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  1. Joseph Agassi (1988). Ixmann and the Gavagai. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 19 (1):103-116.
    Dirk Koppelberg is an ambitious new arrival to take notice of. His first book, "Die Aufhebung der analytischen Philosophic: Quine als Synthese von Carnap und Neurath" (Suhrkamp, 1987, pp. 416) is extremely detailed and comprehensive. In succinct 300 pages or so (plus 40 pages of notes and 30 pages of (not too successful) bibliography) he manages to touch on W. V. Quine's diverse concerns, to synthesize them, to relate them to their..
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  2. Arif Ahmed (2008). W.V. Quine. In C. J. Misak (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
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  3. Ken Akiba (1995). Quine and the Linguistic Doctrine of Logical Truth. Philosophical Studies 78 (3):237 - 256.
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  4. Virgil C. Aldrich (1955). Mr. Quine on Meaning, Naming, and Purporting to Name. Philosophical Studies 6 (2):17 - 26.
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  5. Sophie R. Allen (2010). Can Theoretical Underdetermination Support the Indeterminacy of Translation? Revisiting Quine's 'Real Ground'. Philosophy 85 (1):67-90.
    It is commonly believed that Quine's principal argument for the Indeterminacy of Translation requires an untenably strong account of the underdetermination of theories by evidence, namely that that two theories may be compatible with all possible evidence for them and yet incompatible with each other. In this article, I argue that Quine's conclusion that translation is indeterminate can be based upon the weaker, uncontroversial conception of theoretical underdetermination, in conjunction with a weak reading of the 'Gavagai' argument which establishes the (...)
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  6. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2001). On Quine on Carnap on Ontology. Philosophical Studies 102 (1):93 - 122.
    W. V. Quine assumed that in _Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology Rudolf Carnap was attempting to dodge commitment to abstract entities--without either renouncing quantification over them or demonstrating their dispensability--by wielding the analytic/synthetic distinction against ontological issues. Quine's interpretation of Carnap's intent--and his criticism of it--is widely endorsed. But Carnap objected, I argue, not to abstract entities, but to his critics' suggestion that empiricism implies nominalism. Quine's and Carnap's views are therefore more akin than Quine ever suspected. Unfortunately, Quine's misinterpretation of (...)
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  7. James A. Anderson (2006). The Ethics and Science of Placebo-Controlled Trials: Assay Sensitivity and the Duhem-Quine Thesis. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (1):65 – 81.
    The principle of clinical equipoise requires that, aside from certain exceptional cases, second generation treatments ought to be tested against standard therapy. In violation of this principle, placebo-controlled trials (PCTs) continue to be used extensively in the development and licensure of second-generation treatments. This practice is typically justified by appeal to methodological arguments that purport to demonstrate that active-controlled trials (ACTs) are methodologically flawed. Foremost among these arguments is the so called assay sensitivity argument. In this paper, I take a (...)
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  8. Gian Aldo Antonelli (1998). Extensional Quotients for Type Theory and the Consistency Problem for NF. Journal of Symbolic Logic 63 (1):247-261.
    Quine’s “New Foundations” (NF) was first presented in Quine [1937] and later on in Quine [1963]. Ernst Specker [1958, 1962], building upon a previous result of Ehrenfeucht and Mostowski [1956], showed that NF is consistent if and only if there is a model of the Theory of Negative (and positive) Types (TNT) with full extensionality that admits of a “shifting automorphism,” but the existence of a such a model remains an open problem.
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  9. Robert L. Arrington & Hans-Johann Glock (eds.) (1996). Wittgenstein and Quine. Routledge.
    This unique study brings together for the first time two of the most important philosophers of the twentieh century. Are the views of Wittgenstein and Quine on method and philosophy compatible or radically opposed? Does Wittgenstein's conception of language engender that of Quine, or threaten its philosophical foundations? An understanding of the similarities and differences between the thought of Wittgenstein and Quine is essential if we are to have a full picture of the landscape of recent and contemporary philosophy. This (...)
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  10. Jamin Asay (2010). How to Express Ontological Commitment in the Vernacular. Philosophia Mathematica 18 (3):293-310.
