This study examined health professionals’ (HPs) experience, beliefs and attitudes towards brain death (BD) and two types of donation after circulatory death (DCD)—controlled and uncontrolled DCD. Five hundred and eighty-seven HPs likely to be involved in the process of organ procurement were interviewed in 14 hospitals with transplant programs in France, Spain and the US. Three potential donation scenarios—BD, uncontrolled DCD and controlled DCD—were presented to study subjects during individual face-to-face interviews. Our study has two main findings: (1) In the (...) context of organ procurement, HPs believe that BD is a more reliable standard for determining death than circulatory death, and (2) While the vast majority of HPs consider it morally acceptable to retrieve organs from brain-dead donors, retrieving organs from DCD patients is much more controversial. We offer the following possible explanations. DCD introduces new conditions that deviate from standard medical practice, allow procurement of organs when donors’ loss of circulatory function could be reversed, and raises questions about “death” as a unified concept. Our results suggest that, for many HPs, these concerns seem related in part to the fact that a rigorous brain examination is neither clinically performed nor legally required in DCD. Their discomfort could also come from a belief that irreversible loss of circulatory function has not been adequately demonstrated. If DCD protocols are to achieve their full potential for increasing organ supply, the sources of HPs’ discomfort must be further identified and addressed. (shrink)

Many believe that the ethical problems of donation after cardiocirculatory death (DCD) have been "worked out" and that it is unclear why DCD should be resisted. In this paper we will argue that DCD donors may not yet be dead, and therefore that organ donation during DCD may violate the dead donor rule. We first present a description of the process of DCD and the standard ethical rationale for the practice. We then present our concerns with DCD, including the following: (...) irreversibility of absent circulation has not occurred and the many attempts to claim it has have all failed; conflicts of interest at all steps in the DCD process, including the decision to withdraw life support before DCD, are simply unavoidable; potentially harmful premortem interventions to preserve organ utility are not justifiable, even with the help of the principle of double effect; claims that DCD conforms with the intent of the law and current accepted medical standards are misleading and inaccurate; and consensus statements by respected medical groups do not change these arguments due to their low quality including being plagued by conflict of interest. Moreover, some arguments in favor of DCD, while likely true, are "straw-man arguments," such as the great benefit of organ donation. The truth is that honesty and trustworthiness require that we face these problems instead of avoiding them. We believe that DCD is not ethically allowable because it abandons the dead donor rule, has unavoidable conflicts of interests, and implements premortem interventions which can hasten death. These important points have not been, but need to be fully disclosed to the public and incorporated into fully informed consent. These are tall orders, and require open public debate. Until this debate occurs, we call for a moratorium on the practice of DCD. (shrink)

This symposium explores the boldest recommendation of the Institute of Medicine’s Committee on Increasing Rates of Organ Donation, namely, the recommendation that the U.S. consider a new population of potential donors. In its 2006 report, Organ Donation: Opportunities for Action, the committee recommended pilot programs in socalled “uncontrolled” donation after a circulatory determination of death. Potential uDCD donors have died from an unexpected loss of circulation, either due to sudden cardiac arrest or excessive blood loss following traumatic injury. Because circulation (...) is lost before death is determined and long before organ procurement could begin, potentially transplantable organs will die from oxygen starvation unless they are quickly preserved by cooling or other means. (shrink)

This symposium explores the boldest recommendation of the Institute of Medicine’s Committee on Increasing Rates of Organ Donation, namely, the recommendation that the U.S. consider a new population of potential donors. In its 2006 report, Organ Donation: Opportunities for Action, the committee recommended pilot programs in socalled “uncontrolled” donation after a circulatory determination of death. Potential uDCD donors have died from an unexpected loss of circulation, either due to sudden cardiac arrest or excessive blood loss following traumatic injury. Because circulation (...) is lost before death is determined and long before organ procurement could begin, potentially transplantable organs will die from oxygen starvation unless they are quickly preserved by cooling or other means. (shrink)

This article responds to the four pieces in this special symposium of the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics on uncontrolled organ donation following circulatory death . The response will focus on lessons and debates about the kinds of consent necessary and sufficient for temporary organ preservation in the context of DCD and for organ donation itself; on conflicts of obligation, loyalty, and interest in DCD and ways to address those conflicts; and on benefit, cost, risk assessments of uDCD programs, (...) including measures to achieve a more favorable balance of benefits, costs, and risks. (shrink)

The several articles in this special issue on organ donation after circulatory determination of death or, as it is often put, donation after cardiac death, draw lessons from different kinds of experience in order to guide efforts in the U.S. to develop or refine policies for DCD. One lesson comes from a major and, by many measures, successful experimental DCD program in Washington, D.C. in the 1990s. Another lesson comes from European countries that have adopted presumed-consent legislation, a form of (...) “opt out” that facilitates DCD as well as donation after neurological determination of death. Another lesson, from the perspective of critical care medicine in Canada, attends to the implications of viewing a dying patient, undergoing resuscitative procedures, as a potential organ donor. A final lesson sketches implications of legislation and court cases in the U.S., often involving DND, for initiating temporary organ preservation in DCD programs before consent has been obtained for organ donation. Some of these lessons are optimistic about the prospects for DCD, especially if certain steps are taken, while others are more cautious, particularly because of the costs and risks involved in DCD. (shrink)