Laurence BonJour a proposé une façon novatrice de défendre son principe inductif en réponse à une proposition posée par Hume et pouvant être remise en question. Dans cet article, j’élabore et fais la critique de la stratégie de BonJour. Au cours de mon développement, j’attire l’attention sur les critiques formulées par Anthony Brueckner à l’égard de l’approche de BonJour, détaillant les raisons pour lesquelles elles ne parviennent pas à réfuter de manière cohérente l’argument de BonJour. En distinguant et en appliquant (...) deux types distincts d’évaluation des probabilités aux hypothèses de BonJour, j’avance l’argument selon lequel la stratégie déductive de BonJour échoue à fournir une argumentation convaincante en faveur du PI. Je conclus en exposant les implications des tentatives visant à défendre le principe à partir d’arguments a priori. (shrink)

Here we challenge the orthodoxy according to which abduction is an a posteriori mode of inference. We start by providing a case study illustrating how abduction can justify a philosophical claim not justifiable by empirical evidence alone. While many grant abduction's epistemic value, nearly all assume that abductive justification is a posteriori, on grounds that our belief in abduction's epistemic value depends on empirical evidence about how the world contingently is. Contra this assumption, we argue, first, that our belief in (...) abduction’s epistemic value is not and could not be justified a posteriori, and second, that attention to the roles experience plays in abductive justification supports taking abduction to be an a priori mode of inference. We close by highlighting how our strategy for establishing the a priority of abduction positively contrasts with strategies in Bonjour (1998), Swinburne (2001), and Peacocke (2004) aiming to establish the a priority of certain ampliative modes of inference or abductive principles. (shrink)

Abstract: According to Laurence BonJour, the problem of induction can be solved by recognizing the a priori necessity that inductive conclusions constitute the best explanations of inductive premises. I defend an interpretation of the key probability claims BonJour makes about inductive premises and show that they are not susceptible to many of the objections that have been lodged against them. I then argue that these purportedly necessary probability claims nevertheless remain deeply problematic and that, as a result, BonJour's proposal fails (...) to provide a satisfactory resolution of the problem of induction. (shrink)