- Thing Causation.Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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(In)compatibilism.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2023 - In Joseph Campbell, V. Alan White & Kristin M. Mickelson (eds.), Wiley-Blackwell: A Companion to Free Will. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 58-83.details
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Degrees of freedom.Timothy O'Connor - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):119 – 125.details
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A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.details
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Deliberating in the presence of manipulation.Yishai Cohen - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):85-105.details
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Preference Change: Approaches From Philosophy, Economics and Psychology.Till Grüne-Yanoff & Sven Ove Hansson - 2009 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism.Jason Turner - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587.details
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Agent-Causation Revisited: Origination and Contemporary Theories of Free Will.Thad Botham - 2008 - Berlin, Germany: Verlag D Müller.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Cameron Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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Wiley-Blackwell: A Companion to Free Will.Joe Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.) - 2023 - Wiley.details
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Agent Causation Is Not Prior to Event Causation.Soo Lam Wong - 2021 - Disputatio 13 (61):143-158.details
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In Defense of Non-Causal Libertarianism.David Widerker - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):1-14.details
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A New Argument Against Libertarian Free Will?David Widerker - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):296-306.details
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Weighing in on decisions in the brain: neural representations of pre-awareness practical intention.Robyn Repko Waller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5175-5203.details
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Forking Paths and Freedom: A Challenge to Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Robyn Repko Waller & Russell L. Waller - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1199-1212.details
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Why the luck problem isn't.Manuel Vargas - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):419-436.details
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On the importance of history for responsible agency.Manuel Vargas - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):351-382.details
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Free Will and Mental Powers.Niels van Miltenburg & Dawa Ometto - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1155-1165.details
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Causality, determination and free will: towards an anscombean account of free action.Niels van Miltenburg - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-20.details
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Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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Are the folk agent-causationists?Jason Turner & Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):597-609.details
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Agent causation and the alleged impossibility of rational free action.Chris Tucker - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (1):17 - 27.details
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Persistence and Responsibility.Neal A. Tognazzini - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. MIT Press.details
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Understanding Source Incompatibilism.Neal A. Tognazzini - 2011 - Modern Schoolman 88 (1/2):73-88.details
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Grounding the Luck Objection.Neal A. Tognazzini - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):127-138.details
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A response to the problem of wild coincidences.Christopher P. Taggart - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11421-11435.details
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Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Acting on One’s Own.Bradford Stockdale - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):27-40.details
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Action: Offshoring Strategies, Creative Governance, and Subnational Island Jurisdictions.Rowland Stout - 2006 - McGill-Queen's University Press.details
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Causes and Categories.Nathanael Stein - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):465-489.details
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Free will and the construction of options.Chandra Sripada - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2913-2933.details
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Free Will and Moral Responsibility: The Trap, the Appreciation of Agency, and the Bubble. [REVIEW]Saul Smilansky - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):211-239.details
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The apparent illusion of conscious deciding.Joshua Shepherd - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.details
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Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):335-351.details
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Why free will remains a mystery.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):105-125.details
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The Ontology of Intentional Agency in Light of Neurobiological Determinism: Philosophy Meets Folk Psychology.Dhar Sharmistha - 2017 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (1):129-149.details
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Free will and mystery: looking past the Mind Argument.Seth Shabo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):291-307.details
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Assimilations and Rollbacks: Two Arguments Against Libertarianism Defended.Seth Shabo - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):151-172.details
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The neuroscientific study of free will: A diagnosis of the controversy.Markus E. Schlosser - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):245-262.details
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The luck argument against event-causal libertarianism: It is here to stay.Markus E. Schlosser - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):375-385.details
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Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Gerhard Schurz, Maria Sekatskaya & Alexander Gebharter - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.details
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From Modal Collapse to Providential Collapse.Joseph C. Schmid - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (3):1413-1435.details
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Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.details
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Agent-causation and agential control.Markus Ernst Schlosser - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3-21.details
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Cosmological Argument: A Pragmatic Defense.Evan Sandsmark & Jason L. Megill - 2010 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1):127 - 142.details
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Agent-causal libertarianism, statistical neural laws and wild coincidences.Jason D. Runyan - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4563-4580.details
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Reductionism, Agency and Free Will.Maria Joana Rigato - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):107-116.details
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Downward causation and supervenience: the non-reductionist’s extra argument for incompatibilism.Joana Rigato - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):384-399.details
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Reductionism, Agency and Free Will.Joana Rigato - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):107-116.details
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The right perspective on responsibility for ill health.Karl Persson - 2013 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (3):429-441.details
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On Alfred Mele's free will and luck.Derk Pereboom - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):163 – 172.details
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