Switch to: References

Citations of:

Omniscience and divine foreknowledge

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. ارزیابی ایراد کانتوری پاتریک گریم به علم مطلق الهی با تکیه بر دیدگاه پلانتینگا و ملاصدرا.ملیحه آقائی, سید احمد فاضلی & زهرا خزاعی - 2022 - پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین 19 (2):23-48.
    استدلال کانتوری گریم از جمله براهینی است که در مباحث فلسفی اخیر ناسازگاری مفهوم علم مطلق را مورد هدف قرار داده است. گریم با استناد به اصل ریاضی کانتور و بر مبنای تعریف پذیرفته‌شدۀ علم مطلق، یعنی علم به تمامی گزاره­های صادق، وجود عالم مطلق را به دلیل عدم امکان وجود متعلق علم او، یعنی «مجموعه گزاره­های صادق»، انکار می­نماید. در این زمینه پاسخ­های متعددی در دفاع از علم مطلق الهی از سوی متفکران مسیحی معاصر ارائه شده که یکی از (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Jesus as an exemplar of faith in the New Testament.Dale Tuggy - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (1-2):171-191.
    Roman Catholic theologians long denied that Jesus had faith in God, and Jesus having faith in God seems in conflict with traditional claims that Jesus is fully divine. What the New Testament means by “faith” is explored, and in light of this we consider arguments from orthodox Incarnation theory to the conclusion that Jesus did not have and could not have had faith in God. Relevantly, the New Testament clearly asserts in five ways that Jesus had faith in God. This (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Grim, Omniscience, and Cantor’s Theorem.Martin Lembke - 2012 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 17 (2):211-223.
    Although recent evidence is somewhat ambiguous, if not confusing, Patrick Grim still seems to believe that his Cantorian argument against omniscienceis sound. According to this argument, it follows by Cantor’s power set theorem that there can be no set of all truths. Hence, assuming that omniscience presupposes precisely such a set, there can be no omniscient being. Reconsidering this argument, however, guided in particular by Alvin Plantinga’s critique thereof, I find it far from convincing. Not only does it have an (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation