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  1. Claire Armon-Jones (1991). Varieties of Affect. University of Toronto Press.
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  2. Annette Baier (1978). Hume's Analysis of Pride. Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):27-40.
  3. J. M. Barbalet (1992). A Macro Sociology of Emotion: Class Resentment. Sociological Theory 10 (2):150-163.
    Emotion inheres simultaneously in individuals and in the social structures and relationships in which individuals are embedded. Beginning with a critical examination of T.H. Marshall's account of class resentment, this paper considers the emotional patterns of resentment in class inequality, in trade cycle changes in costs and opportunities for income, and in class cultures. Arising from social relationships, emotion is the basis of action that subsequently affects the structure of social relationships. Thus emotion connects phases of social structure separated by (...)
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  4. Lisa Feldman Barrett, Maria Gendron & Yang-Ming Huang (2009). Do Discrete Emotions Exist? Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):427 – 437.
    In various guises (usually referred to as the “basic emotion” or “discrete emotion” approach), scientists and philosophers have long argued that certain categories of emotion are natural kinds. In a recent paper, Colombetti (2009) proposed yet another natural kind account, and in so doing, characterized and critiqued psychological constructionist approaches to emotion, including our own Conceptual Act Model. In this commentary, we briefly address three topics raised by Columbetti. First, we correct several common misperceptions about the discrete emotion approach to (...)
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  5. A. W. Benn (1914). Aristotle's Theory of Tragic Emotion. Mind 23 (89):84-90.
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  6. Sin Yee Chan (1999). Standing Emotions. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):495-513.
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  7. Marc A. Cohen (2005). Against Basic Emotions, and Toward a Comprehensive Theory. Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (4):229-254.
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  8. Paul Griffiths (2001). Basic Emotions, Complex Emotions, Machiavellian Emotions. Proceedings of the Royal Institute of Philosophy 52:39-67.
    The current state of knowledge in psychology, cognitive neuroscience and behavioral ecology allows a fairly robust characterization of at least some, so-called ?basic emotions? - short-lived emotional responses with homologues in other vertebrates. Philosophers, however are understandably more focused on the complex emotion episodes that figure in folk-psychological narratives about mental life, episodes such as the evolving jealousy and anger of a person in an unraveling sexual relationship. One of the most pressing issues for the philosophy of emotion is the (...)
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  9. Paul E. Griffiths (2003). Basic Emotions, Complex Emotions, Machiavellian Emotions. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press. 39-67.
    The current state of knowledge in psychology, cognitive neuroscience and behavioral ecology allows a fairly robust characterization of at least some, so-called ‘basic emotions’ - short-lived emotional responses with homologues in other vertebrates. Philosophers, however are understandably more focused on the complex emotion episodes that figure in folk-psychological narratives about mental life, episodes such as the evolving jealousy and anger of a person in an unraveling sexual relationship. One of the most pressing issues for the philosophy of emotion is the (...)
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  10. Anthony Hatzimoysis (2007). The Case Against Unconscious Emotions. Analysis 67 (296):292–299.
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  11. Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
  12. J. M. Howarth (1976). On Thinking of What One Fears. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76:53-74.
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  13. David Irons (1898). Primary Emotions: Reply. Philosophical Review 7 (3):298-299.
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  14. David Irons (1897). The Primary Emotions. Philosophical Review 6 (6):626-645.
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  15. Michael Lacewing (2007). Do Unconscious Emotions Involve Unconscious Feelings? Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):81-104.
    The very idea of unconscious emotion has been thought puzzling. But in recent debate about emotions, comparatively little attention has been given explicitly to the question. I survey a number of recent attempts by philosophers to resolve the puzzle and provide some preliminary remarks about their viability. I identify and discuss three families of responses: unconscious emotions involve conscious feelings, unconscious emotions involve no feelings at all, and unconscious emotions involve unconscious feelings. The discussion is exploratory rather than decisive for (...)
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  16. John A. Lambie & Anthony J. Marcel (2002). Consciousness and the Varieties of Emotion Experience: A Theoretical Framework. Psychological Review 109 (2):219-259.
  17. Tony Milligan (2008). False Emotions. Philosophy 83 (2):213-230.
    This article sets out an account of false emotions and focuses upon the example of false grief. Widespread but short-lived mourning for well known public figures involves false grief on the part of at least some mourners. What is false about such grief is not any straightforward pretence but rather the inappropriate antecendents of the state in question and/or the desires that the relevant state involves. False grief, for example, often involves a desire for the experience itself, and this can (...)
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  18. J. Morreal (1983). Humor and Emotion. American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (July):297-304.
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  19. Harvey Mullane (1976). Unconscious and Disguised Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (March):403-411.
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  20. Harvey Mullane (1965). Unconscious Emotion. Theoria 31 (3):181-190.
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  21. Joe Neisser (2006). Making the Case for Unconscious Feeling. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):129-138.
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  22. Rupert Read (2009). Extreme Aversive Emotions: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Dread. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan. 221.
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  23. Christine Tappolet (2010). Emotion, Motivation and Action: The Case of Fear. In Goldie Peter (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion.
    Consider a typical fear episode. You are strolling down a lonely mountain lane when suddenly a huge wolf leaps towards you. A number of different interconnected elements are involved in the fear you experience. First, there is the visual and auditory perception of the wild animal and its movements. In addition, it is likely that given what you see, you may implicitly and inarticulately appraise the situation as acutely threatening. Then, there are a number of physiological changes, involving a variety (...)
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Classifying Emotions
  1. Lucy Allais (2011). Introduction. Philosophical Papers 39 (3):281-287.
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  2. Macalester Bell (2005). A Woman's Scorn: Toward a Feminist Defense of Contempt as a Moral Emotion. Hypatia 20 (4):80-93.
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  3. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (2002). Are Envy, Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions? Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154.
    The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions.
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  4. Robert Brown (1987). Analyzing Love. Cambridge University Press.
    Analyzing Love is concerned with four basic and neglected problems concerning love. The first is identifying its relevant features: distinguishing it from liking and benevolence and from sexual desire; describing the objects that can be loved and the judgments and aims required by love. The second question is how we recognize the presence of love and what grounds we may have for thinking it present in any particular case. The third is that of relating it to other emotions such as (...)
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  5. C. A. Campbell (1936). Are There `Degrees' of the Moral Emotion? Mind 45 (180):492-497.
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  6. Teresa Chandler (2001). Kinds of Emotion. Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):109-115.
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  7. Jason A. Clark (2010). Relations of Homology Between Higher Cognitive Emotions and Basic Emotions. Biology and Philosophy 25 (1):75-94.
    In the last 10 years, several authors including Griffiths and Matthen have employed classificatory principles from biology to argue for a radical revision in the way that we individuate psychological traits. Arguing that the fundamental basis for classification of traits in biology is that of ‘homology’ (similarity due to common descent) rather than ‘analogy’, or ‘shared function’, and that psychological traits are a special case of biological traits, they maintain that psychological categories should be individuated primarily by relations of homology (...)
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  8. Tom Cochrane (2009). Eight Dimensions for the Emotions. Social Science Information 48 (3):379-420.
    The author proposes a dimensional model of our emotion concepts that is intended to be largely independent of one’s theory of emotions and applicable to the different ways in which emotions are measured. He outlines some conditions for selecting the dimensions based on these motivations and general conceptual grounds. Given these conditions he then advances an 8-dimensional model that is shown to effectively differentiate emotion labels both within and across cultures, as well as more obscure expressive language. The 8 dimensions (...)
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  9. John M. Cooper (2005). The Emotional Life of the Wise. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (S1):176-218.
    The ancient Stoics notoriously argued, with thoroughness and force, that all ordinary “emotions” (passions, mental affections: in Greek, pãyh) are thoroughly bad states of mind, not to be indulged in by anyone, under any circumstances: anger, resentment, gloating; pity, sympathy, grief; delight, glee, pleasure; impassioned love (i.e. ¶rvw), agitated desires of any kind, fear; disappointment, regret, all sorts of sorrow; hatred, contempt, schadenfreude. Early on in the history of Stoicism, however, apparently in order to avoid the objection that human nature (...)
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  10. Wayne A. Davis (1981). A Theory of Happiness. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):111-20.
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  11. Ronald de Sousa (2001). Moral Emotions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):109-126.
    Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question (...)
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  12. Ronald B. de Sousa (1978). Self-Deceptive Emotions. Journal of Philosophy 75 (November):684-697.
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  13. Dorothea Debus (2007). Being Emotional About the Past: On the Nature and Role of Past-Directed Emotions. Noûs 41 (4):758-779.
    We sometimes experience emotions which are directed at past events (or situations) which we witnessed at the time when they occurred (or obtained). The present paper explores the role which such "autobiographically past-directed emotions" (or "APD-emotions") play in a subject's mental life. A defender of the "Memory-Claim" holds that an APD-emotion is a memory, namely a memory of the emotion which the subject experienced at the time when the event originally occurred (or the situation obtained) towards which the APD-emotion is (...)
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  14. John Deigh (2004). Primitive Emotions. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
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  15. Julien A. Deonna (2007). The Structure of Empathy. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):99-116.
    If Sam empathizes with Maria, then it is true of Sam that (1) Sam is aware of Maria's emotion, and (2) Sam ‘feels in tune’ with Maria. On what I call the transparency conception of how they interact when instantiated, I argue that these two conditions are collectively necessary and sufficient for empathy. I first clarify the ‘awareness’ and ‘feeling in tune’ conditions, and go on to examine different candidate models that explain the manner in which these two conditions might (...)
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  16. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2009). Taking Affective Explanations to Heart. Social Science Information 48 (3):359-377.
    In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositions) is to ascribe a certain stability to the subject’s moods (episodes). The rationale for this (...)
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  17. John J. Drummond (2006). Respect as a Moral Emotion: A Phenomenological Approach. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 22 (1):1-27.
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  18. Paul Ekamn & Daniel Cordaro (2011). What is Meant by Calling Emotions Basic. Emotion Review 3 (4): Emotion Review October 2364-370.
    Emotions are discrete, automatic responses to universally shared, culture-specific and individual-specific events. The emotion terms, such as anger, fear, etcetera, denote a family of related states sharing at least 12 characteristics, which distinguish one emotion family from another, as well as from other affective states. These affective responses are preprogrammed and involuntary, but are also shaped by life experiences.
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  19. Michael Fox (1976). Unconscious and Disguised Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (3):403-414.
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  20. Michael Fox (1976). Unconscious Emotions: A Reply to Professor Mullane's Unconscious and Disguised Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (March):412-414.
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  21. Peter Goldie (2003). Review: Justifying Emotions: Pride and Jealousy. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (447):551-555.
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  22. Robert M. Gordon (1978). Emotion Labelling and Cognition. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 8 (2):125–135.
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  23. Robert M. Gordon (1969). Emotions and Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 66 (July):408-413.
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  24. Justin C. B. Gosling (1962). Mental Causes and Fear. Mind 71 (July):289-306.
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  25. Patricia S. Greenspan (1986). Identificatory Love. Philosophical Studies 50 (3):321 - 341.
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  26. Joshua C. Gregory (1923). Some Theories of Laughter. Mind 32 (127):328-344.
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  27. Paul E. Griffiths (2004). Is Emotion a Natural Kind? In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    In _What Emotions Really Are: The problem of psychological categories_ I argued that it is unlikely that all the psychological states and processes that fall under the vernacular category of emotion are sufficiently similar to one another to allow a unified scientific psychology of the emotions. In this paper I restate what I mean by ?natural kind? and my argument for supposing that emotion is not a natural kind in this specific sense. In the following sections I discuss the two (...)
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