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Accepted beliefs, revision and bipolarity in the possibilistic framework.Didier Dubois & Henri Prade - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 161--184.details
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Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
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Carnapian frameworks.Gabriel L. Broughton - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4097-4126.details
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A perspective for viewing the history of psychophysics.David J. Murray - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):115-137.details
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On Uncertainty.Brian Weatherson - 1998 - Dissertation, Monash Universitydetails
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Rumos da Epistemologia v. 11.Luiz Dutra & Alexandre Meyer Luz (eds.) - 2011 - Núcleo de Epistemologia e Lógica.details
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A perspective for viewing the present of psychophysics.Paul Whittle - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):165-166.details
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Looking backward: Progress in outer psychophysics.David J. Weiss - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):165-165.details
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Experimental Explications for Conceptual Engineering.Samantha Wakil - 2021 - Erkenntnis:1-23.details
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Experimental Explications for Conceptual Engineering.Samantha Wakil - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1509-1531.details
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On the construction of psychophysical reality.Mark Wagner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):164-165.details
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Carnapian and Tarskian semantics.Pierre Wagner - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):97-119.details
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Single-case probabilities and content-neutral norms: a reply to Gigerenzer.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2001 - Cognition 81 (1):105-111.details
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Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2000 - Cognition 76 (3):179-193.details
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Carnapian Explication and the Canberra Plan’s Conceptual Analysis.Rogelio Miranda Vilchis - 2019 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22 (1):160-179.details
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The analysis of sensations as the foundation of all sciences.J. van Brakel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):163-164.details
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Psychophysics and the mind-brain problem.Michel Treisman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):162-163.details
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Sensation strength: Another point of view.Robert Teghtsoonian - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):161-162.details
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Conceptual fragmentation and the rise of eliminativism.Henry Taylor & Peter Vickers - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (1):17-40.details
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A Problem with the Dependence of Informal Proofs on Formal Proofs.Fenner Tanswell - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 23 (3):295-310.details
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Inductive Logic as Explication: The Evolution of Carnap’s Notion of Logical Probability.Marta Sznajder - 2018 - The Monist 101 (4):417-440.details
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Bedrock metaphysics, fossil fuel psychophysics.Dale A. Stout - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):160-161.details
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Concept Formation and Concept Grounding.Jörgen Sjögren & Christian Bennet - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):827-839.details
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A Note on the Relation Between Formal and Informal Proof.Jörgen Sjögren - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (4):447-458.details
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The non-existence of a principle of natural selection.Abner Shimony - 1989 - Biology and Philosophy 4 (3):255-273.details
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Propensity theories of probability unscathed: A reply to white.Tom Settle - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (4):331-335.details
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Words in contexts: Fregean elucidations.Hans Rott - 2000 - Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (6):621-643.details
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Unwarranted popularity of a power function for heaviness estimates.Helen E. Ross - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):159-160.details
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Deflating the functional turn in conceptual engineering.Jared Riggs - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11555-11586.details
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A Battle in the Statistics Wars: a simulation-based comparison of Bayesian, Frequentist and Williamsonian methodologies.Mantas Radzvilas, William Peden & Francesco De Pretis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13689-13748.details
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Can Church’s thesis be viewed as a Carnapian explication?Paula Quinon - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 5):1047-1074.details
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Choosing the realist framework.Stathis Psillos - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):301 - 316.details
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Response time based psychophysics: An added perspective.William M. Petrusic - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):158-159.details
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Quantum theoretical concepts of measurement: Part I.James L. Park - 1968 - Philosophy of Science 35 (3):205-231.details
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What Ekman really said.Mats Olsson, Kathleen Harder & John C. Baird - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):157-158.details
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Carnapian explication, formalisms as cognitive tools, and the paradox of adequate formalization.Catarina Dutilh Novaes & Erich Reck - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):195-215.details
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Feigl’s ‘Scientific Realism’.Matthias Neuber - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (1):165-183.details
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The place of psychophysics in the history of sensory science.David J. Murray - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):166-186.details
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Toward an inscriptional semantics.R. M. Martin & J. H. Woodger - 1951 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 16 (3):191-203.details
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Quantifying, valuing, choosing.Lawrence E. Marks - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):156-157.details
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Inductive logic: aims and procedures.Maria Concetta di Maio - 1994 - Theoria 60 (2):129-153.details
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Inductive logic: aims and procedures.Maria Concetta di Maio - 1994 - Theoria 60 (2):129-153.details
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Let's not promulgate either Fechner's erroneous algorithm or his unidimensional approach.R. Duncan Luce - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):155-156.details
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Information is intrinsically semantic but alethically neutral.Bruce Raymond Long - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3447-3467.details
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A parallel view of the history of psychophysics.Gregory R. Lockhead - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):154-155.details
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Fechner's theory of mental measurement.Stephen Link - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):153-154.details
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Derivation of Stevens's exponent from neurophysiological data.Artour N. Lebedev - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):152-153.details
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Hitting a Moving Target: Gödel, Carnap, and Mathematics as Logical Syntax.Gregory Lavers - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (2):219-243.details
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Frege, Carnap, and Explication: ‘Our Concern Here Is to Arrive at a Concept of Number Usable for the Purpose of Science’.Gregory Lavers - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):225-41.details
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