Prioritized bases, i.e., weakly ordered sets of sentences, have been used for specifying an agent’s ‘basic’ or ‘explicit’ beliefs, or alternatively for compactly encoding an agent’s belief state without the claim that the elements of a base are in any sense basic. This paper focuses on the second interpretation and shows how a shifting of priorities in prioritized bases can be used for a simple, constructive and intuitive way of representing a large variety of methods for the change of belief (...) states—methods that have usually been characterized semantically by a system-of-spheres modeling. Among the methods represented are ‘radical’, ‘conservative’ and ‘moderate’ revision, ‘revision by comparison’ in its raising and lowering variants, as well as various constructions for belief expansion and contraction. Importantly, none of these methods makes any use of numbers. (shrink)

We prove some embedding theorems for classical conditional logic, covering 'finitely cumulative' logics, 'preferential' logics and what we call 'semi-monotonic' logics. Technical tools called 'partial frames' and 'frame morphisms' in the context of neighborhood semantics are used in the proof.

This paper investigates the structure of lattices of normal mono- and polymodal subframelogics, i.e., those modal logics whose frames are closed under a certain type of substructures. Nearly all basic modal logics belong to this class. The main lattice theoretic tool applied is the notion of a splitting of a complete lattice which turns out to be connected with the “geometry” and “topology” of frames, with Kripke completeness and with axiomatization problems. We investigate in detail subframe logics containing K4, those (...) containing polymodal Altn and subframe logics which are tense logics. (shrink)

This paper investigates partitions of lattices of modal logics based on superintuitionistic logics which are defined by forming, for each superintuitionistic logic L and classical modal logic , the set L[] of L-companions of . Here L[] consists of those modal logics whose non-modal fragments coincide with L and which axiomatize if the law of excluded middle p V p is added. Questions addressed are, for instance, whether there exist logics with the disjunction property in L[], whether L[] contains a (...) smallest element, and whether L[] contains lower covers of . Positive solutions as concerns the last question show that there are (uncountably many) superclean modal logics based on intuitionistic logic in the sense of Vakarelov [28]. Thus a number of problems stated in [28] are solved. As a technical tool the paper develops the splitting technique for lattices of modal logics based on superintuitionistic logics and ap plies duality theory from [34]. (shrink)

In this paper, intuitionistic modal logics which do not admit the law of the excluded middle are studied. The main result is that there exista a continuum of such logics.

Rough polyadic modal logics, introduced in the paper, contain modal operators of many arguments with a relational semantics, based on the Pawlak's rough set theory. Rough set approach is developed as an alternative to the fuzzy set philosophy, and has many applications in different branches in Artificial Intelligence and theoretical computer science.

The main results of the paper are the following: For each monadic prepositional formula which is classically true but not intuitionistically so, there is a continuum of intuitionistic monotone modal logics L such that L+ is inconsistent.There exists a consistent intuitionistic monotone modal logic L such that for any formula of the kind mentioned above the logic L+ is inconsistent.

It is natural to ask under what conditions negating a conditional is equivalent to negating its consequent. Given a bivalent background logic, this is equivalent to asking about the conjunction of Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM, opposite conditionals are not both false) and Weak Boethius' Thesis (WBT, opposite conditionals are not both true). In the system CI.0 of consequential implication, which is intertranslatable with the modal logic KT, WBT is a theorem, so it is natural to ask which instances of CEM (...) are derivable. We also investigate the systems CIw and CI of consequential implication, corresponding to the modal logics K and KD respectively, with occasional remarks about stronger systems. While unrestricted CEM produces modal collapse in all these systems, CEM restricted to contingent formulas yields the Alt2 axiom (semantically, each world can see at most two worlds), which corresponds to the symmetry of consequential implication. It is proved that in all the main systems considered, a given instance of CEM is derivable if and only if the result of replacing consequential implication by the material biconditional in one or other of its disjuncts is provable. Several related results are also proved. The methods of the paper are those of propositional modal logic as applied to a special sort of conditional. (shrink)

In their presentation of canonical models for normal systems of modal logic, Hughes and Cresswell observe that some of these models are based on a frame which can be also thought of as a collection of two or more isolated frames; they call such frames ‘non-cohesive’. The problem of checking whether the canonical model of a given system is cohesive is still rather unexplored and no general decision procedure is available. The main contribution of this article consists in introducing a (...) method which is sufficient to show that canonical models of some relevant classes of normal monomodal and bimodal systems are always non-cohesive. (shrink)

It is shown that the normal modal logic of two reflexive points jointed with a symmetric binary relation splits the lattice of normal extensions of the logic KTB. By this fact, it is easily seen that there exists the third largest logic in the class of all normal extensions of KTB.

