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  1. Charles Joseph Abate (1986). The Rabbit and the Beetle: An Essay on Quine and Wittgenstein. Dissertation, Syracuse University
    In the course of my investigation, I examine and compare what is generally understood as "the private language argument" with certain passages in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations which I take to constitute the skeleton of a private object argument, and I attempt to show how the two arguments are related, and to what extent. Appealing to various passages in the Investigations, I attempt to construct, from Wittgenstein's often cryptic remarks, a more explicitly stated hypothesis about the privacy of objects and their (...)
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  2. Ashraf Adeel (1989). Quine's Thesis of Underdetermination and Wittgenstein's Skeptical Paradox: A Parallel. Pakistan Philosophical Journal 26:19-30.
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  3. M. Ashraf Adeel (2015). Evolution of Quine’s Thinking on the Thesis of Underdetermination and Scott Soames’s Accusation of Paradoxicality. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):56-69.
    Scott Soames argues that interpreted in the light of Quine's holistic verificationism, Quine's thesis of underdetermination leads to a contradiction. It is contended here that if we pay proper attention to the evolution of Quine's thinking on the subject, particularly his criterion of theory individuation, Quine's thesis of underdetermination escapes Soames' charge of paradoxicality.
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  4. Alexander Afriat, Duhem, Quine and the Other Dogma.
    With resources hinted at in different ways by both Duhem and Quine, it is argued that some of their misgivings about empirical confirmation, or crucial experiments, may be exaggerated or unfounded; and that such experiments, suitably conceived, can give good meaning to empirical sentences. With appropriate meanings one can then wonder about synonymy and analyticity.
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  5. Joseph Agassi (1988). Ixmann and the Gavagai. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 19 (1):103-116.
    Dirk Koppelberg is an ambitious new arrival to take notice of. His first book, "Die Aufhebung der analytischen Philosophic: Quine als Synthese von Carnap und Neurath" (Suhrkamp, 1987, pp. 416) is extremely detailed and comprehensive. In succinct 300 pages or so (plus 40 pages of notes and 30 pages of (not too successful) bibliography) he manages to touch on W. V. Quine's diverse concerns, to synthesize them, to relate them to their..
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  6. Arif Ahmed (2008). W.V. Quine. In C. J. Misak (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy. Oxford University Press
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  7. Ken Akiba (1995). Quine and the Linguistic Doctrine of Logical Truth. Philosophical Studies 78 (3):237 - 256.
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  8. Maria Albisu (1987). Paul GOCHET: Ascent to Truth, A Critical Examination of Quine's Philosophy. [REVIEW] Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 2 (5):616-622.
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  9. Maria Albisu & Jesús Ezquerro (1987). Ascent to Truth: A Critical Examination of Quine's Philosophy. Theoria 2 (2):616-622.
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  10. Francisco Javier Rodríguez Alcázar (1991). W. V. Quine: Pursuit of Truth. Revista de filosofía (Chile) 5:229.
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  11. Virgil C. Aldrich (1955). Mr. Quine on Meaning, Naming, and Purporting to Name. Philosophical Studies 6 (2):17 - 26.
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  12. Sophie R. Allen (2010). Can Theoretical Underdetermination Support the Indeterminacy of Translation? Revisiting Quine's 'Real Ground'. Philosophy 85 (1):67-90.
    It is commonly believed that Quine's principal argument for the Indeterminacy of Translation requires an untenably strong account of the underdetermination of theories by evidence, namely that that two theories may be compatible with all possible evidence for them and yet incompatible with each other. In this article, I argue that Quine's conclusion that translation is indeterminate can be based upon the weaker, uncontroversial conception of theoretical underdetermination, in conjunction with a weak reading of the 'Gavagai' argument which establishes the (...)
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  13. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2001). On Quine on Carnap on Ontology. Philosophical Studies 102 (1):93 - 122.
    W. V. Quine assumed that in _Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology Rudolf Carnap was attempting to dodge commitment to abstract entities--without either renouncing quantification over them or demonstrating their dispensability--by wielding the analytic/synthetic distinction against ontological issues. Quine's interpretation of Carnap's intent--and his criticism of it--is widely endorsed. But Carnap objected, I argue, not to abstract entities, but to his critics' suggestion that empiricism implies nominalism. Quine's and Carnap's views are therefore more akin than Quine ever suspected. Unfortunately, Quine's misinterpretation of (...)
