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  1. Donald C. Ainslie (2010). Adequate Ideas and Modest Scepticism in Hume's Metaphysics of Space. Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie 92 (1):39-67.
    In the Treatise of Human Nature , Hume argues that, because we have adequate ideas of the smallest parts of space, we can infer that space itself must conform to our representations of it. The paper examines two challenges to this argument based on Descartes's and Locke's treatments of adequate ideas, ideas that fully capture the objects they represent. The first challenge, posed by Arnauld in his Objections to the Meditations , asks how we can know that an idea is (...)
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  2. Donald C. Ainslie (1999). Scepticism About Persons in Book II of Hume's. Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (3).
  3. Sophie R. Allen (2002). Deepening the Controversy Over Metaphysical Realism. Philosophy 77 (4):519-541.
    A significant ontological commitment is required to sustain metaphysical realism—the view that there is a single, objective way the world is—in order to defend it from common sense objections. This involves presupposing the existence of properties (or tropes, or universals) and relations between them which define the objective structure of the world. This paper explores the grounds for accepting this ontological assumption and examines a sceptical argument which questions whether, having assumed the world is objectively divided into fundamental properties, we (...)
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  4. William P. Alston & Marcus B. Hester (eds.) (1992). Faith, Reason, and Skepticism: Essays. Temple University Press.
    INTRODUCTION William Alston opens this dialogue on faith, reason, and skepticism by arguing that if the belief-forming processes of a typical Christian are ...
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  5. Lilian Alweiss (2010). Against Cartesian Mistrust: Cavell, Husserl and the Other Mind Sceptic. Ratio 23 (3):241-259.
    This paper asks whether we should still be haunted by scepticism about other minds. It draws on the writings of Cavell and Husserl to show that there is some truth in the Cartesian premise that has given rise to scepticism about other minds, namely, that our self-awareness is of a fundamentally different type from our awareness of objects and other subjects. While this leads Cavell to argue that there is a truth to scepticism, it proves the opposite to Husserl, viz. (...)
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  6. Robert Arp (1998). Hume's Mitigated Skepticism and the Design Argument. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):539-558.
  7. Robert Audi (2008). Skepticism About A Priori Justification: Self-Evidence, Defeasibility, and Cogito Propositions. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
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  8. Yuval Avnur (2012). Mere Faith and Entitlement. Synthese 189 (2):297-315.
    The scandal to philosophy and human reason, wrote Kant, is that we must take the existence of material objects on mere faith . In contrast, the skeptical paradox that has scandalized recent philosophy is not formulated in terms of faith, but rather in terms of justification, warrant, and entitlement. I argue that most contemporary approaches to the paradox (both dogmatist/liberal and default/conservative) do not address the traditional problem that scandalized Kant, and that the status of having a warrant (or justification) (...)
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  9. Gary Banham (2010). Scepticism, Causation and Cognition. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):507-520.
  10. Jonathan Barnes (1988). Scepticism and the Arts. Apeiron 21 (2):53 - 77.
  11. Peter Baumann (2013). Knowledge and Dogmatism. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):1-19.
    There is a sceptical puzzle according to which knowledge appears to license an unacceptable kind of dogmatism. Here is a version of the corresponding sceptical argument: (1) If a subject S knows a proposition p, then it is OK for S to ignore all evidence against p as misleading; (2) It is never OK for any subject to ignore any evidence against their beliefs as misleading; (3) Hence, nobody knows anything.I distinguish between different versions of the puzzle (mainly a ‘permissibility’ (...)
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  12. Donald L. M. Baxter (2009). Hume's Theory of Space and Time in its Sceptical Context. In David Fate Norton & Jacqueline Anne Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge University Press.
  13. Gordon C. F. Bearn (1987). Reply to Martin's “A Critique of Nietzsche's Metaphysical Scepticism”. International Studies in Philosophy 19 (2):61-65.
  14. John Beaudoin (2000). Inscrutable Evil and Scepticism. Heythrop Journal 41 (3):297–302.
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  15. James Beebe (2010). Constraints on Sceptical Hypotheses. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):449 - 470.
    I examine the conditions which hypotheses must satisfy if they are to be used to raise significant sceptical challenges. I argue that sceptical hypotheses do not have to be logically, metaphysically or epistemically possible: they need only to depict scenarios subjectively indistinguishable from the actual world and to show how subjects can believe what they do while not having knowledge. I also argue that sceptical challenges can be raised against a priori beliefs, even if those beliefs are necessarily true. I (...)
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  16. Niels Ole Bernsen (1978). Knowledge: A Treatise on Our Cognitive Situation. Odense University Press.
  17. Richard Bett (2000). Nietzsche on the Skeptics and Nietzsche as Skeptic. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 82 (1):62-86.
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  18. Bhaswati Bhattacharya (1987). Absolute Skepticism, Eastern and Western. Prajñā.
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  19. Shlomo Biderman (1981). The Sceptic's Dillema: An Indian Version. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 9 (1):39-48.
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  20. John Bigelow (1994). Skeptical Realism. The Monist 77 (1):3-26.
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  21. Tim Black (2008). Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617.
