J. Anthony Blair is a prominent international figure in argumentation studies. He is among the originators of informal logic, an author of textbooks on the informal logic approach to argument analysis and evaluation and on critical thinking, and a founder and editor of the journal Informal Logic. Blair is widely recognized among the leaders in the field for contributing formative ideas to the argumentation literature of the last few decades. This selection of key works provides insights into the history of (...) the field of argumentation theory and various related disciplines. It illuminates the central debates and presents core ideas in four main areas: Critical Thinking, Informal Logic, Argument Theory and Logic, Dialectic and Rhetoric. (shrink)

An ad hominem fallacy is committed when an individual employs an irrelevant personal attack against an opponent instead of addressing that opponent’s argument. Many discussions of such fallacies discuss judgments of relevance about such personal attacks, and consider how we might distinguish those that are relevant from those that are not. This paper will argue that the literature on bias and testimony can helpfully contribute to that analysis. This will highlight ways in which biases, particularly unconscious biases, can make ad (...) hominem fallacies seem effective, even when the irrelevance is recognized. (shrink)

This article investigates the deep-rooted logical structures underlying our thinking about other animals with a particular focus on topics relevant for cognitive primate research. We begin with a philosophical propaedeutic that makes perspicuous how we are to differentiate ontological from epistemological considerations regarding primates, while also accounting for the many perplexities that will undoubtedly be encountered upon applying this difference to concrete phenomena. Following this, we give an account of what is to be understood by the assertion of a thesis (...) of anthropological difference, identifying, inter alia, a property that fulfils the exclusivity, universality, and constitution criteria and demarcates the differentia specifica between humans and other animals. Also, we systematically develop how such theses can be formulated more moderately. Furthermore, we account for different theoretical frameworks, argumentative schemes, and sociological factors whose employment is associated with theses as such. This endeavor is carried out under the guise of anthropomorphism and anthropodenial. Doing so, we show that both are favored by the logic of cognitive primate research. Put briefly, concepts like cladistic parsimony and arguments by analogy favor anthropomorphism whereas concepts like traditional parsimony and Morgan’s canon favor anthropodenial. We close by framing these topics in the light of the self-other category mistake that lies in ascribing exclusive self-properties to some other. Lastly, we probe this category mistake for potency and scope of implications and find it to be central to and unavoidably ingrained in our thinking about other animals. (shrink)

A critic may attack an arguer personally by pointing out that the arguer’s position is pragmatically inconsistent: the arguer does not practice what he preaches. A number of authors hold that such attacks can be part of a good argumentative discussion. However, there is a difficulty in accepting this kind of contribution as potentially legitimate, for the reason that there is nothing wrong for a protagonist to have an inconsistent position, in the sense of committing himself to mutually inconsistent propositions. (...) If so, any such charge seems to be irrelevant. The questions to be answered in this essay are: what, if any, is the dialectical rationale for this type of criticism, and in what situations, if any, is this kind of charge dialectically legitimate? It will be shown that these attacks can be dialectically legitimate, in special circumstances, and that they can be seen as strategic␣manoeuvres where a party attempts to reconcile his dialectical and his rhetorical objectives. (shrink)

‘In Context’ is aimed at giving contextualization its rightful place in the study of argumentation. First, Frans H. van Eemeren explains the crucial role of context in a reconstructive analysis of argumentative discourse. He distinguishes four levels of contextualization. Second, he situates his approach to context in the field of argumentation studies by comparing it with Walton’s approach. He emphasizes the importance of distinguishing clearly between a normatively motivated theoretical ideal model and empirically-based communicative activity types. Third, van Eemeren concentrates (...) on the ‘macro-level’ of contextualization: contextualization in institutionalized communicative activity types. He makes clear that the macro-context of a communicative activity type can be characterized argumentatively by describing the disctinctive features of the empirical counterparts of the four stages of a critical discussion in the activity type concerned. Fourth, he points out what the consequences of the macrocontextualization of argumentative discourse in a certain communicative activity type are for the strategic maneuvering that may takes place and the identification of fallacies as derailments of strategic maneuvering. Fifth, van Eemeren draws some general conclusions regarding the role of contextualization in the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse. (shrink)

This article explores the modalities by which referring to past discursive performance of adversaries within a continuous polemical exchange is used in ad hominem attacks. Our starting point holds that in the context of lengthy debates, participants and third-party listeners share a rhetorical memory, which, dynamic and subjective as it may be, allows for the evaluation of participants’ characters based on their perceived discursive performances. By analysing opinion articles related to the Israeli political debate, this study shows how drawing inference (...) from adversaries’ prior statements and conduct is used to compromise their credibility as participants in the polemical exchange. It is found that, alongside supporting arguments from inconsistent commitment, previous discursive performance is mobilized to discredit speakers’ epistemic authority and their moral legitimacy. (shrink)

