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  1. Robert J. Ackermann (1986). Science and Scepticism. Philosophical Books 27 (1):50-54.
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  2. Joseph Agassi (2008). Philosophy From a Skeptical Perspective. Cambridge University Press.
    One of the questions that philosophers discuss is: How can we avoid, or at least reduce, errors when explaining the world? The skeptical answer to this question is: We cannot avoid errors since no statement is certain or even definitely plausible, but we can eliminate some past errors. This book advocates the skeptical position and discusses its practical applications in science, ethics, aesthetics, and politics. It brings philosophy down to earth and comprises an outline of a skeptical guide to the (...)
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  3. Rogers Albritton (2011). On a Form of Skeptical Argument From Possibility. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):1-24.
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  4. John Anderson (1935). Scepticism and Construction. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 13:151.
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  5. Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri, Forward Induction.
    Gian Aldo Antonelli and Cristina Bicchieri. Forward Induction.
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  6. Julian Baggini (2011). The Sceptical Ethicist. The Philosophers' Magazine 13:37-39.
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  7. Annette C. Baier (2009). Hume's Skeptical Crisis. [REVIEW] Hume Studies 35 (1/2):231-235.
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  8. Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans (2013). Schaffer's Demon. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):552-559.
    Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has summoned a new sort of demon – which he calls the debasing demon – that apparently threatens all of our purported knowledge. We show that any debasing skeptical argument must attack the justification condition and can do so only if a plausible thesis about justification is false.
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  9. Jonathan Barnes (2007). Sextan Scepticism. In Dominic Scott (ed.), Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat. Oup Oxford.
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  10. Ron Barnette (2003). Review of" Skeptical Philosophy for Everyone". [REVIEW] Essays in Philosophy 4 (2):16.
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  11. John W. Bender (2003). Skepticism, Justification and the Trustworthiness Argument. In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer. 263--280.
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  12. Richard Bett (2008). What Kind of Self Can a Greek Sceptic Have? In Pauliina Remes & Juha Sihvola (eds.), Ancient Philosophy of the Self. Springer. 139--154.
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  13. John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter (1997). The Validation of Induction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):62 – 76.
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  14. Max Black (1966). The Raison d'Être of Inductive Argument. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (3):177-204.
  15. M. Bonazzi (2003). Rec.: J. Sihvola (Ed.), Ancient Scepticism and the Sceptical Tradition (Helsinki 2000). Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 58:161-164.
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  16. Anthony L. Brueckner (1997). Is Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Incoherent? Analysis 57 (4):287-90.
    Gary Ebbs has argued that skepticism regarding knowledge of the contents of one's own mental states cannot even be coherently formulated. This articles is a reply to that argument.
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  17. Otavio Bueno (2008). Relativism and Scepticism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):247 – 254.
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  18. Sarah Buss (1999). Practical Induction. Philosophical Review 108 (4):571-575.
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  19. Charles A. Campbell (1932). Scepticism and Construction: Bradley's Sceptical Principle as the Basis of Constructive Philosophy. Journal of Philosophy 29 (23):637-639.
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  20. James Cargile (2000). Skepticism and Possibilities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):157-171.
    One skeptical strategy against A’s claim to know that P is to hold that it is logically possible for someone to have the same “base” for P as A does in spite of its not being true that P. Philosophical replies have focussed on showing that these are not genuine possibilities. Whether they are can be an interesting question of metaphysics, but it is argued in this paper that this metaphysical discussion is not the proper focus for an assessment of (...)
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  21. Rudolf Carnap (1946). Remarks on Induction and Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 6 (4):590-602.
  22. Curtis L. Carter (1973). Skepticism and Moral Principles Modern Ethics in Review. [New University Press].
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  23. Philip E. Catton, The Justification(s) of Induction(S).
    Induction is ‘the glory of science and the scandal of philosophy’. I diagnose why. I call my solution a “disappearance theory of induction”: inductive inferences are not themselves arguments, but they synthesise manifold reasons that are. Yet the form of all these underlying arguments is not inductive at all, but rather deductive. Both in science and in the wider practical sphere, responsible people seek the most measured way to understand their situation. The most measured understanding possible is thick with arguments (...)
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  24. David Christensen (1993). Switched-Words Skepticism: A Case Study in Semantical Anti-Skeptical Argument. Philosophical Studies 71 (1):33 - 58.
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  25. Stephen R. L. Clark (2012). Folly to the Greeks: Good Reasons to Give Up Reason. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4:93-113.
    A discussion of why a strong doctrine of 'reason' may not be worth sustaining in the face of modern scientific speculation, and the difficulties this poses for scientific rationality, together with comments on the social understanding of religion, and why we might wish to transcend common sense.
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  26. James Van Cleve (1984). Reliability, Justification, and the Problem of Induction. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):555-567.
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  27. Andrew D. Cling (1997). Epistemic Levels and the Problem of the Criterion. Philosophical Studies 88 (2):109-140.
    The problem of the criterion says that we can know a proposition only if we first know a criterion of truth and vice versa, hence, we cannot know any proposition or any criterion of truth. The epistemic levels response says that since knowledge does not require knowledge about knowledge, we can know a proposition without knowing a criterion of truth. This response (advocated by Chisholm and Van Cleve) presupposes that criteria of truth are epistemic principles. In general, however, criteria of (...)
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  28. Robert C. Coburn (1961). Braithwaite's Inductive Justification of Induction. Philosophy of Science 28 (1):65-71.
