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  1. Stuart Rachels -Torin Alter (2005). Nothing Matters in Survival. Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):311-330.
    The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 3-4 (October, 2005), pp. 311-330. Abstract: Do I have a special reason to care about my future, as opposed to yours? We reject the common belief that I do. Putting our thesis paradoxically, we say that nothing matters in survival: nothing in our continued existence justifies any special self-concern. Such an “extreme” view is standardly tied to ideas about the metaphysics of persons, but not by us. After rejecting various arguments against our thesis, (...)
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  2. Robert Merrihew Adams (1989). Should Ethics Be More Impersonal? A Critical Notice of Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons. Philosophical Review 98 (4):439-484.
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  3. Torin Alter & Stuart Rachels (2005). Nothing Matters in Survival. Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):311-330.
    Do I have a special reason to care about my future, as opposed to yours? We reject the common belief that I do. Putting our thesis paradoxically, we say that nothing matters in survival: nothing in our continued existence justifies any special self-concern. Such an "extreme" view is standardly tied to ideas about the metaphysics of persons, but not by us. After rejecting various arguments against our thesis, we conclude that simplicity decides in its favor. Throughout the essay we honor (...)
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  4. L. Andra (2007). Multiple Occupancy, Identity, and What Matters. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):211 – 225.
    As regards the question of what matters in survival two views have been identified: on the one hand, we have the view that what matters is identity (the so-called 'commonsense view') and, on the other hand, we have the view that what matters is the holding of certain psychological connections between various mental states over time (the relation R). Several attempts have tried to reconcile these two views involving the so-called 'multiple occupancy view' or 'cohabitation thesis'. Even if the latter (...)
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  5. Jonny Anomaly (2008). Personal Identity and Practical Reason. Dialogue 47 (02):331-.
    ABSTRACT: This essay examines and criticizes a set of Kantian objections to Parfit's attempt in Reasons and Persons to connect his theory of personal identity to practical rationality and moral philosophy. Several of Parfit's critics have tried to sever the link he forges between his metaphysical and practical conclusions by invoking the Kantian thought that even if we accept his metaphysical theory of personal identity, we still have good practical grounds for rejecting that theory when deliberating about what to do. (...)
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  6. Kim Atkins (2000). Personal Identity and the Importance of One's Own Body: A Response to Derek Parfit. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (3):329 – 349.
    In this essay I take issue with Derek Parfit's reductionist account of personal identity.Parfit is concerned to respond to what he sees as flaws in the conception of the role of 'person' in self-interest theories. He attempts to show that the notion of a person as something over and above a totality of mental and physical states and events (in his words, a 'further fact'), is empty, and so, our ethical concerns must be based on something other than this. My (...)
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  7. Robert Audi (1976). Eschatological Verification and Personal Identity. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (4):391 - 408.
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  8. James Baillie (1996). Identity, Relation R, and What Matters: A Challenge to Derek Parfit. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4):263-267.
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  9. James Baillie (1993). What Matters in Survival. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):255-61.
    I examine Derek Parfit’s claim that it doesn’t matter whether he survives in the future, if someone survives who is psychologically connected to him by “Relation R.” Thus, were his body to perish and be replaced by an exact duplicate, both physically and psychologically identical to him, this would be just as good as “ordinary” survival. Parfit takes the corollary view that replacement of loved ones by exact duplicates is no loss. In contrast, Peter Unger argues that we place nontransferable (...)
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  10. James Baillie (1990). Identity, Survival, and Sortal Concepts. Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159):183-194.
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  11. Sam Baron & Christina Dyke (2014). Animal Interrupted, or Why Accepting Pascal's Wager Might Be the Last Thing You Ever Do. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):109-133.
    According to conventionalist accounts of personal identity, persons are constituted in part by practices and attitudes of certain sorts of care. In this paper, we concentrate on the most well-developed and defended version of conventionalism currently on offer (namely, that proposed by David Braddon-Mitchell, Caroline West, and Kristie Miller) and discuss how the conventionalist appears forced either (1) to accept arbitrariness concerning from which perspective to judge one's survival or (2) to maintain egalitarianism at the cost of making “transfiguring” decisions (...)
