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  1. A. Alfred (1999). Knopf. Hoag, R.(1992)'JS Mill's Language of Pleasures'. Utilitas 4 (247):78.
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  2. Kenneth J. Arrow (2006). Freedom and Social Choice: Notes in the Margin. Utilitas 18 (1):52-60.
    I comment on Amartya Sen's study of the relations between the analysis of freedom and the theory of social choice. Two of his themes are analysed with regard to their contribution to an analytic understanding of the issues. These are: (1) the multiple interpretations of the concept of ‘preferences’ as a foundation for the formal conceptualizations of social choice and freedom; and (2) some issues in the formalization of freedom as a value to be compared with outcomes. Under (2), I (...)
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  3. J. S. Bentham (2000). Mill, and Qualitative Hedonism'. Utilitas 12 (2).
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  4. I. Introductory Comment (1995). Justice, Desert, and the Repugnant Conclusion. Utilitas 7 (2).
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  5. S. Consensus (1995). Justice, Desert, and the Repugnant Conclusion. Utilitas 7 (2).
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  6. Jelle de Boer (2013). Scaling Happiness. Philosophical Psychology:1-16.
    This paper focuses on a particular method which is used in contemporary empirical happiness studies, namely measuring people’s happiness by scoring their emotions (Kahneman is a prominent scholar). I examine the presupposition in this field that emotion scores can be added or subtracted, that throughout affective space runs a straight axis that plots hedonic tone or pleasure.
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  7. I. Definitions (1997). Agent-Neutral Reasons: Are They for Everyone? Utilitas 9 (2).
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  8. Marc Fleurbaey (2010). Shlomi Segall, Health, Luck, and Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), Pp. X + 239. Utilitas 22 (4):503-506.
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  9. Kasper Lippert-rasmussen (2004). Are Some Inequalities More Unequal Than Others? Nature, Nurture and Equality. Utilitas 16 (2):193-219.
    Many egalitarians believe that social inequalities are worse than natural ones. Others deny that one can coherently distinguish between them. I argue that although one can separate the influence of these factors by an analysis of variance, the distinction is morally irrelevant. It might be alleged that my argument in favour of moral irrelevance attacks a straw man. While I think this allegation is incorrect, I accommodate it by distinguishing between four claims that are related to, and sometimes confused with, (...)
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  10. Bryan Lueck (forthcoming). The Terrifying Concupiscence of Belonging: Noise and Evil in the Work of Michel Serres. Symposium.
    In this paper I examine the conception of evil and the prescriptions for its mitigation that Michel Serres has articulated in his recent works. My explication of Serres’s argument centers on the claim, advanced in many different texts, that practices of exclusion, motivated by what he calls “the terrifying concupiscence of belonging,” are the primary sources of evil in the world. After explicating Serres’s argument, I examine three important objections, concluding that Serres overestimates somewhat the role of exclusion in perpetuating (...)
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  11. Dennis Mckerlie (2001). Dimensions of Equality. Utilitas 13 (03):263-.
    The egalitarian values of equality and priority are standardly given maximal scope in that they are applied to the overall condition of peoples' lives and to temporally complete lifetimes. They are also standardly restricted to interpersonal choices. This paper argues that egalitarian values can also reasonably be applied to particular dimensions of lives, to people at particular times, and to choices made about one person's life. It contends that these special applications of egalitarianism are easier to defend in the case (...)
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  12. Dennis Mckerlie (1994). Equality and Priority. Utilitas 6 (01):25-.
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  13. David Miller (2004). Matt Cavanagh, Against Equality of Opportunity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), Pp. VIII + 223. Utilitas 16 (2):225-227.
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  14. Kevin Mulligan (forthcoming). Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Personal Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Pp. Xv + 185. Utilitas:1-3.
