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  1. Jonathan E. Adler (2002). Akratic Believing? Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.
    Davidson's account of weakness of will depends upon a parallel that he draws between practical and theoretical reasoning. I argue that the parallel generates a misleading picture of theoretical reasoning. Once the misleading picture is corrected, I conclude that the attempt to model akratic belief on Davidson's account of akratic action cannot work. The arguments that deny the possibility of akratic belief also undermine, more generally, various attempts to assimilate theoretical to practical reasoning.
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  2. Donald Ross Algeo (1977). Weakness of Will and Rationalization. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
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  3. Nomy Arpaly (2003). Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency. Oxford University Press.
    Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.
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  4. Nomy Arpaly (2000). On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgment. Ethics 110 (3):488-513.
    I argue that akrasia is not always significantly irrational. To be more precise, I argue that an agent is sometimes more rational for being akratic then she would have been for being enkratic or strong-willed.
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  5. Koki Asano (2008). A Counterargument to Skepticism of Akrasia. Kagaku Tetsugaku 41 (2):17-29.
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  6. Robert Audi (1993). Action, Intention, and Reason. Cornell University Press.
    In this collection of essays, Audi develops a general theory of action ranging from the nature of action and action-explanation to free and rational action.
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  7. Robert Audi (1990). Weakness of Will and Rational Action. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):270 – 281.
    Weakness of will has been widely discussed from at least three points of view. It has been examined historically, with Aristotle recently occupying centre stage. It has been analysed conceptually, with the question of its nature and possibility in the forefront. It has been considered normatively in relation to both rational action and moral character. My concern is not historical and is only secondarily conceptual: while I hope to clarify what constitutes weakness of will, I presuppose, rather than construct, an (...)
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  8. Robert Audi (1979). Weakness of Will and Practical Judgment. Noûs 13 (2):173-196.
    Weakness of will is a common phenomenon of human experience. But what is it? It has proved highly resistant to analysis, and even the accounts that seem to capture our intuitions about what weakness of will is raise problems about how it is possible. This is because these accounts seem inconsistent with some highly plausible principles about action. My aim here is to propose a new account of weakness of will and its relation to practical judgment, and to explain how (...)
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  9. Baker (2010). Procrastination as Vice. In Chrisoula Andreou Mark D. White (ed.), The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination. Oxford
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  10. Tomas Barrero (2010). Reason, Action, and Weakness of the Will: A Semantic Approach. Ideas Y Valores 59 (143):161-187.
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  11. Tomás Barrero (2010). Razón, acción Y debilidad de la voluntad. Una lectura semántica. Ideas Y Valores 59 (143):161-187.
    This paper develops some of Austin’s ideas on excuses, stressing their “dimensional” character and relating it to Searle’s distinction between intention-in-action and previous intention, in order to show that the original speech-act shaped distinction between weakness of the will and moral weakness can be embedded in a quite different theoretical framework such as Davidson’s, while Austin’s dimensional classification of actions cannot. Finally, the article analyzes how Grice’s critique of Davidson’s views on akrasia is more faithful to Austin and more radical (...)
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  12. Greg Bassett (2013). Incontinence and Perception. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):1019-1028.
    The traditional problem of incontinence raises the question of whether there is any way to account for action contrary to judgment. When one acts, rather than only being acted upon by circumstances, the action is explained in terms of the reasons for action one judges oneself to have. It therefore seems impossible to explain action that iscontrary to such judgment. This paper examines the question of how such explanation would be possible. After excluding accounts that either eliminate incontinence or render (...)
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  13. James Beebe (2013). Weakness of Will, Reasonability, and Compulsion. Synthese 190 (18):4077-4093.
    Experimental philosophers have recently begun to investigate the folk conception of weakness of will (e.g., Mele in Philos Stud 150:391–404, 2010; May and Holton in Philos Stud 157:341–360, 2012; Beebe forthcoming; Sousa and Mauro forthcoming). Their work has focused primarily on the ways in which akrasia (i.e., acting contrary to one’s better judgment), unreasonable violations of resolutions, and variations in the moral valence of actions modulate folk attributions of weakness of will. A key finding that has emerged from this research (...)
