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  1. Toward a more natural historical attitude.Todd Grantham - 2024 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 14 (1):1-21.
    Modeling his position on Arthur Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitude, Derek Turner proposed the Natural Historical Attitude. Although these positions share a family resemblance, Turner’s position differs from Fine’s in two important ways. First, Fine’s contextualism is more fine-grained. Second, Turner’s argument for metaphysical agnosticism seems to lead to the implausible conclusion that we should be agnostic about the mind-independence of ordinary objects – a position in tension with Fine’s “core position.” While this paper presents a textual analysis of Fine’s and (...)
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  • Making coherent senses of success in scientific modeling.Beckett Sterner & Christopher DiTeresi - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-20.
    Making sense of why something succeeded or failed is central to scientific practice: it provides an interpretation of what happened, i.e. an hypothesized explanation for the results, that informs scientists’ deliberations over their next steps. In philosophy, the realism debate has dominated the project of making sense of scientists’ success and failure claims, restricting its focus to whether truth or reliability best explain science’s most secure successes. Our aim, in contrast, will be to expand and advance the practice-oriented project sketched (...)
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  • Qual o argumento para a Atitude Ontológica Natural?Bruno Malavolta E. Silva - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):175-205.
    Arthur Fine presented the Natural Ontological Attitude as a third alternative between scientific realism and anti-realism by identifying a core position contained in both and rejecting any philosophical addition to this core. At first, Fine’s proposal was understood as offering a doxastic middle ground between believing in the truth of a theory and believing in its empirical adequacy. In this reading, NOA was widely disregarded after Alan Musgrave’s criticisms of it, which characterized Fine’s proposal as a form of realism. After (...)
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  • On the alleged non-existence of orbitals.Peter Mulder - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (2):178-182.
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  • Acerca del status ontológico de las entidades químicas: el caso de los orbitales atómicos.Martín Labarca & Olimpia Lombardi - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 14 (3):309-333.
    The aim of the present paper is to analyze the problem of the relationship between chemistry and physics, by focusing on the widely discussed case of the atomic orbitals. We will begin by remembering the difference between the physical and the chemical interpretation of the concept of orbital. Then, we will refer to the claim made in 1999 that atomic orbitals have been directly imaged for the first time. On this basis, we will analyze the problem from a new approach, (...)
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  • Coherence objectivity and measurement: the example of democracy.Sharon Crasnow - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1207-1229.
    Empirical research on democracy depends upon data. The need for such data has led to the development of measures of democracy. Measurement models are evaluated in terms of their reliability and validity, both of which may be thought of as related to the objectivity of the measure. Using the Varieties of Democracy Project as an example, I consider how assessing reliability and validity of measurement models is challenging and argue that democracy might be understood as measured objectively when it is (...)
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  • Scientific Realism.Anjan Chakravartty - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Debates about scientific realism are closely connected to almost everything else in the philosophy of science, for they concern the very nature of scientific knowledge. Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. This epistemic attitude has important metaphysical and semantic dimensions, and these various commitments are contested by a number of rival epistemologies of science, known collectively (...)
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  • Scientific Realism.Richard Boyd - 1984 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 21 (1&2):767-791.
    (i) Scientific realism is primarily a metaphysical doctrine about the existence and nature of the unobservables of science. (ii) There are good explanationist arguments for realism, most famously that from the success of science, provided abduction is allowed. Abduction seems to be on an equal footing, at least, with other ampliative methods of inference. (iii) We have no reason to believe a doctrine of empirical equivalence that would sustain the underdetermination argument against realism. (iv) The key to defending realism from (...)
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