- On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication.Hamid Seyedsayamdost - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):95-116.details
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Experimentalist pressure against traditional methodology.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):743 - 765.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Two Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (2):177-204.details
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Is reflective equilibrium enough?Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):325-359.details
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What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.details
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Variantism about responsibility.John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):183–214.details
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Consciousness and Knowledge.Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Some hope for intuitions: A reply to Weinberg.Thomas Grundmann - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):481-509.details
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The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):128-159.details
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Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.details
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Intuitions as Evidence, Philosophical Expertise and the Developmental Challenge.Steve Clarke - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (2):175-207.details
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Intuitions are inclinations to believe.Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109.details
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The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.details
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Reflective Equilibrium Without Intuitions?Georg Brun - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):237-252.details
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Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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Minimalism, Psychological Reality, Meaning and Use.Henry Jackman - 2007 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Thought Experiments in Experimental Philosophy.Kirk Ludwig - 2018 - In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. London: Routledge. pp. 385-405.details
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Failed-Art and Failed Art-Theory.Christopher Mag Uidhir - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):381-400.details
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Skepticism about persons.John M. Doris - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):57-91.details
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Tracking instability in our philosophical judgments: Is it intuitive?Jennifer Wright - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):485-501.details
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Epistemic subjectivism.Roger White - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):115-129.details
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How to challenge intuitions empirically without risking skepticism.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):318–343.details
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What good are counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.details
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Experimental philosophy of medicine and the concepts of health and disease.Walter Veit - 2020 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics:1-18.details
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Experimental philosophy of medicine and the concepts of health and disease.Walter Veit - 2020 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 42 (3):169-186.details
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Philosophical methodology: The current debate.Anand J. Vaidya - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):391-417.details
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Conceivability and possibility: Chalmers on modal epistemology.Hamid Vahid - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):243-260.details
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Wisdom revisited: a case study in normative theorizing.Valerie Tiberius & Jason Swartwood - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):277-295.details
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Why so negative? Evidence aggregation and armchair philosophy.Brian Talbot - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3865-3896.details
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Reforming intuition pumps: when are the old ways the best?Brian Talbot - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):315-334.details
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The proper province of philosophy.Justin Sytsma - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):427-445.details
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Intuition and philosophical methodology.John Symons - 2008 - Axiomathes 18 (1):67-89.details
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Knowledge of essence: the conferralist story.Ásta Kristjana Sveinsdóttir - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):21-32.details
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Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?Bart Streumer - 2013 - Ratio 26 (4):450-470.details
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Survey-Driven Romanticism.Simon Cullen - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):275-296.details
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The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):731-743.details
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Primitivism About Intrinsicality.Alexander Skiles - 2014 - In Robert M. Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter. pp. 221-252.details
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Epistemically self-defeating arguments and skepticism about intuition.Paul Silva - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):579-589.details
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A partial defense of intuition on naturalist grounds.Joseph Shieber - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):321-341.details
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The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):665-682.details
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Reply to Kriegel, Smithies, and Spener.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1195-1206.details
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Object persistence in philosophy and psychology.Brian J. Scholl - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (5):563–591.details
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If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1697-1721.details
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Ernest Gellner's Words and Things: A Case Study of Empirical Philosophy.Stefan Schubert - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (2):300-316.details
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Has psychology debunked conceptual analysis?Per Sandin - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):26–33.details
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Surveys, intuitions, knowledge attributions: Comments on Keith DeRose’s “Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys”.Patrick Rysiew - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):111-120.details
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Rock bottom: Coherentism's soft spot.Bruce Russell - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):94-111.details
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How not to test for philosophical expertise.Regina A. Rini - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):431-452.details
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