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  1. A. Ahsen (2005). A Second Report on AA-VVIQ: Role of Vivid and Unvivid Images in Consciousness Research. Journal of Mental Imagery 29 (3-4).
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  2. A. Ahsen (1993). Imagery Paradigm: Imaginative Consciousness in the Experimental and Clinical Setting. Journal of Mental Imagery 17 (1-2).
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  3. A. Ahsen (1991). A Second Report on AA-VVIQ: Role of Vivid and Unvivid Images in Consciousness Research. Journal of Mental Imagery 15:1-31.
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  4. A. Ahsen (1991). Imagery and Consciousness: Putting Together Poetic, Mythic and Social Realities. Journal of Mental Imagery 15:63-97.
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  5. Emmanuel Alloa (2011). Seeing-in, Seeing-as, Seeing-With: Looking Through Pictures. In Elisabeth Nemeth, Richard Heinrich, Wolfram Pichler & Wagner David (eds.), Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science, and the Arts. Volume I. Proceedings of the 33rd International Wittgenstein Symposium. Ontos: 179-190
    In the constitution of contemporary image theory, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy has undoubtedly become a major conceptual reference. Rather than trying to establish what Wittgenstein’s own image theory could possibly look like, this paper would like to critically assess some of the advantages as well as some of the quandaries that arise when using Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘seeing-as’ for addressing the plural realities of images. While putting into evidence the tensions that come into play when applying what was initially a theory (...)
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  6. Rudolf Arnheim (1994). Consciousness: An Island of Images. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):121-27.
    Discusses consciousness as an island of images, which informs us incompletely and indirectly about the mental and the physical worlds. A dualistic worldview separates the perceptual world from the transcendental physical world. Both universes of discourse are empowered by dynamic forces and are related to each other by reflection, the one reflecting the other. The physical world is understood and operated through the intermediary of perception. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
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  7. Martha E. Arterberry, Catherine Craver-Lemley & Adam Reeves (2002). Visual Imagery is Not Always Like Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):183-184.
    The “Perky effect” is the interference of visual imagery with vision. Studies of this effect show that visual imagery has more than symbolic properties, but these properties differ both spatially (including “pictorially”) and temporally from those of vision. We therefore reject both the literal picture-in-the-head view and the entirely symbolic view.
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  8. Cordula Becker, Klaus Gramann, Hermann J. Müller & Mark A. Elliott (2009). Electrophysiological Correlates of Flicker-Induced Color Hallucinations. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):266-276.
    In a recent study, Becker and Elliott [Becker, C., & Elliott, M. A. . Flicker induced color and form: Interdependencies and relation to stimulation frequency and phase. Consciousness & Cognition, 15, 175–196] described the appearance of subjective experiences of color and form induced by stimulation with intermittent light. While there have been electroencephalographic studies of similar hallucinatory forms, brain activity accompanying the appearance of hallucinatory colors was never measured. Using a priming procedure where observers were required to indicate the presence (...)
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  9. F. R. Bichowsky (1926). The Mechanism of Consciousness: Images. American Journal of Psychology 37:557-564.
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  10. Ned Block (2011). Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
    One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to the (...)
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  11. Miriam Bras, Michel Aurnague, Mario Borillo & Andree Borillo (eds.) (1994). Semantics of Time, Space, and Movement. IRIT.
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  12. Robert Briscoe (2011). Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.
    The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay suggests, (...)
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  13. Robert Briscoe (2008). Vision, Action, and Make‐Perceive. Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497.
    In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements (...)
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  14. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Varieties of Synesthetic Experience. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Neuroscience Series, Synthese Library
    In her response to my "Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case from Synesthesia and Visual Imagery" Ophelia Deroy presents an argument for an interesting new account of synesthesia. On this account, synesthesia can be thought of as "a perceptual state (e.g. of a letter)" that is "changed or enriched by the incorporation of a conscious mental image (e.g. a color)." I reply that while this is a plausible account of some types of synesthesia, some forms cannot be accounted (...)
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  15. Berit Brogaard (2012). Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case From Synesthesia and Visual Imagery. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Neuroscience Series, Synthese Library
    The paper argues that the English verb ‘to see’ can denote three different kinds of conscious states of seeing, involving visual experiences, visual seeming states and introspective seeming states, respectively. The case for the claim that there are three kinds of seeing comes from synesthesia and visual imagery. Synesthesia is a relatively rare neurological condition in which stimulation in one sensory or cognitive stream involuntarily leads to associated experiences in a second unstimulated stream. Visual synesthesia is often considered a case (...)
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  16. Carmelo Calì (2005). Husserl and the Phenomenological Description of Imagery: Some Issues for the Cognitive Sciences? ARHE 2 (4):25-37.
    This paper deals with two theories Husserl worked out on imagery in order to see if the properties a phenomenological description ascribes to imagery are fit to give meaningful constraints upon theoretical models that guide empirical research. Husserlian descriptions and Kosslyn and colleagues models are hence compared as to their explanatory strategy and implications.