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  14. James A. Anderson (2006). The Ethics and Science of Placebo-Controlled Trials: Assay Sensitivity and the Duhem-Quine Thesis. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (1):65 – 81.
    The principle of clinical equipoise requires that, aside from certain exceptional cases, second generation treatments ought to be tested against standard therapy. In violation of this principle, placebo-controlled trials (PCTs) continue to be used extensively in the development and licensure of second-generation treatments. This practice is typically justified by appeal to methodological arguments that purport to demonstrate that active-controlled trials (ACTs) are methodologically flawed. Foremost among these arguments is the so called assay sensitivity argument. In this paper, I take a (...)
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  15. Gian Aldo Antonelli (1998). Extensional Quotients for Type Theory and the Consistency Problem for NF. Journal of Symbolic Logic 63 (1):247-261.
    Quine’s “New Foundations” (NF) was first presented in Quine [1937] and later on in Quine [1963]. Ernst Specker [1958, 1962], building upon a previous result of Ehrenfeucht and Mostowski [1956], showed that NF is consistent if and only if there is a model of the Theory of Negative (and positive) Types (TNT) with full extensionality that admits of a “shifting automorphism,” but the existence of a such a model remains an open problem.
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  16. P. Arango (2005). El dogma de Quine. Discusiones Filosóficas 6 (9).
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  17. José María Ariso (2009). El efecto de la experiencia sobre la reestructuración de los sistemas de creencias de Quine y Wittgenstein. Logos: Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica 41 (2):239-258.
    Tras describir a grandes rasgos los sistemas de creencias propuestos por Quine y Wittgenstein, en este artículo hago referencia a las similitudes y diferencias que Pieranna Garavaso y Danièle Moyal Sharrock advierten entre ambos sistemas. Partiendo de la crítica de estas interpretaciones, llamaré la atención sobre un aspecto del sistema wittgensteiniano de creencias que, desde mi punto de vista, es de la mayor importancia. Concretamente, me refiero a la posibilidad de revisar incluso las creencias más básicas de este sistema. El (...)
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  18. Jack Arnold & Stewart Shapiro (2007). Where in the (World Wide) Web of Belief is the Law of Non-Contradiction? Noûs 41 (2):276–297.
    It is sometimes said that there are two, competing versions of W. V. O. Quine’s unrelenting empiricism, perhaps divided according to temporal periods of his career. According to one, logic is exempt from, or lies outside the scope of, the attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction. This logic-friendly Quine holds that logical truths and, presumably, logical inferences are analytic in the traditional sense. Logical truths are knowable a priori, and, importantly, they are incorrigible, and so immune from revision. The other, radical (...)
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  19. Robert L. Arrington & Hans-Johann Glock (eds.) (1996). Wittgenstein and Quine. Routledge.
    This unique study brings together for the first time two of the most important philosophers of the twentieh century. Are the views of Wittgenstein and Quine on method and philosophy compatible or radically opposed? Does Wittgenstein's conception of language engender that of Quine, or threaten its philosophical foundations? An understanding of the similarities and differences between the thought of Wittgenstein and Quine is essential if we are to have a full picture of the landscape of recent and contemporary philosophy. This (...)
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  20. Jamin Asay (2010). How to Express Ontological Commitment in the Vernacular. Philosophia Mathematica 18 (3):293-310.
    According to the familiar Quinean understanding of ontological commitment, (1) one undertakes ontological commitments only via theoretical regimentations, and (2) ontological commitments are to be identified with the domain of a theory’s quantifiers. Jody Azzouni accepts (1), but rejects (2). Azzouni accepts (1) because he believes that no vernacular expression carries ontological commitments. He rejects (2) by locating a theory’s commitments with the extension of an existence predicate. I argue that Azzouni’s two theses undermine each other. If ontological commitments follow (...)
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  21. Jay David Atlas, Aboutness, Fiction, and Quantifying Into Intentional Contexts: A Linguistic Analysis of Prior, Quine, and Searle on Propositional Attitudes, Martinich on Fictional Reference, Taglicht on The..
    A Linguistic Analysis of Prior, Quine, and Searle on Propositional Attitudes, Martinich on Fictional Reference, Taglicht on the Active/Passive Mood Distinction in English, etc.
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  22. Bruce Aune (1977). Root on Quine. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):240-243.