It is shown that the normal modal logic of two reflexive points jointed with a symmetric binary relation splits the lattice of normal extensions of the logic KTB. By this fact, it is easily seen that there exists the third largest logic in the class of all normal extensions of KTB.

Modal logic is concerned with the analysis of sentential operators in the widest sense. Originally invented to analyse the notion of necessity applications have been found in many areas of philosophy, logic, linguistics and computer science. This in turn has led to an increased interest in the technical development of modal logic.

This papers gives a survey of recent results about simulations of one class of modal logics by another class and of the transfer of properties of modal logics under extensions of the underlying modal language. We discuss: the transfer from normal polymodal logics to their fusions, the transfer from normal modal logics to their extensions by adding the universal modality, and the transfer from normal monomodal logics to minimal tense extensions. Likewise, we discuss simulations of normal polymodal logics by normal (...) monomodal logics, of nominals and the difference operator by normal operators, of monotonic monomodal logics by normal bimodal logics, of polyadic normal modal logics by polymodal normal modal logics, and of intuitionistic modal logics by normal bimodal logics. (shrink)

A moda logic Λ is called invariant if for all automorphisms α of NExt K, α = Λ. An invariant ogic is therefore unique y determined by its surrounding in the attice. It wi be established among other that a extensions of K.alt1S4.3 and G.3 are invariant ogics. Apart from the results that are being obtained, this work contributes to the understanding of the combinatorics of finite frames in genera, something wich has not been done except for transitive frames. Certain (...) useful concepts will be established, such as the notion of a d-homogeneous frame. (shrink)

We present an algebraic proof of the theorem stating that there are continuum many axiomatic extensions of global consequence associated with modal system E that do not admit the local deduction detachment theorem. We also prove that all these logics lack the finite frame property and have exactly three proper axiomatic extensions, each of which admits the local deduction detachment theorem.

The totality of extensional 1-ary connectives distinguishable in a logical framework allowing sequents with multiple or empty (alongside singleton) succedents form a lattice under a natural partial ordering relating one connective to another if all the inferential properties of the former are possessed by the latter. Here we give a complete description of that lattice; its Hasse diagram appears as Figure 1 in §2. Simple syntactic descriptions of the lattice elements are provided in §3; §§4 and 5 give some additional (...) remarks on matrix methods and on alternative terminology. Background: The size of this lattice was underestimated in [3]; some missing cases were noted in [4] in the course of correcting an example from [3] purporting to show the non-distributivity of the lattice. All the 'missing cases' (as well as those originally noted) are covered here. (The present discussion is self-contained.). (shrink)

It is observed that a consistent congruential modal logic is not guaranteed to have a consistent extension in which the Box operator becomes a truth-functional connective for one of the four one-place truth functions.

A notable early result of David Makinson establishes that every monotone modal logic can be extended to LI, LV, or LF, and every antitone logic can be extended to LN, LV, or LF, where LI, LN, LV, and LF are logics axiomatized, respectively, by the schemas □α↔α, □α↔¬α, □α↔⊤, and □α↔⊥. We investigate logics that are both monotone and antitone (hereafter amphitone). There are exactly three: LV, LF, and the minimum amphitone logic AM axiomatized by the schema □α→□β. These logics, (...) along with LI, LN, and a wider class of “extensional” logics, bear close affinities to classical propositional logic. Characterizing those affinities reveals differences among several accounts of equivalence between logics. Some results about amphitone logics do not carry over when logics are construed as consequence or generalized (“multiple-conclusion”) consequence relations on languages that may lack some or all of the nonmodal connectives. We close by discussing these divergences and conditions under which our results do carry over. (shrink)

Only propositional logics are at issue here. Such a logic is contra-classical in a superficial sense if it is not a sublogic of classical logic, and in a deeper sense, if there is no way of translating its connectives, the result of which translation gives a sublogic of classical logic. After some motivating examples, we investigate the incidence of contra-classicality (in the deeper sense) in various logical frameworks. In Sections 3 and 4 we will encounter, originally as an example of (...) what (in Section 2) we call a contra-classical modal logic, an unusual logic boasting a connective (" demi-negation" ) whose double application is equivalent to a single application of the negation connective. Pondering the example points the way to a general characterization of contra-classicality (Theorems 3.3 and 4.6). In an Appendix (Section 5), we look at one alternative to classical logic as the target for such translational assimilation, intuitionistic logic, calling logics which resist the assimilation, in this case, contra- intuitionistic. We will show that one such logic is classical logic itself, thereby strengthening a result of Wojcicki's to the effect that the consequence relation of classical logic cannot be faithfully embedded by any connective-by-connective translation into that of intuitionistic logic. (What the "faithfully" means here is that not only is the translation of anything provable in the 'source' logic.. (shrink)

