does not succeed, and it is suggested, more positively, that utilitarians cannot easily distance themselves from deontic assessment, just as long as scalar utilitarians admit (...)
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  6. Michael Otsuka (2012). Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons. Utilitas 24 (03):365-380.
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  7. Michael Otsuka & Alex Voorhoeve (2011). Reply to Crisp. Utilitas 23:109-114.
    In 'Why It Matters that Some Are Worse off than Others,' we offer a new critique of the Priority View. In a recent article, Roger Crisp has argued that our critique is flawed. In this reply Crisp, we show that Crisp fails to grapple with, much less defeat, the central claim of our critique. We also show that an example that Crisp offers in support of the Priority View in fact lends support to our critique of that view.
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  8. Lanning Sowden (1984). Rule Utilitarianism, Rational Decision and Obligations. Theory and Decision 17 (2):177-192.
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  9. Kevin Tobia (forthcoming). Rule Consequentialism and the Problem of Partial Acceptance. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
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  10. Peter Vallentyne (1988). Teleology, Consequentialism, and the Past. Journal of Value Inquiry 22 (2):89-101.
    Act teleological theories are theories that judge an action permissible just in case its outcome is maximally good.[1] It is usually assumed that act teleological theories cannot be @i, i.e., make the permissibility of actions depend on what the past was like (e.g., on what promises were made, what wrong doings were done, and more generally on what actions were performed).[2] I shall argue that this is not so. Although @u act teleological theories, such as classical act utilitarianism, are not (...)
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Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Consequentialism
  1. Elizabeth Ashford (2001). A Response to Splawn. Utilitas 13 (3):334-341.
    I argue that Sider's view does succeed in accommodating the kind of maximization he is after, according to which the agent is required to maximize overall welfare with the single exception of his own welfare. I then argue that Splawn's argument highlights some interesting and important ways in which Sider's view fail to capture basic common-sense intuitions concerning the self-other asymmetry, but offer a different diagnosis of the source of the problem.
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  2. Campbell Brown (2011). Consequentialize This. Ethics 121 (4):749-771.
    To 'consequentialise' is to take a putatively non-consequentialist moral theory and show that it is actually just another form of consequentialism. Some have speculated that every moral theory can be consequentialised. If this were so, then consequentialism would be empty; it would have no substantive content. As I argue here, however, this is not so. Beginning with the core consequentialist commitment to 'maximising the good', I formulate a precise definition of consequentialism and demonstrate that, given this definition, several sorts of (...)
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  3. James Dreier (2011). In Defense of Consequentializing. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 1. Oxford University Press.
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  4. James Dreier (1993). Structures of Normative Theories. The Monist 76 (1):22-40.
    Normative theorists like to divide normative theories into classes. One special point of focus has been to place utilitarianism into a larger class of theories which do not necessarily share its view about what is alone of impersonal intrinsic value, namely, individual human well-being, but do share another structural feature, roughly its demand that each person seek to maximize the realization of what is of impersonal intrinsic value. The larger class is distinguished from its complement in two apparently different ways. (...)
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  5. Jennie Louise (2004). Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):518–536.
    Does the real difference between non-consequentialist and consequentialist theories lie in their approach to value? Non-consequentialist theories are thought either to allow a different kind of value (namely, agent-relative value) or to advocate a different response to value ('honouring' rather than 'promoting'). One objection to this idea implies that all normative theories are describable as consequentialist. But then the distinction between honouring and promoting collapses into the distinction between relative and neutral value. A proper description of non-consequentialist theories can only (...)
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  6. David McNaughton & Piers Rawling (1998). On Defending Deontology. Ratio 11 (1):37–54.
    This paper comprises three sections. First, we offer a traditional defence of deontology, in the manner of, for example, W.D. Ross (1965). The leading idea of such a defence is that the right is independent of the good. Second, we modify the now standard account of the distinction, in terms of the agent-relative/agentneutral divide, between deontology and consequentialism. (This modification is necessary if indirect consequentialism is to count as a form of consequentialism.) Third, we challenge a value-based defence of deontology (...)
