A response to a recent critique by Cem Bozşahin of the theory of syntactic semantics as it applies to Helen Keller, and some applications of the theory to the philosophy of computer science.

استنتاج بهترین تبیین، به‌تازگی به‌عنوان استنتاجی جدید در عرض استقراء و قیاس توسط چارلز پیرس در توجیه بسیاری از نظریات علمی ارائه شده است. هدف این نوشتار انجام مقایسه‌ای میان این نوع استنتاج و تجربه از دیدگاه ابن­سیناست. در این مقایسه سعی شده است به تمامی شباهت‌ها و تفاوت­های موجود میان تجربه و استنتاج بهترین تبیین پرداخته شود و در کنار آن به برخی عیوب هر کدام از این دو نیز اشاره شود؛ ازجمله شباهت­های این دو استنتاج می‌توان به مقدمه (...) مضمر موجود در هر دو استنتاج و نیز استقرایی بودن و واقع­گرایی هر دو استنتاج و نیز معیار بودن تبیین علّی در هر دو استنتاج اشاره کرد و از تمایزات میان این دو استنتاج می‌توان به معیارهای انتخاب تبیین بهتر همچون سادگی و جذابیت و تطابق در استنتاج بهترین تبیین اشاره کرد که در تجربه به آنها اعتنایی نشده است. درعین‌حال که کارآمد بودن این معیارها موردتردید است. علاوه بر این، از این تمایزات می­توان به شروط و قواعدی که ابن­سینا بر تجربه افزوده است، اشاره کرد؛ چراکه در استنتاج بهترین تبیین، هیچ اشاره­ای به‌قاعده غیاب­های هم­زمان یا عدم مغالطه اخذ مابالعرض به‌جای مابالذات نشده است. (shrink)

This book examines the philosophical conception of abductive reasoning as developed by Charles S. Peirce, the founder of American pragmatism. It explores the historical and systematic connections of Peirce's original ideas and debates about their interpretations. Abduction is understood in a broad sense which covers the discovery and pursuit of hypotheses and inference to the best explanation. The analysis presents fresh insights into this notion of reasoning, which derives from effects to causes or from surprising observations to explanatory theories. The (...) author outlines some logical and AI approaches to abduction as well as studies various kinds of inverse problems in astronomy, physics, medicine, biology, and human sciences to provide examples of retroductions and abductions. The discussion covers also everyday examples with the implication of this notion in detective stories, one of Peirce’s own favorite themes. The author uses Bayesian probabilities to argue that explanatory abduction is a method of confirmation. He uses his own account of truth approximation to reformulate abduction as inference which leads to the truthlikeness of its conclusion. This allows a powerful abductive defense of scientific realism. This up-to-date survey and defense of the Peircean view of abduction may very well help researchers, students, and philosophers better understand the logic of truth-seeking. (shrink)

Whether abduction is treated as an argument or as an inference, the mainstream view presupposes a tight connection between abduction and inference to the best explanation. This paper critically evaluates this link and supports a narrower view on abduction. Our main thesis is that merely the hypothesis-generative aspect, but not the evaluative aspect, is properly abductive in the sense introduced by C. S. Peirce. We show why equating abduction with IBE unnecessarily complicates argument evaluation by levelling the status of abduction (...) as a third reasoning mode. We also propose a scheme for abductive argument along with critical questions, and suggest retaining abduction alongside IBE as related but distinct categories. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between information and abductive reasoning in the context of problem-solving, focusing on non-human animals. Two questions guide our investigation: What is the relation between information and abductive reasoning in the context of human and non-human animals? Do non-human animals perform discovery based on inferential processes such as abductive reasoning? In order to answer these questions, we discuss the semiotic concept of information in relation to the concept of abductive reasoning and, (...) more specifically, to the notion of manipulative abduction proposed by Magnani. Finally, we investigate a case study of corvids’ intelligence, namely, their capacity of causal cognition. (shrink)

“Scientific research faces up with an open and unknown world”Within the work of C. S. Peirce, the most fundamental and contentious form of inference is that of abduction. According to Peirce, abduction is the only type of inference from which new ideas are created (CP 5.171, 1903). He wrote, “every single item of scientific theory which stands established today has been due to Abduction” (CP 5.172, 1903). Similarly, “All that makes knowledge applicable comes to us viâ abduction. […] Not the (...) smallest advance can be made in knowledge beyond the stage of vacant staring, without making an abduction at every step” (HP 2:899–900, 1901). It is little wonder that so much attention has been paid to this particular type of.. (shrink)

