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  1. John G. Adair & Barry Spinner (1981). Subjects' Access to Cognitive Processes: Demand Characteristics and Verbal Report. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 11 (1):31–52.
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  2. William A. Adams (2006). Transpersonal Heterophenomenology? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):89-93.
    Anthony Freeman's article on transpersonal psychology cited Jorge Ferrer's criticism that while the field claims to be non-dualistic or 'post-Cartesian' (no subject -object or mind-body split), it is nevertheless hopelessly dualistic. . .Freeman proposes a way of salvation for transpersonal psychology by invoking Daniel Dennettapos;s concept of heterophenomenology, which is a third-person investigation of someone elseapos;s first-person experience (as reported). . .Freeman's proposal is a fine demonstration of lateral thinking, calling upon atheist Dennett in support of transpersonal and religious inquiry. (...)
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  3. Miri Albahari (2002). Can Heterophenomenology Ground a Complete Science of Consciousness? Noetica.
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  4. Christian Beenfeldt (2008). A Philosophical Critique of Heterophenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (8):5-34.
    In this paper Dennett's method of heterophenomenology is discussed. After a brief explanation of the method, three arguments in support of it are considered in turn. First, the argument from the possibility of error and self-delusion of the subject is found to ignore the panoply of intermediate position that one can take with regard to the epistemic status of first-personal knowledge. The argument is also criticized for employing an epistemic double-standard. Second, the argument from the neutrality of heterophenomenology is found (...)
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  5. P. J. Benoit & W. L. Benoit (1986). Consciousness: The Mindlessness/Mindfulness and Verbal Report Controversies. Western Journal of Speech Communication 50:41-63.
  6. Manuel Bremer (2006). Animal Consciousness, Anthromorphism and Heterophenomenology. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 113 (2):397-410.
  7. Richard Brown (ed.) (2013). Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer Studies in Brain and Mind.
    This volume is product of the third online consciousness conference, held at http://consciousnessonline.com in February and March 2011. Chapters range over epistemological issues in the science and philosophy of perception, what neuroscience can do to help us solve philosophical issues in the philosophy of mind, what the true nature of black and white vision, pain, auditory, olfactory, or multi-modal experiences are, to higher-order theories of consciousness, synesthesia, among others. Each chapter includes a target article, commentaries, and in most cases, a (...)
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  8. Richard Cytowic (2003). The Clinician's Paradox: Believing Those You Must Not Trust. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):9-10.
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  9. Daniel C. Dennett (2007). Heterophenomenology Reconsidered. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):247-270.
    Descartes’ Method of Radical Doubt was not radical enough. –A. Marcel (2003, 181) In short, heterophenomenology is nothing new; it is nothing other than the method that has been used by psychophysicists, cognitive psychologists, clinical neuropsychologists, and just about everybody who has ever purported to study human consciousness in a serious, scientific way. –D. Dennett (2003, 22).
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  10. Daniel C. Dennett (2003). Who's on First? Heterophenomenology Explained. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9):19-30.
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  11. Daniel C. Dennett (1982). How to Study Human Consciousness Empirically, or, Nothing Comes to Mind. Synthese 53 (2):159-80.
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  12. Zoltán Dienes (2004). Assumptions of Subjective Measures of Unconscious Mental States: Higher Order Thoughts and Bias. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):25-45.
  13. Jérôme Dokic & Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). Too Much Ado About Belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):185-200.
    Three commitments guide Dennett’s approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls ‘heterophenomenology.’ Third, a ‘doxological’ commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject’s beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/appearance distinction for consciousness. (...)
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  14. Hubert L. Dreyfus & Sean D. Kelly (2007). Heterophenomenology: Heavy-Handed Sleight-of-Hand. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):45-55.
    We argue that heterophenomenology both over- and under-populates the intentional realm. For example, when one is involved in coping, one’s mind does not contain beliefs. Since the heterophenomenologist interprets all intentional commitment as belief, he necessarily overgenerates the belief contents of the mind. Since beliefs cannot capture the normative aspect of coping and perceiving, any method, such as heterophenomenology, that allows for only beliefs is guaranteed not only to overgenerate beliefs but also to undergenerate other kinds of intentional phenomena.
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  15. K. A. Ericsson (2003). Valid and Non-Reactive Verbalization of Thoughts During Performance of Tasks - Towards a Solution to the Central Problems of Introspection as a Source of Scientific Data. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):1-18.
  16. Arthur E. Falk (1975). Learning to Report One's Introspections. Philosophy of Science 42 (September):223-241.
    The author argues for a purely naturalistic underpinning of the linguistic practice of reporting one's introspections. In doing so he avoids any commitments about the ontological status of entities referred to in introspective reports. He also presents evidence of the inadequacy of peripheralistic behaviorism as a naturalistic underpinning of introspective reports. The paper includes (a) a definition of 'introspection' and criticism of alternative definitions, (b) a classification scheme that sorts introspections into six different types, and (c) a presentation of evidence (...)