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  12. John Barresi & Raymond Martin (2003). Self-Concern From Priestley to Hazlitt. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (3):499 – 507.
    himself or a proper object of his egoistic self-concern. Hazlitt concluded that belief in personal identity must be an acquired imaginary conception and that since in reality each of us is no more related to his or her future self than to the future self of any other person none of us is 2 ‘.
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  13. Patrick K. Bastable (1972). Survival and Disembodied Existence. Philosophical Studies 21:282-283.
  14. Simon Beck (2004). Our Identity, Responsibility and Biology. Philosophical Papers:3-14.
    Eric Olson argues in The Human Animal that thought-experiments involving body-swapping do not in the end offer any support to psychological continuity theories, nor do they pose any threat to his Biological View. I argue that he is mistaken in at least the second claim.
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  15. Simon Beck (2000). Points of Concern. Theoria 47 (96):121-130.
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  16. Simon Beck (1989). Parfit and the Russians (Personal Identity and Moral Concepts). Analysis 49 (4):205-209.
  17. Carl Bradley Becker (1981). Survival: Death and Afterlife in Christianity, Buddhism, and Modern Science. Dissertation, University of Hawai'i
    Survival is the theory that some significant part of man continues after the death of his physical body. This dissertation studies philosophical argumentation of Christians and Buddhists, and analyzes the latest available empirical data, to determine which if any forms of survival are most probable. ;Part I finds insuperable difficulties in the purely materialistic resurrection theory, and in survival of disembodied minds as pure process. To make sense, resurrection must postulate either invisible bodies as conscious carriers of personal identity, or (...)
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  18. Kathy Behrendt (2007). Reasons to Be Fearful: Strawson, Death and Narrative. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (60):133-.
    I compare and assess two significant and opposing approaches to the self with respect to what they have to say about death: the anti-narrativist, as articulated by Galen Strawson, and the narrativist, as pieced together from a variety of accounts. Neither party fares particularly well on the matter of death. Both are unable to point towards a view of death that is clearly consistent with their views on the self. In the narrativist’s case this inconsistency is perhaps not as explicit (...)
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  19. Christopher Belshaw, Death, Brains, and Persons.
    This book explores many of the issues that arise when we consider persons who are in pain, who are suffering, and who are nearing the end of life. Suffering provokes us into a journey toward discovering who we are and forces us to rethink many of the views we hold about ourselves.
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  20. Marvin Belzer (2005). Self-Conception and Personal Identity: Revisiting Parfit and Lewis with an Eye on the Grip of the Unity Reaction. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):126-164.
    Derek Parfit's “reductionist” account of personal identity (including the rejection of anything like a soul) is coupled with the rejection of a commonsensical intuition of essential self-unity, as in his defense of the counter-intuitive claim that “identity does not matter.” His argument for this claim is based on reflection on the possibility of personal fission. To the contrary, Simon Blackburn claims that the “unity reaction” to fission has an absolute grip on practical reasoning. Now David Lewis denied Parfit's claim that (...)
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  21. David Benatar (ed.) (2009). Life, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc..
    Introduction -- Part I: The meaning of life -- Richard Taylor, The meaning of life -- Thomas Nagel, The absurd -- Richard Hare, Nothing matters -- W.D. Joske, Philosophy and the meaning of life -- Robert Nozick, Philosophy and the meaning of life -- David Schmidtz, The meanings of life -- Part II: Creating people -- Derek Parfit, Whether causing someone to exist can benefit this person -- John Leslie, Why not let life ecome extinct? -- James Lenman, On becoming (...)
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  22. P. Bendlova (1993). Death Survival and Immortality in the Works of Marcez, Gabriel (Vol 41, Pg 677, 1993). Filosoficky Casopis 41 (6):1100-1100.
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  23. E. Bodansky (1987). Parfit on Selves and Their Interests. Analysis 47 (January):47-50.
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  24. Montse Bordes (1997). Four-Dimensional Remarks: A Defence of Temporal Parts. Theoria (29):343-377.
  25. David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2004). How to Be a Conventional Person. The Monist 87 (4):457 - 474.
    Recent work in personal identity has emphasized the importance of various conventions, or ‘person directed practices’ in the determination of personal identity. An interesting question arises as to whether we should think that there are any entities that have, in some interesting sense, conventional identity conditions. We think that the best way to understand such work about practices and conventions is the strongest and most radical. If these considerations are correct, persons are, on our view, conventional constructs: they are in (...)
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  26. Stephen E. Braude (2005). Personal Identity and Postmortem Survival. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):226-249.
    The so-called “problem of personal identity” can be viewed as either a metaphysical or an epistemological issue. Metaphysicians want to know what it is for one individual to be the same person as another. Epistemologists want to know how to decide if an individual is the same person as someone else. These two problems converge around evidence from mediumship and apparent reincarnation cases, suggesting personal survival of bodily death and dissolution. These cases make us wonder how it might be possible (...)
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  27. Roland Breeur & Arnold Burms (2008). Persons and Relics. Ratio 21 (2):134–146.
    We describe a number of puzzling phenomena and use them as evidence for a hypothesis about why bodily continuity matters for personal identity. The phenomena all belong to a particular kind of symbolisation: each of them illustrates how an entity (object or person) sometimes acquires symbolic significance in virtue of a material link with the symbolised entity. Relics are the most obvious example of what happens here: they are cherished, desired or respected, not because of their intrinsic features, but because (...)
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  28. Andrew A. Brennan (1987). Survival and Importance. Analysis 47 (October):225-30.
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  29. Andrew A. Brennan (1984). Survival. Synthese 59 (June):339-62.
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  30. Andrew A. Brennan (1982). Personal Identity and Personal Survival. Analysis 42 (January):44-50.
    Parfit argues that survival, Not identity, Is the important thing in cases of personal resurrection, Fission, Etc. I argue that parfit's and dennett's well known cases--And fantasies about cloning and telecloning--Suggest a distinction between type and token persons, Memories, Intentions, Etc. Parfit is wrong, I suggest, To think survival more determinate than identity; with quine I hold that there is no objective matter to be right or wrong about.
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  31. David O. Brink (2011). Prospects for Temporal Neutrality. In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. OUP Oxford
  32. David O. Brink (1997). Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons. In J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit. Blackwell 96--134.
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  33. C. D. Broad (1955). Human Personality and the Possibility of its Survival. Berkeley, University of California Press.
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  34. John Broome (1997). Reasons and Motivation: John Broome. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):131–146.
    Derek Parfit takes an externalist and cognitivist view about normative reasons. I shall explore this view and add some arguments that support it. But I shall also raise a doubt about it at the end.
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  35. Anthony L. Brueckner (2005). Branching in the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Analysis 65 (288):294-301.
    In this introduction to the special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics on the topic of personal identity and bioethics, I provide a background for the topic and then discuss the contributions in the special issue by Eric Olson, Marya Schechtman, Tim Campbell and Jeff McMahan, James Delaney and David Hershenov, and David DeGrazia.
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  36. Anthony L. Brueckner (1993). Parfit on What Matters in Survival. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22.
    Parfit's most controversial claim about personal identity is that personal identity does not matter in the way we uncritically think it does) I would like to analyze Parfit's reasons for making this claim. These reasons are complex, and they stand in some tension with one another. I would like to examine them carefully and to try to arrive at the strongest case that can be made for Parfit's controversial claim about what matters.
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  37. Andrei A. Buckareff & Joel S. Van Wagenen (2010). Surviving Resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):123-139.
    In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies . We argue that these problems (...)
