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  1. M. Ashraf Adeel (2015). Evolution of Quine’s Thinking on the Thesis of Underdetermination and Scott Soames’s Accusation of Paradoxicality. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):56-69.
    Scott Soames argues that interpreted in the light of Quine's holistic verificationism, Quine's thesis of underdetermination leads to a contradiction. It is contended here that if we pay proper attention to the evolution of Quine's thinking on the subject, particularly his criterion of theory individuation, Quine's thesis of underdetermination escapes Soames' charge of paradoxicality.
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  2. Joseph Agassi (1987). Whatever Happened to the Positivist Theory of Meaning. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 18 (1-2):22-29.
    It is getting increasingly difficult to comprehend the history of ideas of the Vienna Circle and only a clear and critical exposition of it will save it from total oblivion; an apologetic presentation will not be understood. Now that the positivist theory of meaning is no longer accepted, only an honest presentation of this fact will enable us to comprehend it and its transformations. An analysis of a paper by Otto Neurath illustrates this: Neurath's inability to present fairly his critics' (...)
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  3. Robert Almeder (1979). Peirce on Meaning. Synthese 41 (1):1 - 24.
    More often than not, the attractive features of Peirce's theory of meaning have been overlooked because of the temptation on the part of many philosophers to dismiss Peirce as a beknighted forerunner of a narrow form of verificationism frequently identified with the view of the ...
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  4. A. J. Ayer (1936). Language, Truth and Logic. London, V. Gollancz, Ltd..
  5. Lars Bergström (1998). Prawitz's Version of Verificationism. Theoria 64 (2-3):139-156.
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  6. Peter M. Burkholder (1972). Verification In Metaphysics. Tulane Studies in Philosophy 21:101-113.
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  7. Harry G. Frankfurt (1960). Meaning, Truth, and Pragmatism. Philosophical Quarterly 10 (39):171-176.
  8. Irwin Goldstein (2007). Solipsism and the Solitary Language User. Philosophical Papers 36 (1):35-47.
    A person skeptical about other minds supposes it is possible in principle that there are no minds other than his. A person skeptical about an external world thinks it is possible there is no world external to him. Some philosophers think a person can refute the skeptic and prove that his world is not the solitary scenario the skeptic supposes might be realized. In this paper I examine one argument that some people think refutes solipsism. The argument, from Wittgenstein, is (...)
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  9. Geoffrey Hellman (1997). Quantum Mechanical Unbounded Operators and Constructive Mathematics – a Rejoinder to Bridges. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (2):121-127.
    As argued in Hellman (1993), the theorem of Pour-El and Richards (1983) can be seen by the classicist as limiting constructivist efforts to recover the mathematics for quantum mechanics. Although Bridges (1995) may be right that the constructivist would work with a different definition of 'closed operator', this does not affect my point that neither the classical unbounded operators standardly recognized in quantum mechanics nor their restrictions to constructive arguments are recognizable as objects by the constructivist. Constructive substitutes that may (...)
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  10. Carl G. Hempel (1935). On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth. Analysis 2 (4):49 - 59.
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  11. Felix Kaufmann (1943). Verification, Meaning, and Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (2):267-284.
  12. Jeff Kochan (2015). Objective Styles in Northern Field Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 52:1-12.
    Social studies of science have often treated natural field sites as extensions of the laboratory. But this overlooks the unique specificities of field sites. While lab sites are usually private spaces with carefully controlled borders, field sites are more typically public spaces with fluid boundaries and diverse inhabitants. Field scientists must therefore often adapt their work to the demands and interests of local agents. I propose to address the difference between lab and field in sociological terms, as a difference in (...)
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  13. N. Kurbis (2007). Pluralism and the Logical Basis of Metaphysics. In Logica Yearbook.
    I argue for a kind of logical pluralism on the basis of a difficulty with defining the meaning of negation in the framework of Dummett's and Prawitz' proof-theoretic semantics.
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  14. Nils Kurbis (forthcoming). What is Wrong with Classical Negation? Grazer Philosophische Studien.
    The focus of this paper are Dummett's meaning-theoretical arguments against classical logic based on consideration about the meaning of negation. Using Dummettian principles, I shall outline three such arguments, of increasing strength, and show that they are unsuccessful by giving responses to each argument on behalf of the classical logician. What is crucial is that in responding to these arguments a classicist need not challenge any of the basic assumptions of Dummett's outlook on the theory of meaning. In particular, I (...)
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  15. Nils Kürbis (2012). How Fundamental is the Fundamental Assumption? Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):5-19.
    The fundamental assumption of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justification of deduction is that ‘if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator’. I argue that the assumption is flawed in this general version, but should be restricted, not to apply to arguments in general, but only to proofs. I also argue that Dummett’s and Prawitz’ project of (...)
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  16. Diego Marconi, Verificationism in the Tractatus?
    In the following, I will mean by ‘verificationism’ the doctrine according to which understanding a sentence entails that one knows how to verify it, i.e. how to determine its truth value. It is not the only possible meaning of ‘verificationism’, nor perhaps the most common. However, it is with reference to this sense of ‘verificationism’ that I am going to ask the question whether the Tractatus is committed to verificationism.
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  17. Charles Pigden (2013). Analytic Philosophy (Alternative Title 'Analytic Atheism?'). In Stephen Bullivant & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Atheism. Oxford University Press 307-319.
    Most analytic philosophers are atheists, but is there a deep connection between analytic philosophy and atheism? The paper argues a) that the founding fathers of analytic philosophy were mostly teenage atheists before they became philosophers; b) that analytic philosophy was invented partly because it was realized that the God-substitute provided by the previously fashionable philosophy - Absolute Idealism – could not cut the spiritual mustard; c) that analytic philosophy developed an unhealthy obsession with meaninglessness which led to a new kind (...)
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  18. Victor Rodych (1995). Review of P. Frascolla, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. [REVIEW] Philosophia Mathematica 3 (3).
  19. David Rynin (1966). Cognitive Meaning and Cognitive Use. Inquiry 9 (1-4):109 – 131.
    In the first part of this paper the author restates arguments made earlier against well-known criticisms of a logical nature leveled (by C. Hempel and others) against the so-called verifiability principle, which purport to show that it is at once both too restrictive and too permissive: including as cognitively meaningful, statements intuitively lacking this property, and excluding others that are generally admitted to possess it. The author claims to show that the charge that the verifiability principle is unduly permissive will (...)
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  20. Richard Swinburne (1983). Verificationism and Theories of Space-Time. In Space, Time and Causality. Reidel 63-78.
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  21. F. Waismann (1951). Verifiability. In Gilbert Ryle & Antony Flew (eds.), Journal of Symbolic Logic. B. Blackwell 117--44.
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