Researchers studying argumentation often make the simplifying assumption that rational persuasion can be studied independently from the processes through which social identities are established and maintained. However, developments in the study of message design, particularly the groundbreaking work of Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) on politeness, suggests that in practice the multiple functions of messages are intertwined in message structure and effects. In contrast to the view that identity issues distort rational processes in communication, both the communication of identity and (...) the use of identity-based appeals in social influence are best seen as prototypical examples of rationality in message design. (shrink)

This paper aims at creating an adequate theoretical basis for a systematic integration of institutional insights into the pragma-dialectical analysis of argumentative exchanges that occur in institutionalised contexts. The argumentative practice of Prime Minister’s Question Time in the British House of Commons is examined, as a case in point, in order to illustrate how the knowledge of the characteristics of an institution, its rules and conventions can be integrated into the pragma-dialectical analysis. The paper highlights the role that theoretical concepts (...) and tools such as strategic manoeuvring, argumentative activity types and dialectical profiles play in this integration. (shrink)

This paper is ultimately about the nature of argumentation in general and about the nature of practical argumentation in particular. (Practical argumentation is the form of argumentation which aims at answering the question: ‘What is to be done?’) The approach adopted here is an indirect one. I analyze one traditional form of argumentive fallacyargumentum ad hominem and try to show that in some argumentative situations it is an intuitively legitimate move. These intuitions can be explained if we accept that practical (...) argumentation is also governed by the general rules of practical rationality. (shrink)

In Roman rhetoric, contrarium was variably considered either a figure of speech or an argument. The paper examines the logical pattern of this type of argument, which according to Cicero is based on a third Stoic indemonstrable syllogism: $$ \neg ({\hbox{p}} \wedge {\hbox{q}});<$> <$>{\hbox{p}} \to \neg {\hbox{q}}{\hbox{.}} $$ The persuasiveness of this type of argument, however, vitally depends on the validity of the alleged ‹incompatibility’ forming its major premiss. Yet this appears to be the argument’s weak point, as the ‹incompatibilities’ (...) employed generally hold for the most part only, and are reducible to topical argument schemes. This is why in practical usage such arguments are most often phrased as rhetorical questions, the persuasive force of which, enhanced by certain strategical maneuverings and fallacies, makes the audience swallow the argument. (shrink)

Informal logic is a new sub-discipline of philosophy, roughly definable as the philosophy of argument. Contributors have challenged the traditional concept of an argument as a premiss-conclusion complex, in favour of speech-act, functional and dialogical conceptions; they have identified as additional components warrants, modal qualifiers, rebuttals, and a dialectical tier. They have objected that "soundness" is neither necessary nor sufficient for a good argument. Alternative proposals include acceptability, relevance and sufficiency of the premisses; conformity to a valid argument schema; conformity (...) to rules for discussion aimed at rational resolution of a dispute. Informal logic is a significant part of philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper the authors give a brief overview of the theoretical background of their research project “Linguistic indicators of argumentative moves.” Starting from the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion, they design dialectical profiles for capturing the moves that may or must be made at a particular stage or sub-stage of such a discussion. They explain how these dialectical profiles can be methodically exploited for systematically identifying the verbal expressions that can be indicative of any of these moves (...) in argumentative practice. (shrink)

This paper presents the concept of relevance in argumentation theory analyzed from a pragma-rhetorical angle. Special attention will be given to examples in which relevance is determined by the extended social context of the use of presentational devices in controversies. The analysis of examples will include the rhetorical concept of decorum, maintaining that a different emphasis should be given to the role of the speaker in the determination of relevance.

This paper scrutinizes some peculiarities of the culture of Internet argumentation: it is a qualitative pragma-dialectical study of different strategies arguers employ to question or attack argumentation of their opponents in online political discussion forums. The basic assumption of the paper is that this particular context of argumentation—or: argumentative activity type—creates special opportunities and constraints for critical reactions regarding propositional content and relevance of argumentation. These opportunities and constraints, it is argued, may lead online discussions to being endless, yet not (...) necessarily fruitless from an argumentative perspective. (shrink)

In order for confrontational strategic manoeuvring, aimed at defining in a reasonable way the difference of opinion to one’s own advantage, to be sound, arguers’ attempt to arrive at a particular definition must not prevent other definitions from coming about. This paper discusses the ad hominem fallacy as an obstruction of the procedure of critical testing as a result of failure to meet this particular soundness conditions.