Cognitive theorists routinely disagree about the evidence supporting claims in cognitive science. Here, we first argue that some disagreements about evidence in cognitive science are about the evidence available to be drawn upon by cognitive theorists. Then, we show that one’s explanation of why this first kind of disagreement obtains will cohere with one’s theory of evidence. We argue that the best explanation for why cognitive theorists disagree in this way is because their evidence is what they rationally grant. Finally, (...) we explain why our view does not lead to a pernicious kind of relativism in cognitive science. (shrink)

Epistemic two-dimensional semantics, advocated by Chalmers and Jackson, among others, aims to restore the link between necessity and a priority seemingly broken by Kripke, by showing how armchair access to semantic intensions provides a basis for knowledge of necessary a posteriori truths. The most compelling objections to E2D are that, for one or other reason, the requisite intensions are not accessible from the armchair. As we substantiate here, existing versions of E2D are indeed subject to such access-based objections. But, we (...) moreover argue, the difficulty lies not with E2D but with the typically presupposed conceiving-based epistemology of intensions. Freed from that epistemology, and given the right alternative—one where inference to the best explanation provides the operative guide to intensions—E2D can meet access-based objections, and fulfill its promise of restoring the desirable link between necessity and a priority. This result serves as a central application of Biggs and Wilson, according to which abduction is an a priori mode of inference. (shrink)

We distinguish three aspects of medical diagnosis: generating new diagnostic hypotheses, selecting hypotheses for further pursuit, and evaluating their probability in light of the available evidence. Drawing on Peirce’s account of abduction, we argue that hypothesis generation is amenable to normative analysis: physicians need to make good decisions about when and how to generate new diagnostic hypothesis as well as when to stop. The intertwining relationship between the generation and selection of diagnostic hypotheses is illustrated through the analysis of a (...) detailed clinical case study. This interaction is not adequately captured by the existing probabilistic, decision-theoretic models of the threshold approach to clinical decision-making. Instead, we propose to conceptualize medical diagnosis in terms of strategic reasoning. (shrink)

The roles of abductive inference in dynamic heuristics allows scientific methodologies to test novel explanations for the world’s ways. Deliberate reasoning often follows abductive patterns, as well as patterns dominated by deduction and induction, but complex mixtures of these three modes of inference are crucial for scientific explanation. All possible mixed inferences are formulated and categorized using a novel typology and nomenclature. Twenty five possible combinations among abduction, induction, and deduction are assembled and analyzed in order of complexity. There are (...) five primary categories for sorting these inferential procedures: fallacies, non-scientific procedures, quasi-scientific procedures, scientific procedures, and scientific heuristics. (shrink)

In philosophy of science, the literature on abduction and the literature on styles of thinking have existed almost totally in parallel. Here, for the first time, we bring them together and explore their mutual relevance. What is the consequence of the existence of several styles of scientific thinking for abduction? Can abduction, as a general creative mode of inference, have distinct characteristic forms within each style? To investigate this, firstly, we present the concept of abduction; secondly we analyze what is (...) understood by styles of thinking; thirdly, we give some comments on abduction and styles of thinking by analyzing examples of scientific discovery or innovation within each style. We develop a case-based comparative investigation of creative aspects of abductive reasoning with examples drawn from different styles of scientific thinking and doing as understood by the Crombie/hacking tradition. We argue that abduction, as a general mode of reasoning, can have a variety of specific expressions enabled and constrained by the styles of scientific thinking. Finally, we draw some conclusions on the relationship between abduction and styles of thinking suggesting that scientific discovery is a dynamical goal-directed activity within the scientific community that benefits from distinct styles of thinking and doing research. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Abduction as a method for sociological explanation is increasingly gaining interest, but questions remain as to what exactly it is and how it differs from other methods of inquiry. This paper compares abduction as conceived in Peircean pragmatism with the critical realist concept of retroduction. I argue that abduction in the Peircean sense and retroduction in the critical realist sense refer to different, but complementary, modes of inference. Abductive conclusions provide the starting point for retroductive inferences; the latter inform (...) the tenability of the former. Together, abduction and retroduction contribute to theoretical explanation. (shrink)