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  7. David McNaughton & Piers Rawling (1995). Agent-Relativity and Terminological Inexactitudes. Utilitas 7 (02):319-.
  8. David McNaughton & Piers Rawling (1995). Value and Agent-Relative Reasons. Utilitas 7 (01):31-.
  9. Martin Peterson (2010). A Royal Road to Consequentialism? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):153-169.
    To consequentialise a moral theory means to account for moral phenomena usually described in nonconsequentialist terms, such as rights, duties, and virtues, in a consequentialist framework. This paper seeks to show that all moral theories can be consequentialised. The paper distinguishes between different interpretations of the consequentialiser’s thesis, and emphasises the need for a cardinal ranking of acts. The paper also offers a new answer as to why consequentialising moral theories is important: This yields crucial methodological insights about how to (...)
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  10. Martin Peterson (2010). Can Consequentialists Honour the Special Moral Status of Persons? Utilitas 22 (4):434-446.
    It is widely believed that consequentialists are committed to the claim that persons are mere containers for well-being. In this article I challenge this view by proposing a new version of consequentialism, according to which the identities of persons matter. The new theory, two-dimensional prioritarianism, is a natural extension of traditional prioritarianism. Two-dimensional prioritarianism holds that wellbeing matters more for persons who are at a low absolute level than for persons who are at a higher level and that it is (...)
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  11. Douglas W. Portmore, Consequentializing Commonsense Morality.
    This is Chapter 4 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that that any plausible nonconsequentialist theory can be consequentialized, which is to say that, for any plausible nonconsequentialist theory, we can construct a consequentialist theory that yields the exact same set of deontic verdicts that it yields.
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  12. Douglas W. Portmore, Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.
    This is Chapter 5 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that those who wish to accommodate typical instances of supererogation and agent-centered options must deny that moral reasons are morally overriding and accept both that the reason that agents have to promote their own self-interest is a non-moral reason and that this reason can, and sometimes does, prevent the moral reason that they have to sacrifice their self-interest so as to do more to (...)
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  13. Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative. In J. E. Crimmins & D. C. Long (eds.), Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism.
    This is an introduction to the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction as it pertains to utilitarianism.
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  14. Douglas W. Portmore (2011). Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. Oxford University Press.
    This is a book on morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, I defend a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons.
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  15. Douglas W. Portmore (2009). Consequentializing. Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.
    A growing trend of thought has it that any plausible nonconsequentialist theory can be consequentialized, which is to say that it can be given a consequentialist representation. In this essay, I explore both whether this claim is true and what its implications are. I also explain the procedure for consequentializing a nonconsequentialist theory and give an account of the motivation for doing so.
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  16. Douglas W. Portmore (2008). Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):409 - 427.
    Dual-ranking act-consequentialism (DRAC) is a rather peculiar version of act-consequentialism. Unlike more traditional forms of act-consequentialism, DRAC doesn’t take the deontic status of an action to be a function of some evaluative ranking of outcomes. Rather, it takes the deontic status of an action to be a function of some non-evaluative ranking that is in turn a function of two auxiliary rankings that are evaluative. I argue that DRAC is promising in that it can accommodate certain features of commonsense morality (...)
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  17. Douglas W. Portmore (2007). Consequentializing Moral Theories. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):39–73.
    To consequentialize a non-consequentialist theory, take whatever considerations that the non-consequentialist theory holds to be relevant to determining the deontic statuses of actions and insist that those considerations are relevant to determining the proper ranking of outcomes. In this way, the consequentialist can produce an ordering of outcomes that when combined with her criterion of rightness yields the same set of deontic verdicts that the non-consequentialist theory yields. In this paper, I argue that any plausible non-consequentialist theory can be consequentialized. (...)
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  18. Douglas W. Portmore (2005). Combining Teleological Ethics with Evaluator Relativism: A Promising Result. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):95–113.