In this article, we tell a story about incompleteness in modal logic. The story weaves together an article of van Benthem, “Syntactic aspects of modal incompleteness theorems,” and a longstanding open question: whether every normal modal logic can be characterized by a class of completely additive modal algebras, or as we call them, ${\cal V}$-baos. Using a first-order reformulation of the property of complete additivity, we prove that the modal logic that starred in van Benthem’s article resolves the open question (...) in the negative. In addition, for the case of bimodal logic, we show that there is a naturally occurring logic that is incomplete with respect to ${\cal V}$-baos, namely the provability logic $GLB$. We also show that even logics that are unsound with respect to such algebras do not have to be more complex than the classical propositional calculus. On the other hand, we observe that it is undecidable whether a syntactically defined logic is ${\cal V}$-complete. After these results, we generalize the Blok Dichotomy to degrees of ${\cal V}$-incompleteness. In the end, we return to van Benthem’s theme of syntactic aspects of modal incompleteness. (shrink)

Monomodal logic has exactly two maximally normal logics, which are also the only quasi-normal logics that are Post complete, and they are complete for validity in Kripke frames. Here we show that addition of a propositional constant to monomodal logic allows the construction of continuum many maximally normal logics that are not valid in any Kripke frame, or even in any complete modal algebra. We also construct continuum many quasi-normal Post complete logics that are not normal. The set of extensions (...) of S4.3 is radically altered by the addition of a constant: we use it to construct continuum many such normal extensions of S4.3, and continuum many non-normal ones, none of which have the finite model property. But for logics with weakly transitive frames there are only eight maximally normal ones, of which five extend K4 and three extend S4. (shrink)

Monomodal logic has exactly two maximally normal logics, which are also the only quasi-normal logics that are Post complete, and they are complete for validity in Kripke frames. Here we show that addition of a propositional constant to monomodal logic allows the construction of continuum many maximally normal logics that are not valid in any Kripke frame, or even in any complete modal algebra. We also construct continuum many quasi-normal Post complete logics that are not normal. The set of extensions (...) of S4.3 is radically altered by the addition of a constant: we use it to construct continuum many such normal extensions of S4.3, and continuum many non-normal ones, none of which have the finite model property. But for logics with weakly transitive frames there are only eight maximally normal ones, of which five extend K4 and three extend S4. (shrink)

In this paper we present a general theory of normal forms, based on a categorial result for the free monoid construction. We shall use the theory mainly for proposictional modal logic, although it seems to have a wider range of applications. We shall formally represent normal forms as combinatorial objects, basically labelled trees and forests. This geometric conceptualization is implicit in and our approach will extend it to other cases and make it more direct: operations of a purely geometric and (...) combinatorial nature will be introduced in order to give a mathematical description of the basic logical/algebraic constructions .We begin by recalling the above-mentioned categorial construction: we need a careful inspection of it because in the various examples considered later we plan to deduce from it in a uniform way the normal forms and the description of finitely generated free algebras. This method always works whenever we can describe the category of algebras corresponding to the logic under consideration as a T-objects category. When this simple description seems not to be available, still the general theory might be of some interest, because a description of the category of algebras as a T-objects category plus equation is possible .The central part of the paper is more advanced and specific: we show how the general approach presented here can provide some insights even in the basic case of the modal system K. Section 4 contains a contribution to the theory of normal forms, namely the description of the uniform substitution. This result will enable us to give a duality theorem for the category of finitely generated free modal algebras and in Section 5 to provide a characterization of the collections of normal forms which happen to be normal forms for a logic, thus giving a description of the lattice of modal logics.Section 6 deals with some applications: we shall show how to use normal forms in order to prove for the modal system K the definability of higher-order propositional quantifiers and of the tense operator F .As to the prerequisites, the paper is almost self-contained. The reader is only assumed to have familiarity with standard techniques in algebraic logic ). Knowledge of the basic facts about adjoint functors is required too, see e.g. McLane or the appendix. (shrink)