We examine Charles S. Peirce's mature views on the logic of science, especially as contained in his later and still mostly unpublished writings. We focus on two main issues. The first concerns Peirce's late conception of retroduction. Peirce conceived inquiry as performed in three stages, which correspond to three classes of inferences: abduction or retroduction, deduction, and induction. The question of the logical form of retroduction, of its logical justification, and of its methodology stands out as the three major threads (...) in his later writings. The other issue concerns the second stage of scientific inquiry, deduction. According to Peirce's later formulation, deduction is divided not only into two kinds but also into two sub-stages: logical analysis and mathematical reasoning, where the latter is either corollarial or theorematic. Save for the inductive stage, which we do not address here, these points cover the essentials of Peirce's latest thinking on the l.. (shrink)

Abductive conclusions are drawn in a special, co-hortative mood. Abductive conclusions are representative interpretants that represent abduction as a form of reasoning that can convey a general conception of the truth. The truth is not asserted; abduction merely delivers the idea of a matter of course, rendering that idea comparatively simple and natural, hence assuring us of its justified assertibility. Hence abductive reasoning is at home in addressing ‘How Possible’-questions in science. Abductive reasoning concerns the question of how things might, (...) could or would conceivably be such that they can be plausibly asserted. Peirce took all reasoning to be diagrammatic and representable using the graphical method of logic. Yet no examples have previously been found in his large manuscript corpus of what such non-deductive graphs might look like. This paper proposes a new interpretation of a sole exception, a sketch of two graphs from a rejected page from 1903, which might be the only surviving example of Peirce’s abductive graphs. The proposed interpretation takes them to be representative interpretants of this special inverse type of inference. (shrink)

Abduction is considered the most powerful, but also the most controversially discussed type of inference. Based on an analysis of Peirce’s retroduction, Lipton’s Inference to the Best Explanation and other theories, a new theory of abduction is proposed. It considers abduction not as intrinsically explanatory but as intrinsically conditional: for a given fact, abduction allows one to infer a fact that implies it. There are three types of abduction: Selective abduction selects an already known conditional whose consequent is the given (...) fact and infers that its antecedent is true. Conditional-creative abduction creates a new conditional in which the given fact is the consequent and a defined fact is the antecedent that implies the given fact. Propositional-conditional-creative abduction assumes that the given fact is implied by a hitherto undefined fact and thus creates a new conditional with a new proposition as antecedent. The execution of abductive inferences is specified by theory-specific patterns. Each pattern consists of a set of rules for both generating and justifying abductive conclusions and covers the complete inference process. Consequently, abductive inferences can be formalised iff the whole pattern can be formalised. The empirical consistency of the proposed theory is demonstrated by a case study of Semmelweis' research on puerperal fever. (shrink)

Under the rubric of understanding the problem of explainability of AI in terms of abductive cognition, I propose to review the lessons from AlphaGo and her more powerful successors. As AI players in Baduk have arrived at superhuman level, there seems to be no hope for understanding the secret of their breathtakingly brilliant moves. Without making AI players explainable in some ways, both human and AI players would be less-than omniscient, if not ignorant, epistemic agents. Are we bound to have (...) less explainable AI Baduk players as they make further progress? I shall show that the resolution of this apparent paradox depends on how we understand the crucial distinction between abduction and inference to the best explanation. Some further philosophical issues arising from explainable AI will also be discussed in connection with this distinction. (shrink)

This paper defends an account of explanatory reasoning generally, and inference to the best explanation in particular, according to which it first and foremost justifies pursuing hypotheses rather than accepting them as true. This side-steps the problem of why better explanations should be more likely to be true. I argue that this account faces no analogous problems. I propose an account of justification for pursuit and show how this provides a simple and straightforward connection between explanatoriness and justification for pursuit.

The relationship between Peircean abduction and the modern notion of Inference to the Best Explanation is a matter of dispute. Some philosophers, such as Harman :88–95, 1965) and Lipton, claim that abduction and IBE are virtually the same. Others, however, hold that they are quite different :503, 1998; Minnameier in Erkenntnis 60:75–105, 2004) and there is no link between them :419–442, 2009). In this paper, I argue that neither of these views is correct. I show that abduction and IBE have (...) important similarities as well as differences. Moreover, by bringing a historical perspective to the study of the relationship between abduction and IBE—a perspective that is lacking in the literature—I show that their differences can be well understood in terms of two historic developments in the history of philosophy of science: first, Reichenbach’s distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification—and the consequent jettisoning of the context of discovery from philosophy of science—and second, underdetermination of theory by data. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the ultimate argument for Scientific Realism, also known as the No-Miracles Argument (NMA), ultimately fails as an abductive defence of Epistemic Scientific Realism (ESR), where (ESR) is the thesis that successful theories of mature sciences are approximately true. The NMA is supposed to be an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) that purports to explain the success of science. However, the explanation offered as the best explanation for success, namely (ESR), fails to yield independently (...) testable predictions that alternative explanations for success do not yield. If this is correct, then there seems to be no good reason to prefer (ESR) over alternative explanations for success. (shrink)