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  15. Mariko Nakano-Okuno & Alan Ryan (2011). To Utilitas, Was Entitled Henry Sidgwick: Happiness and Religion, Edited by Placido Bucolo, Roger Crisp, and Bart Schultz, and Published by the Dipartimento di Scienze Umane di Catania, in 2007. Essays by Giuseppe Acocella, Placido Bucolo, Roger Crisp, Alan Gauld. Utilitas 23 (2).
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  16. Serena Olsaretti (2011). Mark Stein, Distributive Justice and Disability: Utilitarianism Against Egalitarianism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), Pp. X + 304. Utilitas 23 (03):355-358.
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  17. Martin Peterson & Sven Ove Hansson (2005). Equality and Priority. Utilitas 17 (3):299-309.
    This article argues that, contrary to the received view, prioritarianism and egalitarianism are not jointly incompatible theories in normative ethics. By introducing a distinction between weighing and aggregating, the authors show that the seemingly conflicting intuitions underlying prioritarianism and egalitarianism are consistent. The upshot is a combined position, equality-prioritarianism, which takes both prioritarian and egalitarian considerations into account in a technically precise manner. On this view, the moral value of a distribution of well-being is a product of two factors: the (...)
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  18. M. Qizilbash (2006). Capability, Adaptation and Happiness in Sen and JS Mill. Utilitas 18 (1):20-32.
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  19. Mozaffar Qizilbash (2011). Sugden's Critique of the Capability Approach. Utilitas 23 (1):25-51.
    In comparing Sen's work with Mill's, Sugden criticizes Sen's capability approach because it may be applied in such a way that society or theorists judge what is best for people and potentially restrict liberty on that basis. Sugden cites Nussbaum's work as evidence in making his case. Sugden's critique of Sen's approach succeeds on a narrow reading of it. On that reading Sen is also critical of it because it does not leave enough room for liberty. On a broad reading, (...)
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  20. Michael Quinn (2014). Bentham on Mensuration: Calculation and Moral Reasoning. Utilitas 26 (1):61-104.
    This article argues that Bentham was committed to attempting to measure the outcomes of rules by calculating the values of the pains and pleasures to which they gave rise. That pleasure was preferable to pain, and greater pleasure to less, were, for Bentham, foundational premises of rationality, whilst to abjure calculation was to abjure rationality. However, Bentham knew that the experience of pleasure and pain, the entities which provided his objective moral standard, was not only subjective, and only indirectly accessible (...)
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  21. Marc Ramsay (2005). Teleological Egalitarianism Vs. The Slogan. Utilitas 17 (1):93-116.
    The Slogan holds that one situation cannot be worse (or better) than another unless there is someone for whom it is worse (or better). This principle appears to provide the basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Larry Temkin, however, argues that the Slogan is not a plausible moral ideal, since it stands against not just teleological egalitarianism, but also values such as freedom, rights, autonomy, virtue and desert. I argue that the Slogan is a plausible moral principle, one (...)
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  22. Soran Reader & Gillian Brock (2004). Needs, Moral Demands and Moral Theory. Utilitas 16 (3):251-266.
    In this article we argue that the concept of need is as vital for moral theory as it is for moral life. In II we analyse need and its normativity in public and private moral practice. In III we describe simple cases which exemplify the moral demandingness of needs, and argue that the significance of simple cases for moral theory is obscured by the emphasis in moral philosophy on unusual cases. In IV we argue that moral theories are inadequate if (...)
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  23. Massimo Renzo (2013). Fairness, Self-Deception and Political Obligation. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    I offer a new account of fair-play obligations for non-excludable benefits received from the state. Firstly, I argue that non-acceptance of these benefits frees recipients of fairness obligations only when a counterfactual condition is met; i.e. when non-acceptance would hold up in the closest possible world in which recipients do not hold motivationally-biased beliefs triggered by a desire to free-ride. Secondly, I argue that because of common mechanisms of self-deception there will be recipients who reject these benefits without meeting the (...)