We investigate an enrichment of the propositional modal language L with a "universal" modality ■ having semantics x ⊧ ■φ iff ∀y(y ⊧ φ), and a countable set of "names" - a special kind of propositional variables ranging over singleton sets of worlds. The obtained language ℒ $_{c}$ proves to have a great expressive power. It is equivalent with respect to modal definability to another enrichment ℒ(⍯) of ℒ, where ⍯ is an additional modality with the semantics x ⊧ ⍯φ (...) iff Vy(y ≠ x → y ⊧ φ). Model-theoretic characterizations of modal definability in these languages are obtained. Further we consider deductive systems in ℒ $_{c}$ . Strong completeness of the normal ℒ $_{c}$ logics is proved with respect to models in which all worlds are named. Every ℒ $_{c}$ -logic axiomatized by formulae containing only names (but not propositional variables) is proved to be strongly frame-complete. Problems concerning transfer of properties ([in]completeness, filtration, finite model property etc.) from ℒ to ℒ $_{c}$ are discussed. Finally, further perspectives for names in multimodal environment are briefly sketched. (shrink)

Robert Stalnaker has recently advocated propositional contingentism, the claim that it is contingent what propositions there are. He has proposed a philosophical theory of contingency in what propositions there are and sketched a possible worlds model theory for it. In this paper, such models are used to interpret two propositional modal languages: one containing an existential propositional quantifier, and one containing an existential propositional operator. It is shown that the resulting logic containing an existential quantifier is not recursively axiomatizable, as (...) it is recursively isomorphic to second-order logic, and a natural candidate axiomatization for the resulting logic containing an existential operator is shown to be incomplete. (shrink)

Propositional modal logic over relational frames is naturally extended with propositional quantifiers by letting them range over arbitrary sets of worlds of the relevant frame. This is also known as second-order propositional modal logic. The propositionally quantified modal logic of a class of relational frames is often not axiomatizable, although there are known exceptions, most notably the case of frames validating the strong modal logic$\mathrm {S5}$. Here, we develop new general methods with which many of the open questions in this (...) area can be answered. We illustrate the usefulness of these methods by applying them to a range of examples, which provide a detailed picture of which normal modal logics define classes of relational frames whose propositionally quantified modal logic is axiomatizable. We also apply these methods to establish new results in the multimodal case. (shrink)

It is well known that no consistent normal modal logic contains (as theorems) both ♦A and ♦¬A (for any formula A). Here we observe that this claim can be strengthened to the following: for any formula A, either no consistent normal modal logic contains ♦A, or else no consistent normal modal logic contains ♦¬A.

Hilbert-style axiomatic systems are presented for versions of the modal logics K, where {D, 4, 5}, with noncontingency as the sole modal primitive. The classes of frames characterized by the axioms of these systems are shown to be first-order definable, though not equal to the classes of serial, transitive, or euclidean frames. The canonical frame of the noncontingency logic of any logic containing the seriality axiom is proved to be nonserial. It is also shown that any class of frames definable (...) in the noncontingency language contains the class of functional frames, and dually, there exists a greatest consistent normal noncontingency logic. (shrink)

In this paper we prove the pretabularity criteria for the logics of infinite depth in NExtK4. Then we use the criteria to resolve the problems of pretabular logics in NExtQ4 and prove that there is a continuum of pretabular logics in NExtQ4 just like NExtK4.

A new characterization of tabularity in tense logic is established, namely, a tense logicLis tabular if and only if$\mathsf {tab}_n^T\in L$for some$n\geq 1$. Two characterization theorems for the Post-completeness in tabular tense logics are given. Furthermore, a characterization of the Post-completeness in the lattice of all tense logics is established. Post numbers of some tense logics are shown.

We take Carnap’s problem to be to what extent standard consequence relations in various formal languages fix the meaning of their logical vocabulary, alone or together with additional constraints on the form of the semantics. This paper studies Carnap’s problem for basic modal logic. Setting the stage, we show that neighborhood semantics is the most general form of compositional possible worlds semantics, and proceed to ask which standard modal logics (if any) constrain the box operator to be interpreted as in (...) relational Kripke semantics. Except when restricted to finite domains, no modal logic characterizes all the Kripkean interpretation of P. Moreover, we show that, in contrast with the case of first-order logic, the obvious requirement of permutation invariance is not adequate in the modal case. After pointing out some known facts about modal logics that nevertheless force the Kripkean interpretation, we focus on another feature often taken to embody the gist of modal logic: locality. We show that invariance under point-generated subframes (properly defined) does single out the Kripkean interpretations, but only among topological interpretations, not in general. Finally, we define a notion of bisimulation invariance — another aspect of locality — that, together with a reasonable closure condition, gives the desired general result. Along the way, we propose a new perspective on normal neighborhood frames as filter frames, consisting of a set of worlds equipped with an accessibility relation, and a free filter at every world. (shrink)