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  17. Alfredo Campos & Maria Angeles Gonzalez (1993). Is Imagery Vividness a Determinant Factor in Creativity? Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 31 (6):560-562.
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  18. Edward S. Casey (1971). Imagination: Imagining and the Image. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (June):475-490.
  19. Jonathan Cole (2005). Imagination After Neurological Losses of Movement and Sensation: The Experience of Spinal Cord Injury. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):183-195.
    To what extent is imagination dependent on embodied experience? In attempting to answer such questions I consider the experiences of those who have to come to terms with altered neurological function, namely those with spinal cord injury at the neck. These people have each lost all sensation and movement below the neck. How might these new ways of living affect their imagination?
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  20. Fabian Dorsch (2013). Transparency and Imagining Seeing. In Marcus Willaschek (ed.), Disjunctivism – Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception. Routledge 5-32.
    In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of (...)
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  21. Fabian Dorsch (2011). Visualising as Imagining Seeing. Kongress-Akten der Deutschen Gesellschaft Für Philosophie 22:1-16.
    In this paper, I would like to put forward the claim that, at least in some central cases, visualising consists literally in imagining seeing. The first section of my paper is concerned with a defence of the specific argument for this claim that M. G. F. Martin presents in his paper 'The Transparency of Experience' (Martin 2002). This argument has been often misunderstood (or ignored), and it is worthwhile to discuss it in detail and to illus­trate what its precise nature (...)
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  22. Fabian Dorsch (2010). Transparency and Imagining Seeing. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):173-200.
    In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of (...)
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  23. Andreas Elpidorou (2010). Imagination in Non-Representational Painting. In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge
  24. Martha J. Farah (1984). The Neurological Basis of Mental Imagery: A Componential Analysis. Cognition 18 (1-3):245-272.
  25. Martha J. Farah & Katherine M. Hammond (1988). Mental Rotation and Orientation-Invariant Object Recognition: Dissociable Processes. Cognition 29 (1):29-46.
  26. Ann Garry (1977). Mental Images. Personalist 58 (January):28-38.
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  27. C. Gauker (2014). Replies to Matthen, Weiskopf and Wikforss. Analysis 75 (1):121-131.
    This article consists of replies to three commentaries on the book, Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas (Oxford 2011).
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  28. C. Gauker (2014). Summary. Analysis 75 (1):81-83.
    This is a summary of the book, Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas (Oxford 2011). This summary serves as an introduction to a symposium on this book, featuring contributions by Mohan Matthen, Daniel Weiskopf and Åsa Wikforss, and a reply by Gauker.
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  29. Christopher Gauker (2011). Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas. Oxford University Press.
    At least since Locke, philosophers and psychologists have usually held that concepts arise out of sensory perceptions, thoughts are built from concepts, and language enables speakers to convey their thoughts to hearers. Christopher Gauker holds that this tradition is mistaken about both concepts and language. The mind cannot abstract the building blocks of thoughts from perceptual representations. More generally, we have no account of the origin of concepts that grants them the requisite independence from language. Gauker's alternative is to show (...)
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  30. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2006). Imaginative Contagion. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):183-203.
    The aim of this article is to expand the diet of examples considered in philosophical discussions of imagination and pretense, and to offer some preliminary observations about what we might learn about the nature of imagination as a result. The article presents a number of cases involving imaginative contagion: cases where merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect only perceiving or believing that P to have. Examples are offered that involve visual imagery, motor imagery, fictional (...)
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  31. Raymond W. Gibbs & Jennifer E. O'Brien (1990). Idioms and Mental Imagery: The Metaphorical Motivation for Idiomatic Meaning. Cognition 36 (1):35-68.
  32. Dominic Gregory (2010). Visual Imagery: Visual Format or Visual Content? Mind and Language 25 (4):394-417.
    It is clear that visual imagery is somehow significantly visual. Some theorists, like Kosslyn, claim that the visual nature of visualisations derives from features of the neural processes which underlie those episodes. Pylyshyn claims, however, that it may merely reflect special features of the contents which we grasp when we visualise things. This paper discusses and rejects Pylyshyn's own attempts to identify the respects in which the contents of visualisations are notably visual. It then offers a novel and very different (...)
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  33. Dominic Gregory (2010). Pictures, Pictorial Contents and Vision. British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (1):15-32.
    Certain simple thoughts about pictures suggest that the contents of pictures are closely bound to vision. But how far can the striking features of depiction be accounted for merely in terms of the especially visual contents which belong to pictures, without considering, for example, any issues concerning the nature of the visual experiences with which pictures provide us? This article addresses that question by providing an account of the distinctively visual contents belonging to pictures, and by using that account to (...)
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  34. Stephen Grossberg (2002). Neural Substrates of Visual Percepts, Imagery, and Hallucinations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):194-195.