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  23. Bruce Aune (1975). Quine on Translation and Reference. Philosophical Studies 27 (4):221 - 236.
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  24. Jody Azzouni (2005). Tarski, Quine, and the Transcendence of the Vernacular “True”. Synthese 142 (3):273 - 288.
    It is argued that the blind ascriptive role for the word true, its use, that is, in conjunction with descriptions of classes of sentences or with proper names of sentences (but not quote-names), is one which applies indiscriminately to sentences regardless of whether these are in languages we speak, can understand, or can translate into sentences that we do speak (and understand). Formal analogues of the ordinary word true as they arise in Tarskis seminal work, and in others, cannot replicate (...)
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  25. Jody Azzouni (1998). On "on What There Is". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1):1–18.
    All sides in the recent debates over the Quine‐Putnam Indispensability thesis presuppose Quine's criterion for determining what a discourse is ontologically committed to. I subject the criterion to scrutiny, especially in regard to the available competitor‐criteria, asking what means of evaluation there are for comparing alternative criteria against each other. Finding none, the paper concludes that ontological questions, in a certain sense, are philosophically indeterminate.
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  26. Jody Azzouni (1997). Applied Mathematics, Existential Commitment and the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Thesis. Philosophia Mathematica 5 (3):193-209.
    The ramifications are explored of taking physical theories to commit their advocates only to ‘physically real’ entities, where ‘physically real’ means ‘causally efficacious’ (e.g., actual particles moving through space, such as dust motes), the ‘physically significant’ (e.g., centers of mass), and the merely mathematical—despite the fact that, in ordinary physical theory, all three sorts of posits are quantified over. It's argued that when such theories are regimented, existential quantification, even when interpreted ‘objectually’ (that is, in terms of satisfaction via variables, (...)
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  27. James Baillie (1996). Quine on Translation and Meaning. Cogito 10 (3):199-204.
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  28. John Robert Baker (1978). Some Remarks on Quine's Arguments Against Modal Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 19 (4):663-673.
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  29. Shaun Baker (2004). On Quine's Arguments Concerning Analyticity. Sorites 15:56-66.
    In a detailed examination of Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism, I argue that Quine fails to make the case that there are no analytical truths in ordinary language. Drawing on admissions he makes with regard to definitions and languages' relationship to pragmatic considerations, and an examination of his arguments concerning the interdefinability of the terms `synonymous', and `analytic', I argue that analytic truths exist as deducible consequences of the various uses to which language or sub-languages are put.
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  30. S. W. Bakhle (1993). Clarity and Certainity: An Introduction to Quine's Semantics. Datsons.
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  31. Yuri Balashov (1994). Duhem, Quine, and the Multiplicity of Scientific Tests. Philosophy of Science 61 (4):608-628.
    Duhem's and Quine's holistic theses, when properly understood, allow methodologically responsible ways of resolving a conflict between a theoretical system and experience; they only deny the possibility of doing it in an epistemically persuasive way. By developing a "string" model of scientific tests I argue that the pattern of interaction between the elements of a theoretical system arising in response to multiple adverse data can be helpful in locating a "weak spot" in it. Combining this model with anti-holistic arguments of (...)
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  32. Dorit Bar-On (1990). Quine. International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3):117-118.
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  33. Robert Barrett (1965). Quine, Synonymy and Logical Truth. Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):361-367.
    W. V. O. Quine's well-known attack upon the analytic-synthetic distinction is held to affect only one of the two species of analytic statements he distinguishes. In particular it is not directed at and does not affect the so-called logical truths. In this paper the scope of Quine's attack is extended so as to embrace the logical truths as well. It is shown that the unclarifiability of the notion of 'synonymy' deprives us not only of "analytic statements that are obtainable from (...)
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  34. William L. Barthelemy (1986). Quine and Analytic Philosophy George Romanos Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983. Pp. Xvii, 227. $17.00, $7.50 Paper. Dialogue 25 (03):576-.
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  35. William L. Barthelemy (1986). George Romanos, "Quine and Analytic Philosophy". [REVIEW] Dialogue 25 (3):576.
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  36. Dilip Kumar Basu (1971). Quine on Logical Truth. Southern Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):341-343.
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  37. Benjamin Bayer (2010). Quine's Pragmatic Solution to Sceptical Doubts. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):177-204.
