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  1. Stuart Rachels -Torin Alter (2005). Nothing Matters in Survival. Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):311-330.
    The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 3-4 (October, 2005), pp. 311-330. Abstract: Do I have a special reason to care about my future, as opposed to yours? We reject the common belief that I do. Putting our thesis paradoxically, we say that nothing matters in survival: nothing in our continued existence justifies any special self-concern. Such an “extreme” view is standardly tied to ideas about the metaphysics of persons, but not by us. After rejecting various arguments against our thesis, (...)
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  2. Robert Merrihew Adams (1989). Should Ethics Be More Impersonal? A Critical Notice of Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons. Philosophical Review 98 (4):439-484.
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  3. Torin Alter & Stuart Rachels (2005). Nothing Matters in Survival. Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):311-330.
    Do I have a special reason to care about my future, as opposed to yours? We reject the common belief that I do. Putting our thesis paradoxically, we say that nothing matters in survival: nothing in our continued existence justifies any special self-concern. Such an "extreme" view is standardly tied to ideas about the metaphysics of persons, but not by us. After rejecting various arguments against our thesis, we conclude that simplicity decides in its favor. Throughout the essay we honor (...)
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  4. L. Andra (2007). Multiple Occupancy, Identity, and What Matters. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):211 – 225.
    As regards the question of what matters in survival two views have been identified: on the one hand, we have the view that what matters is identity (the so-called 'commonsense view') and, on the other hand, we have the view that what matters is the holding of certain psychological connections between various mental states over time (the relation R). Several attempts have tried to reconcile these two views involving the so-called 'multiple occupancy view' or 'cohabitation thesis'. Even if the latter (...)
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  5. Jonny Anomaly (2008). Personal Identity and Practical Reason: The Failure of Kantian Replies to Parfit. Dialogue 47 (02):331-.
  6. Kim Atkins (2000). Personal Identity and the Importance of One's Own Body: A Response to Derek Parfit. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (3):329 – 349.
    In this essay I take issue with Derek Parfit's reductionist account of personal identity.Parfit is concerned to respond to what he sees as flaws in the conception of the role of 'person' in self-interest theories. He attempts to show that the notion of a person as something over and above a totality of mental and physical states and events (in his words, a 'further fact'), is empty, and so, our ethical concerns must be based on something other than this. My (...)
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  7. Robert Audi (1976). Eschatological Verification and Personal Identity. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (4):391 - 408.
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  8. James Baillie (1996). Identity, Relation R, and What Matters: A Challenge to Derek Parfit. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4):263-267.
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  9. James Baillie (1993). What Matters in Survival. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):255-61.
    I examine Derek Parfit’s claim that it doesn’t matter whether he survives in the future, if someone survives who is psychologically connected to him by “Relation R.” Thus, were his body to perish and be replaced by an exact duplicate, both physically and psychologically identical to him, this would be just as good as “ordinary” survival. Parfit takes the corollary view that replacement of loved ones by exact duplicates is no loss. In contrast, Peter Unger argues that we place nontransferable (...)
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  10. James Baillie (1990). Identity, Survival, and Sortal Concepts. Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159):183-194.
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  11. John Barresi & Raymond Martin (2003). Self-Concern From Priestley to Hazlitt. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (3):499 – 507.
    himself or a proper object of his egoistic self-concern. Hazlitt concluded that belief in personal identity must be an acquired imaginary conception and that since in reality each of us is no more related to his or her future self than to the future self of any other person none of us is 2 ‘.
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  12. Simon Beck (2004). Our Identity, Responsibility and Biology. Philosophical Papers:3-14.
    Eric Olson argues in The Human Animal that thought-experiments involving body-swapping do not in the end offer any support to psychological continuity theories, nor do they pose any threat to his Biological View. I argue that he is mistaken in at least the second claim.
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  13. Simon Beck (2000). Points of Concern. Theoria 47 (96):121-130.
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  14. Simon Beck (1989). Parfit and the Russians (Personal Identity and Moral Concepts). Analysis 49 (4):205-209.
  15. Kathy Behrendt (2007). Reasons to Be Fearful: Strawson, Death and Narrative. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (60):133-.
    I compare and assess two significant and opposing approaches to the self with respect to what they have to say about death: the anti-narrativist, as articulated by Galen Strawson, and the narrativist, as pieced together from a variety of accounts. Neither party fares particularly well on the matter of death. Both are unable to point towards a view of death that is clearly consistent with their views on the self. In the narrativist’s case this inconsistency is perhaps not as explicit (...)
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  16. Marvin Belzer (2005). Self-Conception and Personal Identity: Revisiting Parfit and Lewis with an Eye on the Grip of the Unity Reaction. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):126-164.
    Derek Parfit's “reductionist” account of personal identity (including the rejection of anything like a soul) is coupled with the rejection of a commonsensical intuition of essential self-unity, as in his defense of the counter-intuitive claim that “identity does not matter.” His argument for this claim is based on reflection on the possibility of personal fission. To the contrary, Simon Blackburn claims that the “unity reaction” to fission has an absolute grip on practical reasoning. Now David Lewis denied Parfit's claim that (...)
