- Intuitions for inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.details
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The Conventional and the Analytic.Manuel García-Carpintero & Manuel Pérez Otero - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):239-274.details
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Why conceptual competence won’t help the non-naturalist epistemologist.Preston J. Werner - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):616-637.details
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Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori.Lisa Warenski - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426.details
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Logic, Mathematics, and the A Priori, Part I: A Problem for Realism.Neil Tennant - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):308-320.details
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Meaning, Understanding, and A Priori Knowledge.Célia Teixeira - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):901-916.details
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Meaning rationalism, a priori, and transparency of content.Tadeusz Szubka - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):491-503.details
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Abductive two-dimensionalism: a new route to the a priori identification of necessary truths.Biggs Stephen & Wilson Jessica - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):59-93.details
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The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic.Joshua Schechter - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):437-464.details
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The limits of conceptual analysis.Laura Schroeter - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):425-453.details
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The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics.Laura Schroeter & François Schroeter - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):192-223.details
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Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens.Joshua Schechter & David Enoch - 2006 - Noûs 40 (4):687 - 715.details
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The Humean problem of induction and Carroll’s Paradox.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):357-376.details
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Three principles of rationalism.Christopher Peacocke - 2002 - European Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):375–397.details
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The Humean problem of induction and Carroll’s Paradox.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):357 - 376.details
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Posséder un concept selon Peacocke.Martin Montminy - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (2):219-.details
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Conceptual and linguistic analysis: A two-step program.Andrew Melnyk - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):267–291.details
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Why essentialism requires two senses of necessity.Stephen K. McLeod - 2006 - Ratio 19 (1):77–91.details
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Concepts, analysis, generics and the canberra plan.Mark Johnston & Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):113-171.details
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Thought-experiment intuitions and truth in fiction.Jonathan Ichikawa & Benjamin Jarvis - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):221 - 246.details
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Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning.Sinan Dogramaci - 2013 - Noûs 49 (4):776-799.details
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Concept individuation, possession conditions, and propositional attitudes.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):140-66.details
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A priori justification.Darragh Byrne - 2007 - Philosophical Books 48 (3):241-251.details
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How to Define your (Mental) Terms.Tim Crane - 1998 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):341-354.details
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Rationality, Norms and the Primitively Compelling: A Reply to Kirk Ludwig.Christopher Peacocke - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (4):492-498.details
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Constantes logiques et décision.Saloua Chatti - 2015 - Philosophia Scientiae 19:229-250.details
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Logical concepts and logical inferences.Paolo Casalegno - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (3):395–411.details
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Logical Concepts and Logical Inferences.Paolo Casalegno† - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (3):395-411.details
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Critical notices.David Archard, Philipp W. Rosemann & Christopher Peacocke - 1996 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 4 (1):128 – 160.details
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Posséder un concept selon Peacocke.Martin Montminy - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (2):219-240.details
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Small Steps and Great Leaps in Thought: The Epistemology of Basic Deductive Rules.Joshua Schechter - 2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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An Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori.Ralph Wedgwood - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:295–314.details
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