Chomsky has constructed an empirical theory about syntactic universals of natural language by defining a class of 'possible languages' which includes all natural languages (inter alia) as members, and claiming that all natural languages fall .within a specified proper subset of that class. I extend Chomsky's work to produce an empirical theory about natural4anguage semantic universals by showing that the semantic description of a language will incorporate a logical calculus, by defining a relatively wide class of 'possible calculi', and by (...) specifying a proper subset of that class which, I hypothesize, includes the calculi needed for the semantic description of any natural language. I argue that the special status, with respect to natural languages, of this particular type of logical calculus is an empirical finding which does not follow from any independently-known principles, and I conclude that the question why the laws of human thought have the structure they do is a biological rather than a logical question. (shrink)

This paper evaluates a form of dualism, which is referred to here as the dualism of conceptual scheme and undifferentiated reality. According to this dualism, although reality appears to be divided into distinct things from the perspective of our system of concepts, it is actually not. I justify the view that this dualism is incoherent.

According to a thesis I call the linguistic assumption, the structure of language is a guide to the fundamental nature of reality. It is deployed in the metaphysical debate over the nature of time. In that debate, it is more radical than the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, and should be rejected. A weak interpretation of the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis makes the empirical claim that speakers of different languages experience, perceive, or think about aspects of the world differently. I survey recent experimental evidence that (...) supports this hypothesis which, I argue, gives us further reason to reject the linguistic assumption. (shrink)

This thesis calls into question the silently-held presumption that the Latinization (i.e. the use of Latin alphabets in transcription) of indigenous languages in southeastern Nigeria is both necessary and sufficient for their orthography. The arguments presented herein aim to demonstrate the fact that Latinization has systematically excluded an entire realm of symbols and meanings which facilitate the inter-subjective transfer of ideas; realms that cannot always be navigated by relying upon transcription by way of Latin alphabets. In order to adequately address (...) several of the weaknesses identified in the Latinized scripts, the thesis will argue for an expanded orthography that is more inclusive and representative of the sociofacts, mentifacts and artifacts that are peculiar to southeastern Nigeria. (shrink)