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  1. Andrew M. Bailey (2010). Warrant is Unique. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):297-304.
    Warrant is what fills the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. But a problem arises. Is there just one condition that satisfies this description? Suppose there isn’t: can anything interesting be said about warrant after all? Call this the uniqueness problem. In this paper, I solve the problem. I examine one plausible argument that there is no one condition filling the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. I then motivate and formulate revisions of the standard analysis of warrant. (...)
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  2. Stewart Clem (2008). Warrant and Epistemic Virtues: Toward and Agent Reliabilist Account of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Dissertation, Oklahoma State University
    Alvin Plantinga’s theory of knowledge, as developed in his Warrant trilogy, has shaped the debates surrounding many areas in epistemology in profound ways. Plantinga has received his share of criticism, however, particularly in his treatment of belief in God as being “properly basic”. There has also been much confusion surrounding his notions of warrant and proper function, to which Plantinga has responded numerous times. Many critics remain unsatisfied, while others have developed alternative understandings of warrant in order to rescue Plantinga’s (...)
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  3. William M. Keith & David E. Beard (2008). Toulmin's Rhetorical Logic: What's the Warrant for Warrants? Philosophy and Rhetoric 41 (1):22-50.
  4. J. J. Kvanvig (ed.) (1996). Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman and Littlefield, Savage, Maryland.
  5. Jonathan Kvanvig, Wright on Truth and Superassertibility.
    Crispin Wright argues persuasively that truth cannot be understood in terms of warranted assertibility, on the basis of some very simple facts about negation. The argument, he claims, undermines not only simply assertibility theories of truth, but more idealized ones according to which truth is to be understood in terms of what is assertible in the long run, or assertible within some ideal scientific theory.
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  6. Jonathan Kvanvig (2007). Two Approaches to Epistemic Defeat. In Deane-Peter Baker (ed.), Alvin Plantinga. Cambridge University Press. 107-124.
    There are two different kinds of theories of the concept of epistemic defeat. One theory begins with propositional relationships, only by implication describing what happens in the context of a noetic system. Such a theory places inforrmation about defeat up front, not informing us of how the defeat relationships play out in the context of actual belief, at least not initially. The other theory takes a back door to the concept of defeat, assuming a context of (...)
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  7. Jonathan Kvanvig (1996). Plantinga's Proper Function Account of Warrant. In J. J. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman and Littlefield, Savage, Maryland.
    Plantinga thus offers an approach that begins by assessing the faculties or abilities of a cognitive system or agent. Once such an assessment is complete, the epistemologist is in a position to infer the epistemic status of the doxastic products of those faculties or abilities.
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  8. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1996). ``Plantinga's Proper Function Theory of Warrant&Quot. In , Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. 281-306.
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  9. Trenton Merricks (1997). More on Warrant's Entailing Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):627-631.
    Warrant is that, whatever it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. In "Warrant Entails Truth" (PPR, December 1995), I argued that it is impossible that a false belief be warranted. Sharon Ryan attacked the argument of that paper in her "Does Warrant Entail Truth?" (PPR, March 1996). In "More on Warrant's Entailing Truth" I present arguments for the claim that warrant entails truth that are, I think, significantly more compelling than the arguments of my original (...)
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  10. Trenton Merricks (1995). Warrant Entails Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):841-855.
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  11. María G. Navarro (2011). Etapas/ Fases de la Argumentación. In Luis Vega and Paula Olmos Gómez (ed.), Compendio de Lógica, Argumentación y Retórica. Editorial Trotta. 243--244.
    El estudio y análisis de las argumentaciones cotidianas entendidas como interacciones discursivas e intencionales encaminadas a dar cuenta de algo con el fin de lograr que aquello que se sostiene sea aceptado, sería inconcebible sin la aparición de la teoría de los actos de habla de Austin (1962), la propuesta de Searle (1969), el trabajo de Grice sobre la teoría de la conversación (1975) y el importante estudio sistemático de Hamblin sobre el argumento falaz (1970). Como una reelaboración de dichas (...)
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  12. Joel Pust (2002). Kitcher on Tradition-Independent a Priori Warrant. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):373-376.
    In his most recent treatment of a priori knowledge, Philip Kitcher argues against what he takes to be the widespread view that our knowledge and warranted belief is 'tradition-independent'. Furthermore, he argues that defeasible conceptions of a priori warrant entail that it is not tradition-independent, a conclusion which he thinks is contrary to what most epistemologists hold. I argue that knowledge is not widely believed to be tradition-independent, and that, while warrant is widely believed to be tradition-independent, Kitcher's arguments show (...)
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  13. Joel Pust (2000). Warrant and Analysis. Analysis 60 (1):51–57.
    Alvin Plantinga theorizes about an epistemic property he calls "warrant," defined as that which makes the difference "between knowledge and mere true belief." I show that, given this account, Plantinga can have no justification for claiming that a false belief is warranted nor for claiming that warrant comes in degrees.
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