    Consequentialism is an agent-neutral teleological theory, and deontology is an agent-relative non-teleological theory. I argue that a certain hybrid of the two—namely, non-egoistic agent-relative teleological ethics (NATE)—is quite promising. This hybrid takes what is best from both consequentialism and deontology while leaving behind the problems associated with each. Like consequentialism and unlike deontology, NATE can accommodate the compelling idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available state of affairs. Yet unlike consequentialism and like deontology, NATE accords (...)
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  19. Douglas W. Portmore (2003). Position‐Relative Consequentialism, Agent‐Centered Options, and Supererogation. Ethics 113 (2):303-332.
    In this paper, I argue that maximizing act-consequentialism (MAC)—the theory that holds that agents ought always to act so as to produce the best available state of affairs—can accommodate both agent-centered options and supererogatory acts. Thus I will show that MAC can accommodate the view that agents often have the moral option of either pursuing their own personal interests or sacrificing those interests for the sake of the impersonal good. And I will show that MAC can accommodate the idea that (...)
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  20. Douglas W. Portmore (2001). Can an Act-Consequentialist Theory Be Agent Relative? American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (4):363-77.
    A theory is agent neutral if it gives every agent the same set of aims and agent relative otherwise. Most philosophers take act-consequentialism to be agent-neutral, but I argue that at the heart of consequentialism is the idea that all acts are morally permissible in virtue of their propensity to promote value and that, given this, it is possible to have a theory that is both agent-relative and act-consequentialist. Furthermore, I demonstrate that agent-relative act-consequentialism can avoid the counterintuitive implications associated (...)
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  21. Douglas W. Portmore (1998). Can Consequentialism Be Reconciled with Our Common-Sense Moral Intuitions? Philosophical Studies 91 (1):1-19.
    Consequentialism is usually thought to be unable to accommodate many of our commonsense moral intuitions. In particular, it has seemed incompatible with the intuition that agents should not violate someone's rights even in order to prevent numerous others from committing comparable rights violations. Nevertheless, I argue that a certain form of consequentialism can accommodate this intuition: agent-relative consequentialism--the view according to which agents ought always to bring about what is, from their own individual perspective, the best available outcome. Moreover, I (...)
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  22. B. C. Postow (1997). Agent-Neutral Reasons: Are They for Everyone? Utilitas 9 (02):249-.
  23. Benjamin Sachs (2010). Consequentialism's Double-Edged Sword. Utilitas 22 (3):258-271.
    Recent work on consequentialism has revealed it to be more flexible than previously thought. Consequentialists have shown how their theory can accommodate certain features with which it has long been considered incompatible, such as agent-centered constraints. This flexibility is usually thought to work in consequentialism’s favor. I want to cast doubt on this assumption. I begin by putting forward the strongest statement of consequentialism’s flexibility: the claim that, whatever set of intuitions the best nonconsequentialist theory accommodates, we can construct a (...)
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  24. T. M. Scanlon (2001). Symposium on Amartya Sen's Philosophy: 3 Sen and Consequentialism. Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):39-50.
    It is a particular pleasure to be able to participate in this symposium in honor of Amartya Sen. We agree on a wide range of topics, but I will focus here on an area of relative disagreement. Sen is much more attracted to consequentialism than I am, and the main topic of my paper will be the particular version of consequentialism that he has articulated and the reasons why he is drawn to this view.
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  25. Mark Schroeder (2007). Teleology, Agent‐Relative Value, and 'Good'. Ethics 117 (2):265-000.
    It is now generally understood that constraints play an important role in commonsense moral thinking and generally accepted that they cannot be accommodated by ordinary, traditional consequentialism. Some have seen this as the most conclusive evidence that consequentialism is hopelessly wrong,1 while others have seen it as the most conclusive evidence that moral common sense is hopelessly paradoxical.2 Fortunately, or so it is widely thought, in the last twenty-five years a new research program, that of Agent-Relative Teleology, has come to (...)
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  26. Mark Schroeder (2006). Not so Promising After All: Evaluator-Relative Teleology and Common-Sense Morality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):348–356.