Modal logics are studied in their algebraic disguise of varieties of so-called modal algebras. This enables us to apply strong results of a universal algebraic nature, notably those obtained by B. Jonsson. It is shown that the degree of incompleteness with respect to Kripke semantics of any modal logic containing the axiom □ p → p or containing an axiom of the form $\square^mp \leftrightarrow\square^{m + 1}p$ for some natural number m is 2 ℵ 0 . Furthermore, we show that (...) there exists an immediate predecessor of classical logic (axiomatized by $p \leftrightarrow \square p$ ) which is not characterized by any finite algebra. The existence of modal logics having 2 ℵ 0 immediate predecessors is established. In contrast with these results we prove that the lattice of extensions of S4 behaves much better: a logic extending S4 is characterized by a finite algebra iff it has finitely many extensions and any such logic has only finitely many immediate predecessors, all of which are characterized by a finite algebra. (shrink)

We study modal logics in the setting of varieties of modal algebras. Any variety of modal algebras generated by a finite algebra — such, a variety is called tabular — has only finitely many subvarieties, i.e. is of finite height. The converse does not hold in general. It is shown that the converse does hold in the lattice of varieties of K4-algebras. Hence the lower part of this lattice consists of tabular varieties only. We proceed to show that there is (...) a continuum of pretabular varieties of K4-algebras — those are the non-tabular varieties all of whose proper subvarieties are tabular — in contrast with Maksimova's result that there are only five pretabular varieties of S4-algebras. (shrink)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 BASIC MODAL LOGIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.

Well-known results due to David Makinson show that there are exactly two Post complete normal modal logics, that in both of them, the modal operator is truth-functional, and that every consistent normal modal logic can be extended to at least one of them. Lloyd Humberstone has recently shown that a natural analog of this result in congruential modal logics fails, by showing that not every congruential modal logic can be extended to one in which the modal operator is truth-functional. As (...) Humberstone notes, the issue of Post completeness in congruential modal logics is not well understood. The present article shows that in contrast to normal modal logics, the extent of the property of Post completeness among congruential modal logics depends on the background set of logics. Some basic results on the corresponding properties of Post completeness are established, in particular that although a congruential modal logic is Post complete among all modal logics if and only if its modality is truth-functional, there are continuum many modal logics Post complete among congruential modal logics. (shrink)

Hume’s famous character Cleanthes claims that there is no difficulty in explaining the existence of causal chains with no first cause since in them each item is causally explained by its predecessor. Relying on logico-mathematical resources, we argue for two theses: (1) if the existence of Cleanthes’ chain can be explained at all, it must be explained by the fact that the causal law ruling it is in force, and (2) the fact that such a causal law is in force (...) cannot explain the occurrence of the events in the chain. In order to perform (1), we manage to express in mathematical terms the intuitive idea that indefinitely delayed explanation is ultimately no explanation. In order to achieve (2), we identify a logical relation we can prove to be as strong as the causal relation at issue in the Cleanthes passage, according to a precise notion of strength of relations. (shrink)

Special issue: "Reflecting on the Legacy of C.I. Lewis: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Modal Logic".

An overcomplete logic is a logic that ‘ceases to make the difference’: According to such a logic, all inferences hold independently of the nature of the statements involved. A negation-inconsistent logic is a logic having at least one model that satisfies both some statement and its negation. A negation-incomplete logic has at least one model according to which neither some statement nor its negation are satisfied. Paraconsistent logics are negation-inconsistent yet non-overcomplete; paracomplete logics are negation-incomplete yet non-overcomplete. A paranormal logic (...) is simply a logic that is both paraconsistent and paracomplete. -/- Despite being perfectly consistent and complete with respect to classical negation, nearly every normal modal logic, in its ordinary language and interpretation, admits to some latent paranormality: It is paracomplete with respect to a negation defined as an impossibility operator, and paraconsistent with respect to a negation defined as non-necessity. In fact, as it will be shown here, even in languages without a primitive classical negation, normal modal logics can often be alternatively characterized directly by way of their paranormal negations and related operators. So, instead of talking about ‘necessity’, ‘possibility’, and so on, modal logics could be seen just as devices tailored for the study of (modal) negation. This paper shows how and to what extent this alternative characterization of modal logics can be realized. (shrink)