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  1. Peter Godfrey -Smith (1986). Why Semantic Properties Won't Earn Their Keep. Philosophical Studies 50 (2):223-236.
  2. Marshall David Abrams (2002). Probabilistic Foundations of Teleology and Content. Dissertation, The University of Chicago
    Ruth Millikan and others advocate theories which attempt to naturalize wide mental content in terms of functions, where the latter are in turn based in part on facts concerning past natural selection. While I support basing content on functions which are constituted by facts about the past, I argue that it is a mistake to base content on selection. This dissertation works out an alternative concept of function which is a more appropriate basis for a theory of mental content. In (...)
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  3. Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (2009). Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind. In John Symons Paco Calvo (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge 193.
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  4. Ö Aydin (2012). Het uiterlijk van het innerlijk: Extended Mind, technologie en de binnen-buiten scheiding. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 74:5-27.
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  5. Benjamin James Lozano (2011). Richard Menary, Ed., The Extended Mind. Radical Philosophy 165:52.
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  6. J. Kiverstein & A. Clark (2009). The Enacted Mind and the Extended Mind. Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy 28 (1).
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  7. R. Menary (2010). The Extended Mind in Focus. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press 1--26.
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  8. William Ramsey (2010). Review of Richard Menary (Ed.), The Extended Mind. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (12).
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  9. Ángel García Rodríguez (2011). An Extended View of Mind and Cognition. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):5-18.
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  10. D. Spurrett & S. J. Cowley (2004). How to Do Things Without Words. Language Sciences 26 (5):443-466.
    Clark and Chalmers (1998) defend the hypothesis of an ‘Extended Mind’, maintaining that beliefs and other paradigmatic mental states can be implemented outside the central nervous system or body. Aspects of the problem of ‘language acquisition’ are considered in the light of the extended mind hypothesis. Rather than ‘language’ as typically understood, the object of study is something called ‘utterance-activity’, a term of art intended to refer to the full range of kinetic and prosodic features of the on-line behaviour of (...)
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  11. W. C. Wilcox (1969). The Antilogism Extended. Mind 78 (310):266-269.
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  12. Robert A. Wilson (2010). Review of Robert D. Rupert, Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3).
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Twin Earth and Externalism
  1. Eran Asoulin, The Explanatory Role Of Externalism.
    I discuss externalism from the point of view of explanatory scientific theories. I ask what externalism is supposed to explain, and whether such an explanation is or should be a scientific one. In contrast to leading externalists, I argue that whatever merits externalism may possess, it is unable to provide a fruitful explanatory framework for a scientific theory of the mind. I argue that an externalist explanation of meaning is concerned with ascription of meaning rather than the mechanisms of meaning. (...)
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  2. Kent Bach & Reinaldo Elugardo (2003). Conceptual Minimalism and Anti-Individualism: A Reply to Goldberg. Noûs 37 (1):151-160.
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  3. Lynne Rudder Baker (1986). Just What Do We Have In Mind? In Theodore E. Uehling Peter A. French (ed.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. University of Minnesota Press 25-48.
    M any philosophers who otherwise have disparate views on the mind share a fundamental assumption. The assumption is that mental processes, or at least those that explain behavior, are wholly determined by properties of the individual whose processes they are.' As elaborated by..
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  4. Yemima Ben-Menahem (ed.) (2005). Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    The essays in this volume discuss Putnam's major philosophical contributions.
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  5. Akeel Bilgrami (1992). Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content. Blackwell.
    Belief and Meaning is a philosophical treatment of intentionality. It offers an original, logical and convincing account of intentional content which is local and contextual and which takes issues with standard theories of meaning.
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  6. Akeel Bilgrami (1989). Realism Without Internalism: A Critique of Searle on Intentionality. Journal of Philosophy 86 (February):57-72.
  7. Gregory Bochner (2014). The Anti-Individualist Revolution in the Philosophy of Language. Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (2):91-120.
    The canonical arguments against the description theory of names are usually taken to have established that the reference of a name as used on a given occasion is not semantically determined by the qualitative descriptions that the speaker may have in mind. The deepest moral of these arguments, on the received view, would be that the speaker’s narrow mental states play no semantic role in fixing reference. My central aim in this paper is to challenge this common understanding by highlighting (...)
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  8. George S. Boolos (ed.) (1990). Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume is a report on the state of philosophy in a number of significant areas.
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  9. J. Brown (1998). Natural Kind Terms and Recognitional Capacities. Mind 107 (426):275-303.
    The main contribution of this paper is a new account of how a community may introduce a term for a natural kind in advance of knowing the correct scientific account of that kind. The account is motivated by the inadequacy of the currently dominant accounts of how a community may do this, namely those proposed by Kripke and by Putman. Their accounts fail to deal satisfactorily with the facts that (1) typically, an item that instantiates one natural kind instantiates several (...)
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  10. Jessica Brown (2004). Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. MIT Press.
    A persuasive monograph that answers the keyepistemological arguments against anti-individualism in thephilosophy of mind.
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  11. Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). Contents Just Aren't in the Head. Erkenntnis 58 (1):1-6.
    A. Horowitz has recently argued against semantic externalism. In this paper, I will show that his arguments are unsuccessful, owing to misconceptions regarding the nature of that semantic view.