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  29. Mark Collier (2008). Two Puzzles in Hume's Epistemology. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (4):301 - 314.
    There are two major puzzles in Hume’s epistemology. The first involves Hume’s fall into despair in the conclusion of Book One of the Treatise. When Hume reflects back upon the results of his research, he becomes so alarmed that he nearly throws his books and papers into the fire. Why did his investigations push him towards such intense skeptical sentiments? What dark discoveries did he make? The second puzzle concerns the way in which Hume emerges from this skeptical crisis and (...)
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  30. Cláudio Costa (2009). The Skeptical Deal with Our Concept of External Reality. Abstracta 5 (1):43-76.
    The following paper contains a new refutation of the skeptical argument concerning our knowledge of the external world. The central idea is that the argument fails because it presupposes ambiguous attributions of reality. Once these ambiguities are identified, they make the argument either trivial or equivocal. Differently from others, this refutation does not lead us to undesired results.
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  31. George Couvalis (2004). Is Induction Epistemologically Prior to Deduction? Ratio 17 (1):28–44.
    Most philosophers hold that the use of our deductive powers confers an especially strong warrant on some of our mathematical and logical beliefs. By contrast, many of the same philosophers hold that it is a matter of serious debate whether any inductive inferences are cogent. That is, they hold that we might well have no warrant for inductively licensed beliefs, such as generalizations. I argue that we cannot know that we know logical and mathemati- cal truths unless we use induction. (...)
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  32. Yuval Dolev (2004). Why Induction is No Cure for Baldness. Philosophical Investigations 27 (4):328–344.
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  33. Brian Ellis (1988). Solving the Problem of Induction Using a Values-Based Epistemology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2):141-160.
  34. J. D. G. Evans (1992). The Toils of Scepticism. Philosophical Books 33 (4):203-205.
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  35. Pirooz Fatoorchi (2013). On Intellectual Skepticism: A Selection of Skeptical Arguments and Ṭūsī's Criticisms, with Some Comparative Notes. Philosophy East and West 63 (2):213-250.
    This essay deals with a selected part of an epistemological controversy provided by Tūsī in response to the skeptical arguments reported by Rāzī that is related to what might be called "intellectual skepticism," or skepticism regarding the judgments of the intellect, particularly in connection with self-evident principles. It will be shown that Rāzī has cited and exposed a position that seems to be no less than a medieval version of empiricism. Tūsī, in contrast, has presented us with a position that (...)
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  36. James K. Feibleman (1954). On the Theory of Induction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 14 (3):332-342.
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  37. Paul K. Feyerabend (1964). A Note on the Problem of Induction. Journal of Philosophy 61 (12):349-353.
  38. Antony Flew & Janet Radcliffe Richards (1981). The Sceptical Feminist. Philosophical Quarterly 31 (125):380.
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  39. Robert J. Fogelin (1984). Taking Skepticism Seriously. Journal of Philosophy 81 (10):552.
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  40. J. William Forgie (1986). Wittgenstein, Skepticism and Non-Inductive Evidence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 (4):269.
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  41. Peter S. Fosl (1998). The Bibliographic Bases of Hume's Understanding of Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 36 (2):261-278.
    The Bibliographic Bases of Hume's Understanding of Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonism PETER S. FOSL N~q~e ~vaoo 6t~ttoxe~v' Epicharmus OVER THE PAST FORTY YEARS, the work of many scholars has served to advance and secure a hermeneutical approach to the development of modern philoso- phy first articulated by Richard H. Popkin3 The central proposition upon which this approach turns is that the discovery and application of ancient I am grateful to Richard Popkin, Julia Annas , Jonathan Barnes , Craig Walton , (...)
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  42. Richard Fumerton (1992). Skepticism and Reasoning to the Best Explanation. Philosophical Issues 2:149-169.
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  43. Neva G. Mihalić (2012). Maja Hudoletnjak Grgić, Davor Pećnjak, Filip Grgić (ur.), Aspekti uma. Prolegomena 11 (2):325-331.
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  44. André Gallois (1993). Is Global Scepticism Self-Refuting? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):36 – 46.
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  45. Peter Gärdenfors (1990). Induction, Conceptual Spaces and AI. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):78-95.
    A computational theory of induction must be able to identify the projectible predicates, that is to distinguish between which predicates can be used in inductive inferences and which cannot. The problems of projectibility are introduced by reviewing some of the stumbling blocks for the theory of induction that was developed by the logical empiricists. My diagnosis of these problems is that the traditional theory of induction, which started from a given (observational) language in relation to which all inductive rules are (...)
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  46. Eve Garrard (2007). Living with Scepticism. The Philosophers' Magazine 38:49-50.
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  47. Benjamin Gibbs (1969). Putnam on Brains and Behaviour. Analysis 30 (December):53-55.
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  48. J. H. Gill (1968). COVAL, S. - "Scepticism and The First Person". [REVIEW] Mind 77:294.
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  49. Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Skepticism About Other Minds. In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury.
    In this paper I distinguish two ways of raising a sceptical problem of others' minds: via a problem concerning the possibility of error or via a problem concerning sources of knowledge. I give some reason to think that the second problem raises a more interesting problem in accounting for our knowledge of others’ minds and consider proposed solutions to the problem.
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  50. D. W. Gotshalk (1932). Uniformity and Induction. Journal of Philosophy 29 (6):141-152.
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