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  17. David Benatar (ed.) (2009). Life, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc..
    Introduction -- Part I: The meaning of life -- Richard Taylor, The meaning of life -- Thomas Nagel, The absurd -- Richard Hare, Nothing matters -- W.D. Joske, Philosophy and the meaning of life -- Robert Nozick, Philosophy and the meaning of life -- David Schmidtz, The meanings of life -- Part II: Creating people -- Derek Parfit, Whether causing someone to exist can benefit this person -- John Leslie, Why not let life ecome extinct? -- James Lenman, On becoming (...)
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  18. E. Bodansky (1987). Parfit on Selves and Their Interests. Analysis 47 (January):47-50.
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  19. Montse Bordes (1997). Four-Dimensional Remarks: A Defence of Temporal Parts. Theoria (29):343-377.
  20. David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2004). How to Be a Conventional Person. The Monist 87 (4):457 - 474.
    Recent work in personal identity has emphasized the importance of various conventions, or ‘person directed practices’ in the determination of personal identity. An interesting question arises as to whether we should think that there are any entities that have, in some interesting sense, conventional identity conditions. We think that the best way to understand such work about practices and conventions is the strongest and most radical. If these considerations are correct, persons are, on our view, conventional constructs: they are in (...)
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  21. Stephen E. Braude (2005). Personal Identity and Postmortem Survival. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):226-249.
    The so-called “problem of personal identity” can be viewed as either a metaphysical or an epistemological issue. Metaphysicians want to know what it is for one individual to be the same person as another. Epistemologists want to know how to decide if an individual is the same person as someone else. These two problems converge around evidence from mediumship and apparent reincarnation cases, suggesting personal survival of bodily death and dissolution. These cases make us wonder how it might be possible (...)
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  22. Roland Breeur & Arnold Burms (2008). Persons and Relics. Ratio 21 (2):134–146.
    We describe a number of puzzling phenomena and use them as evidence for a hypothesis about why bodily continuity matters for personal identity. The phenomena all belong to a particular kind of symbolisation: each of them illustrates how an entity (object or person) sometimes acquires symbolic significance in virtue of a material link with the symbolised entity. Relics are the most obvious example of what happens here: they are cherished, desired or respected, not because of their intrinsic features, but because (...)
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  23. Andrew A. Brennan (1987). Survival and Importance. Analysis 47 (October):225-30.
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  24. Andrew A. Brennan (1984). Survival. Synthese 59 (June):339-62.
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  25. Andrew A. Brennan (1982). Personal Identity and Personal Survival. Analysis 42 (January):44-50.
    Parfit argues that survival, Not identity, Is the important thing in cases of personal resurrection, Fission, Etc. I argue that parfit's and dennett's well known cases--And fantasies about cloning and telecloning--Suggest a distinction between type and token persons, Memories, Intentions, Etc. Parfit is wrong, I suggest, To think survival more determinate than identity; with quine I hold that there is no objective matter to be right or wrong about.
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  26. C. D. Broad (1955). Human Personality and the Possibility of its Survival. Berkeley, University of California Press.
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  27. John Broome (1997). Reasons and Motivation: John Broome. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):131–146.
    Derek Parfit takes an externalist and cognitivist view about normative reasons. I shall explore this view and add some arguments that support it. But I shall also raise a doubt about it at the end.
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  28. Anthony L. Brueckner (2005). Branching in the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Analysis 65 (288):294-301.
    In this introduction to the special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics on the topic of personal identity and bioethics, I provide a background for the topic and then discuss the contributions in the special issue by Eric Olson, Marya Schechtman, Tim Campbell and Jeff McMahan, James Delaney and David Hershenov, and David DeGrazia.
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  29. Anthony L. Brueckner (1993). Parfit on What Matters in Survival. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22.
    Parfit's most controversial claim about personal identity is that personal identity does not matter in the way we uncritically think it does) I would like to analyze Parfit's reasons for making this claim. These reasons are complex, and they stand in some tension with one another. I would like to examine them carefully and to try to arrive at the strongest case that can be made for Parfit's controversial claim about what matters.
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  30. Andrei A. Buckareff & Joel S. Van Wagenen (2010). Surviving Resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):123-139.
    In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies . We argue that these problems (...)
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  31. Christopher T. Buford (2013). Does Indeterminacy Matter? Theoria 79 (2):155-166.
    Derek Parfit has offered numerous arguments in an attempt to establish that identity is not what matters. Jens Johannson has recently argued that Parfit's various arguments for the claim that identity is not what matters fail to establish what Parfit takes such arguments to establish. Johannson contends that this is due in part to the invalidity of one of Parfit's key arguments, and the fact that Parfit ignores a position that is compatible with the conclusions of his successful arguments and (...)
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  32. John Burgess (2010). Could a Zygote Be a Human Being? Bioethics 24 (2):61-70.