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  24. English Law Reporting, W. R. Cornish, G. De N. Clark, Thomas Reid, James E. Crimmins, Alan Carter, David Garland, Judith Shklar & John Belchem (1992). Welfare, Happiness, and Pleasure LW SUMNER 199 Jeremy Bentham and the Real Property Commission of 1828. Utilitas 4 (2).
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  25. Jonathan Riley (1993). On Quantities and Qualities of Pleasure. Utilitas 5 (02):291-.
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  26. Mauro Rossi (2011). Degrees of Preference and Degrees of Preference Satisfaction. Utilitas 23 (03):316-323.
    The standard view holds that the degree to which an individual's preferences are satisfied is simply the degree to which the individual prefers the prospect that is realized to the other prospects in her preference domain. In this article, I reject the standard view by showing that it violates one fundamental intuition about degrees of preference satisfaction.
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  27. Amartya Sen (2006). Reason, Freedom and Well-Being. Utilitas 18 (1):80-96.
    I am embarrassed at being placed in the dizzying company of one of the truly great thinkers in the world. The similarities between Mill's ideas and mine partly reflect, of course, his influence on my thinking. But I also discuss some difficulties in taking Mill's whole theory without modification, since there are internal tensions within it. In a paper I published in 1967, I tried to discuss how Mill's willingness to hold on to some contrary positions depended on the nature (...)
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  28. G. W. Smith (1996). David Lyons, Rights, Welfare, and Mill's Moral Theory and Necip Fikri Alican, Mill's Principle of Utility: A Defense of John Stuart Mill's Notorious Proof. Utilitas 8:127-129.
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  29. L. W. Sumner (2006). Utility and Capability. Utilitas 18 (1):1-19.
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  30. D. A. Lloyd Thomas (1995). Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993, Pp. Xi + 222. Utilitas 7 (02):327-.
  31. Patrick Tomlin (2012). On Fairness and Claims. Utilitas 24 (2):200-213.
    Perhaps the best-known theory of fairness is John Broome’s: that fairness is the proportional satisfaction of claims. In this article, I question whether claims are the appropriate focus for a theory of fairness, at least as Broome understands them in his current theory. If fairness is the proportionate satisfaction of claims, I argue, then the following would be true: fairness could not help determine the correct distribution of claims; fairness could not be used to evaluate the distribution of claims; fairness (...)
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  32. Orn Tannsj O. Torbj (2008). Egalitarianism and the Putative Paradoxes of Population Ethics. Utilitas 20 (2).
  33. O. F. Well-Being (2008). Well-Being, Autonomy, and the Horizon Problem. Utilitas 20 (2).
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  34. T. M. Wilkinson (2003). Against Dworkin's Endorsement Constraint. Utilitas 15 (02):175-.
    Ronald Dworkin argues on the basis of a theory of well-being that critical paternalism is self-defeating. People must endorse their lives if they are to benefit. This is the endorsement constraint and this paper rejects it. For certain kinds of important mistakes that people can make in their lives, the endorsement constraint is either incredible or too narrow to rule out as much paternalism as Dworkin wants. The endorsement constraint cannot be interpreted to give sensible judgements when people change their (...)
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  35. Andrew Williams (2012). The Priority View Bites the Dust? Utilitas 24 (03):315-331.
    This article distinguishes between a telic and a deontic version of Derek Parfit's influential Priority View. Employing the distinction, it shows that the existence of variations in how intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts should be resolved fails to provide a compelling case in favour of relational egalitarianism and against all pure versions of the Priority View. In addition, the article argues that those variations are better understood as providing counterevidence to certain distribution-sensitive versions of consequentialism.
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  36. Jurgen Wispelaerdee (2000). Andrew Mason (Ed.), Ideals of Equality, Oxford, Blackwell, 1998, Pp. Xi + 114. Utilitas 12 (02):243-.
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  37. Jurgen Wispelaerdee (2000). Andrew Mason (Ed.), Ideals of Equality, Oxford, Blackwell, 1998, Pp. Xi + 114. Utilitas 12 (02):243-.