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  14. James R. Beebe, The Folk Conception of Weakness of Will.
    Philosophers have long puzzled over the phenomenon of weakness of will. Some (e.g., Socrates in the Protagoras ; Hare, 1952, 1963; Watson, 1977) have questioned whether weak-willed action is genuinely possible, since it requires that agents do one thing while sincerely believing they ought to do something else. Others have been skeptical about whether weak-willed actions can be free, since agents who display weakness of will sometimes seem to be overcome or enslaved by their desires or passions (cf. Watson 1977; (...)
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  15. Jonathan Bennett (1974). The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn. Philosophy 49 (188):123-134.
    In this paper1 I shall present not just the conscience of Huckleberry Finn but two others as well. One of them is the conscience of Heinrich Himmler. He became a Nazi in 1923; he served drably and quietly, but well, and was rewarded with increasing responsibility and power. At the peak of his career he held many offices and commands, of which the most powerful was that of leader of the S.S. - the principal police force of the Nazi regime. (...)
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  16. Vera Bergelson (2009). The Case of Weak Will and Wayward Desire. Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (1):19-28.
    In this article, I confront Garvey’s argument that a weak-willed individual deserves partial excuse for trying to resist a strong desire that pushes him toward commission of a criminal act even though in the end he unreasonably abandons his resistance and commits the crime. I attempt to refute Garvey’s argument on two counts: one, I question whether the law should indeed provide mitigation to such an offender; and two, I argue that, even if it should, this mitigation may not come (...)
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  17. Don Berkich (2007). A Puzzle About Akrasia. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):59-72.
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  18. Don Berkich (2006). On Two Solutions To Akrasia. Philosophical Writings 33 (3).
    In ancient and contemporary discussions of weakness of will, or akrasia, Aristotle and Davidson have articulated two of the more seminal accounts. Yet drawing a sharp distinction between the conditions on akratic agency, the reasons why it poses a problem, and solutions in the accounts of Aristotle and Davidson makes clear that Davidson’s rejection of Aristotle’s solution is illicit insofar as his own solution is, at root, Aristotelian.
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  19. Monika Betzler (2009). Weakness of the Will as Furtive Irrationality. Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):191-215.
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  20. John Bigelow, Susan M. Dodds & Robert Pargetter (1990). Temptation and the Will. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1):39-49.
    The authors argue, against Frank Jackson, that weakness (and strength) of will involves higher-order mental states. The authors hold that this is compatible with a decision-theoretic belief-desire psychology of human action.
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  21. Renée Bilodeau (2002). Intention Et Faiblesse de la Volonté. Dialogue 41 (01):27-44.
    Akrasia is both an intentional and an irrational phenomenon. These two characteristics can be reconciled by a careful reconstruction of practical reasoning. I undertake this task along Davidsonian lines, arguing against his critics that the notion of unconditional judgment is the key to an adequate account of akrasia. Unless akrasia is conceived as a failure of the agent to form an unconditional judgment that conforms to her best judgment "all things considered," the intentionality of akrasia is lost. Likewise, I show (...)
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  22. Christopher Bobonich (2007). Plato on Akrasia and Knowing Your Own Mind. In Christopher Bobonich & Pierre Destrée (eds.), Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus. Brill 41--60.
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  23. Paula Boddington (1988). Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self‐Deception, and Self‐Control. Philosophical Books 29 (3):157-158.
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  24. William John Boyle (1982). Weakness of Will and Self-Control According to St. Thomas Aquinas. Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
    The subject of this thesis is the Thomistic notion of incontinentia which considered in its broad sense is equivalent to the sin from weakness . The aim of the thesis is to show that for St. Thomas the ultimate explanation of incontinentia is to be found in the will. The thesis is divided into five chapters. In the first chapter is found an effort to determine what can be learned of incontinentia from an analysis of the term itself. ;The second (...)
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  25. Shoshana Brassfield (2013). Descartes and the Danger of Irresolution. Essays in Philosophy 14 (2):162-178.