    This paper re-examines the question of whether quirks of early human foetal development tell against the view (conceptionism) that we are human beings at conception. A zygote is capable of splitting to give rise to identical twins. Since the zygote cannot be identical with either human being it will become, it cannot already be a human being. Parallel concerns can be raised about chimeras in which two embryos fuse. I argue first that there are just two ways of dealing with (...)
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  33. Dana E. Bushnell (1993). Identity, Psychological Continuity, and Rationality. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:15-24.
    Derek Parfit claims that all that rationally matters for a person is psychological connectedness or continuity, even without identity. A psychological replica of a person whose body is destroyed upon the replication rationally should be considered just as valuable as the original person. I argue against this, maintaining that any such copying procedure would be objectionable. First, I argue that a copy of an original person does not preserve identity to the original person. And second, I argue that because a (...)
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  34. Scott Campbell (2005). Is Causation Necessary for What Matters in Survival? Philosophical Studies 126 (3):375-396.
    In this paper I shall argue that if the Parfitian psychological criterion or theory of personal identity is true, then a good case can be made out to show that the psychological theorist should accept the view I call “psychological sequentialism”. This is the view that a causal connection is not necessary for what matters in survival, as long as certain other conditions are met. I argue this by way of Parfit’s own principle that what matters in survival cannot depend (...)
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  35. Scott Campbell (2001). Is Connectedess Necessary to What Matters in Survival? Ration 14 (3):193-202.
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  36. Scott Campbell (2000). Strawson, Parfit and Impersonality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):207-225.
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  37. Quassim Cassam (1993). Parfit on Persons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:17-37.
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  38. Hugh S. Chandler, Parfit on Division.
    Parfit’s well known book, Reasons and Persons, argues, among other things, that ‘what matters’ in regard to ‘survival’ is not personal identity but something he calls ‘relation R.’ On this basis, plus other considerations, he rejects the ‘Self-interest’ theory as to what should be our aim in life. Here I show, or try to show, that his over-all argument is seriously defective. In particular, he fails to prove that personal identity is not what matters for survival.
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  39. T. D. J. Chappell (2003). Persons in Time: Metaphysics and Ethics. In Heather Dyke (ed.), Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 189--207.
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  40. Timothy Chappell (1998). Reductionism About Persons; and What Matters. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):41-58.
    This paper's ?I examines Derek Parfit's main, metaphysical, argument for reductionism about personal identity. ?II considers three possible ethical arguments for reductionism, and suggests a new approach to the question of what matters about personal identity which has to do with the notion of an ethical narrative.
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  41. Timothy Chappell (1995). Personal Identity, R-Relatedness, and the Empty Question Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):88-92.
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  42. Sébastien Charles (2008). Egoismo metaficiso ed egoismo morale. Dialogue 47 (2):402-404.
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  43. Benjamin L. Curtis (2012). A Zygote Could Be a Human: A Defence of Conceptionism Against Fission Arguments. Bioethics 26 (3):136-142.
    In this paper I defend the view that a zygote is a human from the fission objection that is widely thought to be decisive against the view. I do so, drawing upon a recent discussion of this issue by John Burgess, by explaining in detail the metaphysical position the proponent of the view should adopt in order to rebut the objection.
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  44. Howard J. Curzer (1991). An Ambiguity in Parfit's Theory of Personal Identity. Ratio 4 (1):16-24.
    In Reasons and Persons Parfit vacillates between two views of personal identity. Both views have unpalatable consequences. According to one view, the question, "Is person A the same as person C?" is always empty. According to the other view, this question is empty only some of the time. The first view is elegant, but it has consequences which are counterintuitive and incompatible with Parfit's later claims. The second view is commonsensical, but its only coherent version is vulnerable to an argument (...)
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  45. Barry Dainton (2012). On Singularities and Simulations. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (1):42.
  46. Barry F. Dainton (1996). Survival and Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:17 - 36.
    (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1996: 17-36) I If I am to survive until some later date, what must happen, and what must not happen, over the intervening period? I am talking here about survival in the strict sense. Take an earlier and a later person, if they are one and the same, what is it about them that makes this so? In addressing this question the preferred tool has long been the exploitation of imaginary or science fiction cases. We (...)
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  47. J. Dancy (ed.) (1997). Reading Parfit. Blackwell.
  48. L. Dennis, R. W. Gray, L. H. Kauffman, J. Brender McNair & N. J. Woolf (2009). A Framework Linking Non-Living and Living Systems: Classification of Persistence, Survival and Evolution Transitions. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 14 (3):217-238.
    We propose a framework for analyzing the development, operation and failure to survive of all things, living, non-living or organized groupings. This framework is a sequence of developments that improve survival capability. Framework processes range from origination of any entity/system, to the development of increased survival capability and development of life-forms and organizations that use intelligence. This work deals with a series of developmental changes that arise from the uncovering of emergent properties. The framework is intended to be general, but (...)
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  49. Frank B. Dilley (2002). Kevin Corcoran (Ed.), Soul, Body and Survival. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 52 (3):195-197.
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  50. F. Doepke (1990). The Practical Importance of Personal Identity. Logos 83:83-91.
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