    Stewart Cohen argues that several epistemological theories fall victim to the problem of easy knowledge: they allow us to know far too easily that certain sceptical hypotheses are false and that how things seem is a reliable indicator of how they are. This problem is a result of the theories' interaction with an epistemic closure principle. Cohen suggests that the theories should be modified. I argue that attempts to solve the problem should focus on closure instead; a new and plausible (...)
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  22. David Frederick Bowers (1941). Atomism, Empiricism, and Scepticism. Princeton.
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  23. Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny & Wai-Hung Wong (eds.) (2012). The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud. OUP USA.
    Barry Stroud's work has had a profound impact on a very wide array of philosophical topics, including epistemological skepticism, the nature of logical necessity, the interpretation of Hume, the interpretation of Wittgenstein, the possibility of transcendental arguments, and the metaphysical status of color and value. And yet there has heretofore been no book-length treatment of his work. The current collection aims to redress this gap, with 13 essays on Stroud's work by a diverse group of contributors including some of his (...)
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  24. Justin Broackes (1995). Common Sense, Science and Scepticism. Hume Studies 21 (1):138-139.
  25. Anthony Brueckner (2010). Essays on Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
    The guiding questions of this volume are: Can we have knowledge of the external world of things outside our minds?
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  26. Anthony Brueckner (2008). Review of Michael N. Forster, Kant and Skepticism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (7).
  27. Anthony Brueckner (2007). Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Redux. Analysis 67 (296):311–315.
  28. Anthony Brueckner (2005). Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):436–443.
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  29. Anthony Brueckner (1999). Difficulties in Generating Scepticism About Knowledge of Content. Analysis 59 (1):59–62.
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  30. Anthony Brueckner (1991). The Anti-Skeptical Epistemology of the Refutation of Idealism. Philosophical Topics 19 (1):31-45.
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  31. Anthony Brueckner (1984). Epistemic Universalizability Principles. Philosophical Studies 46 (3):297-305.
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  32. Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). The Coherence of Scepticism About Self-Knowledge. Analysis 63 (1):41-48.
  33. Anthony L. Brueckner (1986). Humean Fictions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4):655-664.
    In "Of Personal Identity,", Hume attempts to explain how one arrives at the fiction of a substantial self which retains its numerical identity through time. In "Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses," Hume offers a similar explanation of the origin of another fiction - that of objects which enjoy a continued and distinct existence. In this paper, I will argue that his pair of parallel explanations does not jointly account for the pair of fictions to be explained.
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  34. Gerd Buchdahl (1959). Sources of Scepticism in Atomic Theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (38):120-134.
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  35. Otávio Bueno (2008). Relativism and Scepticism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):247-254.
  36. A. C. (1982). The Sceptical Feminist. Review of Metaphysics 36 (1):184-186.
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  37. Joseph Campbell (2010). Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press.
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  38. Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.) (2010). Knowledge and Skepticism. Mit Press.
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  39. Nicholas Capaldi (1982). Skepticism & Cognitivism. Review of Metaphysics 36 (2):455-456.
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  40. James Cargile (1972). In Reply to a Defense of Skepticism. Philosophical Review 81 (2):229-236.
  41. L. S. Carrier (1974). Skepticism Made Certain. Journal of Philosophy 71 (5):140-150.
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  42. Alan Chalmers (1989). How to Defend Science Against Scepticism: A Reply to Barry Gower. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):249-253.
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  43. Roderick Chisholm (1989). Probability in the Theory of Knowledge. In Marjorie Clay & Keith Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Westview Press.
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  44. Stewart Cohen (1998). Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):143-159.
    This paper compares two kinds of epistemic principles-an underdetermination principle and a deductive closure principle. It argues that each principle provides the basis for an independently motivated skeptical argument. It examines the logical relations between the premises of the two kinds of skeptical argument and concludes that the deductive closure argument cannot be refuted without refuting the underdetermination argument. The underdetermination argument, however, can be refuted without refuting the deductive closure argument. In this respect, the deductive closure argument is the (...)
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  45. Stewart Cohen (1998). Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):143 - 159.
    This paper compares two kinds of epistemic principles-an underdetermination principle and a deductive closure principle. It argues that each principle provides the basis for an independently motivated skeptical argument. It examines the logical relations between the premises of the two kinds of skeptical argument and concludes that the deductive closure argument cannot be refuted without refuting the underdetermination argument. The underdetermination argument, however, can be refuted without refuting the deductive closure argument. In this respect, the deductive closure argument is the (...)
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  46. Annalisa Coliva, Sebastiano Moruzzi & Giorgio Volpe (2012). Introduction. Synthese 189 (2):221-234.
    This Introduction to the special issue on “Skepticism and Justification” provides a background to the nine articles collected here and a detailed summary of each, which highlights their interconnections and relevance to the debate at the heart of the issue.
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  47. James Conant (2004). Varieties of Scepticism. In Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge. 97--136.
  48. Earl Brink Conee (2004). Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition. Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve the problem of (...)
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  49. James Connelly (2006). Postmodern Scepticism, Truth and History. In A. L. Macfie (ed.), The Philosophy of History: Talks Given at the Institute of Historical Research, London, 2000-2006. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  50. John M. Cooper (2006). Arcesilaus: Socratic and Sceptic. In Lindsay Judson & V. Karasmanēs (eds.), Remembering Socrates: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
1 — 50 / 281