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  17. A. Goldman (2004). Epistemology and the Evidential Status of Introspective Reports I. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):1-16.
  18. G. Hartelius (2006). All That Glisters is Not Gold - Heterophenomenology and Transpersonal Theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (6):63-77.
    Anthony Freeman (2006) proposes that Dennett's heterophenomenology (HP) be fully integrated into transpersonal studies as a solution to the 'subtle Cartesianism' that Jorge Ferrer (2002) detects within the field. Methods virtually indistinguishable from HP are already in use within transpersonal research, so the issue of comparison lies deeper. On close analysis, Ferrer's approach cannot be situated within Dennett's (2003) data levels at all, for participatory transpersonalism conceives a profoundly different relationship between conscious subject and the world: a relational matrix of (...)
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  19. R. Hurlburt & C. L. Heavey (2004). To Beep or Not to Beep: Obtaining Accurate Reports About Awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7):113-128.
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  20. Eduard Marbach (2007). No Heterophenomenology Without Autophenomenology: Variations on a Theme of Mine. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):75-87.
    The paper assumes that the very source for an appropriate concept formation and categorization of the phenomena of consciousness is provided by pre-reflectively living through one’s own experiences (of perceiving, remembering, imagining, picturing, judging, etc.) and reflecting upon them. It tries to argue that without reflective auto-phenomenological theorizing about such phenomena, there is no prospect for a scientific study of consciousness doing fully justice to the phenomena themselves. To substantiate the point, a detailed reflective and descriptive analysis of re-presentational experiences (...)
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  21. Eduard Marbach (1994). Troubles with Heterophenomenology. In Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
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  22. Anthony J. Marcel (2003). Introspective Report - Trust, Self-Knowledge and Science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):167-186.
  23. John Mcclure (1983). Telling More Than They Can Know: The Positivist Account of Verbal Reports and Mental Processes. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 13 (1):111–128.
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  24. Alain Morin & Jennifer Everett (1990). Inner Speech as a Mediator of Self-Awareness, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge: An Hypothesis. New Ideas in Psychology 8 (3):337-56.
  25. Eddy A. Nahmias (2002). Verbal Reports on the Contents of Consciousness: Reconsidering Introspectionist Methodology. Psyche 8 (21).
    Doctors must now take a fifth vital sign from their patients: pain reports. I use this as a case study to discuss how different schools of psychology (introspectionism, behaviorism, cognitive psychology) have treated verbal reports about the contents of consciousness. After examining these differences, I suggest that, with new methods of mapping data about neurobiological states with behavioral data and with verbal reports about conscious experience, we should reconsider some of the introspectionists' goals and methods. I discuss examples from cognitive (...)
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  26. Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson (1977). Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes. Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.
  27. Morten Overgaard (2001). The Role of Phenomenological Reports in Experiments on Consciousness. Psycoloquy 12 (29):1-10.
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  28. Claire Petitmengin (2006). Describing One's Subjective Experience in the Second Person: An Interview Method for the Science of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):229-269.
    This article presents an interview method which enables us to bring a person, who may not even have been trained, to become aware of his or her subjective experience, and describe it with great precision. It is focused on the difficulties of becoming aware of one’s subjective experience and describing it, and on the processes used by this interview technique to overcome each of these difficulties. The article ends with a discussion of the criteria governing the validity of the descriptions (...)
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  29. Gualtiero Piccinini (2010). How to Improve on Heterophenomenology: The Self-Measurement Methodology of First-Person Data. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):3 - 4.
    Heterophenomenology is a third-person methodology proposed by Daniel Dennett for using first-person reports as scientific evidence. I argue that heterophenomenology can be improved by making six changes: (i) setting aside consciousness, (ii) including other sources of first-person data besides first-person reports, (iii) abandoning agnosticism as to the truth value of the reports in favor of the most plausible assumptions we can make about what can be learned from the data, (iv) interpreting first-person reports (and other first-person behaviors) directly in terms (...)
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  30. Gualtiero Piccinini (2003). Data From Introspective Reports: Upgrading From Common Sense to Science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):141-156.
    Introspective reports are used as sources of information about other minds, in both everyday life and science. Many scientists and philosophers consider this practice unjustified, while others have made the untestable assumption that introspection is a truthful method of private observation. I argue that neither skepticism nor faith concerning introspective reports are warranted. As an alternative, I consider our everyday, commonsensical reliance on each other’s introspective reports. When we hear people talk about their minds, we neither refuse to learn from (...)
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  31. Nini Praetorius (2004). Intersubjectivity of Cognition and Language: Principled Reasons Why the Subject May Be Trusted. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):195-214.
    The paper aims to show that scepticism concerning the status of first-person reports of mental states and their use as evidence in scientific cognitive research is unfounded. Rather, principled arguments suggest that the conditions for the intersubjectivity of cognition and description of publicly observable things apply equally for our cognition and description of our mental or internal states. It is argued that on these conditions relies the possibility of developing well-defined scientific criteria for distinguishing between first-person and third-person cognition and (...)