    Douglas Portmore has recently argued in this journal for a "promising result" – that combining teleological ethics with "evaluator relativism" about the good allows an ethical theory to account for deontological intuitions while "accommodat[ing] the compelling idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available state of affairs." I show that this result is false. It follows from the indexical semantics of evaluator relativism that Portmore's compelling idea is false. I also try to explain what might have (...)
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  27. Amartya Sen (2000). Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason. Journal of Philosophy 97 (9):477-502.
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  28. Amartya Sen (1993). Positional Objectivity. Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (2):126-145.
  29. Amartya Sen (1983). Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation. Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (2):113-132.
  30. Amartya Sen (1982). Rights and Agency. Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1):3-39.
    This paper is about three distinct but interrelated problems: (1) the role 0f rights in moral theory, (2) thc characterization 0f agent relative values and their admissibility in consequ<—:ncc—bascd evaluation, and ( 3) the nature 0f moral evaluation 0f states 0f aihirs.
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  31. Theodore Sider (1993). Asymmetry and Self-Sacrifice. Philosophical Studies 70 (2):117 - 132.
    Recent discussions of consequentialism have drawn our attention to the so-called “self-other” asymmetry. Various cases presented by Michael Slote and Michael Stocker are alleged to demonstrate a fundamental asymmetry between our obligations to others and ourselves.1 Moreover, these cases are taken to constitute a difficulty for consequentialism, and for the various versions of utilitarianism in particular. I agree that there is a fundamental asymmetry between our obligations to ourselves and to others, and that this fact is inconsistent with the letter (...)
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  32. John Skorupski (1996). Neutral Versus Relative: A Reply to Broome, and McNaughton and Rawling. Utilitas 8 (02):235-.
  33. Michael Smith (2009). Kinds of Consequentialism. In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
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  34. Michael Smith (2009). Kinds of Consequentialism. In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
  35. Jussi Suikkanen (2009). Consequentialism, Constraints and The Good-Relative-To: A Reply to Mark Schroeder. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Recently, it has been a part of the so-called consequentializing project to attempt to construct versions of consequentialism that can support agent-relative moral constraints. Mark Schroeder has argued that such views are bound to fail because they cannot make sense of the agent relative value on which they need to rely. In this paper, I provide a fitting-attitude account of both agent-relative and agent-neutral values that can together be used to consequentialize agent-relative constraints.
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  36. Jean-Paul Vessel, Supererogation for Utilitarianism.
    Many believe that traditional consequentialist moral theories are incapable of incorporating the allegedly important phenomenon of supererogation. After surveying the “ties at the top,” “satisficing,” and “egoistic-adjustment” strategies to avoid the supererogation objection, I argue that a recent formulation of utilitarianism incorporating the self-other asymmetry exhibits interesting supererogatory properties. I then incorporate this asymmetry into a version of egoistically-adjusted act utilitarianism, arguing that such a view exhibits very rich supererogatory properties, properties that should assuage the theoretical worries of a vast (...)
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  37. Desheng Zong (2000). Agent Neutrality is the Exclusive Feature of Consequentialism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):676-693.
    An idea that has attracted a lot of attention lately is the thought that consequentialism is a theory characterized basically by its agent neutrality.1 The idea, however, has also met with skepticism. In particular, it has been argued that agent neutrality cannot be what separates consequentialism from other types of theories of reasons for action, since there can be agent-neutral non-consequentialist theories as well as agent-relative consequentialist theories. I will argue in this paper that this last claim is false. The (...)
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Act- and Rule-Consequentalism
  1. Richard Arneson (2005). Sophisticated Rule Consequentialism: Some Simple Objections. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):235–251.
    The popularity of rule-consequentialism among philosophers has waxed and waned. Waned, mostly; at least lately. The idea that the morality that ought to claim allegiance is the ideal code of rules whose acceptance by everybody would bring about best consequences became the object of careful analysis about half a century ago, in the writings of J. J. C. Smart, John Rawls, David Lyons, Richard Brandt, Richard Hare, and others.1 They considered utilitarian versions of rule consequentialism but discovered flaws in the (...)