Efforts to formalize qualitative accounts of inference to the best explanation (IBE) confront two obstacles: the imprecise nature of such accounts and the unusual logical properties that explanations exhibit, such as contradiction-intolerance and irreflexivity. This paper aims to surmount these challenges by utilising a new, more precise theory that treats explanations as expressions that codify defeasible inferences. To formalise this account, we provide a sequent calculus in which IBE serves as an elimination rule for a connective that exhibits many of (...) the properties associated with the behaviour of the English expression ‘That... best explains why ... ’. We first construct a calculus that encodes these properties at the level of the turnstile, i.e. as a metalinguistic expression for classes of defeasible consequence relations. We then show how this calculus can be conservatively extended over a language that contains a best-explains-why operator. (shrink)

Modern explainable AI methods remain far from providing human-like answers to ‘why’ questions, let alone those that satisfactorily agree with human-level understanding. Instead, the results that such methods provide boil down to sets of causal attributions. Currently, the choice of accepted attributions rests largely, if not solely, on the explainee’s understanding of the quality of explanations. The paper argues that such decisions may be transferred from a human to an XAI agent, provided that its machine-learning algorithms perform genuinely abductive inferences. (...) The paper outlines the key predicament in the current inductive paradigm of ML and the associated XAI techniques, and sketches the desiderata for a truly participatory, second-generation XAI, which is endowed with abduction. (shrink)

We present a dynamic approach to Peirce’s original construal of abductive logic as a logic of conjecture making, and provide a new decidable, contraction-free and cut-free proof system for the dynamic logic of abductive inferences with neighborhood semantics. Our formulation of the dynamic logic of abduction follows the philosophical and scientific track that led Peirce to his late, post-1903 characterization of abductive conclusions as investigands, namely invitations to investigate propositions conjectured at the level of pre-beliefs.

This article generalizes the explanationist account of inference to the best explanation. It draws a clear distinction between IBE and abduction and presents abduction as the first step of IBE. The second step amounts to the evaluation of explanatory power, which consist in the degree of explanatory virtues that a hypothesis exhibits. Moreover, even though coherence is the most often cited explanatory virtue, on pain of circularity, it should not be treated as one of the explanatory virtues. Rather, coherence should (...) be equated with explanatory power and considered to be derivable from the other explanatory virtues: unification, explanatory depth and simplicity. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of how scientists determine which type of hypothesis is most suitable for tackling a particular problem by examining the historical case of the anomalous β spectrum in early nuclear physics, a puzzle that occasioned the most diverse hypotheses amongst physicists at the time. It is shown that such determinations are most often implicitly informed by scientists' individual perspectives on the structural relations between the various elements of the theory and the problem at hand. In addition (...) to this main result, it is suggested that Wolfgang Pauli's neutrino idea may well have been an adaptation of Ernst Rutherford's original and older neutron idea, which would provide evidence that the adaptation of older ideas is a more common practice than is often thought. (shrink)

Peirce made repeated attempts to clarify what he understood as abduction or creative reasoning in scientific discoveries. In this article, we draw on past and recent scholarship on Peirce’s later accounts of abduction to put a case for how teachers can apply his ideas productively to elicit and guide student creative reasoning in the science classroom. We focus on (a) his rationale for abduction, (b) conditions he recognised as necessary to support this speculative reasoning, (c) pragmatic strategies to guide inquiry (...) and test conjectural hypotheses, and (d) his growing recognition of creative dimensions to reasoning beyond abductive inference-making. We illustrate this case through examples of a guided inquiry approach to student claim-making in the science classroom. (shrink)

Clinical diagnostic medicine is an experimental science based on observation, hypothesis making, and testing. It is an use dynamic process that involves observation and summary, diagnostic conjectures, testing, review, observation and summary, new or revised conjectures, i.e. it is an iterative process. It can then be said that diagnostic hypotheses are also ‘observation-laden’. My aim is to enlarge on the strategies of medical diagnosis as these are meshed in training and clinical experience—that is, to describe the patterns of reasoning used (...) by experienced clinicians under different diagnostic circumstances and how these patterns of inquiry allow further insight into the evaluation and treatment of patients. I do not aim to present a theory and illustrate it with examples; I wish rather am to let a realistic example, similar to actual clinical scenarios, direct the exposition. To this end, I introduce an account of medical diagnosis—briefly comparing and contrasting it to other accounts—in order to focus on discussing the process of diagnosis through a detailed clinical case. (shrink)

