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The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.details
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Descriptions.P. Elbourne - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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How valuable could a material object be?Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):332-343.details
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The Boundaries of the Mind.Katalin Farkas - 2018 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge. pp. 256-279.details
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Why Panpsychism doesn't Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.details
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The Scrambler: An Argument Against Representationalism.Stephen Biggs - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):215-236.details
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The scrambler: An argument against representationalism.Stephen Biggs - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 215-236.details
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Atomism, pluralism, and conceptual content.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.details
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Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and the Epistemic Argument.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):59-78.details
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Holisme, référence et irréductibilité du mental.Martin Montminy - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (3):419-437.details
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Two-Dimensional Semantics - Edited by Manuel García-Carpintero and Josep Maciá.Susana Nuccetelli - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (1):94-99.details
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Senses for senses.Brad Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.details
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Dissolving type‐b physicalism.Helen Yetter-Chappell - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):469-498.details
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A naturalistic interpretation of the Kripkean modality.Feng Ye - 2009 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (3):454-470.details
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Why Naturalize Consciousness?Wayne Wright - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):583-607.details
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Epistemically possible worlds and propositions.Bruno Whittle - 2009 - Noûs 43 (2):265-285.details
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Utility and framing.Paul Weirich - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):83 - 103.details
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Centered communication.Clas Weber - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):205-223.details
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Two-dimensionalism and the epistemology of recognition.Markos Valaris - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):427 - 445.details
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Grounding: necessary or contingent?Kelly Trogdon - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.details
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The Measure of Knowledge.Nick Treanor - 2012 - Noûs 47 (3):577-601.details
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Is 'no' a force-indicator? No!M. Textor - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):448-456.details
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Two Conceivability Arguments Compared.Daniel Stoljar - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):27-44.details
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Epistemic two-dimensionalism and the epistemic argument.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):59 – 78.details
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Students’ Ideas and Radical Constructivism.Pedro Sánchez Gómez - 2016 - Science & Education 25 (5-6):629-650.details
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Perception and the external world.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1119-1145.details
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Can Truth‐Conditional Theorists of Content Do Without ‘That’‐Clause Ascriptions?Lionel Shapiro - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (1):1-27.details
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Befuddling the mind: radical Enactivism (Hutto-Myin style) and the metaphysics of experience.Itay Shani - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (1):39-56.details
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Two‐Dimensional Semantics and Sameness of Meaning.Laura Schroeter - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (1):84-99.details
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Thought and Talk in a Generous World.Alexander Sandgren - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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Secondary belief content, what is it good for?Alexander Sandgren - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1467-1476.details
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Puzzling Pierre and Intentional Identity.Alexander Sandgren - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):861-875.details
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Private Investigators and Public Speakers.Alexander Sandgren - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):95-113.details
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Minding one's cognitive systems: When does a group of minds constitute a single cognitive unit?Robert Rupert - 2005 - Episteme 1 (3):177-188.details
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Modes of Introspective Access: a Pluralist Approach.Adriana Renero - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):823-844.details
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Analytic Functionalism and Mental State Attribution.Mark Phelan & Wesley Buckwalter - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):129-154.details
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Are Infants Conscious?Claudia Passos-Ferreira - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):308-329.details
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Pessimism and procreation.Daniel Pallies - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Two pictures of communication: from content identity to coordination.Andrea Onofri - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-20.details
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Loar’s Puzzle, Similarity, and Knowledge of Reference.Andrea Onofri - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (2):1-45.details
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Can groups have concepts? Semantics for collective intentions.Cathal O'Madagain - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):347-363.details
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Two-dimensionalism and natural kind terms.Christian Nimtz - 2004 - Synthese 138 (1):125-48.details
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Analytic truths—still harmless after all these years?Christian Nimtz - 2003 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):91-118.details
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The experience property frame work: a misleading paradigm.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3361-3387.details
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A Panpsychist Dead End.Yujin Nagasawa - 2021 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 95 (1):25-50.details
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Cognitive phenomenology and conscious thought.Michelle Montague - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):167-181.details
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Perceiving properties versus perceiving objects.Boyd Millar - 2022 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (2):99-117.details
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A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to Block's harder problem.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):163-204.details
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Understanding Kripke's puzzles about belief.Michael McGlone - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):487-514.details
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