Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Impredicative Identity Criteria.Leon Horsten - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):411-439.
    In this paper, a general perspective on criteria of identity of kinds of objects is developed. The question of the admissibility of impredicative or circular identity criteria is investigated in the light of the view that is articulated. It is argued that in and of itself impredicativity does not constitute sufficient grounds for rejecting a putative identity criterion. The view that is presented is applied to Davidson’s criterion of identity for events and to the structuralist criterion of identity of places (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Locke's Place‐Time‐Kind Principle.Jessica Gordon-Roth - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (4):264-274.
    John Locke discusses the notions of identity and diversity in Book 2, Chapter 27 of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. At the beginning of this much-discussed chapter, Locke posits the place-time-kind principle. According to this principle, no two things of the same kind can be in the same place at the same time . Just what Locke means by this is unclear, however. So too is whether this principle causes problems for Locke, and whether these problems can be resolved. This (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Locke's Principle is an Applicable Criterion of Identity.Rafael De Clercq - 2011 - Noûs 47 (4):697-705.
    According to Locke’s Principle, material objects are identical if and only if they are of the same kind and once occupy the same place at the same time. There is disagreement about whether this principle is true, but what is seldom disputed is that, even if true, the principle fails to constitute an applicable criterion of identity. In this paper, I take issue with two arguments that have been offered in support of this claim by arguing (i) that we can (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation