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  1. John A. Barker & Fred Adams (2012). Conclusive Reasons, Knowledge, and Action. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):35-52.
  2. John Campbell (2009). Does Knowledge of Material Objects Depend on Spatial Perception? Comments on Quassim Cassam's the Possibility of Knowledge. Analysis 69 (2):309-317.
  3. Albert Casullo, Annotated Bibliography on A Priori Knowledge.
    Contents 1. Introduction 2. General Overviews 3. Textbooks 4. Anthologies 5. Historical Background to the Contemporary Debate 6. General Accounts 7. Mathematical Knowledge 8. Logical Knowledge 9. Intuitions and Conceptual Analysis 10. Modal Knowledge a. Overviews b. Primary Sources 11. Testimonial Knowledge 12. Naturalism 13. Scepticism 14. New Developments..
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  4. Ralf Meerbote (1973). The Distinction Between Derivative and Non-Derivative Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 24 (3):192 - 198.
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  5. Yitzhak Y. Melamed (2013). “ ’Scientia Intuitiva’: Spinoza’s Third Kind of Cognition”. In Johannes Haag (ed.), Übergänge - diskursiv oder intuitiv? Essays zu Eckart Förster die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Klostermann. 99-116.
    I am not going to solve in this paper the plethora of problems and riddles surrounding Spinoza’s scientia intuitiva, but I do hope to break some new ground and help make this key doctrine more readily understandable. I will proceed in the following order (keep in mind the word ‘proceed’). I will first provide a close preliminary analysis of the content and development of Spinoza’s discussion of scientia intuitiva in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and the Ethics. (...)
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  6. Adam Morton & Antti Karjalainen (2008). Contrastivity and Indistinguishability. Social Epistemology 22 (3):271 – 280.
    We give a general description of a class of contrastive constructions, intended to capture what is common to contrastive knowledge, belief, hope, fear, understanding and other cases where one expresses a propositional attitude in terms of “rather than”. The crucial element is the agent's incapacity to distinguish some possibilities from others. Contrastivity requires a course-graining of the set of possible worlds. As a result, contrastivity will usually cut across logical consequence, so that an agent can have an attitude to p (...)
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  7. Anne Newstead (2009). Interpreting Anscombe's Intention §32FF. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:157-176.
    G. E. M. Anscombe’s view that agents know what they are doing “without observation” has been met with skepticism and the charge of confusion and falsehood. Simultaneously, some commentators think that Anscombe has captured an important truth about the first-personal character of an agent’s awareness of her actions. This paper attempts an explanation and vindication of Anscombe’s view. The key to the vindication lies in focusing on the role of practical knowledge in an agent’s knowledge of her actions. Few commentators, (...)
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Knowledge by Acquaintance
  1. R. S. Bluck (1963). 'Knowledge by Acquaintance' in Plato's Theaetetus. Mind 72 (286):259-263.
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  2. Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1944). Do We Have Knowledge-by-Acquaintance of the Self? Journal of Philosophy 41 (25):694-696.
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  3. Audre Jean Brokes (2000). Semantic Empiricism and Direct Acquiantance in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Russell 20 (1):33-65.
  4. John Campbell, 1. Acquaintance Vs. Knowledge of Truths.
    Suppose your conscious life were surgically excised, but everything else left intact, what would you miss? In this situation you would not have the slightest idea what was going on. You would have no idea what there is in the world around you; what the grounds are of the potentialities and threats are that you are negotiating. Experience of your surroundings provides you with knowledge of what is there: with your initial base of knowledge of what the things are that (...)
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  5. Dale Cannon (2002). Construing Polanyi's Tacit Knowing as Knowing by Acquaintance Rather Than Knowing by Representation. Tradition and Discovery 29 (2):26-43.
    This essay proposes that Polanyi’s tacit knowing – specifically his conception of tacit knowing as cognitive contact with reality – should be construed as fundamentally a knowing by acquaintance – a relational knowing of reality, rather than merely the underlying subsidiary component of explicit representational knowledge. Thus construed, Polanyi’s theory that tacit knowing is foundational to all human knowing is more radical than is often supposed, for it challenges the priority status of explicit representational knowledge relative to tacit acquaintance knowledge, (...)
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  6. Tim Crane (2012). Tye on Acquaintance and the Problem of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):190-198.
  7. John M. DePoe, Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  8. Naomi Eilan (2001). Consciousness, Acquaintance and Demonstrative Thought. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):433–440.
  9. Paulo Faria (2010). Memory as Acquaintance with the Past: Some Lessons From Russell, 1912-1914. Kriterion 51 (121):149-172.
    Russell’s theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of ‘presentation’, which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell’s theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance (...)
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  10. Richard Fumerton (2010). Poston on Similarity and Acquaintance. Philosophical Studies 147 (3):379 - 386.
    In this article, I try to defend my conception of noninferential justification from important criticisms raised by Ted Poston in a recent article published in Philosophical Studies. More specifically, I argue that from within the framework of an acquaintance theory, one can still allow for fallible noninferential justification, and one can do so without losing the advantages I claim for the theory.
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  11. Richard Fumerton, Knowledge by Acquaintance Vs. Description. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  12. Brie Gertler (forthcoming). Renewed Acquaintance. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    I will elaborate and defend a set of metaphysical and epistemic claims that comprise what I call the acquaintance approach to introspective knowledge of the phenomenal qualities of experience. The hallmark of this approach is the thesis that, in some introspective judgments about experience, (phenomenal) reality intersects with the epistemic, that is, with the subject’s grasp of that reality. In Section 1 of the paper I outline the acquaintance approach by drawing on its Russellian lineage. A more detailed picture of (...)
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  13. Patricia Hanna (2010). Beyond the “Delivery Problem”: Why There is “No Such Thing as a Language”. Philosophia 38 (2):343-355.
    In “Practical Knowledge of Language”, C.-h. Tsai criticizes the arguments in “Swimming and Speaking Spanish” (this issue, pp. 331–341), on the grounds that its account of knowledge of language as knowledge-how is mistaken. In its place, he proposes an alternative account in terms of Russell’s concept “knowledge-by-acquaintance”. In this paper, I show that this account succeeds neither in displacing the account in Swimming and Speaking Spanish nor in addressing Tsai’s main concern: solving the “delivery problem”.
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  14. Paul Hayner (1970). Meyers on Knowledge by Acquaintance: A Rejoinder. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (2):297-298.
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  15. Paul Hayner (1969). Knowledge by Acquaintance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (3):423-431.
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  16. Ilhan Inan (2012). The Philosophy of Curiosity. Routledge.
    Meno's paradox and inostensible conceptualization -- Asking and answering -- Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description -- Referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions -- De re/de dicto -- Rigidity and direct reference -- Reference to the object of curiosity -- Conditions for curiosity -- Conditions for the satisfaction of curiosity -- Relativity of curiosity and its satisfaction -- Presuppositions of curiosity -- Limits of curiosity and its satisfaction.
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  17. İlhan İnan (2012). The Philosophy of Curiosity. Routledge.
    Meno's paradox and inostensible conceptualization -- Asking and answering -- Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description -- Referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions -- De re/de dicto -- Rigidity and direct reference -- Reference to the object of curiosity -- Conditions for curiosity -- Conditions for the satisfaction of curiosity -- Relativity of curiosity and its satisfaction -- Presuppositions of curiosity -- Limits of curiosity and its satisfaction.
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  18. Robin Jeshion (2002). Acquiantanceless De Re Belief'. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O.’Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. Seven Bridges Press. 53-74.
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  19. Franck Lihoreau (ed.) (2008). Knowledge and Questions: Grazer Philosophische Studien 77. Rodopi.
    Contributors: Maria Aloni, Berit Brogaard, Paul Egré, Pascal Engel, Stephen Hetherington, Christopher Hookway, Franck Lihoreau, Martin Montminy, Duncan Pritchard, Ian Rumfitt, Daniele Sgaravatti, Claudine Tiercelin, Elia Zardini.
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  20. Paul Livingston (2013). Phenomenal Concepts and the Problem of Acquaintance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (5-6):5 - 6.
    Some contemporary discussion about the explanation of consciousness substantially recapitulates a decisive debate about reference, knowledge and justification from an earlier stage of the analytic tradition. In particular, I argue that proponents of a recently popular strategy for accounting for an explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal facts – the so-called “phenomenal concept strategy” – face a problem that was originally fiercely debated by Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath. The question that is common to both the older and the contemporary discussion (...)
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  21. Robert G. Meyers (1970). Knowledge by Acquaintance: A Reply to Hayner. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (2):293-296.
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  22. Nikolay Milkov (2001). The History or Russell's Concepts 'Sense-Data' and 'Knowledge by Acquaintance'. Archiv Fuer Begriffsgeschichte 43:221-231.
    Two concepts of utmost importance for the analytic philosophy of the twentieth century, “sense-data” and “knowledge by acquaintance”, were introduced by Bertrand Russell under the influence of two idealist philosophers: F. H. Bradley and Alexius Meinong. This paper traces the exact history of their introduction. We shall see that between 1896 and 1898, Russell had a fully-elaborated theory of “sense-data”, which he abandoned after his analytic turn of the summer of 1898. Furthermore, following a subsequent turn of August 1900—-after he (...)
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  23. Tim O'Keefe (2011). The Cyrenaics Vs. The Pyrrhonists on Knowledge of Appearances. In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Brill. 27-40.
    In Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus takes pains to differentiate the skeptical way of life from other positions with which it is often confused, and in the course of this discussion he briefly explains how skepticism differs from Cyrenaicism. Surprisingly, Sextus does not mention an important apparent difference between the two. The Cyrenaics have a positive epistemic commitment--that we can apprehend our own feelings. Although we cannot know whether the honey is really sweet, we can know infallibly that right now (...)
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  24. DeWitt H. Parker (1945). Knowledge by Acquaintance. Philosophical Review 54 (1):1-18.
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  25. John Perry (1979). ``A Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description&Quot. Noûs 13:3-21.
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  26. Ted Poston (2010). Similarity and Acquaintance: A Dilemma. Philosophical Studies 147 (3):369 - 378.
    There is an interesting and instructive problem with Richard Fumerton's acquaintance theory of noninferential justification. Fumerton's explicit account requires acquaintance with the truth-maker of one's belief and yet he admits that one can have noninferential justification when one is not acquainted with the truthmaker of one's belief but instead acquainted with a very similar truth-maker. On the face of it this problem calls for clarification. However, there are skeptical issues lurking in the background. This paper explores these issues by developing (...)
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  27. Ted Poston (2007). Acquaintance and the Problem of the Speckled Hen. Philosophical Studies 132 (2):331 - 346.
    This paper responds to Ernest Sosa's recent criticism of Richard Fumerton's acquaintance theory. Sosa argues that Fumerton's account of non-inferential justification falls prey to the problem of the speckled hen. I argue that Sosa's criticisms are both illuminating and interesting but that Fumerton's theory can escape the problem of the speckled hen. More generally, the paper shows that an internalist account of non-inferential justification can survive the powerful objections of the Sellarsian dilemma and the problem of the speckled hen.
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  28. Ian Proops (forthcoming). Russellian Acquaintance Revisited. Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    In Bertrand Russell’s writings during the first two decades of the Twentieth Century there occur two rather different distinctions that involve his much-discussed, technical notion of acquaintance. The first is the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description; the second, the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge of truths. This article examines the nature and philosophical purpose of these two distinctions, while also tracing the evolution of Russell’s notion of acquaintance. It argues that, when he first expressly (...)
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  29. Bertrand Russell (1917). ``Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description&Quot. In Mysticism and Logic. London: Longmans Green.
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  30. Bertrand Russell (1910). Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11:108--28.
  31. Susanna Siegel (2013). Are There Edenic Grounds of Perceptual Intentionality? Analysis 73 (2):329-344.
    This is a critical piece on *The Character of Consciousness* by David Chalmers. It focuses on Chalmers's two-stage view of perceptual content and the epistemology of perceptual belief that flows from this theory, and criticizes his theories of Edenic concepts, perceptual acquaintance, and perceptual belief.
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  32. Nicholas D. Smith (1979). Knowledge by Acquaintance and 'Knowing What' in Plato's Republic. Dialogue 18 (03):281-288.
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  33. Jennifer Vaughan Taylor (2008). Acquaintance and Possible Worlds. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):393-400.
    I argue that if a subject's acquaintance with an object is necessary for him to think about and refer to the object, then the content of his thought cannot be a set of metaphysically possible worlds. Acquaintance resets what possibilities there are; it affects the powers of representation, and does not only limit the range of possibilities. If acquaintance restricts what a subject can think about, the theorist cannot specify what possibilities are open to the subject simply in terms of (...)
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  34. Cheng-Hung Tsai (forthcoming). Knowledge of Language in Action. Philosophical Explorations:1-22.
    Knowledge of a language is a kind of knowledge, the possession of which enables a speaker to understand and perform a variety of linguistic actions in that language. In this paper, I pursue an agency-oriented approach to knowledge of language. I begin by examining two major agency-oriented models of knowledge of language: Michael Dummett's Implicit Knowledge Model and Jennifer Hornsby's Practical Knowledge Model. I argue that each of these models is inadequate for different reasons. I present an Acquaintance Knowledge Model, (...)
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  35. Cheng-Hung Tsai (2010). Practical Knowledge of Language. Philosophia 38 (2):331-341.
    One of the main challenges in the philosophy of language is determining the form of knowledge of the rules of language. Michael Dummett has put forth the view that knowledge of the rules of language is a kind of implicit knowledge; some philosophers have mistakenly conceived of this type of knowledge as a kind of knowledge-that . In a recent paper in this journal, Patricia Hanna argues against Dummett’s knowledge-that view and proposes instead a knowledge-how view in which knowledge of (...)
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  36. Chris Tucker (forthcoming). Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification. In Michael Bergmann & Brett Coppenger (eds.), Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press.
    Classical acquaintance theory is any version of classical foundationalism that appeals to acquaintance in order to account for non-inferential justification. Such theories are well suited to account for a kind of infallible non-inferential justification. Why am I justified in believing that I’m in pain? An initially attractive (partial) answer is that I’m acquainted with my pain. But since I can’t be acquainted with what isn’t there, acquaintance with my pain guarantees that I’m in pain. What’s less clear is whether, given (...)
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Knowledge How
  1. Marcus P. Adams (2009). Empirical Evidence and the Knowledge-That/Knowledge-How Distinction. Synthese 170 (1):97 - 114.
    In this article I have two primary goals. First, I present two recent views on the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how (Stanley and Williamson, The Journal of Philosophy 98(8):411–444, 2001; Hetherington, Epistemology futures, 2006). I contend that neither of these provides conclusive arguments against the distinction. Second, I discuss studies from neuroscience and experimental psychology that relate to this distinction. Having examined these studies, I then defend a third view that explains certain relevant data from these studies by positing the (...)
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  2. R. T. Allen (1991). Practical Knowledge. Tradition and Discovery 17 (1-2):46-47.
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  3. Torin Alter (2001). Know-How, Ability, and the Ability Hypothesis. Theoria 67 (3):229-39.
    David Lewis (1983, 1988) and Laurence Nemirow (1980, 1990) claim that knowing what an experience is like is knowing-how, not knowing-that. They identify this know-how with the abilities to remember, imagine, and recognize experiences, and Lewis labels their view ‘the Ability Hypothesis’. The Ability Hypothesis has intrinsic interest. But Lewis and Nemirow devised it specifically to block certain anti-physicalist arguments due to Thomas Nagel (1974, 1986) and Frank Jackson (1982, 1986). Does it?
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  4. Julia Annas (2001). Moral Knowledge as Practical Knowledge. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (02):236-.
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  5. Constantin Antonopoulos (1997). Time as Non-Observational Knowledge: How to Straighten Out Δeδt≥H. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (2):165 – 183.
    The Energy-Time Uncertainty (ETU) has always been a problem-ridden relation, its problems stemming uniquely from the perplexing question of how to understand this mysterious Δ t . On the face of it (and, indeed, far deeper than that), we always know what time it is. Few theorists were ignorant of the fact that time in quantum mechanics is exogenously defined, in no ways intrinsically related to the system. Time in quantum theory is an independent parameter, which simply means independently known (...)
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  6. Kent Bach (2012). Review, Jason Stanley, Know How. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Stanley’s insightful new book refines his earlier formulation of intellectualism. Indeed, it does a whole lot more, but leaves open some tough questions. He makes a powerful case for the view that knowing how to do something is to know, of a certain way, that one could do that thing in that way. But he says surprisingly little about what ways are, and how they might differ, depending on the kind of case. And he doesn't exclude the possibility that in (...)
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  7. Carla Bagnoli (2012). Morality as Practical Knowledge. Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):61-70.
    In his original essay, The Form of Practical Knowledge, Stephen Engstrom argues for placing Kant’s ethics in the tradition of practical cognitivism. My remarks are intended to highlight the merits of his interpretation in contrast to intuitionism and constructivism, understood as ways of appropriating Kant’s legacy. In particular, I will focus on two issues: first, the special character of practical knowledge—as opposed to theoretical knowledge and craft expertise; and second, the apparent tension between the demands of morality and the requirements (...)
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