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  2. Allen Buchanan (1999). Rule-Governed Institutions Versus Act-Consequentialism: A Rejoinder to Naticchia. Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (3):258–270.
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  3. Robert F. Card (2007). Inconsistency and the Theoretical Commitments of Hooker's Rule-Consequentialism. Utilitas 19 (2):243-258.
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  4. Thomas Carson, A Note on Hooker's "Rule Consequentialism" Thomas L. Carson.
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
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  5. Thomas Carson, Rule-Consequentialism and Demandingness: A Reply to Carson.
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
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  6. Thomas L. Carson (1991). A Note on Hooker's "Rule Consequentialism". Mind 100 (1):117-121.
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  7. Ben Eggleston (2007). Conflicts of Rules in Hooker's Rule-Consequentialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):329-349.
    Just about any proponent of a rule-based theory of morality must eventually confront the question of how to resolve confl icts among the rules that the theory endorses. Is there a priority rule specifying which rules must yield to which, as in Rawls’s lexical ordering of the fi rst principle of his theory of justice over the second?3 Must the agent intuitively bal-.
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  8. Fred Feldman (1984). Hare's Proof. Philosophical Studies 45 (2):269 - 283.
  9. Fred Feldman (1980). The Principle of Moral Harmony. Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):166-179.
  10. Fred Feldman (1974). On the Extensional Equivalence of Simple and General Utilitarianism. Noûs 8 (2):185-194.
  11. Richard Fumerton (1990). Group Action and Act Consequentialism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):296-310.
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  12. Holly S. Goldman (1978). The 'Collective' Interpretation of Utilitarian Generalization. Philosophical Studies 34 (2):207 - 209.
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  13. Holly S. Goldman (1976). Reply to Silverstein. Philosophical Studies 30 (1):57 - 61.
  14. Holly S. Goldman (1974). David Lyons on Utilitarian Generalization. Philosophical Studies 26 (2):77 - 95.
  15. Brad Hooker, Promises and Rule-Consequentialism.
    The duty to keep promises has many aspects associated with deontological moral theories. The duty to keep promises is non-welfarist, in that the obligation to keep a promise need not be conditional on there being a net benefit from keeping the promise—indeed need not be conditional on there being at least someone who would benefit from its being kept. The duty to keep promises is more closely connected to autonomy than directly to welfare: agents have moral powers to give themselves (...)
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  16. Brad Hooker (2007). Rule-Consequentialism and Internal Consistency: A Reply to Card. Utilitas 19 (4):514-519.
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  17. Brad Hooker (2005). Reply to Arneson and McIntyre. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):264–281.
    Richard Arneson and Alison McIntyre have done me a great honor by reading my book Ideal Code, Real World so carefully.1 In addition, they have done me a great kindness by reading it sympathetically. Nevertheless, they each find the book ultimately unconvincing, though in very different ways. But the cause of their dissatisfaction with the book is not mistaken interpretation. They have interpreted the book accurately, and they have advanced penetrating criticisms of it. One group of their criticisms definitely draw (...)
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  18. Brad Hooker (2000). Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. Oxford University Press.
    What are the appropriate criteria for assessing a theory of morality? In this enlightening work, Brad Hooker begins by answering this question. He then argues for a rule-consequentialist theory which, in part, asserts that acts should be assessed morally in terms of impartially justified rules. In the end, he considers the implications of rule-consequentialism for several current controversies in practical ethics, making this clearly written, engaging book the best overall statement of this approach to ethics.
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  19. Brad Hooker (1998). Rule-Consequentialism and Obligations Toward the Needy. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1):19–33.
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  20. Brad Hooker (1996). Ross-Style Pluralism Versus Rule-Consequentialism. Mind 105 (420):531-552.
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  21. Brad Hooker (1995). Rule-Consequentialism, Incoherence, Fairness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:19 - 35.
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  22. Brad Hooker (1994). Is Rule-Consequentialism a Rubber Duck? Analysis 54 (2):92 - 97.