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  38. Jurgen De Wispelaere (2000). Andrew Mason (Ed.), Ideals of Equality, Oxford, Blackwell, 1998, Pp. Xi + 114. Utilitas 12 (2):243-248.
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Agent-Relative Value
  1. C. D. Broad (1942). Certain Features in Moore's Ethical Doctrines. In P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Evanston and Chicago.
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  2. John Broome (1995). Skorupski on Agent-Neutrality. Utilitas 7 (02):315-.
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  3. Christian Coons (2012). Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Personal Value. [REVIEW] Ethics 123 (1):183-188.
  4. Guy Fletcher (2012). Resisting Buck-Passing Accounts of Prudential Value. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):77-91.
    This paper aims to cast doubt upon a certain way of analysing prudential value (or good for ), namely in the manner of a ‘buck-passing’ analysis. It begins by explaining why we should be interested in analyses of good for and the nature of buck-passing analyses generally (§I). It moves on to considering and rejecting two sets of buck-passing analyses. The first are analyses that are likely to be suggested by those attracted to the idea of analysing good for in (...)
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  5. Thomas Hurka (2006). Value and Friendship: A More Subtle View. Utilitas 18 (3):232-242.
    T. M. Scanlon has cited the value of friendship in arguing against a ‘teleological’ view of value which says that value inheres only in states of affairs and demands only that we promote it. This article argues that, whatever the teleological view's final merits, the case against it cannot be made on the basis of friendship. The view can capture Scanlon's claims about friendship if it holds, as it can consistently with its basic ideas, that (i) friendship is a higher-level (...)
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  6. Christine M. Korsgaard (2013). The Relational Nature of the Good. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8:1.
  7. Hugh LaFollette (1996). Personal Relationships: Love, Identity and Morality. Blackwell.
    "This admirably clear and engaging work ... is broadly accessible... and is informed by social science research. Yet it is also thoroughly philosophical, delving into problems in ethics, epistemology, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language.... Let us hope that LaFollette continues to tackle these problems with the clarify and rigor he shows here.".
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  8. Hugh LaFollette (1995). Morality and Personal Relationships. In Personal Relationships: Love, Identity, and Morality. Blackwell.
    Throughout this book, I made frequent reference to a wide range of moral issues: honesty, jealousy, sexual fidelity, commitment, paternalism, caring, etc. This suggests there is an intricate connection between morality and personal relationships. There is. Of course personal relationships do not always promote moral values, nor do people find all relationships salutary. Some friendships, marriages, and kin relationships are anything but healthy or valuable. We all know (and perhaps are in) some relationships which hinder personal growth, undermine moral values, (...)
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  9. Kris McDaniel (2014). A Moorean View of the Value of Lives. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (4):23-46.
    Can we understand being valuable for in terms of being valuable? Three different kinds of puzzle cases suggest that the answer is negative. In what follows, I articulate a positive answer to this question, carefully present the three puzzle cases, and then explain how a friend of the positive answer can successfully respond to them. This response requires us to distinguish different kinds of value bearers, rather than different kinds of value, and to hold that among the value bearers are (...)
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  10. David Mcnaughton & Piers Rawling (2001). Achievement, Welfare and Consequentialism. Analysis 61 (2):156–162.
    significant role for accomplishment thereby admits a ‘Trojan Horse’ (267).1 To abandon hedonism in favour of a conception of well-being that incorporates achievement is to take the first step down a slippery slope toward the collapse of the other two pillars of utilitarian morality: welfarism and consequentialism. We shall argue that Crisp’s arguments do not support these conclusions. We begin with welfarism. Crisp defines it thus: ‘Well-being is the only value. Everything good must be good for some being or beings’ (...)
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  11. David McNaughton & Piers Rawling (1995). Agent-Relativity and Terminological Inexactitudes. Utilitas 7 (02):319-.
  12. David McNaughton & Piers Rawling (1995). Value and Agent-Relative Reasons. Utilitas 7 (01):31-.
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