An influential suggestion about the relationship between Bayesianism and inference to the best explanation holds that IBE functions as a heuristic to approximate Bayesian reasoning. While this view promises to unify Bayesianism and IBE in a very attractive manner, important elements of the view have not yet been spelled out in detail. I present and argue for a heuristic conception of IBE on which IBE serves primarily to locate the most probable available explanatory hypothesis to serve as a working hypothesis (...) in an agent’s further investigations. Along the way, I criticize what I consider to be an overly ambitious conception of the heuristic role of IBE, according to which IBE serves as a guide to absolute probability values. My own conception, by contrast, requires only that IBE can function as a guide to the comparative probability values of available hypotheses. This is shown to be a much more realistic role for IBE given the nature and limitations of the explanatory considerations with which IBE operates. (shrink)

In science and everyday life, we often infer that something is true because it would explain some set of facts better than any other hypothesis we can think of. But what if we have reason to believe that there is a better way to explain these facts that we just haven't thought of? Wouldn't that undermine our warrant for believing the best available explanation? Many philosophers have assumed that we can solve such underconsideration problems by stipulating that a hypothesis should (...) not only be 'the best' explanation available; rather, it should also be 'good enough'. Unfortunately, however, the only current suggestion for what it might mean to say that an explanation is 'good enough' is, well, not good enough. This paper aims to provide a better account of what is required for an explanatory hypothesis to be considered 'good enough'. In brief, the account holds that a `good enough' hypothesis is one that has gone through a process that I call explanatory consolidation, in which accumulating evidence and failed attempts to formulate better alternatives gradually make it more plausible that the explanation we currently have is better than any other that could be formulated. (shrink)

Although the inferring of explanations plays an important role in both our everyday lives and in the workings of science, I argue that inference to the best explanation as it is commonly conceived is often not the best way to capture this sort of reasoning. I suggest that a different form of reasoning – so-called immediate explanatory inference – is instead often much better suited to this task. This is a form of inference in which we are justified in believing (...) explanations for the evidence before us purely in virtue of this evidence, and not in virtue of the evidence plus some general principle or rule of non-deductive reasoning. I defend the idea of such a notion of inference, and argue that it plays a central role in both ordinary life and science. (shrink)

This paper presents an enrichment of the Gabbay–Woods schema of Peirce’s 1903 logical form of abduction with illocutionary acts, drawing from logic for pragmatics and its resources to model justified assertions. It analyses the enriched schema and puts it into the perspective of Peirce’s logic and philosophy.