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  23. Brad Hooker (1991). Rule-Consequentialism and Demandingness: A Reply to Carson. Mind 100 (2):269-276.
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  24. Brad Hooker (1990). Rule-Consequentialism. Mind 99 (393):67-77.
    The theory of morality we can call full rule-consequentialism selects rules solely in terms of the goodness of their consequences and then claims that these rules determine which kinds of acts are morally wrong. George Berkeley was arguably the first rule-consequentialist. He wrote, “In framing the general laws of nature, it is granted we must be entirely guided by the public good of mankind, but not in the ordinary moral actions of our lives. … The rule is framed with respect (...)
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  25. Frances Howard-Snyder (1993). Rule Consequentialism Is a Rubber Duck. American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (3):271 - 278.
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  26. Rosalind Hursthouse (2002). Virtue Ethics Vs. Rule-Consequentialism: A Reply to Brad Hooker. Utilitas 14 (01):41-.
  27. Conrad D. Johnson (1991). Moral Legislation: A Legal-Political Model for Indirect Consequentialist Reasoning. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a book about moral reasoning: how we actually reason and how we ought to reason. It defends a form of "rule" utilitarianism whereby we must sometimes judge and act in moral questions in accordance with generally accepted rules, so long as the existence of those rules is justified by the good they bring about. The author opposes the currently more fashionable view that it is always right for the individual to do that which produces the most good. Among (...)
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  28. Leonard Kahn, How Many Codes Are Ideal?
    Rule consequentialism (RC) holds that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined by a morally ideal code, i.e., the set of rules whose internalization would have the best consequences. Absolute RC holds that there is a single morally ideal code for everyone, while Relative RC holds that there are different codes for different groups or individuals. I argue that Relative RC better meets the test of reflective equilibrium than Absolute RC. In particular, I contend that Relative RC is superior (...)
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  29. Leonard Kahn (2013). Rule Consequentialism and Disasters. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):219-236.
    Rule consequentialism (RC) is the view that it is right for A to do F in C if and only if A's doing F in C is in accordance with the the set of rules which, if accepted by all, would have consequences which are better than any alternative set of rules (i.e., the ideal code). I defend RC from two related objections. The first objection claims that RC requires obedience to the ideal code even if doing so has disastrous (...)
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  30. Iain Law (1999). Rule-Consequentialism's Dilemma. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):263-276.
    This paper examines recent attempts to defend Rule-Consequentialism against a traditional objection. That objection takes the form of a dilemma, that either Rule-Consequentialism collapses into Act-Consequentialism or it is incoherent. Attempts to avoid this dilemma based on the idea that using RC has better results than using AC are rejected on the grounds that they conflate the ideas of a criterion of rightness and a decision procedure. Other strategies, Brad Hooker's prominent amongst them, involving the thought that RC need contain (...)
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  31. A. Moore (2002). Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):113 – 114.
    Book Information Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. By Brad Hooker. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xiii + 213. Hardback, 25.
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  32. Tim Mulgan (1994). Rule Consequentialism and Famine. Analysis 54 (3):187 - 192.
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  33. Douglas W. Portmore, Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.
    This is Chapter 5 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that those who wish to accommodate typical instances of supererogation and agent-centered options must deny that moral reasons are morally overriding and accept both that the reason that agents have to promote their own self-interest is a non-moral reason and that this reason can, and sometimes does, prevent the moral reason that they have to sacrifice their self-interest so as to do more to (...)
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  34. Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Parfit on Reasons and Rule Consequentialism. In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Reading Parfit. Routledge.
    I argue that rule consequentialism sometimes requires us to act in ways that we lack sufficient reason to act. And this presents a dilemma for Parfit. Either Parfit should concede that we should reject rule consequentialism (and, hence, Triple Theory, which implies it) despite the putatively strong reasons that he believes we have for accepting the view or he should deny that morality has the importance he attributes to it. For if morality is such that we sometimes have decisive reason (...)