    Descartes's approach to practical judgments about what is beneficial or harmful, or what to pursue or avoid, is almost exactly the opposite of his approach to theoretical judgments about the true nature of things. Instead of the cautious skepticism for which Descartes is known, throughout his ethical writings he recommends developing the habit of making firm judgments and resolutely carrying them out, no matter how doubtful and uncertain they may be. Descartes, strikingly, takes irresolution to be the source of remorse (...)
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  26. Michael Bratman (1979). Practical Reasoning and Weakness of the Will. Noûs 13 (2):153-171.
    In a case of weak-willed action the agent acts-freely, deliberately, and for a reason-in a way contrary to his best judgment, even though he thinks he could act in accordance with his best judgment. The possibility of such actions has posed one problem in moral philosophy, the exact nature of the problem it poses another. In this essay I offer an answer to the latter problem: an explanation of why a plausible account of free, deliberate and purposive action seems to (...)
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  27. Michael E. Bratman (2014). Temptation and the Agent's Standpoint. Inquiry 57 (3):293-310.
    Suppose you resolve now to resist an expected temptation later while knowing that once the temptation arrives your preference or evaluative assessment will shift in favor of that temptation. Are there defensible norms of rational planning agency that support sticking with your prior intention in the face of such a shift at the time of temptation and in the absence of relevant new information? This article defends the idea that it might be rational to stick with your prior intention in (...)
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  28. Michael Edward Bratman (1974). Thought, Action, and Acting Against One's Best Judgment. Dissertation, The Rockefeller University
  29. Sarah Broadie (1994). Another Problem of Akrasia. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (2):229 – 242.
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  30. Mark T. Brown (2005). Three Kinds of Weakness of the Will. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (2):135-138.
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  31. Sarah Buss (1997). Weakness of Will. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1):13–44.
    My chief aim is to explain how someone can act freely against her own best judgment. But I also have a second aim: to defend a conception of practical rationality according to which someone cannot do something freely if she believes it would be better to do something else. These aims may appear incompatible. But I argue that practical reason has the capacity to undermine itself in such a way that it produces reasons for behaving irrationally. Weakness of will is (...)
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  32. Peter G. Campbell (1994). Rational and Irrational Agency. Dissertation, The University of British Columbia (Canada)
    Only with a comprehensive detailed theory of the practical processes which agents engage in prior to successful action can one get a picture of all those junctures at which the mechanism of rationality may be applied, and at which irrationality may therefore occur. Rationality, I argue, is the exercise of normatives, such as believable and desirable, whose function is to control the formation of the stages in practical processes by determining what content and which functions of practical states are allowed (...)
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  33. Carlos E. Caorsi (2005). La Teoría Davidsoniana de la Akrasia. Signos Filosóficos 7 (13):9-30.
    Davidson’s treatment of akrasia resorts to the introduction of a type of operator, the prima facie connector. This operator should yield conditional judgments in which the affirmation of the antecedent does not admit to obtain the consequent as a separate conclusion; and it must allow to separate ..
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  34. D. Carr (1999). Virtue, Akrasia and Moral Weakness. In David Carr & J. W. Steutel (eds.), Virtue Ethics and Moral Education. Routledge
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  35. David Carr (1999). Moral Weakness. In David Carr & J. W. Steutel (eds.), Virtue Ethics and Moral Education. Routledge 138.
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  36. Marcia Cavell (1989). Book Review:Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception and Self-Control. Alfred R. Mele. [REVIEW] Ethics 99 (2):429-.
  37. William Charlton (1988). Weakness of Will. B. Blackwell.
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  38. Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield (2010). Rational Capacities, Resolve, and Weakness of Will. Mind 119 (476):907 - 932.
    In this paper we present an account of practical rationality and weakness of will in terms of rational capacities. We show how our account rectifies various shortcomings in Michael Smith's related theory. In particular, our account is capable of accommodating cases of weak-willed behaviour that are not `akratic', or otherwise contrary to the agent's better judgement. Our account differs from Smith's primarily by incorporating resolve: a third rational capacity for resolute maintenance of one's intentions. We discuss further two ways to (...)