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  32. Daisie M. Radner (1994). Heterophenomenology: Learning About the Birds and the Bees. Journal of Philosophy 91 (8):389-403.
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  33. Marvina C. Rich (1979). Verbal Reports on Mental Processes: Issues of Accuracy and Awareness. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (1):29–37.
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  34. Andreas Roepstorff (2003). Why Trust the Subject? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10.
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  35. Jean-Michel Roy (2007). Heterophenomenology and Phenomenological Skepticism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):1-20.
    This paper is an attempt to clarify and assess Dennett’s opinion about the relevance of the phenomenological tradition to contemporary cognitive science, focussing on the very idea of a phenomenological investigation. Dennett can be credited with four major claims on this topic: (1) Two kinds of phenomenological investigations must be carefully distinguished: autophenomenology and heterophenomenology; (2) autophenomenology is wrong, because it fails to overcome what might be called the problem of phenomenological scepticism; (3) the phenomenological tradition mainly derived from Husserl (...)
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  36. Johann F. Schneider (2002). Relations Among Self-Talk, Self-Consciousness and Self-Knowledge. Psychological Reports 91 (3):807-812.
  37. Johann F. Schneider, Markus Pospeschill & Jochen Ranger (2005). Does Self-Consciousness Mediate the Relation Between Self-Talk and Self-Knowledge? Psychological Reports 96 (2):387-396.
  38. Gianfranco Soldati (2007). Subjectivity in Heterophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):89-98.
    I distinguish between naïve phenomenology and really existing phenomenology, a distinction that is too often ignored. As a consequence, the weaknesses inherent in naïve phenomenology are mistakenly attributed to phenomenology. I argue that the critics of naïve phenomenology have unwittingly adopted a number of precisely those weaknesses they wish to point out. More precisely, I shall argue that Dennett’s criticism of the naïve or auto-phenomenological conception of subjectivity fails to provide a better understanding of the intended phenomenon.
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  39. Shannon Spaulding (forthcoming). Phenomenology of Social Cognition. Erkenntnis.
    Can phenomenological evidence play a decisive role in accepting or rejecting social cognition theories? Is it the case that a theory of social cognition ought to explain and be empirically supported by our phenomenological experience? There is serious disagreement about the answers to these questions. This paper aims to determine the methodological role of phenomenology in social cognition debates. The following three features are characteristic of evidence capable of playing a substantial methodological role: novelty, reliability, and relevance. I argue that (...)
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  40. Justin Sytsma, Does Heterophenomenology Concede Too Much? Experiments on the Folk Theory of Consciousness.
    It is fairly common in the modern debates over qualia to find assumptions being made about the views of non-philosophers. It is often assumed that the concept is part of the folk theory of consciousness. In fact, even prominent skeptics about qualia will admit that their views run counter to common sense. I illustrate this by considering the work of Daniel Dennett, focusing on his standard articulation of the debate concerning his heterophenomenological method. While Dennett is often accused of not (...)
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  41. David L. Thompson (2000). Phenomenology and Heterophenomenology: Husserl and Dennett on Reality and Science. In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.
  42. Max Velmans (2007). Heterophenomenology Vs. Critical Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):221-230.
    Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the critical phenomenology that I outline may be thought of as competing accounts of a cautious approach to phenomenal description and method. One can be critical or cautious about how well or how reliably a subject can communicate his or her subjective experience in experimental settings, without for a moment doubting their existence or claiming them to be something completely different to how they seem. Given this, Dennett’s heterophenomenology with its accompanying “qualia denial” looks like nothing more (...)
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  43. Max Velmans, Heterophenomenogy Versus Critical Phenomenology: A Dialogue with Dan Dennett.
    ABSTRACT. The following is an email interchange that took place between Dan Dennett and myself in the period 14th to 28th June, 2001. The discussion tries to clarify some essential features of the "heterophenomenology" developed in his book Consciousness Explained (1996), and how this differs from a form of "critical phenomenology" implicit in my own book Understanding Consciousness (2000), and developed in my edited Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: new methodologies and maps (2000). The departure point for the discussion is a paper (...)
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  44. Prof Max Velmans, Heterophenomenology Versus Critical Phenomenology.
    Following an on-line dialogue with Dennett (Velmans, 2001) this paper examines the similarities and differences between heterophenomenology (HP) and critical phenomenology (CP), two competing accounts of the way that conscious phenomenology should be, and normally is incorporated into psychology and related sciences. Dennett’s heterophenomenology includes subjective reports of conscious experiences, but according to Dennett, first person conscious phenomenena in the form of “qualia” such as hardness, redness, itchiness etc. have no real existence. Consequently, subjective reports about such qualia should be (...)
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  45. Patricia D. White (1980). Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bem. Psychological Review 87:105-12.
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