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  1. From symbols to icons: the return of resemblance in the cognitive neuroscience revolution.Daniel Williams & Lincoln Colling - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):1941-1967.
    We argue that one important aspect of the “cognitive neuroscience revolution” identified by Boone and Piccinini :1509–1534. doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0783-4, 2015) is a dramatic shift away from thinking of cognitive representations as arbitrary symbols towards thinking of them as icons that replicate structural characteristics of their targets. We argue that this shift has been driven both “from below” and “from above”—that is, from a greater appreciation of what mechanistic explanation of information-processing systems involves, and from a greater appreciation of the problems (...)
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  • Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness.Andrea Serino, Adrian Alsmith, Marcello Costantini, Alisa Mandrigin, Ana Tajadura-Jimenez & Christophe Lopez - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1239-1252.
  • Feeling the burn: When it looks like it hurts, and belongs to me, it really does hurt more.Melita J. Giummarra, Nellie Georgiou-Karistianis, Antonio Verdejo-Garcia & Stephen J. Gibson - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:314-326.
  • Distorted body representations in anorexia nervosa.Stephen Gadsby - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 51:17-33.
    In this paper, I discuss empirical evidence regarding anorexic patients’ distorted body representations. I fit this evidence into a broader framework for understanding how the spatial content of the body is tracked and represented. This framework is motivated by O’Shaughnessy’s (1980) long-term body image hypothesis. This hypothesis posits a representation that tracks changes in the spatial content of the body and supplies this content to other body representations. I argue that a similar kind of body representation might exist and, in (...)
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  • Who am I in out of body experiences? Implications from OBEs for the explanandum of a theory of self-consciousness.Glenn Carruthers - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):183-197.
    Contemporary theories of self-consciousness typically begin by dividing experiences of the self into types, each requiring separate explanation. The stereotypical case of an out of body experience may be seen to suggest a distinction between the sense of oneself as an experiencing subject, a mental entity, and a sense of oneself as an embodied person, a bodily entity. Point of view, in the sense of the place from which the subject seems to experience the world, in this case is tied (...)
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