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  38. Christopher T. Buford (2013). Does Indeterminacy Matter? Theoria 79 (2):155-166.
    Derek Parfit has offered numerous arguments in an attempt to establish that identity is not what matters. Jens Johannson has recently argued that Parfit's various arguments for the claim that identity is not what matters fail to establish what Parfit takes such arguments to establish. Johannson contends that this is due in part to the invalidity of one of Parfit's key arguments, and the fact that Parfit ignores a position that is compatible with the conclusions of his successful arguments and (...)
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  39. John Burgess (2010). Could a Zygote Be a Human Being? Bioethics 24 (2):61-70.
    This paper re-examines the question of whether quirks of early human foetal development tell against the view (conceptionism) that we are human beings at conception. A zygote is capable of splitting to give rise to identical twins. Since the zygote cannot be identical with either human being it will become, it cannot already be a human being. Parallel concerns can be raised about chimeras in which two embryos fuse. I argue first that there are just two ways of dealing with (...)
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  40. Dana E. Bushnell (1993). Identity, Psychological Continuity, and Rationality. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:15-24.
    Derek Parfit claims that all that rationally matters for a person is psychological connectedness or continuity, even without identity. A psychological replica of a person whose body is destroyed upon the replication rationally should be considered just as valuable as the original person. I argue against this, maintaining that any such copying procedure would be objectionable. First, I argue that a copy of an original person does not preserve identity to the original person. And second, I argue that because a (...)
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  41. Jeremy Allen Byrd (2007). The Perfect Murder: A Philosophical Whodunit. Synthese 157 (1):47 - 58.
    In his Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues from the possibility of cases of fission and/or fusion of persons that one must reject identity as what matters for personal survival. Instead Parfit concludes that what matters is “psychological connectedness and/or continuity with the right kind of cause,” or what he calls an R-relation. In this paper, I argue that, if one accepts Parfit’s conclusion, one must accept that R-relations are what matter for moral responsibility as well. Unfortunately, it seems that (...)
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  42. Scott Campbell (2005). Is Causation Necessary for What Matters in Survival? Philosophical Studies 126 (3):375-396.
    In this paper I shall argue that if the Parfitian psychological criterion or theory of personal identity is true, then a good case can be made out to show that the psychological theorist should accept the view I call “psychological sequentialism”. This is the view that a causal connection is not necessary for what matters in survival, as long as certain other conditions are met. I argue this by way of Parfit’s own principle that what matters in survival cannot depend (...)
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  43. Scott Campbell (2001). Is Connectedess Necessary to What Matters in Survival? Ration 14 (3):193-202.
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  44. Scott Campbell (2000). Strawson, Parfit and Impersonality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):207-225.
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  45. Quassim Cassam (1993). Parfit on Persons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:17-37.
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  46. Hugh S. Chandler, Parfit on Division.
    Parfit’s well known book, Reasons and Persons, argues, among other things, that ‘what matters’ in regard to ‘survival’ is not personal identity but something he calls ‘relation R.’ On this basis, plus other considerations, he rejects the ‘Self-interest’ theory as to what should be our aim in life. Here I show, or try to show, that his over-all argument is seriously defective. In particular, he fails to prove that personal identity is not what matters for survival.
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  47. T. D. J. Chappell (2003). Persons in Time: Metaphysics and Ethics. In Heather Dyke (ed.), Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Kluwer Academic Publishers 189--207.
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  48. Timothy Chappell (1998). Reductionism About Persons; and What Matters. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):41-58.
    This paper's ?I examines Derek Parfit's main, metaphysical, argument for reductionism about personal identity. ?II considers three possible ethical arguments for reductionism, and suggests a new approach to the question of what matters about personal identity which has to do with the notion of an ethical narrative.
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  49. Timothy Chappell (1995). Personal Identity, R-Relatedness, and the Empty Question Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):88-92.
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  50. Sébastien Charles (2008). Egoismo metaficiso ed egoismo morale. Dialogue 47 (2):402-404.
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