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  1. Benjamin Franklin Armstrong (1980). Skepticism and Theories of Justification. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania
    An equally important part of the discussion concerns the role that doubt must play in inquiries about theories of justification. I argue that Chisholm's efforts to remove such considerations from these inquiries are mistaken. The importance of doubt is a point about which Wittgenstein has much to say in On Certainty. I try to bring to bear some of his insights. ;An important part of my discussion concerns where one is not to start when one is dealing with skeptical arguments. (...)
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  2. Micah Baize (2012). The Skeptic’s Predicament. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):147-155.
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  3. Thomas Bonk (2003). Scepticism Under New Colors? Stroud's Criticism of Carnap. In Language, Truth and Knowledge. Kluwer 133--147.
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  4. Richard Bosley (1993). On Knowing That One Knows the Logic of Skepticism and Theory.
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  5. Christopher T. Buford & Anthony Brueckner (2015). Effective Skeptical Arguments. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (1):55-60.
    _ Source: _Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 55 - 60 Peter Murphy has argued that effective skeptical scenarios all have the following feature: the subject involved in the scenario does not know that some ordinary proposition is true, even if the proposition is true in the scenario. So the standard “false belief” conception of skeptical scenarios is wrong, since the belief of the targeted proposition need not be mistaken in the scenario. Murphy then argues that this observation engenders a problem (...)
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  6. Benjamin Gibbs (1969). Putnam on Brains and Behaviour. Analysis 30 (December):53-55.
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Brains in Vats
  1. Jon Altschul (2011). Reliabilism and Brains in Vats. Acta Analytica 26 (3):257-272.
    According to epistemic internalism, the only facts that determine the justificational status of a belief are facts about the subject’s own mental states, like beliefs and experiences. Externalists instead hold that certain external facts, such as facts about the world or the reliability of a belief-producing mechanism, affect a belief’s justificational status. Some internalists argue that considerations about evil demon victims and brains in vats provide excellent reason to reject externalism: because these subjects are placed in epistemically unfavorable settings, externalism (...)
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  2. David L. Anderson (1992). What is Realistic About Putnam's Internal Realism? Philosophical Topics 20 (1):49-83.
    Failure to recognize the "realistic" motivations for Putnam's commitment to internal realism has led to a widely shared misunderstanding of Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism. Realist critics of these arguments frequently offer rebuttals that fail to confront his arguments. Simply put, Putnam's arguments --the brains in a vat argument as well as the model-theoretic argument -- are "reductios" that are intended to show that "metaphysical realism itself is not sufficiently realistic". If that claim can be substantiated then Putnam can go (...)
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  3. Yuval Avnur (2011). An Old Problem for the New Rationalism. Synthese 183 (2):175-185.
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  4. Yemima Ben-Menahem (2005). Putnam on Skepticism. In Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press 125--55.
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  5. Hans Bernhard Schmid (2003). Can Brains in Vats Think as a Team? Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):201-217.
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  6. T. Black (2002). A Moorean Response to Brain-in-a-Vat Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):148 – 163.
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  7. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2006). A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):381–390.
    The most prominent arguments for scepticism in modern epistemology employ closure principles of some kind. To begin my discussion of such arguments, consider Simple Knowledge Closure (SKC): (SKC) (Kxt[p] ∧ (p → q)) → Kxt[q].1 Assuming its truth for the time being, the sceptic can use (SKC) to reason from the two assumptions that, firstly, we don’t know ¬sh and that, secondly, op entails ¬sh to the conclusion that we don’t know op, where ‘op’ and ‘sh’ are shorthand for ‘ordinary (...)
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  8. C. Johnsen Bredo (2003). Of Brains in Vats, Whatever Brains in Vats May Be. Philosophical Studies 112 (3):225 - 249.
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  9. C. D. Broad (1921). The External World. Mind 30 (120):385-408.
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  10. Jessica Brown, Proof.
    Davies and Wright have recently diagnosed the felt inadequacy of Moore’s response to the sceptic in terms of a failure of transmission of warrant. They argue that warrant fails to transmit across the following key inference: I have hands, if I have hands then I am not a BIV, so I am not a BIV, on the grounds that this inference cannot be used to rationally overcome doubt about its conclusion, and cannot strengthen one’s epistemic position with respect to the (...)
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  11. A. Brueckner (2011). Debasing scepticism. Analysis 71 (2):295-297.
    In this paper, I will clarify Jonathan Schaffer's; debasing scepticism, highlighting its logical structure. 1 In many current discussions of scepticism, its scope is limited to propositions about the external world which, if known at all, are known a posteriori. The standard sceptical set-up goes as follows. The sceptic specifies a sceptical hypothesis, or counterpossibility, that is incompatible with the external-world propositions that I claim to know. The hypothesis – e.g. that I am a brain in a vat – is (...)
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  12. A. L. Brueckner (2000). Klein on Closure and Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):139-151.
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  13. Anthony Brueckner (2008). Reply to Coffman on Closure and Skepticism. Synthese 162 (2):167–171.