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  39. John M. Connolly (2007). Das Problem der Willensschwäche in der Mittelalterlichen Philosophie / the Problem of Weakness of Will in Medieval Philosophy [Recherches de Théologie Et Philosophie Médiévales, Bibliotheca 8]. Review of Metaphysics 60 (4):865-866.
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  40. Thomas D. Connor (2014). Self-Control, Willpower and the Problem of Diminished Motivation. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):783-796.
    Self-control has been described as the ability to master motivation that is contrary to one’s better judgement; that is, an ability that prevents such motivation from resulting in behaviour that is contrary to one’s overall better judgement (Mele, Irrationality: An essay on Akrasia, self-deception and self-control, p. 54, 1987). Recent discussions in philosophy have centred on the question of whether synchronic self-control, in which one exercises self-control whilst one is currently experiencing opposing motivation, is actional or non-actional. The actional theorist (...)
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  41. Christopher Cordner (1985). Jackson on Weakness of Will. Mind 94 (374):273-280.
    I begin with a resume ofJ ackson's position. I shall follow this with some counter- examples; and end with a diagnosis of why the problems with Jackson's account arise. In objecting to Jackson's account I am not presupposing the truth of one or other particular account of akrasia. What I am supposing is that unless we recognize some kind of conflict of mind as engaged at the time of action, we are not speaking of akrasia. I hive argued that Jackson, (...)
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  42. Norman O. Dahl (1988). Book Review:The Possibility of Weakness of Will. Robert Dunn. [REVIEW] Ethics 99 (1):160-.
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  43. John J. Davenport (2002). Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Sanity and Weakness of Will. Journal of Ethics 6 (3):235–259.
    This essay evaluates John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's mature semi-compatibilist account of moral responsibility, focusingon their new theory of moderate reasons-responsiveness as a model of "moral sanity." This theory, presented in _Responsibility and Control_, solves many of the problems with Fischer's earlier weak reasons-responsiveness model, such as its unwanted implication that agents who are only erratically responsive to bizarre reasons can be responsible for their acts. But I argue that the new model still faces several problems. It does not (...)
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  44. Donald Davidson (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press.
  45. Donald Davidson (1970). How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts. Oxford University Press
    D. In doing x an agent acts incontinently if and only if: 1) the agent does x intentionally; 2) the agent believes there is an alternative action y open to him; and 3) the agent judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than to do x.
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  46. Giovanni De Grandis (2002). John R. Searle, Rationality in Action. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6:370-374.
  47. Brendan Dill & Richard Holton (2014). The Addict in Us All. Frontiers in Psychiatry 5 (139):01-20.
    In this paper, we contend that the psychology of addiction is similar to the psychology of ordinary, non-addictive temptation in important respects, and explore the ways in which these parallels can illuminate both addiction and ordinary action. The incentive salience account of addiction proposed by Robinson and Berridge (1993; 2001; 2008) entails that addictive desires are not in their nature different from many of the desires had by non-addicts; what is different is rather the way that addictive desires are acquired, (...)
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  48. Dylan Dodd (2009). Weakness of Will as Intention-Violation. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):45-59.
    According to the traditional view of weakness of will, a weak-willed agent acts in a way inconsistent with what she judges to be best.1 Richard Holton has argued against this view, claiming that ‘the central cases of weakness of will are best characterized not as cases in which people act against their better judgment, but as cases in which they fail to act on their intentions’ (1999: 241). But Holton doesn’t think all failures to act on one’s prior intentions, or (...)
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  49. Dylan Dodd (2005). Intentions, Plans, and Weakness of Will. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):45-52.
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  50. Mathieu Doucet & John Turri (2014). Non-Psychological Weakness of Will: Self-Control, Stereotypes, and Consequences. Synthese 191 (16):3935-3954.
    Prior work on weakness of will has assumed that it is a thoroughly psychological phenomenon. At least, it has assumed that ordinary attributions of weakness of will are purely psychological attributions, keyed to the violation of practical commitments by the weak-willed agent. Debate has recently focused on which sort of practical commitment, intention or normative judgment, is more central to the ordinary concept of weakness of will. We report five experiments that significantly advance our understanding of weakness of will attributions (...)
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