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  1. William Alston (1995). Epistemic Warrant as Proper Function. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):397-402.
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  2. Kent Bach, Accidental Truth and Would-Be Knowledge.
    Nowadays the traditional quest for certainty seems not only futile but pointless. Resisting skepticism no longer seems to require meeting the Cartesian demand for an unshakable foundation for knowledge. True beliefs can be less than maximally justified and still be justified enough to qualify as knowledge, even though some beliefs that are justified to the same extent are false. Yet a few philosophers suggest that there is a special sort of justification that only true beliefs can have. Call it 'full (...)
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  3. Adam Bartlett (2005). By Transmission: How It All Comes Down to Nothing. [REVIEW] Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 1 (2):348-356.
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  4. Jon Barton, Warrant and Objectivity.
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  5. Kelvin Beckett (1983). Transmission. Journal of Philosophy of Education 17 (2):201–205.
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  6. Rebecca Bennett (2007). Should We Criminalize HIV Transmission? In Charles A. Erin & Suzanne Ost (eds.), The Criminal Justice System and Health Care. OUP Oxford
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  7. T. M. Botham (2003). Plantinga and Favorable Mini-Environments. Synthese 135 (3):431 - 441.
    In response to a collection of essays in Jonathan Kvanvig's (1996) Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, Alvin Plantinga notices that certain Gettier-style examples undermine his (1993b) canonical account of epistemic warrant as delineated in Warrant and Proper Function. In hopes to clarify how his account survives Gettier's purchase, he (1996; 2000) argues that a belief has warrant sufficient for knowledge only when produced in a favorable cognitive mini-environment. In Warranted Christian Belief Plantinga (2000) (...)
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  8. Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2009). Bootstrapping and Knowledge of Reliability. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):407–412.
    This is a critical discussion of a paper on the problem of bootstrapping by Jose Zalabardo.
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  9. Andrew Chignell (2003). Accidentally True Belief and Warrant. Synthese 137 (3):445 - 458.
    The Proper Functionist account of warrant – like many otherexternalist accounts – is vulnerable to certain Gettier-style counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. In this paper, I briefly survey the development of the account, noting the way it was altered in response to such counterexamples. I then argue that Alvin Plantinga's latest amendment to the account is flawed insofar as it rules out cases of true beliefs which do intuitively strike us as knowledge, and that a conjecture recently put forward by (...)
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  10. E. J. Coffman (2008). Warrant Without Truth? Synthese 162 (2):173 - 194.
    This paper advances the debate over the question whether false beliefs may nevertheless have warrant, the property that yields knowledge when conjoined with true belief. The paper’s first main part—which spans Sections 2–4—assesses the best argument for Warrant Infallibilism, the view that only true beliefs can have warrant. I show that this argument’s key premise conflicts with an extremely plausible claim about warrant. Sections 5–6 constitute the paper’s second main part. Section 5 presents an overlooked puzzle about warrant, and uses (...)
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  11. Juan Comesaña (2005). Justified Vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383.
    In this paper I argue that McDowell’s brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill-motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a “highest common factor” between veridical and non-veridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant (where “warrant” is understood as whatever has to be added to true belief to yield (...)
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  12. Neil Cooper (1987). The Transmission of Knowledge. In Roger Straughan & John Wilson (eds.), Philosophers on Education. Barnes & Noble Books
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  13. Robert Cutter (1976). A Note On The Transmission Of The Hsü Hsüan-Kuai Lu. Journal of the American Oriental Society 96 (1):124-131.
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  14. Gilles Denis (2001). Pratiques Paysannes Et Théories Savantes Préagronomiques au XVIIIe Siècle: Le Cas des Débats Sur la Transmission des Maladies des Grains de Blé/Rural Practice and Learned Pre-Agronomical Theories in the 18th Century: The Case of the Debate on the Transmission of Grain Diseases. Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 54 (4):451-494.
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  15. Margherita di Stasio (2006). On Plantinga's Idea of Warrant in Epistemology and in Philosophy of Religion. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):307-325.
    The paper reconstructs Plantinga’s understanding of knowledge as an alternative to the standard conception of knowledge. In the first phase, Plantinga’s work about warrant was taken as a contribution to the discussion about the possibility of a priori knowledge. With his conception of knowledge as warranted belief he wanted to show that also a posteriori belief can have a degree of warrant, and may be considered to be knowledge. The paper concludes that Plantinga points at an alternative to the standard (...)