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  12. Anthony L. Brueckner (1995). The Characteristic Thesis of Anti-Individualism. Analysis 55 (3):146-48.
    This is a response to an argument (by Michael McKinsey) purporting to show that anti-individualism is trivially true. I show that this argument rests upon a misconception of the basic claim of anti-individualism.
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  13. M. Bruns & Gianfranco Soldati (1997). Object-Dependent and Property-Dependent Concepts. Dialectica 48 (3-4):185-208.
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  14. Tyler Burge (2003). Social Anti-Individualism, Objective Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):682–690.
  15. Tyler Burge (1982). Other Bodies. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press
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  16. Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
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  17. Keith Butler (1998). Internal Affairs: Making Room for Psychosemantic Internalism. Kluwer.
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  18. John Campbell (1982). Extension and Psychic State: Twin Earth Revisited. Philosophical Studies 42 (June):67-90.
    Argues that natural kind terms are token-reflexive, with reference ultimately fixed to the underlying explanatory properties of the surface qualities of local matter.
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  19. J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos (forthcoming). Epistemic Internalism, Content Externalism and the Subjective/Objective Justification Distinction. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Two arguments against the compatibility of epistemic internalism and content externalism are considered. Both arguments are shown to fail, because they equivocate on the concept of justification involved in their premises. To spell out the involved equivocation, a distinction between subjective and objective justification is introduced, which can also be independently motivated on the basis of a wide range of thought experiments to be found in the mainstream literature on epistemology. The subjective/objective justification distinction is also ideally suited for providing (...)
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  20. Noam A. Chomsky (2003). Internalist Explorations. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press
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  21. Carleton B. Christensen (2001). Escape From Twin Earth: Putnam's 'Logic' of Natural Kind Terms. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):123-150.
    Many still seem confident that the kind of semantic theory Putnam once proposed for natural kind terms is right. This paper seeks to show that this confidence is misplaced because the general idea underlying the theory is incoherent. Consequently, the theory must be rejected prior to any consideration of its epistemological, ontological or metaphysical acceptability. Part I sets the stage by showing that falsehoods, indeed absurdities, follow from the theory when one deliberately suspends certain devices Putnam built into it , (...)
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  22. Tim Crane (1991). All the Difference in the World. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (January):1-25.
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  23. Robert C. Cummins (1991). Methodological Reflections on Belief. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press 53--70.
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  24. Steven Davis (2003). Arguments for Externalism. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli
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  25. Michael Devitt (2001). A Shocking Idea About Meaning. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55 (218):471-494.
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  26. Michael Devitt (1990). Meanings Just Ain't in the Head. In George S. Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press 79--104.
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  27. Fred Dretske (1993). The Nature of Thought. Philosophical Studies 70 (2):185-99.
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  28. Ronald P. Endicott (forthcoming). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan Press.
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  29. Ronald P. Endicott (2005). Multiple Realizability. In D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition. Thomson Gale, Macmillan Reference
    Multiple realizability has been at the heart of debates about whether the mind reduces to the brain, or whether the items of a special science reduce to the items of a physical science. I analyze the two central notions implied by the concept of multiple realizability: "multiplicity," otherwise known as property variability, and "realizability." Beginning with the latter, I distinguish three broad conceptual traditions. The Mathematical Tradition equates realization with a form of mapping between objects. Generally speaking, x realizes (or (...)
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  30. Michael Esfeld (2002). Externalism About Content: Its Social and Its Physical Roots. Filosoficky Casopis 50:387-400.
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  31. Katalin Farkas (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise. The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. (...)
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  32. Katalin Farkas (2008). The Subject's Point of View. Oxford University Press.
    Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of (...)
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  33. Katalin Farkas (2006). Semantic Internalism and Externalism. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press
    Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.
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  34. Katalin Farkas (2003). Does Twin Earth Rest on a Mistake? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (8):155-169.
    In this paper I argue against Twin-Earth externalism. The mistake that Twin Earth arguments rest on is the failure to appreciate the force of the following dilemma. Some features of things around us do matter for the purposes of conceptual classification, and others do not. The most plausible way to draw this distinction is to see whether a certain feature enters the cognitive perspective of the experiencing subject in relation to the kind in question or not. If it does, we (...)
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  35. Katalin Farkas (2003). What is Externalism? Philosophical Studies 112 (3):187-208.
    The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged (...)
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  36. Justin C. Fisher (2007). Why Nothing Mental is Just in the Head. Noûs 41 (2):318-334.
    Mental internalists hold that an individuals mental features at a given time supervene upon what is in that individuals head at that time. While many people reject mental internalism about content and justification, mental internalism is commonly accepted regarding such other mental features as rationality, emotion-types, propositional-attitude-types, moral character, and phenomenology. I construct a counter-example to mental internalism regarding all these features. My counter-example involves two creatures: a human and an alien from Pulse World. These creatures environments, behavioral dispositions and (...)
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  37. Juliet Floyd (2005). Putnam's 'the Meaning of Meaning': Externalism in Historical Context. In Yemima Ben-Menahem (ed.), Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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  38. Bryan Frances, A Philosophically Inexpensive Introduction to Twin-Earth.
    I say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument.
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