Reverse inference is a crucial inferential strategy used in cognitive neuroscience to derive conclusions about the engagement of cognitive processes from patterns of brain activation. While widely employed in experimental studies, it is now viewed with increasing scepticism within the neuroscience community. One problem with reverse inference is that it is logically invalid, being an instance of abduction in Peirce’s sense. In this paper, we offer the first systematic analysis of reverse inference as a form of abductive reasoning and highlight (...) some relevant implications for the current debate. We start by formalising an important distinction that has been entirely neglected in the literature, namely the distinction between weak and strong reverse inference. Then, we rely on case studies from recent neuroscientific research to systematically discuss the role and limits of both strong and weak reverse inference; in particular, we offer the first exploration of weak reverse inference as a discovery strategy within cognitive neuroscience. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the ways in which epistemic anxiety promotes well-being, specifically by examining the positive contributions that feelings of epistemic anxiety make toward intellectually virtuous inquiry. While the prospects for connecting the concept of epistemic anxiety to the two most prominent accounts of intellectual virtue, i.e., “virtue-reliabilism” and “virtue-responsibilism”, are promising, I primarily focus on whether the capacity for epistemic anxiety counts as an intellectual virtue in the reliabilist sense. As I argue, there is a close yet (...) unexplored connection between feelings of epistemic anxiety and the form of inference commonly known as “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE). Specifically, I argue that both the recognition that some fact requires an explanation—a necessary first step in applying IBE—and the subsequent motivation to employ IBE are typically facilitated by feelings of epistemic anxiety. So, provided IBE is truth-conducive the capacity for epistemic anxiety should count as an intellectual virtue in the reliabilist sense. After outlining my main argument, I address the challenge that the capacity for epistemic anxiety has the potential to be misleading. To respond to this challenge, I discuss how our recognition that a fact requires an explanation must in part be a species of practical knowledge, rather than theoretical knowledge. For the agent to skillfully distinguish between facts that require an explanation and facts that do not, she must develop the virtuous disposition to feel the appropriate amount of epistemic anxiety. Despite the many negative aspects associated with anxiety, as I conclude, being disposed to feel the appropriate amount of epistemic anxiety is ultimately good for us. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the relationship between Inference to the Best Explanation and Bayesianism, both of which are well-known accounts of the nature of scientific inference. In Sect. 2, I give a brief overview of Bayesianism and IBE. In Sect. 3, I argue that IBE in its most prominently defended forms is difficult to reconcile with Bayesianism because not all of the items that feature on popular lists of “explanatory virtues”—by means of which IBE ranks competing explanations—have confirmational import. (...) Rather, some of the items that feature on these lists are “informational virtues”—properties that do not make a hypothesis \ more probable than some competitor \ given evidence E, but that, roughly-speaking, give that hypothesis greater informative content. In Sect. 4, I consider as a response to my argument a recent version of compatibilism which argues that IBE can provide further normative constraints on the objectively correct probability function. I argue that this response does not succeed, owing to the difficulty of defending with any generality such further normative constraints. Lastly, in Sect. 5, I propose that IBE should be regarded, not as a theory of scientific inference, but rather as a theory of when we ought to “accept” H, where the acceptability of H is fixed by the goals of science and concerns whether H is worthy of commitment as research program. In this way, IBE and Bayesianism, as I will show, can be made compatible, and thus the Bayesian and the proponent of IBE can be friends. (shrink)

Exploring the early development of an area of medical literature can inform contemporary medical debates. Different methods of inference include deduction, induction, abduction, and inference to the best explanation. I argue that early shaken baby research is best understood as using abduction to tentatively suggest that infants with unexplained intracranial and ocular bleeding have been assaulted. However, this tentative conclusion was quickly interpreted, by some at least, as a general rule that infants with these pathological signs were certainly cases of (...) abuse. Rather than focusing on inductive arguments, researchers today may be better off focusing on making a compelling inference to the best explanation. (shrink)

The measurement of diagnostic accuracy is an important aspect of the evaluation of diagnostic tests. Sometimes, medical researchers try to discover the set of observations that are most accurate of all by directly inspecting diseased and not-diseased patients. This method is perhaps intuitively appealing, as it seems a straightforward empirical way of discovering how to identify diseased patients, which amounts to trying to correlate the results of diagnostic tests with disease status. I present three examples of researchers who try to (...) produce definitive diagnostic criteria by directly inspecting diseased and not diseased patients. Despite this method’s intuitive appeal, I will argue that it is impossible to carry out. Before researchers can inspect these patients to discover definitive diagnostic criteria, they must be able to distinguish diseased and not-diseased patients; and they do not know how to do this, because this is what they are trying to discover. I suspect the intuitive appeal of directly inspecting patients makes this difficult to appreciate. To counter this difficulty, I present this problem as a manifestation of ‘Meno’s paradox’, which was described in classical antiquity, and of ‘the problem of nomic measurement’, described more recently. Considering these philosophical problems may help researchers address the methodological issues they face when evaluating diagnostic tests. (shrink)

Here we challenge the orthodoxy according to which abduction is an a posteriori mode of inference. We start by providing a case study illustrating how abduction can justify a philosophical claim not justifiable by empirical evidence alone. While many grant abduction's epistemic value, nearly all assume that abductive justification is a posteriori, on grounds that our belief in abduction's epistemic value depends on empirical evidence about how the world contingently is. Contra this assumption, we argue, first, that our belief in (...) abduction’s epistemic value is not and could not be justified a posteriori, and second, that attention to the roles experience plays in abductive justification supports taking abduction to be an a priori mode of inference. We close by highlighting how our strategy for establishing the a priority of abduction positively contrasts with strategies in Bonjour (1998), Swinburne (2001), and Peacocke (2004) aiming to establish the a priority of certain ampliative modes of inference or abductive principles. (shrink)

