- Morality without Categoricity.Elizabeth Ventham - 2023 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 19 (2):4-1.details
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Error Theory in Metaethics.Jonas Olson - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 58-71.details
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Why Reasons Skepticism is Not Self‐Defeating.Stan Husi - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):424-449.details
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Epistemic Normativity is Independent of our Goals.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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On the Dialectical Disadvantage of the Normative Error Theorist: A Reply to Clipsham.Xinkan Zhao - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):861-871.details
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Folk metaethics and error.Xinkan Zhao - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Moral reasons, epistemic reasons, and rationality.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):341-361.details
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Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2969-2983.details
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Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists.Toby Svoboda - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-25.details
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Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists.Toby Svoboda - 2015 - New Content is Available for Journal of Moral Philosophy (1):48-72.details
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Response to Hattiangadi, Evers, and Tiefensee.Bart Streumer - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (6):743-754.details
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Moral error theory and hypothetical reasons.Robert Shaver - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-12.details
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Moral Error Theory Without Epistemic Error Theory: Scepticism About Second-Personal Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):547-569.details
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Conceptions of Epistemic Value.Timothy Perrine - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):213-231.details
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Why Epistemic Reductionism Won’t Save the Moral Error Theorist.Alex Murphy - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):53-69.details
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Robust Normativity and the Argument from Weirdness.Victor Moberger - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-31.details
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Perceptualism and the epistemology of normative reasons.Jean Moritz Müller - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3557-3586.details
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Standard and alternative error theories about moral reasons.Kipros Lofitis - 2020 - Ratio 33 (1):37-45.details
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If Nothing Matters.Guy Kahane - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):327-353.details
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Prudential Parity Objections to the Moral Error Theory.François Jaquet - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 24 (1).details
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The Euthyphro, Divine Command Theory and Moral Realism.Gerald K. Harrison - 2014 - Philosophy (1):107-123.details
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Morality, Inescapable Rational Authority, and a God's Wishes.Gerald K. Harrison - 2015 - Journal of Religious Ethics 43 (3):454-474.details
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Believable Normative Error Theory.Gerald K. Harrison - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (2):208-223.details
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Pain for the Moral Error Theory? A New Companions-in-Guilt Argument.Guy Fletcher - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):474-482.details
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Why companions in guilt arguments still work: Reply to Cowie.Ramon Das - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv078.details
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Bad News for Moral Error Theorists: There Is No Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies.Ramon Das - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):58-69.details
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Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies.Christopher Cowie - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):115-130.details
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Companions in guilt arguments.Christopher Cowie - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12528.details
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The tale of a moderate normative skeptic.Brendan Cline - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):141-161.details
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What’s Left for the Companions in Guilt Argument?Patrick Clipsham - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):137-151.details
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The Limits of Self-Effacement: A Reply to Wittwer.Patrick Clipsham - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3617-3636.details
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The Type-B Moral Error Theory.Anthony Robert Booth - 2020 - Erkenntnis:1-19.details
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The Type-B Moral Error Theory.Anthony Robert Booth - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2181-2199.details
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Against Normative Naturalism.Matthew S. Bedke - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):111 - 129.details
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Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.details
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Non-Descriptive Relativism: Adding Options to the Expressivist Marketplace.Matthew Bedke - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:48-70.details
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Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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