    In this paper I examine a series of criticisms that have been levelled against Quine's naturalized epistemology, regarding its response to the problem of scepticism. Barry Stroud and Michael Williams, assuming that Quine wishes to refute scepticism, argue that Quine not only fails to undertake this refutation, but is also committed to theses (such as the inscrutability of reference and the underdetermination of theory by evidence) which imply versions of scepticism of their own. In Quine's defence, Roger Gibson argues that (...)
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  38. Benjamin Bayer (2007). How Not to Refute Quine: Evaluating Kim's Alternatives to Naturalized Epistemology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):473-495.
    This paper offers an interpretation of Quine’s naturalized epistemology through the lens of Jaegwon Kim’s influential critique of the same. Kim argues that Quine forces a false choice between traditional deductivist foundationalism and naturalized epistemology and contends that there are viable alternative epistemological projects. However it is suggested that Quine would reject these alternatives by reference to the same fundamental principles (underdetermination, indeterminacy of translation, extensionalism) that led him to reject traditional epistemology and propose naturalism as an alternative. Given this (...)
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  39. P. William Bechtel (1980). Indeterminacy and Underdetermination: Are Quine's Two Theses Consistent? Philosophical Studies 38 (3):309 - 320.
  40. P. William Bechtel (1978). Indeterminacy and Intentionality: Quine's Purported Elimination of Propositions. Journal of Philosophy 75 (November):649-661.
  41. Edward Becker (1975). Pure Reference: Linsky's Criticisms of Quine. Philosophia 5 (4):477-488.
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  42. Edward F. Becker (2012). The Themes of Quine's Philosophy: Meaning, Reference, and Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Preface; Acknowledgements; 1. Conventionalism and the linguistic doctrine of logical truth; 2. Analyticity and synonymy; 3. The indeterminacy of translation; 4. Ontological relativity; 5. Criticisms and extensions; Concluding remarks: conventionalism and implications; Bibliography; Index.
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  43. Edward F. Becker (1976). W. V. Quine, "The Roots of Reference". [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 7 (3):235.
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  44. K. Becker (2001). Understanding Quine's Famous `Statement'. Erkenntnis 55 (1):73-84.
    I argue that Quine''s famous claim, any statement can be held true come what may, demands an interpretation that implies that the meanings of the expressions in the held-true statement change. The intended interpretation of this claim is not clear from its context, and so it is often misunderstood by philosophers (and is misleadingly taught to their students). I explain Fodor and Lepore''s (1992) view that the above interpretation would render Quine''s assertion entirely trivial and reply, on both textual and (...)
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  45. François Beets (2011). Paul Gochet, un Professeur pas ordinaire. Chromatikon: Annales de la Philosophie En Procès / Yearbook of Philosophy in Process 7:229-231.
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  46. Martin L. Bell, Janet Hoenig, Bryan Magee, W. V. Quine & Inc British Broadcasting Corporation (1997). The Ideas of Quine. Films for the Humanities & Sciences Distributed Under License From Bbc Worldwide Americas, Inc.
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  47. J. Ben (1982). Theories and Things. Review of Metaphysics 36 (1):184-184.
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  48. Yemima Ben-menahem (2005). Black, White and Gray: Quine on Convention. Synthese 146 (3):245 - 282.
    This paper examines Quine’s web of belief metaphor and its role in his various responses to conventionalism. Distinguishing between two versions of conventionalism, one based on the under-determination of theory, the other associated with a linguistic account of necessary truth, I show how Quine plays the two versions of conventionalism against each other. Some of Quine’s reservations about conventionalism are traced back to his 1934 lectures on Carnap. Although these lectures appear to endorse Carnap’s conventionalism, in exposing Carnap’s failure to (...)
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  49. José A. Benardete (1993). Real Definitions: Quine and Aristotle. Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):265 - 282.
    Re-activating the philosophical quest for real definitions, I dare propose that its fulfillment is most convincingly represented, close to home, where one probably least expects it, notably in the first half of Section 36 of Word and Object, in the pages of Quine. Aristotle must inevitably remain our guide even as we insist on respecting Quine's anti-essentialism, and I must then explain how Aristotle, truncated, can be put here to use. Well, we may begin, appropriately, with a definition or with (...)
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  50. Václav Edvard Beneš (1954). A Partial Model for Quine's "New Foundations". Journal of Symbolic Logic 19 (3):197-200.
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