    E. J. Coffman defends Peter Klein’s work on epistemic closure against various objections that I raised in an earlier paper. In this paper, I respond to Coffman.
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  14. Anthony Brueckner (2006). Johnsen on Brains in Vats. Philosophical Studies 129 (3):435 - 440.
    This is a response to a recent Philosophical Studies article by Bredo Johnsen, in which he makes a number of criticisms of Putnamian anti-skeptical arguments.
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  15. Anthony Brueckner (1995). Scepticism and the Causal Theory of Reference. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (179):199-201.
  16. Anthony Brueckner (1994). Ebbs on Skepticism, Objectivity and Brains in Vats. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75:77-87.
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  17. Anthony Brueckner (1992). Conceiving One's Envatment While Denying Metaphysical Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):469 – 474.
    J.D. Collier sees Putnam as arguing that metaphysical realism is false.' He sees the argument as proceeding from the background assumption that metaphysical realism has the consequence that truth is 'radically non-epistemic', so that 'an [epistemically] ideal theory could be radically wrong about the world' [3, p. 413]. But, according to Collier, Putnam argues that 'an ideal theory satisfying all of our methodological and theoretical constraints cannot be false' [3, p. 413]. Collier attempts to defend metaphysical realism against this Putnamian (...)
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  18. Anthony Brueckner (1992). If I Am a Brain in a Vat, Then I Am Not a Brain in a Vat. Mind 101 (401):123-128.
    Massimo Dell'Utri (1990) provides a reconstruction of Hilary Putnam's argument (1981, chapter 1) to show that the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is self-refuting. I will explain why the argument Dell'Utri offers us is, on the face of it, quite problematic. Then I will provide a way out of the difficulty.
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  19. Anthony Brueckner (1985). ``Skepticism and Epistemic Closure&Quot. Philosophical Topics 13:89--117.
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  20. Anthony L. Brueckner (1986). Brains in a Vat. Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):148-167.
    In chapter 1 of Reason, Truth, and History, Hilary Putnam argues from some plausible assumptions about the nature of reference to the conclusion that it is not possible that all sentient creatures are brains in a vat. If this argument is successful, it seemingly refutes an updated form of Cartesian skepticism concerning knowledge of physical objects. In this paper, I will state what I take to be the most promising interpretation of Putnam's argument. My reconstructed argument differs from an argument (...)
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  21. Anthony L. Brueckner (1985). Losing Track of the Sceptic. Analysis 45 (2):103 - 104.
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  22. Anthony L. Brueckner (1984). Why Nozick is a Sceptic. Mind 93 (370):259-264.
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  23. Anthony Brueckner & Gary Ebbs (2012). Debating Self-Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. Brains in a vat Anthony Brueckner; 2. Scepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats Gary Ebbs; 3. Ebbs on scepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats Anthony Brueckner; 4. The dialectical context of Putnam's argument that we are not brains in vats Gary Ebbs; 5. Trying to get outside your own skin Anthony Brueckner; 6. Can we take our words at face value? Gary Ebbs; 7. Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? Anthony Brueckner; 8. Is scepticism about (...)
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  24. Robert Reid Buchanan (1999). Deflationary Approaches to Scepticism. Dissertation, Mcmaster University (Canada)
    This dissertation examines a traditional philosophical problem within a novel framework. The so-called "problem of the external world" is a problem about how knowledge, and even reasonable belief, about the world are possible, and it is best characterized as the challenge to show how and why scepticism about the external world---the absurd view that such knowledge is impossible---is incorrect. My framework for the examination of this problem involves two major elements. ;The first element involves a general characterization of the nature (...)
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  25. Keith Butler (2000). Problems for Semantic Externalism and A Priori Refutations of Skeptical Arguments. Dialectica 54 (1):29-49.
    SummaryA familiar sort of argument for skepticism about the external world appeals to the evidential similarity between what is presumed to be the normal case and the case where one is a brain in a vat . An argument from Putnam has been taken by many to provide an a priori refutation of this sort of skeptical argument. The question I propose to address in this paper is whether Putnam's argument affords us an a priori refutation of skeptical arguments that (...)
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  26. Tim Button (forthcoming). Brains in Vats and Model Theory. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge University Press
    Hilary Putnam’s BIV argument first occurred to him when ‘thinking about a theorem in modern logic, the “Skolem–Löwenheim Theorem”’ (Putnam 1981: 7). One of my aims in this paper is to explore the connection between the argument and the Theorem. But I also want to draw some further connections. In particular, I think that Putnam’s BIV argument provides us with an impressively versatile template for dealing with sceptical challenges. Indeed, this template allows us to unify some of Putnam’s most enduring (...)
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  27. Tim Button (2015). The Limits of Realism. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Tim Button explores the relationship between minds, words, and world. He argues that the two main strands of scepticism are deeply related and can be overcome, but that there is a limit to how much we can show. We must position ourselves somewhere between internal realism and external realism, and we cannot hope to say exactly where.
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  28. Roberto Casati & Jérôme Dokic (1991). Brains in a Vat, Language and Metalanguage. Analysis 51 (2):91 - 93.
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  29. David J. Chalmers (2005). The Matrix as Metaphysics. In Christopher Grau (ed.), Philosophers Explore the Matrix. Oxford University Press 132.
    The Matrix presents a version of an old philosophical fable: the brain in a vat. A disembodied brain is floating in a vat, inside a scientist’s laboratory. The scientist has arranged that the brain will be stimulated with the same sort of inputs that a normal embodied brain receives. To do this, the brain is connected to a giant computer simulation of a world. The simulation determines which inputs the brain receives. When the brain produces outputs, these are fed back (...)
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  30. David Christensen (1993). Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):301-321.
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  31. John D. Collier (1990). Could I Conceive Being a Brain in a Vat? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (4):413 – 419.
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  32. Diego Cosmelli & Evan Thompson (web). Embodiment or Envatment? Reflections on the Bodily Basis of Consciousness. In J. Stewart, O. Gapenne & E Di Paolo (eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press
    Suppose that a team of neurosurgeons and bioengineers were able to remove your brain from your body, suspend it in a life-sustaining vat of liquid nutrients, and connect its neurons and nerve terminals by wires to a supercomputer that would stimulate it with electrical impulses exactly like those it normally receives when embodied. According to this brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, your envatted brain and your embodied brain would have subjectively indistinguishable mental lives. For all you know—so one argument goes—you could be (...)
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  33. Jonas Dagys (2010). Putnamian Anti-Envattor Ver. 3.00: New Features – Same Results. Problemos 77:39-48.
    The paper is devoted to a discussion and critical evaluation of antisceptical arguments in epistemology that are based on causal theory of reference, with the special focus upon the revised version of the Hilary Putnam‘s Brain-in-a-Vat argument presented by Olaf Müller. Müller claims that his argument is based on the metaphysically neutral principles of semantic externalism and disquotation, however more thorough analysis of these principles and of the possibility to use them for antisceptical purposes reveals the flaw in his argument. (...)
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  34. Marian David (1991). Neither Mentioning 'Brains in a Vat' nor Mentioning Brains in a Vat Will Prove That We Are Not Brains in a Vat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):891-896.
    In Reason, Truth, and History Hilary Putnam has presented an anti-skeptical argument purporting to prove that we are not brains in a vat. How exactly the argument goes is somewhat controversial. A number of competing "recon¬structions" have been proposed. They suffer from a defect which they share with what seems to be Putnam's own version of the argument. In this paper, I examine a very simple and rather natural reconstruction of the argument, one that does not employ any premises in (...)
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  35. David Davies (1997). Why One Shouldn’T Make an Example of a Brain in a Vat. Analysis 57 (1):51–59.
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  36. David Davies (1995). Putnam's Brain-Teaser. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):203--27.
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  37. Massimo Dell’Utri (1990). Choosing Conceptions of Realism: The Case of the Brains in a Vat. Mind 99 (393):79--90.
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  38. Keith DeRose, Externalism and Skepticism.
    A few years back, I participated in the Spindell Conference in Memphis, and gave a paper, “How Can We Know That We’re Not Brains in Vats?” (available on-line at: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/Spindell.htm). The bulk of that paper concerned responses to skepticism. I pursued an unusually radical criticism of the often-criticized “Putnam-style” responses to skepticism. To put it rather enigmatically, I argued that such responses don’t work even if they work! And I compared such responses with the type of response I favor – (...)
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  39. Keith DeRose (2000). How Can We Know That We 'Re Not Brains in Vats?'. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):121-148.
    This should be fairly close to the text of this paper as it appears in The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 121-148.
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  40. Michael Durrant (1991). Scepticism: Three Recently Presented Arguments Examined. Philosophical Investigations 14 (3):252-266.
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  41. Gary Ebbs (1992). Skepticism, Objectivity, and Brains in Vats. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):239-266.
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  42. Santiago Echeverri (forthcoming). How to Undercut Radical Skepticism. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Radical skepticism relies on the hypothesis that one could be completely cut off from the external world. In this paper, I argue that this hypothesis can be rationally motivated by means of a conceivability argument. Subsequently, I submit that this conceivability argument does not furnish a good reason to believe that one could be completely cut off from the external world. To this end, I show that we cannot adequately conceive scenarios that verify the radical skeptical hypothesis. Attempts to do (...)
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  43. Adam Elga, Why Neo Was Too Confident That He Had Escaped the Matrix.
    According to a typical skeptical hypothesis, the evidence of your senses has been massively deceptive. Venerable skeptical hypotheses include the hypotheses that you have been deceived by a powerful evil demon, that you are now having an incredibly detailed dream, and that you are a brain in a vat. It is obviously reasonable for you now to be confident that neither of the above hypotheses is true. Epistemologists have proposed many stories to explain why that is reasonable. One theory is (...)
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  44. Frank B. Farrell (1986). Putnam and the Vat-People. Philosophia 16 (2):147-160.
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