In this article, which is fourth in a series of six articles, I address the fourth concept of consciousness that the Oxford English Dictionary defines in its six main entries under the word consciousness. I first introduce this fourth concept, the concept of consciousness4. by identifying the previous three OED concepts of consciousness, which I have already discussed in this series of articles, and by indicating how that to which we make reference, respectively, by means of those three concepts is (...) related to the referents of the concept of consciousness4. I then address the latter concept more directly by pursuing for the remainder of the article where the OED's fourm entry leads. Among other things, I am led to consider two competing accounts of consciousness4 that figure prominently in the OED entry, namely the intrinsic, self-intimational account of William Hamilton and the inner-eye, perceptionlike account of John Locke. Both kinds of account are very much with us today. (shrink)

This is the fifth of a series of six articles examining respectively the six concepts of consciousness identified in the main entries of the Oxford English Dictionary under the word. I call the concept of consciousness5 the unitive meaning because it is said to refer to the totality of mental-occurrence instances that constitute a person's conscious being. The present article consists mainly of an effort to answer the question of which totality of mental-occurrence instances it is to which the fifth (...) concept refers. Four possible answers are considered, and the fourth, derived form Locke, is found to capture best the dictionary's meaning. Accordingly, consciousness5 is a certain subjectively determined unity of mental-occurrence instances mat is further specified, of course, in the article. However, I also consider, finally, that the compilers of the dictionary may have had something more objective in mind as well, another meaning toward which the word is tending if it has not already arrived mere. This further sense may amount to an identification of consciousness with those components of James's stream that he described as “the very core and nucleus of our self as we know it, the very sanctuary of our life.”. (shrink)

Part I [sections 2–4] draws out the conceptual links between modern conceptions of teleology and their Aristotelian predecessor, briefly outlines the mode of functional analysis employed to explicate teleology, and develops the notion of cybernetic organisation in order to distinguish teleonomic and teleomatic systems. Part II is concerned with arriving at a coherent notion of intentional control. Section 5 argues that intentionality is to be understood in terms of the representational properties of cybernetic systems. Following from this, section 6 argues (...) that intentional control needs to be seen as a particular type of relationship between the system and its environment. (shrink)

Deep sleep has traditionally been deemed as a period that lack consciousness. However, recent evidence challenges this assumption and highlights the possibility of experiencing awareness during deep sleep. By drawing from Indian philosophical traditions, this thesis defends a positive view of consciousness during dreamless sleep – the period of sleep where we are aware but not dreaming. Moreover, this thesis also challenges classic views on the nature of conscious states where consciousness is reduced to representational content. For that purpose, this (...) thesis develops a taxonomy of dreamless sleep that, contrary to other research in the area, considers the existence of different sorts of awareness with different degrees of content. Thus, a full spectrum of mental states during conscious dreamless sleep are considered: from awareness of substantial content to awareness devoid of content altogether. The aim of the thesis is to show how such a taxonomy can encourage a shift from a two-dimensional view of consciousness to a multidimensional one — from a view that only considers brain activation and reportable content to one that assesses conscious states on different level of analysis. This shift will result in an adequate conceptualisation of dreamless sleep as a period where we could have conscious states with content, but also, conscious states without content. Moreover, this shift on a multidimensional approach will allow us to undertake a proper comparison compare between different sleep phenomena. In order to develop this taxonomy of dreamless sleep, I explore definitions on awareness during dreamless sleep found in Indian philosophical traditions and Western analytical philosophy. From the definitions found in the literature, I argue that all the types of conscious states proposed in my taxonomy can be identified. Then, I test my taxonomy in a pilot study about awareness during deep sleep that I carried out. The results show that the different types of awareness can be recognised in the phenomenological descriptions gathered from the participants. Finally, I compare the phenomenon of dreamless sleep with other associated experiences, such as dreams and hypnagogia. My claim is that the differences among sleep phenomena are gradual and that in some cases there is not a strict cut-off line between them. Notwithstanding this assumption, I defend the development of future research were my proposed taxonomy can be improved by considering typical cases of dreamless sleep. (shrink)