We propose a logic of abduction that (i) provides an appropriate formalization of the explanatory conditional, and that (ii) captures the defeasible nature of abductive inference. For (i), we argue that explanatory conditionals are non-classical, and rely on Brian Chellas’s work on conditional logics for providing an alternative formalization of the explanatory conditional. For (ii), we make use of the adaptive logics framework for modeling defeasible reasoning. We show how our proposal allows for a more natural reading of explanatory relations, (...) and how it overcomes problems faced by other systems in the literature. (shrink)

: In 1878's ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’, Peirce states that truth is the predestinate opinion, or that which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate. Later in his life, though, he would claim both that truth is what would be believed if we could figure out the right method of inquiry and that, instead of affirming that truth is the predestinate opinion in 1878, he ought to have affirmed that truth is what would be (...) believed if inquiry were carried sufficiently far. The aim of this paper is to provide an account of why the early Peirce endorses the claim that truth is the predestinate opinion and why the late Peirce is compelled to modify that position. I argue that Peirce's early statement that truth is the predestinate opinion is motivated by his theory that all mental action is of the nature of a valid inference and that the later modification of his view is partly motivated by his rejection of that theory. (shrink)

Some New Mechanists have proposed that claims of compositional relations are justified by combining the results of top-down and bottom-up interlevel interventions. But what do scientists do when they can perform, say, a cellular intervention, but not a subcellular detection? In such cases, paired interlevel interventions are unavailable. We propose that scientists use abduction and we illustrate its use through a case study of the ionic theory of resting and action potentials.

It is usually accepted that deductions are non-informative and monotonic, inductions are informative and nonmonotonic, abductions create hypotheses but are epistemically irrelevant, and both deductions and inductions can’t provide new insights. In this article, I attempt to provide a more cohesive view of the subject with the following hypotheses: (1) the paradigmatic examples of deductions, such as modus ponens and hypothetical syllogism, are not inferential forms, but coherence requirements for inferences; (2) since any reasoner aims to be coherent, any inference (...) must be deductive; (3) a coherent inference is an intuitive process where the premises should be taken as sufficient evidence for the conclusion, which on its turn should be viewed as necessary evidence for the premises in some modal range; (4) inductions, properly understood, are abductions, but there are no abductions beyond the fact that in any inference the conclusion should be regarded as necessary evidence for the premises; (5) monotonicity is not only compatible with the retraction of past inferences given new information, but it is a requirement for it; (6) this explanation of inferences holds true for discovery processes, predictions and trivial inferences. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper defends David Armstrong’s solution to the problem of inductionb against Helen Beebee’s attack on that solution. To solve theproblem of induction, Armstrong contends that the timeless necessity explanation is the best explanation of our observed regularities, whereas Beebee attempts to demonstrate that the time-limited necessity explanation is an equally good explanation. Allegedly, this explanation blocks Armstrong’s solution. I demonstrate that even if the time-limited ecessity explanation were an equally good explanation of our observed regularities, this explanation does (...) not block Armstrong’s solution. I argue that, in fact, the timeless necessity explanation is a better explanation of our observed regularities than is the time-limited necessity explanation. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce luokitteli 1865 päättelyn lajit deduktioon, induktioon ja hypoteesiin, joista viimeksi mainittua hän luonnehti päättelynä vaikutuksista syihin tai päättelynä selitykseen. Hypoteesi on Peircelle induktion ohella tietoa laajentava päätelmä. 1890-luvun lopun kirjoituksissaan hän alkoi kutsua hypoteettista päättelyä uusilla nimillä ”retroduktio” ja ”abduktio”. Tässä vaiheessa Peirce kuvasi abduktiota tieteellisen päättelyn ensimmäisenä askeleena, mahdollisten arvausten esittämisenä, jonka tulokset on asetettava induktion kautta testeihin. Hänen tunnetuin kaavionsa abduktion loogiselle muodolle on vuodelta 1903: The surprising fact C is observed; But if A were (...) true, C would be a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to think that A is true. Toisin sanoen abduktio päättelee yllättävästä tosiseikasta hypoteettiseen teoriaan, joka selittäisi tämän faktan. Peircen ajatukset tulivat laajemmin tunnetuiksi, kun kuusiosainen Collected Papers ilmestyi 1931-35. Maailmansodan jälkeen hänen ehdotuksiaan on tulkittu kolmessa suunnassa. Hansonin mukaan abduktio on keksimisen logiikkaa. Laudanin mukaan abduktiossa on kyse ohjeesta työskennellä kiinnostavan hypoteesin parissa. Harmanin mukaan abduktio on päättelyä parhaaseen selitykseen. Monet loogikot, tekoälyn tutkijat ja tieteenfilosofit käyttävät termiä ”abduktio” suoraviivaisesti IBE:n synonyyminä, kun taas varovaisemman kannan ottavat mm. Aliseda, Magnani ja Douven. Toisaalta tätä rinnastusta on eri syistä pidetty harhaanjohtavana abduktion todellisen luonteen ja tehtävän perusteella. Myös monet Peirce-tutkijat ovat ottaneet intohimoisesti kantaa asiaan vedoten mestarin monitulkintaisiin kirjoituksiin. Esimerkiksi Minnamaier esittää, että abduktion samaistaminen IBE:n kanssa hämärtäisi Peircen erottelua induktion ja abduktion välillä. Campos argumentoi, että abduktio tulisi rajata selittävien hypoteesien generoimiseen, joten valikointi hypoteesien välillä ei kuulu sen tehtäviin. Gaultierin mukaan skeeman johtopäätös ei ole suositus testata A:n totuutta, vaan selvittää, onko A todellakin mahdollinen selitys C:lle. Sen sijaan Nyrupin mukaan jättää avoimeksi, tukeeko onnistunut selitys hypoteesin totuutta, joten abduktiossa on kyse hypoteesin työstämisestä. Peircen kirjoituksista puolen vuosisadan aikana kuitenkin löytyy aineksia kaikille kolmelle abduktion päätulkinnalle. Abduktio on ainoa menetelmä uusien ideoiden generoimiseksi. Abduktio auttaa tunnistamaan testaamisen arvioisia hypoteeseja. Joissakin tapauksissa, kuten havainnoissa ja historiallisissa päätelmissä, abduktio on ”pakottavaa” tai ”täysin varmaa”, joten sillä voi olla tekemistä myös hypoteesien oikeuttamisen kanssa. Vaikka Peirce päätyi esittämään, ettei abduktiivisiin päätelmiin liity mitään todennäköisyyksiä, hän kuitenkin myöhäisissäkin töissään antoi abduktiolle selkeän loogisen muodon. Lisäksi abduktion ja IBE:n yhteyttä puolustaa käsikirjoitus ”The Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents”, jossa Peirce antaa kriteerejä ”abduktiolle eli hypoteesien valinnan prosessille”. Näitä kriteerejä ovat selitysvoima, testattavuus, varovaisuus, laajuus ja yksinkertaisuus. Samantapaisia metodologisia sääntöjä ovat muotoilleet ne tutkijat, jotka ovat kehitelleet eteenpäin IBE:n muotoja. Vastaus otsikon kysymykseen on siis ”kyllä ja ei”. Vaikka Peirce keksi termin ”abduktio”, hänellä ei ole loputonta yksinoikeutta määrätä sen käytöstä. Hän ajatuksensa ovat inspiroivia tavalla, joka voi johtaa abduktion tutkimisessa erilaisiin suuntiin. Näitä linjoja on tarpeetonta oikeaoppisesti pitää toisilleen vastakkaisina. Keksimisen logiikka on kiehtova aihe, mutta samalla tavoin on aihetta analysoida sitä, miten keksittyjen selityshypoteesien paremmuutta voidaan vertailla ja millaisilla ehdoilla voisimme olla oikeutettuja hyväksymään parhaan toistaiseksi löydetyistä selityksistä. Kaikki nämä loogis-metodologiset tutkimuslinjat tekevät omalla tavallaan oikeutta Peircen filosofian suurille oivalluksille. (shrink)

The article develops and justifies, on the basis of the epistemological argumentation theory, two central pieces of the theory of evaluative argumentation interpretation: 1. criteria for recognizing argument types and 2. rules for adding reasons to create ideal arguments. Ad 1: The criteria for identifying argument types are a selection of essential elements from the definitions of the respective argument types. Ad 2: After presenting the general principles for adding reasons (benevolence, authenticity, immanence, optimization), heuristics are proposed for finding missing (...) reasons, for deductive arguments, e.g., semantic tableaux are suggested. (shrink)

Abduction is a widely used but deductively invalid type of reasoning. In this paper I will develop a tool for the assessment of argumentation based on abduction that can be used to analyse and evaluate the type of argumentation as it occurs in institutionalized contexts like science and medical diagnosis. I will summarize the most important definitions of abduction and propose an argumentative pattern on the basis of a critical examination of two extant dialectical accounts of the argument scheme involved.