    According to the familiar Quinean understanding of ontological commitment, (1) one undertakes ontological commitments only via theoretical regimentations, and (2) ontological commitments are to be identified with the domain of a theory’s quantifiers. Jody Azzouni accepts (1), but rejects (2). Azzouni accepts (1) because he believes that no vernacular expression carries ontological commitments. He rejects (2) by locating a theory’s commitments with the extension of an existence predicate. I argue that Azzouni’s two theses undermine each other. If ontological commitments follow (...)
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  11. Jay David Atlas, Aboutness, Fiction, and Quantifying Into Intentional Contexts: A Linguistic Analysis of Prior, Quine, and Searle on Propositional Attitudes, Martinich on Fictional Reference, Taglicht on The..
    A Linguistic Analysis of Prior, Quine, and Searle on Propositional Attitudes, Martinich on Fictional Reference, Taglicht on the Active/Passive Mood Distinction in English, etc.
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  12. Bruce Aune (1977). Root on Quine. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):240-243.
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  13. Bruce Aune (1975). Quine on Translation and Reference. Philosophical Studies 27 (4):221 - 236.
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  14. Jody Azzouni (2005). Tarski, Quine, and the Transcendence of the Vernacular “True”. Synthese 142 (3):273 - 288.
    It is argued that the blind ascriptive role for the word true, its use, that is, in conjunction with descriptions of classes of sentences or with proper names of sentences (but not quote-names), is one which applies indiscriminately to sentences regardless of whether these are in languages we speak, can understand, or can translate into sentences that we do speak (and understand). Formal analogues of the ordinary word true as they arise in Tarskis seminal work, and in others, cannot replicate (...)
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  15. Jody Azzouni (1998). On "on What There Is". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1):1–18.
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  16. Jody Azzouni (1997). Applied Mathematics, Existential Commitment and the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Thesis. Philosophia Mathematica 5 (3):193-209.
    The ramifications are explored of taking physical theories to commit their advocates only to ‘physically real’ entities, where ‘physically real’ means ‘causally efficacious’ (e.g., actual particles moving through space, such as dust motes), the ‘physically significant’ (e.g., centers of mass), and the merely mathematical—despite the fact that, in ordinary physical theory, all three sorts of posits are quantified over. It's argued that when such theories are regimented, existential quantification, even when interpreted ‘objectually’ (that is, in terms of satisfaction via variables, (...)
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  17. James Baillie (1996). Quine on Translation and Meaning. Cogito 10 (3):199-204.
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  18. John Robert Baker (1978). Some Remarks on Quine's Arguments Against Modal Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 19 (4):663-673.
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  19. S. W. Bakhle (1993). Clarity and Certainity: An Introduction to Quine's Semantics. Datsons.
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  20. Yuri Balashov (1994). Duhem, Quine, and the Multiplicity of Scientific Tests. Philosophy of Science 61 (4):608-628.
    Duhem's and Quine's holistic theses, when properly understood, allow methodologically responsible ways of resolving a conflict between a theoretical system and experience; they only deny the possibility of doing it in an epistemically persuasive way. By developing a "string" model of scientific tests I argue that the pattern of interaction between the elements of a theoretical system arising in response to multiple adverse data can be helpful in locating a "weak spot" in it. Combining this model with anti-holistic arguments of (...)
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  21. Robert Barrett (1965). Quine, Synonymy and Logical Truth. Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):361-367.
    W. V. O. Quine's well-known attack upon the analytic-synthetic distinction is held to affect only one of the two species of analytic statements he distinguishes. In particular it is not directed at and does not affect the so-called logical truths. In this paper the scope of Quine's attack is extended so as to embrace the logical truths as well. It is shown that the unclarifiability of the notion of 'synonymy' deprives us not only of "analytic statements that are obtainable from (...)
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  22. William L. Barthelemy (1986). Quine and Analytic Philosophy George Romanos Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983. Pp. Xvii, 227. $17.00, $7.50 Paper. Dialogue 25 (03):576-.
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  23. Dilip Kumar Basu (1971). Quine on Logical Truth. Southern Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):341-343.
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  24. Benjamin Bayer (2010). Quine's Pragmatic Solution to Sceptical Doubts. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):177-204.
    In this paper I examine a series of criticisms that have been levelled against Quine's naturalized epistemology, regarding its response to the problem of scepticism. Barry Stroud and Michael Williams, assuming that Quine wishes to refute scepticism, argue that Quine not only fails to undertake this refutation, but is also committed to theses (such as the inscrutability of reference and the underdetermination of theory by evidence) which imply versions of scepticism of their own. In Quine's defence, Roger Gibson argues that (...)
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  25. Benjamin Bayer (2007). How Not to Refute Quine: Evaluating Kim's Alternatives to Naturalized Epistemology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):473-495.
    This paper offers an interpretation of Quine’s naturalized epistemology through the lens of Jaegwon Kim’s influential critique of the same. Kim argues that Quine forces a false choice between traditional deductivist foundationalism and naturalized epistemology and contends that there are viable alternative epistemological projects. However it is suggested that Quine would reject these alternatives by reference to the same fundamental principles (underdetermination, indeterminacy of translation, extensionalism) that led him to reject traditional epistemology and propose naturalism as an alternative. Given this (...)
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  26. P. William Bechtel (1978). Indeterminacy and Intentionality: Quine's Purported Elimination of Propositions. Journal of Philosophy 75 (November):649-661.
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  27. Edward Becker (1975). Pure Reference: Linsky's Criticisms of Quine. Philosophia 5 (4):477-488.
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  28. Edward F. Becker (2012). The Themes of Quine's Philosophy: Meaning, Reference, and Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Preface; Acknowledgements; 1. Conventionalism and the linguistic doctrine of logical truth; 2. Analyticity and synonymy; 3. The indeterminacy of translation; 4. Ontological relativity; 5. Criticisms and extensions; Concluding remarks: conventionalism and implications; Bibliography; Index.
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  29. K. Becker (2001). Understanding Quine's Famous `Statement'. Erkenntnis 55 (1):73-84.
    I argue that Quine''s famous claim, any statement can be held true come what may, demands an interpretation that implies that the meanings of the expressions in the held-true statement change. The intended interpretation of this claim is not clear from its context, and so it is often misunderstood by philosophers (and is misleadingly taught to their students). I explain Fodor and Lepore''s (1992) view that the above interpretation would render Quine''s assertion entirely trivial and reply, on both textual and (...)
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  30. Yemima Ben-menahem (2005). Black, White and Gray: Quine on Convention. Synthese 146 (3):245 - 282.
    This paper examines Quine’s web of belief metaphor and its role in his various responses to conventionalism. Distinguishing between two versions of conventionalism, one based on the under-determination of theory, the other associated with a linguistic account of necessary truth, I show how Quine plays the two versions of conventionalism against each other. Some of Quine’s reservations about conventionalism are traced back to his 1934 lectures on Carnap. Although these lectures appear to endorse Carnap’s conventionalism, in exposing Carnap’s failure to (...)
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  31. José A. Benardete (1993). Real Definitions: Quine and Aristotle. Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):265 - 282.
    Re-activating the philosophical quest for real definitions, I dare propose that its fulfillment is most convincingly represented, close to home, where one probably least expects it, notably in the first half of Section 36 of Word and Object, in the pages of Quine. Aristotle must inevitably remain our guide even as we insist on respecting Quine's anti-essentialism, and I must then explain how Aristotle, truncated, can be put here to use. Well, we may begin, appropriately, with a definition or with (...)
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  32. Jonathan Berg (ed.) (1993). Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
    Contents: Preface. Johannes BRANDL: Semantic Holism Is Here To Stay. Michael DEVITT: A Critique of the Case for Semantic Holism. Georges REY: The Unavailability of What We Mean: A Reply to Quine, Fodor and LePore. Joseph LEVINE: Intentional Chemistry. Louise ANTHONY: Conceptual Connection and the Observation/Theory Distinction. Gilbert HARMAN: Meaning Holism Defended. Kirk A. LUDWIG: Is Content Holism Incoherent? Anne BEZUIDENHOUT: The Impossibility of Punctate Mental Representations. Takashi YAGISAWA: The Cost of Meaning Solipsism. Alberto PERUZZI: Holism: The Polarized Spectrum. Jonathan (...)
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  33. Jonathan Berg (1993). Inferential Roles, Quine, and Mad Holism. In Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 283-301.
    Jerry Fodor and Ernie LePore argue against inferential role semantics on the grounds that either it relies on an analytic/synthetic distinction vulnerable to Quinean objections, or else it leads to a variety of meaning holism frought with absurd consequences. However, the slide from semantic atomism to meaning holism might be prevented by distinctions not affected by Quine's arguments against analyticity; and the absurd consequences Fodor and LePore attribute to meaning holism obtain only on an implausible construal of inferential roles.