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  35. Douglas W. Portmore (2009). Rule-Consequentialism and Irrelevant Others. Utilitas 21 (03):368-.
    AS MANY OF us know, millions of people on this planet are suffering for lack of potable water, basic healthcare, and adequate nutrition. And, as many of us also know, we (the well‐to‐do) could alleviate and/or prevent some of this suffering by making certain sacrifices, e.g., by donating some of our incomes to organizations such as Oxfam and UNICEF. Suppose, then, that we are wondering to what extent each of us is morally obligated to make sacrifices for the sake of (...)
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  36. Douglas W. Portmore (2008). Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):409 - 427.
    Dual-ranking act-consequentialism (DRAC) is a rather peculiar version of act-consequentialism. Unlike more traditional forms of act-consequentialism, DRAC doesn’t take the deontic status of an action to be a function of some evaluative ranking of outcomes. Rather, it takes the deontic status of an action to be a function of some non-evaluative ranking that is in turn a function of two auxiliary rankings that are evaluative. I argue that DRAC is promising in that it can accommodate certain features of commonsense morality (...)
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  37. Douglas W. Portmore (2001). Can an Act-Consequentialist Theory Be Agent Relative? American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (4):363-77.
    A theory is agent neutral if it gives every agent the same set of aims and agent relative otherwise. Most philosophers take act-consequentialism to be agent-neutral, but I argue that at the heart of consequentialism is the idea that all acts are morally permissible in virtue of their propensity to promote value and that, given this, it is possible to have a theory that is both agent-relative and act-consequentialist. Furthermore, I demonstrate that agent-relative act-consequentialism can avoid the counterintuitive implications associated (...)
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  38. Michael Ridge (2009). Climb Every Mountain? Ratio 22 (1):59-77.
    The central thesis of Derek Parfit's On What Matters is that three of the most important secular moral traditions – Kantianism, contractualism, and consequentialism – all actually converge in a way onto the same view. It is in this sense that he suggests that we may all be 'climbing the same mountain, but from different sides'. In this paper, I argue that Parfit's argument that we are all metaphorically climbing the same mountain is unsound. One reason his argument does not (...)
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  39. Jacob Ross, S K B C ?
    Parfit argues that a form of rule consequentialism can be derived from the most plausible formulation of the fundamental principle of Kantian ethics. And so he concludes that Kantians should be consequentialists. I argue that we have good reason to reject two of the auxiliary premises that figure in Parfit’s derivation of rule consequentialism from Kantianism..
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  40. Jacob Ross (2009). Should Kantians Be Consequentialists? Ratio 22 (1):126-135.
    Parfit argues that a form of rule consequentialism can be derived from the most plausible formulation of the fundamental principle of Kantian ethics. And so he concludes that Kantians should be consequentialists. I argue that we have good reason to reject two of the auxiliary premises that figure in Parfit's derivation of rule consequentialism from Kantianism. 1.
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  41. Jörg Schroth (2004). Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):91-94.
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  42. William H. Shaw (2001). Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. Brad Hooker. Mind 110 (440):1074-1077.
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  43. Harry S. Silverstein & Holly S. Goldman (1976). Goldman's 'Level-2' Act Descriptions and Utilitarian Generalization. Philosophical Studies 30 (1):45 - 55.
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  44. Holly Smith (2010). Measuring the Consequences of Rules. Utilitas 22 (4):413-433.
    Rule utilitarianism has recently enjoyed a resurgence of interest triggered by Brad Hooker’s sophisticated treatment in Ideal Code, Real World.1 An intriguing new debate has now broken out about how best to formulate rule utilitarianism – whether to evaluate candidate moral codes in terms of the value of their consequences at a fixed rate (such as 90%) of social acceptance (as Hooker contends), or to evaluate codes in terms of the value of their consequences throughout the entire range of possible (...)
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  45. Philip Stratton-Lake (1997). Can Hooker's Rule-Consequentialist Principle Justify Ross's Prima Facie Duties? Mind 106 (424):751-758.
