- Distributed cognition: A perspective from social choice theory.Christian List - 2003 - In M. Albert, D. Schmidtchen & S Voigt (eds.), Scientific Competition: Theory and Policy, Conferences on New Political Economy. Mohr Siebeck.details
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The Argument from Common Consent.Jonathan Matheson - 2021 - In Colin Ruloff & Peter Horban (eds.), Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology: God and Rational Belief. Bloomsbury Publishing.details
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Experimental philosophy and moral responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 494–516.details
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Public Preferences about Fairness and the Ethics of Allocating Scarce Medical Interventions.Govind Persad - 2017 - In Meng Li & David P. Tracer (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Fairness, Equity, and Justice. Springer. pp. 51-65.details
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Can Coherence Generate Warrant Ex Nihilo? Probability and the Logic of Concurring Witnesses.James van Cleve - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):337-380.details
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A general model of a group search procedure, applied to epistemic democracy.Christopher Thompson - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1233-1252.details
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Egalitarianism and Moral Bioenhancement.Robert Sparrow - 2014 - American Journal of Bioethics 14 (4):20-28.details
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Philosophical Agreement and Philosophical Progress.Julia Smith - 2024 - Episteme:1-19.details
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The Epistemic Aims of Democracy.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (11):e12941.details
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Kann ich rational und ein Außenseiter sein? Außenseitermeinungen in der Wissenschaft.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 75 (1):71-93.details
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Arguing for majority rule.Mathias Risse - 2004 - Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (1):41–64.details
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When to defer to majority testimony – and when not.Philip Pettit - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):179–187.details
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No testimonial route to consensus.Philip Pettit - 2006 - Episteme 3 (3):156-165.details
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Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s1):268-299.details
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Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Philosophical Issues 11 (1):268-299.details
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Plural Voting for the Twenty-First Century.Thomas Mulligan - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):286-306.details
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Intuitions about the epistemic virtues of majority voting.Hugo Mercier, Martin Dockendorff, Yoshimasa Majima, Anne-Sophie Hacquin & Melissa Schwartzberg - forthcoming - Thinking and Reasoning:1-19.details
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Does discussion make crowds any wiser?H. Mercier & N. Claidière - 2022 - Cognition 222 (C):104912.details
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An Epistemic Justification for the Obligation to Vote.Julia Maskivker - 2016 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 28 (2):224-247.details
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The discursive dilemma and public reason.Christian List - 2006 - Ethics 116 (2):362-402.details
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On the significance of the absolute Margin.Christian List - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):521-544.details
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Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective.Christian List - 2005 - Episteme 2 (1):25-38.details
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Epistemic democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem.Christian List & Robert E. Goodin - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3):277–306.details
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Yes, We Can (Make It Up on Volume): Answers to Critics.Hélène Landemore - 2014 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 26 (1-2):184-237.details
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Fact-Dependent Policy Disagreements and Political Legitimacy.Klemens Kappel - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):313-331.details
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Dependent philosophical majorities and the skeptical argument from disagreement.Rasmus Jaksland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-24.details
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Are Dissenters Epistemically Arrogant?Tine Hindkjaer Madsen - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (1):1-23.details
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Should juries deliberate?Brian R. Hedden - 2017 - Social Epistemology 31 (4):368-386.details
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The Social Value of Non-Deferential Belief.Allan Hazlett - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):131-151.details
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Anchoring in Deliberations.Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85:1041-1069.details
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Representation in Models of Epistemic Democracy.Patrick Grim, Aaron Bramson, Daniel J. Singer, William J. Berger, Jiin Jung & Scott E. Page - 2020 - Episteme 17 (4):498-518.details
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Epistemic democracy and the social character of knowledge.Michael Fuerstein - 2008 - Episteme 5 (1):pp. 74-93.details
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Epistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation.Don Fallis - 2005 - Episteme 2 (1):39-55.details
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The Epistemic Dimension of Democratic Authority.David Estlund - 1997 - Modern Schoolman 74 (4):259-276.details
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No Title available: Reviews.David Estlund - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (1):113-119.details
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A Family Affair: Populism, Technocracy, and Political Epistemology.Kevin J. Elliott - 2020 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 32 (1-3):85-102.details
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Reliable group belief.Jeffrey Dunn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (S23):5653-5677.details
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The Premises of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem Are Not Simultaneously Justified.Franz Dietrich - 2008 - Episteme 5 (1):56-73.details
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Independent Opinions? On the Causal Foundations of Belief Formation and Jury Theorems.Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):655-685.details
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Epistemic Democracy with Defensible Premises.Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (1):87--120.details
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A model of jury decisions where all jurors have the same evidence.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2004 - Synthese 142 (2):175 - 202.details
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Is an Appeal to Popularity a Fallacy of Popularity?Don Dedrick - 2019 - Informal Logic 39 (2):147-167.details
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Democracy & Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference, Geoffery Brennan and Loren Lomasky. Cambridge University Press, 1993, 225 + x pages. [REVIEW]David Estlund - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (1):113.details
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Optimizing Individual and Collective Reliability: A Puzzle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2022 - Social Epistemology 36 (4):516-531.details
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One standard to rule them all?Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2018 - Ratio 32 (1):12-21.details
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Should agents be immodest?Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):235-251.details
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Getting to the source of the illusion of consensus.Saoirse Connor Desai, Belinda Xie & Brett K. Hayes - 2022 - Cognition 223 (C):105023.details
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Justifying deliberative democracy: Are two heads always wiser than one?Zsuzsanna Chappell - 2011 - Contemporary Political Theory 10 (1):78-101.details
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Are good leaders truly good?Susumu Cato & Akira Inoue - 2023 - Analysis 83 (3):437-446.details
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Epistemology in Group Agency: Six objections in search of the truth. [REVIEW]Fabrizio Cariani - 2012 - Episteme 9 (3):255-269.details
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