The application of the death penalty for perpetrators of riddah by fuqaha is a problematic violation of human rights. This is because there is no good reason to show that the punishment for riddah is the death penalty. The existence of the hadith which is considered to be the legitimacy of riddah punishment turns out to be very different from the reality of its application in the history of Islamic criminal law. This article aims to answer academic anxiety about the (...) death penalty for perpetrators of riddah as a result of the ijtihad of fuqaha as well as to confirm the construction of its historical reality in state life. This article finds that some verses of the Qur’an and the hadith which are used as legal basis by fuqaha are only understood textually and treated as absolute theological verses and hadiths, but not based on historical evidence. The history of the application of criminal punishment during the time of the Prophet shows that there is no application of the death penalty to the perpetrators of riddah, except riddah which is followed by criminal acts. So it is not solely because of the act of riddah itself, but because of a greater crime against Islam. The implementation of the death penalty for the perpetrators of riddah which is based on textual interpretation of the hadith, thus has the potential to conflict with the principles of human rights and religious freedom which have been regulated in the Qur’an. Contribution: This study enriches perspectives on the meaning of riddah as one of the strategic issues in Islam and shows that a new interpretation of riddah has become an important idea to promote a peaceful and inclusive society and provide access to justice for all. (shrink)

En este trabajo se hace una crítica a la interpretación que hacen Ulises Schmill y Carlos Silva Nava de la noción de interés legítimo. La primera parte de la crítica consiste en advertir serios problemas en la tradición doctrinal que ha combinado la concepción de Ihering de interés jurídico con la noción kelseniana de derecho subjetivo, la cual ha influido en la jurisprudencia desarrollada por los tribunales en México. La segunda parte de la crítica apunta a que dichos autores no (...) tomaron en consideración el nuevo contexto normativo que existe en México a partir de la reforma en materia de derechos humanos. El autor propone entonces una interpretación de la noción de interés legítimo compatible con el artículo 1o. de la Constitución, relativo a los derechos humanos. Esta interpretación implica el abandono de la doctrina tradicional. (shrink)

What does it mean to defend moral cosmopolitanism in terms of human rights? I outline ‘human rights cosmopolitanism’, explain the role of equality in giving content to this conception, and defend the liberal view of human rights against the restricted view by considering – and responding to – several arguments for remaining neutral between a range of cultural and ideological perspectives on the demands of social justice and political legitimacy. I defend the liberal view that a conception of human rights (...) should not remain neutral on controversial questions of justice and legitimacy. (shrink)

The question raised in this paper is whether legal rights to vote are also moral rights to vote. The challenge to the justification of a moral right to vote is that it is not clear that the vote is instrumental to the preservation of some critical interest of the voter. Because a single vote has ‘no impact’ on electoral outcomes, the right to vote is unlikely to serve the interests of the individual. The account developed in this paper holds that (...) moral voting rights can be justified once we acknowledge that voting by a sub-set of citizens is among the necessary preconditions for democratic institutions making a significant difference to their collective interests. The justification of a moral right to vote does not, then, apply to each individual citizen but only to a sub-set of them. In order to justify inclusive moral voting rights, the further consideration must be added that individuals have critical interests in public recognition of equal status. An inclusive moral right to vote accordingly depends on both collective interest in the outcomes of democratic institutions and on individual interest in equal recognition. (shrink)