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  16. Michael Dummett (2007). Reply to Crispin Wright. In R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Open Court 445--454.
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  17. Hasan Elboudrari (1991). Transmission du Charisme Et Institutionnalisation: Les Cas de la Zawiya d'Ouezzane, Maroc XVIème-XIXème Siècles. Al-Qantara: Revista de Estudios Árabes 12 (2):523-536.
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  18. N. Everitt (1998). Kvanig, JL-Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Philosophical Books 39:188-190.
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  19. Neil Feit (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can (...)
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  20. Fred Feldman (1978). Final Comments on the Analysis of Warranting. Synthese 37 (3):465 - 469.
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  21. Fred Feldman (1977). On the Analysis of Warranting. Synthese 34 (4):497 - 512.
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  22. Fred Feldman (1976). Warranting. Journal of Philosophy 73 (17):585-587.
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  23. R. Douglas Geivett & Greg Jesson (2001). Plantinga's Externalism and the Terminus of Warrant-Based Epistemology. Philosophia Christi 3 (2):329-340.
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  24. S. Gromb & L. BenaLi (2008). La Transmission Volontaire du Sida, Un Problème de Qualification Pénale. Médecine Et Droit 2008 (92):139-143.
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  25. Daniel Hill (2001). Interview with Alvin Plantinga. Philosophy Now 34:38-41.
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  26. Bruce Hunter (1994). Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 14 (2):121-127.
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  27. Bruce Hunter (1994). Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 14:121-127.
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  28. P. J. (1958). The Origin and Transmission of the New Testament. Review of Metaphysics 12 (1):150-150.
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  29. Daniel M. Johnson (2011). Proper Function and Defeating Experiences. Synthese 182 (3):433-447.
    Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that what he terms “doxastic” theories of epistemic justification fail to account for certain epistemic features having to do with evidence. I’m going to give an argument roughly along these lines, but I’m going to focus specifically on proper function theories of justification or warrant. In particular, I’ll focus on Michael Bergmann’s recent proper function account of justification, though the argument applies also to Alvin Plantinga’s proper function account of warrant. The epistemic features I’m concerned about (...)
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  30. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.) (1996). Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield.
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  31. Jaspar Joseph-Lester & Sharon Kivland (2007). Transmission Working From the Collection. Angelaki 12 (2):1 – 2.
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  32. John Wingard Jr (2010). Reliability in Plantinga´s Account of Epistemic Warrant. Principia 6 (2):249-278.
    In das paper 1 ccmstder the rehabday condaton in Atm PlanungaS's proper functionabst account of eptstemtc warrant I begm by reviewing m some detail the features of the rehabdity condition as Planunga lias aruculated a From there, 1 consider what is needed to ground or secure the sort of rehability whzch Plantinga has m mind, and argue that what is needed is a significant causai condam which has generally been overlooked Then, after identifying eight verstons of the relevant sort of (...)
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  33. Timo Kajamies & Krister Talvinen (2005). Warrant: Mundane or Divine? Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):95-108.
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  34. Ladislav Koreň (2015). Hinge Commitments Vis-À-Vis the Transmission Problem. Synthese 192 (8):2513-2534.
    This study provides a critical appraisal of Duncan Pritchard’s argument to the effect that ability to preserve certain eminently plausible transmission and/or closure principles for knowledge serves as a powerful adequacy test on alternative accounts of so-called Wittgensteinian certainties or hinge commitments. I argue that Pritchard fails to establish this claim—the transmission test does not favour his favourite conception over alternative conceptions premised on the idea that hinge commitments are not supportable via evidential-cognitive routes.
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  35. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.) (1996). Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
    Alvin Plantinga responds to the essays in a concluding chapter.
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  36. Chin-Lun Lai (2006). Multimedia Compression and Transmission-Dynamic Perceptual Quality Control Strategy for Mobile Multimedia Transmission Via Watermarking Index. In O. Stock & M. Schaerf (eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer-Verlag 4319--712.
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  37. Andrew Moon (2012). Warrant Does Entail Truth. Synthese 184 (3):287-297.
