Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Depersonalization: A selective impairment of self-awareness.Mauricio Sierra & Anthony S. David - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):99-108.
    Depersonalization is characterised by a profound disruption of self-awareness mainly characterised by feelings of disembodiment and subjective emotional numbing.It has been proposed that depersonalization is caused by a fronto-limbic suppressive mechanism – presumably mediated via attention – which manifests subjectively as emotional numbing, and disables the process by which perception and cognition normally become emotionally coloured, giving rise to a subjective feeling of ‘unreality’.Our functional neuroimaging and psychophysiological studies support the above model and indicate that, compared with normal and clinical (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Epistemic Feelings are Affective Experiences.Slawa Loev - 2022 - Emotion Review 14 (3):206-216.
    Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 206-216, July 2022. This paper develops the claim that epistemic feelings are affective experiences. To establish some diagnostic criteria, characteristic features of affective experiences are outlined: valence and arousal. Then, in order to pave the way for showing that epistemic feelings have said features, an initial challenge coming from introspection is addressed. Next, the paper turns to empirical findings showing that we can observe physiological and behavioural proxies for valence and arousal in epistemic (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Word recall process and physiological activation in the tip-of-the-tongue state: Comparison of young and middle-aged groups.Yoshiko Kurosaki, Ryusaku Hashimoto, Michitaka Funayama, Yuri Terasawa & Satoshi Umeda - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 106 (C):103433.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness.Robert J. Howell & Brad Thompson - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):103-127.
    It’s a familiar fact that there is something it is like to see red, eat chocolate or feel pain. More recently philosophers have insisted that in addition to this objectual phenomenology there is something it is like for me to eat chocolate, and this for-me-ness is no less there than the chocolatishness. Recognizing this subjective feature of consciousness helps shape certain theories of consciousness, introspection and the self. Though it does this heavy philosophical work, and it is supposed to be (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • In what sense 'familiar'? Examining experiential differences within pathologies of facial recognition.Garry Young - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):628-638.
    Explanations of Capgras delusion and prosopagnosia typically incorporate a dual-route approach to facial recognition in which a deficit in overt or covert processing in one condition is mirror-reversed in the other. Despite this double dissociation, experiences of either patient-group are often reported in the same way – as lacking a sense of familiarity toward familiar faces. In this paper, deficits in the facial processing of these patients are compared to other facial recognition pathologies, and their experiential characteristics mapped onto the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Nature and extent of person recognition impairments associated with Capgras syndrome in Lewy body dementia.Chris M. Fiacconi, Victoria Barkley, Elizabeth C. Finger, Nicole Carson, Devin Duke, R. Shayna Rosenbaum, Asaf Gilboa & Stefan Kã¶Hler - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • A role for visceral feedback and interoception in feelings-of-knowing.Chris M. Fiacconi, Jane E. Kouptsova & Stefan Köhler - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 53:70-80.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Are noetic feelings embodied? The case for embodied metacognition.John Dorsch - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 1:1-23.
    One routinely undergoes a noetic feeling (also called “metacognitive feeling” or “epistemic feeling”), the so-called “feeling of knowing”, whenever trying to recall a person’s name. One feels the name is known despite being unable to recall it. Other experiences also fall under this category, e.g., the tip-of-the-tongue experience, the feeling of confidence. A distinguishing characteristic of noetic feelings is how they are crucially related to the facts we know, so much so that the activation of semantic memory can easily result (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•