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  46. Jussi Suikkanen (2008). A Dilemma for Rule-Consequentialism. Philosophia 36 (1):141-150.
    Rule-consequentialists tend to argue for their normative theory by claiming that their view matches our moral convictions just as well as a pluralist set of Rossian duties. As an additional advantage, rule-consequentialism offers a unifying justification for these duties. I challenge the first part of the ruleconsequentialist argument and show that Rossian duties match our moral convictions better than the rule-consequentialist principles. I ask the rule-consequentialists a simple question. In the case that circumstances change, is the wrongness of acts determined (...)
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  47. Peter Vallentyne (2006). Against Maximizing Act-Consequentialism (June 30, 2008). In James Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theories. Blackwell Publishers.
    Maximizing act consequentialism holds that actions are morally permissible if and only if they maximize the value of consequences—if and only if, that is, no alternative action in the given choice situation has more valuable consequences.[i] It is subject to two main objections. One is that it fails to recognize that morality imposes certain constraints on how we may promote value. Maximizing act consequentialism fails to recognize, I shall argue, that the ends do not always justify the means. Actions with (...)
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  48. Peter Vallentyne (2006). Against Maximizing Act-Consequentialism (December 2, 2010) in Moral Theories Edited by Jamie Dreier (Blackwell Publishers, 2006), Pp. 21-37. [REVIEW] In Dreier Jamie (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theories. Blackwell Publishers.
    Maximizing act consequentialism holds that actions are morally permissible if and only if they maximize the value of consequences—if and only if, that is, no alternative action in the given choice situation has more valuable consequences.1 It is subject to two main objections. One is that it fails to recognize that morality imposes certain constraints on how we may promote value. Maximizing act consequentialism fails to recognize, I shall argue, that the ends do not always justify the means. Actions with (...)
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  49. Edmund Wall (2009). Hooker's Consequentialism and the Depth of Moral Experience. Dialogue 48 (02):337-.
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  50. Eric Wiland (2010). The Incoherence Objection in Moral Theory. Acta Analytica 25 (3):279-284.
    J.J.C. Smart famously complained that rule utilitarianism is incoherent, and that rule utilitarians are guilty of rule worship . Much has been said about whether Smart’s complaint is justified, but I will assume for the sake of argument that Smart was on to something. Instead, I have three other goals. First, I want to show that Smart’s complaint is a specific instance of a more general objection to a moral theory—what I will call the Incoherence Objection. Second, I want to (...)
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  51. Christopher Woodard, The Common Structure of Kantianism and Act Consequentialism.
    Indeed, these are the sorts of reasons that Act Consequentialism recognises. But we can think of act-based reasons as a limiting kind of pattern-based reason, in which the pattern P is identical to the action A. Thus the idea of pattern-based reasons is more general than the idea of act-based reasons, and we can properly understand Act Consequentialism as a theory of pattern-based reasons. If pattern-based reasons exist, they are reasons for individual agents to act. They are not supposed to (...)
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  52. Christopher Woodard (2008). A New Argument Against Rule Consequentialism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):247 - 261.
    We best understand Rule Consequentialism as a theory of pattern-based reasons, since it claims that we have reasons to perform some action because of the goodness of the pattern consisting of widespread performance of the same type of action in the same type of circumstances. Plausible forms of Rule Consequentialism are also pluralist, in the sense that, alongside pattern-based reasons, they recognise ordinary act-based reasons, based on the goodness of individual actions. However, Rule Consequentialist theories are distinguished from other pluralist (...)
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Maximizing and Satisficing Consequentialism
  1. Ben Bradley (2006). Against Satisficing Consequentialism. Utilitas 18 (2):97-108.
    The move to satisficing has been thought to help consequentialists avoid the problem of demandingness. But this is a mistake. In this article I formulate several versions of satisficing consequentialism. I show that every version is unacceptable, because every version permits agents to bring about a submaximal outcome in order to prevent a better outcome from obtaining. Some satisficers try to avoid this problem by incorporating a notion of personal sacrifice into the view. I show that these attempts are unsuccessful. (...)
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