    Let ‘warrant’ denote whatever precisely it is that makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. A current debate in epistemology asks whether warrant entails truth, i.e., whether (Infallibilism) S’s belief that p is warranted only if p is true. The arguments for infallibilism have come under considerable and, as of yet, unanswered objections. In this paper, I will defend infallibilism. In Part I, I advance a new argument for infallibilism; the basic outline is as follows. Suppose fallibilism is (...)
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  38. Joseph Mouton (2007). La transmission fétiche. Multitudes 5:199-207.
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  39. Ram Neta (2013). 6. Easy Knowledge, Transmission Failure, and Empiricism. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:166.
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  40. Leland Gerson Neuberg (1988). Distorted Transmission. Theory and Society 17 (4):487-525.
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  41. Melissa Parker, Helen Ward & Sophie Day (1998). Sexual Networks and the Transmission of Hiv in London. Journal of Biosocial Science 30 (1):63-83.
    This paper discusses ways in which empirical research investigating sexual networks can further understanding of the transmission of HIV in London, using information from a 24-month period of participant observation and 53 open-ended, in-depth interviews with eighteen men and one woman who have direct and indirect sexual links with each other. These interviews enabled the identification of a wider sexual network between 154 participants and contacts during the year August 1994-July 1995. The linked network data help to identify pathways of (...)
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  42. Colin Ruloff (2010). Some Remarks on Bonjour on Warrant, Proper Function, and Defeasibility. Principia 4 (2):215-228.
    A number of counterexamples have recently been leveled against Alvin Plantinga's Proper Functionalism, counterexamples aimed at showing that Plantinga's theory fails to provide sufficient conditions for warrant — that elusive epistemic property which together with true belief yields knowledge. Among these counterexamples, Laurence Bonjour's is perhaps the most formidable and, if successful, shows that Proper Functionalism is simply too weak to serve as an acceptable theory of warrant. In this paper, I argue that, contrary to initial appearances, BonJour's counterexample is (...)
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  43. S. Thakchöe (2011). Prāsaṅgika Epistemology in Context. In Sonam Thakchoe, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay Garfield, Guy Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Georges Dreyfus, Tom Tillemans & Jan Westerhoff (eds.), Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press 39--55.
    Some argue that a prāsaṅgika mādhyamika is committed to rejecting all epistemic instruments (pramāṇas) in virtue of the rejection of intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and intrinsic characteristic (svalakṣaṇa). This chapter takes a different perspective, arguing that Candrakīrti accepts both conventional and rational epistemic instruments, and develops a cogent account of their respective roles in our cognitive lives. To be sure, any mādhyamika rejects intrinsic nature, but Candrakīrti shows that epistemic instruments give us access to epistemic objects precisely because they lack such (...)
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  44. Jonathan Vogel (2008). Epistemic Bootstrapping. Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):518-539.
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  45. Michael Welbourne (1979). The Transmission of Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 29 (114):1-9.
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  46. Nancy I. Woolf (2002). Cholinergic Transmission. In Elaine Perry, Heather Ashton & Andrew W. Young (eds.), Neurochemistry of Consciousness: Neurotransmitters in Mind. John Benjamins 36--25.
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Transmission of Warrant
  1. Marc Alspector‐Kelly (2015). Wright Back to Dretske, or Why You Might as Well Deny Knowledge Closure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):570-611.
    Fred Dretske notoriously claimed that knowledge closure sometimes fails. Crispin Wright agrees that warrant does not transmit in the relevant cases, but only because the agent must already be warranted in believing the conclusion in order to acquire her warrant for the premise. So the agent ends up being warranted in believing, and so knowing, the conclusion in those cases too: closure is preserved. Wright's argument requires that the conclusion's having to be warranted beforehand explains transmission failure. I (...)
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  2. Helen Beebee (2002). Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question, and Semantic Externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-74.
  3. Paul Boghossian (2003). Blind Reasoning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225–248.
    The paper asks under what conditions deductive reasoning transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion. It argues that both standard externalist and standard internalist accounts of this phenomenon fail. The nature of this failure is taken to indicate the way forward: basic forms of deductive reasoning must justify by being instances of ‘blind but blameless’ reasoning. Finally, the paper explores the suggestion that an inferentialist account of the logical constants can help explain how such reasoning is possible.
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  4. J. Brown (2003). The Reductio Argument and Transmission of Warrant. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press
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