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  34. Alan Berger (1983). Quine on Alternative Logics: A Reply. Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):127-129.
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  35. Alan Berger (1980). Quine on "Alternative Logics" and Verdict Tables. Journal of Philosophy 77 (5):259-277.
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  36. Gustav Bergmann (1955). Professor Quine on Analyticity. Mind 64 (254):254-258.
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  37. Lars Bergstr (1994). Quine's Truth. Inquiry 37 (4):421 – 435.
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  38. Lars Bergström (2006). Quine's Relativism. Theoria 72 (4):286-298.
  39. Lars Bergström (1994). Quine's Truth. Inquiry 37 (4):421-435.
    W. V. Quine has made statements about truth which are not obviously compatible, and his statements have been interpreted in more than one way. For example, Donald Davidson claims that Quine has an epistemic theory of truth, but Quine himself often says that truth is just disquotational. This paper argues that Quine should recognize two different notions of truth. One of these is disquotational, the other is empiricist. There is nothing wrong with recognizing two different notions of truth. Both may (...)
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  40. Lars Bergström (1994). Quine's Truth. Inquiry 37 (4):421 – 435.
    W. V. Quine has made statements about truth which are not obviously compatible, and his statements have been interpreted in more than one way. For example, Donald Davidson claims that Quine has an epistemic theory of truth, but Quine himself often says that truth is just disquotational. This paper argues that Quine should recognize two different notions of truth. One of these is disquotational, the other is empiricist. There is nothing wrong with recognizing two different notions of truth. Both may (...)
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  41. Lars Bergström (1993). Quine, Underdetermination, and Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 60 (7):331-358.
  42. Lars Bergström & Dagfinn Føllesdal (1994). Interview with Willard Van Orman Quine in November 1993. Theoria 60 (3):193-206.
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  43. John Bigelow (2010). Quine, Mereology, and Inference to the Best Explanation. Logique Et Analyse 53 (212):465.
    Given Quine's views on philosophical methodology, he should not have taken the axioms of classical mereology to be "self-evident", or "analytic"; but rather, he should have set out to justify them by what might be broadly called an "inference to the best explanation". He does very little to this end. In particular, he does little to examine alternative theories, to see if there might be anything they could explain better than classical mereology can. I argue that there is something important (...)
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  44. Graham H. Bird (1995). Carnap and Quine: Internal and External Questions. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 42 (1):41 - 64.
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  45. Michael Bishop (2009). Reflections on Cognitive and Epistemic Diversity : Can a Stich in Time Save Quine? In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    In “Epistemology Naturalized”, Quine famously suggests that epistemology, properly understood, “simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science” (1969, 82). Since the appearance of Quine’s seminal article, virtually every epistemologist, including the later Quine (1986, 664), has repudiated the idea that a normative discipline like epistemology could be reduced to a purely descriptive discipline like psychology. Working epistemologists no longer take Quine’s vision in “Epistemology Naturalized” seriously. In this paper, I will explain why I (...)
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  46. Edward Black (1968). Aristotle's 'Essentialism' and Quine's Cycling Mathematician. The Monist 52 (2):288-297.
  47. Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.) (forthcoming). Ontology After Carnap. Oxford University Press.
    Analytic philosophy is once again in a methodological frame of mind. Nowhere is this more evident than in metaphysics, whose practitioners and historians are actively reflecting on the nature of ontological questions, the status of their answers, and the relevance of contributions both from other areas within philosophy (e.g., philosophical logic, semantics) and beyond (notably, the natural sciences). Such reflections are hardly new: the debate between Willard van Orman Quine and Rudolf Carnap about how to understand and resolve ontological questions (...)
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  48. Alex Blum (1981). Quine on an Alleged Non Sequitur. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22 (3):249-250.
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  49. Paul Artin Boghossian (1996). Analyticity Reconsidered. Noûs 30 (3):360-391.
    This is what many philosophers believe today about the analytic/synthetic distinction: In his classic early writings on analyticity -- in particular, in "Truth by Convention," "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," and "Carnap and Logical Truth" -- Quine showed that there can be no distinction between sentences that are true purely by virtue of their meaning and those that are not. In so doing, Quine devastated the philosophical programs that depend upon a notion of analyticity -- specifically, the linguistic theory of necessary (...)
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  50. D. E. Bolton (1979). Quine on Meaning and Translation. Philosophy 54 (209):329 - 346.
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