    Recent neural models clarify many properties of mental imagery as part of the process whereby bottom-up visual information is influenced by top-down expectations, and how these expectations control visual attention. Volitional signals can transform modulatory top-down signals into supra-threshold imagery. Visual hallucinations can occur when the normal control of these volitional signals is lost.
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  35. Rick Grush (1998). Perception, Imagery, and the Sensorimotor Loop. In F. Esken & F.-D. Heckman (eds.), A Consciousness Reader. Schoeningh Verlag
    I have argued elsewhere that imagery and represention are best explained as the result of operations of neurally implemented emulators of an agent's body and environment. In this article I extend the theory of emulation to address perceptual processing as well. The key notion will be that of an emulator of an agent's egocentric behavioral space. This emulator, when run off-line, produces mental imagery, including transformations such as visual image rotations. However, while on-line, it is used to process information from (...)
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  36. William E. Gumenik (1976). Imagery and Association in Incidental Learning. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 7 (3):241-242.
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  37. P. J. Hampson, D. F. Marks & Janet Richardson (eds.) (1990). Imagery: Current Developments. Routledge.
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  38. P. J. Hampson & P. E. Morris (1990). Imagery, Consciousness, and Cognitive Control: The Boss Model Reviewed. In P. J. Hampson, D. F. Marks & Janet Richardson (eds.), Imagery: Current Developments. Routledge
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  39. P. J. Hampson & P. E. Morris (1978). Unfulfilled Expectations: A Criticism of Neisser's Theory of Imagery. Cognition 6 (March):79-85.
  40. D. O. Hebb (1968). Concerning Imagery. Psychological Review 75 (6):466-77.
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  41. R. Hopkins (2013). Perky, Phenomenal Similarity and Photographs: Reply to Nanay. Analysis 73 (1):77-80.
    In a recent paper, I argue that Perky’s famous experiments do not show what they are often taken to show. Bence Nanay has criticised my argument on two grounds. I argue against both his lines of objection.
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  42. Robert Hopkins (forthcoming). Sartre. In Amy Kind (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge 82-93.
    In The Imaginary Sartre offers a systematic, insightful and heterodox account of imagining in many forms. Beginning with four ‘characteristics’ he takes to capture the phenomenology of imagining, he draws on considerations both philosophical and psychological to describe the deeper nature of the state that has those features. The result is a view that remains the most potent challenge to the Humean orthodoxy that to this day dominates both philosophical and psychological thinking on the topic.
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  43. Robert Hopkins (2010). Imagination and Affective Response. In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge 100-117.
    What is the relation between affective states, such as emotions and pleasure, and imagining? Do the latter cause the former, just as perceptual states do? Or are the former merely imagined, along with suitable objects? I consider this issue against the backdrop of Sartre’s theory of imagination, and drawing on his highly illuminating discussion of it. I suggest that, while it is commonly assumed that imaginative states cause affective responses much as do perceptions, the alternatives merit more careful consideration than (...)
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  44. Robert Hopkins (2006). With Sight Too Much in Mind, Mind Too Little in Sight? Philosophical Books 47 (4):293-305.
    This is a critical notice of Colin McGinn's 'Mindsight'.
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  45. P. V. Horne (1993). The Nature of Imagery. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (1):58-82.
    I contend that influential, computational theories have failed to relate the subjective and information processing dimensions of imagery. Hampson and Morris′s account of the phenomenology of imagery is evaluated, and I reject the proposal that the sensuous quality of images is reducible to the specificity of corresponding representations. A selective literature review suggests necessary information processing conditions for sensuous objects-for-awareness to emerge, and these conditions inform development of a theory explicating conscious perception and sensuous imagery in terms of a self-regulating (...)
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  46. Alumit Ishai & D. Sagi (1998). Visual Imagery and Visual Perception: The Role of Memory and Conscious Awareness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press 2--321.
  47. Matthew Kieran & Dominic Lopes (eds.) (2012). Imagination, Philosophy and the Arts. Routledge.
    _Imagination, Philosophy and the Arts_ is the first comprehensive collection of papers by philosophers examining the nature of imagination and its role in understanding and making art. Imagination is a central concept in aesthetics with close ties to issues in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, yet it has not received the kind of sustained, critical attention it deserves. This collection of seventeen brand new essays critically examines just how and in what form the notion of imagination (...)
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  48. Stephen M. Kosslyn, Jennifer Brunn, Kyle R. Cave & Roger W. Wallach (1984). Individual Differences in Mental Imagery Ability: A Computational Analysis. Cognition 18 (1-3):195-243.
  49. Stephen Michael Kosslyn (1981). Research on Mental Imagery: Some Goals and Directions. Cognition 10 (1-3):173-179.
  50. Robert G. Kunzendorf (ed.) (1990). Mental Imagery. Plenum Press.
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