- Direct reference and the Goldbach puzzle.Stefan Rinner - 2024 - Theoria 90 (1):8-16.details
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Eliciting and Conveying Information.Heimir Geirsson - 2021 - In Stephen Biggs & Heimir Geirsson (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 153-166.details
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The Normative Property Dualism Argument.Jesse Hambly - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Cognition and Content.João Branquinho - 2005 - Lisboa, Portugal: Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa.details
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How I Really Say What You Think.José Manuel Viejo - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):251-277.details
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How I Really Say What You Think.José Manuel Viejo - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):251-277.details
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Reconciling justificatory internalism and content externalism.Chris Tillman - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):419-440.details
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De Re And De Dicto: Against The Conventional Wisdom.Ken Taylor - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s16):225-265.details
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“Assertion” and intentionality.Jason Stanley - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (1):87-113.details
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Frege's Puzzle and Descriptive Enrichment.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):267-282.details
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Do conversational implicatures explain substitutivity failures?Cara Spencer - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):126–139.details
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A Theory of Propositions.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2016 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 25 (1):83-125.details
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Pejoratives and Ways of Thinking.Adam Sennet & David Copp - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (3):248-271.details
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Pure Russellianism.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (2):171-202.details
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A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reports.Stephen Schiffer - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):361-368.details
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Concept Cartesianism, Concept Pragmatism, and Frege Cases.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):211-238.details
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The multiple relation theory and Schiffer’s puzzle.Stefan Rinner - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):1-21.details
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Recanati on 'That'-clauses.Stafan Rinner - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (4):619-626.details
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Naive Russellians and Schiffer’s Puzzle.Stefan Rinner - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):787-806.details
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A Puzzle about Logical Analysis.Stefan Rinner - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):691-698.details
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Why and How to Fill an Unfilled Proposition.Samuel C. Rickless - 2011 - Theoria 78 (1):6-25.details
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‘That’-clauses as existential quantifiers.François Recanati - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):229-235.details
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A Puzzle about Belief-about.Alex Rausch - forthcoming - Mind.details
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Sleeping Beauty, evidential support and indexical knowledge: reply to Horgan.Joel Pust - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1489-1501.details
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The price of innocent millianism.Stefano Predelli - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):335-356.details
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Forms and objects of thought.Michael W. Pelczar - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):97-122.details
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A problem for Russellian theories of belief.Gary Ostertag - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):249 - 267.details
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Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports.James Openshaw - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (4):415-437.details
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Two pictures of communication: from content identity to coordination.Andrea Onofri - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-20.details
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Loar’s Puzzle, Similarity, and Knowledge of Reference.Andrea Onofri - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (2):1-45.details
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On non-pragmatic Millianism.Andrea Onofri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):305-327.details
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Are only mental phenomena intentional?Anders Nes - 2008 - Analysis 68 (299):205-215.details
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The problem of puzzling pairs.Michael Nelson - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3):319 - 350.details
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Plenitudinous Russellianism, ‘That’-Clauses, and the Principle of Substitutivity.Seyed N. Mousavian - forthcoming - Dialogue:1-24.details
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Neo-Meinongian neo-Russellians.Seyed N. Mousavian - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):229-259.details
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Saving belief from (internalist) epistemology.Adam Morton - 2003 - Facta Philosophica 5 (2):277-95.details
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Frege's Puzzle for Perception.Boyd Millar - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):368-392.details
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Understanding Kripke's puzzles about belief.Michael McGlone - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):487-514.details
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Russellianism unencumbered.Mark McCullagh - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2819-2843.details
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That ‐clauses: Some bad news for relationalism about the attitudes.Robert J. Matthews - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (3):414-431.details
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Referential intentions and ordinary names in fiction.Jeonggyu Lee - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (3):1059-1079.details
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Authorial Intention, Readers’ Creation, and Reference Shift.Jeonggyu Lee - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):381-401.details
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Familiarity inferences, subjective attitudes and counterstance contingency: towards a pragmatic theory of subjective meaning.Christopher Kennedy & Malte Willer - 2022 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (6):1395-1445.details
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Belief Ascription and Context Dependence.David Hunter - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (12):902-911.details
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Uttering Moorean Sentences and the pragmatics of belief reports.Frank Hong - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1879-1895.details
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Russellians can solve the problem of empty names with nonsingular propositions.Thomas Hodgson - 2020 - Synthese 197:5411–5433.details
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Solving Frege's puzzle.Richard Heck - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):728-732.details
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Intuition and the Substitution Argument.Richard G. Heck - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):1-30.details
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Perspectivism.Jeremy Goodman & Harvey Lederman - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):623-648.details
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Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.details
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