Purpose Although the term “responsibility” plays a central role in bioethics and public health, its meaning and implications are often unclear. This paper defends the importance of a more systematic conception of responsibility to improve moral philosophical as well as descriptive analysis. Methods We start with a formal analysis of the relational conception of responsibility and its meta-ethical presuppositions. In a brief historical overview, we compare global-collective, professional, personal, and social responsibility. The value of our analytical matrix is illustrated by (...) sorting out the plurality of responsibility models in three cases (organ transplantation, advance directives, and genetic testing). Results Responsibility is a relational term involving at least seven relata. The analysis of the relata allows distinguishing between individual versus collective agency, retrospective versus prospective direction, and liability versus power relations. Various bioethical ambiguities result from insufficient, implicit, or inappropriate ascriptions of responsibility. Conclusions A systematic conception of responsibility is an important tool for bioethical reflection. It allows an in-depth understanding and critique of moral claims on a meta-ethical level without presuming one particular normative approach. Considering the concept of responsibility can also help to complement the current bioethical focus on individual autonomy by including the perspectives of other actors, such as family members or social groups. (shrink)

From the beginning, a code of ethics for bioethicists has been conceived of as part of a movement to professionalise the field. In advocating for such a code, Baker repeatedly identifies 'having a code of ethics' with 'professionalization'. The American Society of Bioethics and Humanities echoes this view in their code of ethics for healthcare ethics consultants 1 and the subsequent publication in the American Journal of Bioethics.2 Taking for granted that a code of ethics could be a valuable asset (...) for HCECs, this essay has two aims. First, there are good reasons to doubt that the label 'profession' has significant meaning for HCECs. Attempts to accurately conceive of a profession fall into two broad camps: substantive and formal. Substantive conceptions should be rejected. Specifically, substantive conceptions beg the question about what it means to be a profession, which produces devastating problems for practical application. Formal conceptions of profession avoid begging the question, but do so at the cost of identifying the responsibilities of a profession. Using the term 'professional responsibilities', then, requires additional explication and classifying HCECs as professionals requires the identification of their role-specific responsibilities.i Second, this essay will critique the ASBH code of ethics for HCECs as a first articulation of these responsibilities. As written, this code of ethics has limited value for HCECs because most of the responsibilities identified in this code do not identify HCEC-specific responsibilities. In closing, some important strategies to improve upon this initial attempt to define the responsibilities of HCECs are identified. (shrink)

A Professor of Law at Santa Clara University, Kerry Lynn Mackintosh presents us with a rigorously structured book on anticloning legislation. Although written for US readers and thus focusing on US context and legislation, the book is very much relevant internationally, due to the similarities between the various anticloning legislative endeavours and between their underlying premises.The book is divided into three parts. In Part I, Macintosh identifies and discusses the five most common sources of objections to human cloning, and shows (...) what the endorsement of each of these objections presupposes and suggests about cloning and clones: human cloning offends God and nature , reduces humans to the level of manmade objects , produces beings who lack individuality, copies (clones are evil, unoriginal, fraudulent, inferior, zombie-like, constrained, pathetic, disturbed, disgusting, identity thieves, destroyers, a threat …. (shrink)

Although bioethics is a lively and expanding interdisciplinary field, there is not enough research about the patient‐doctor relationship, a central issue in philosophy of medicine. This article surveys the state of the field, paying attention to recent work by Alfred Tauber, and supplementing it with insights from Hans Jonas's philosophy of technology in order to propose a principle of responsible autonomy for health care. Based on a comparative look across different sub‐fields in bioethics, the resulting model claims that physician responsibility (...) is essential to professional integrity, providing an alternative to other active trends emphasizing patient autonomy, such as Robert Veatch's contractual model. (shrink)

Although bioethics is a lively and expanding interdisciplinary field, there is not enough research about the patient‐doctor relationship, a central issue in philosophy of medicine. This article surveys the state of the field, paying attention to recent work by Alfred Tauber, and supplementing it with insights from Hans Jonas's philosophy of technology in order to propose a principle of responsible autonomy for health care. Based on a comparative look across different sub‐fields in bioethics, the resulting model claims that physician responsibility (...) is essential to professional integrity, providing an alternative to other active trends emphasizing patient autonomy, such as Robert Veatch's contractual model. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze some of the major difficulties of informed consent. We consider insufficient to base IC on the principle of autonomy. We must not forget that the patient may be in a situation of extreme vulnerability and the good doctor should assume a degree of commitment and responsibility with his/her decisions. Our aim is to introduce the ethics of responsibility of Levinas in practice and theory of IC in order to generate a beneficent medical practice in which (...) the supervision and overseeing of the patient do not undermine his/her autonomy. (shrink)

This paper explores the value of respect for personal autonomy in relation to clearly immoral and irrational acts committed freely and intentionally by competent people. Following Berlin's distinction between two kinds of liberty and Darwall's two kinds of respect, it is argued that coercive suppression of nonautonomous, irrational, and self-harming acts of competent persons is offensive to their human dignity, but not disrespectful of personal autonomy. Irrational and immoral choices made by competent people may claim only the negative liberty to (...) be left alone. Lives disposed to autonomy are worthy of solidarity and active support in addition to the right of free choice and action. Autonomous premeditated desires (distinguished from mere consent) may embody transcendental choices, which transcend consideration of physical and psychological well-being. Choices made by incompetent persons (e.g., children and the mentally disabled) are not related to autonomy, but to self-directedness. The value of human dignity confers protection to self-directedness, but not at the expense of other vital interests. (shrink)

The article examines the new discourse on medical professionalism and responsibility through the prism of conflicts among moral values, especially with regard to truth-telling. The discussion is anchored in the renaissance of English-language writing on medical ethics in the 18th century, which paralleled the rise of humanitarianism and the advent of the word “responsibility”. Following an analysis of the meanings of the value of responsibility in general and in medical practice in particular, it is argued that, similarly to the Aristotelian (...) notion of equity, responsibility of care is a second-order value, which corrects virtues, laws and norms in exceptional circumstances. Virtues and practices of the second order, such as responsibility and deliberation, bear especially on professional doctoring, which includes a commitment to give priority to the good of the patient over one’s own good. It is argued that, in situations of conflict, and particularly conflicts between personal moral identity and the good of patients, the fundamental professional commitment is to critical and rational deliberation and to the cultivation of psycho-moral flexibility. This leads indirectly to moral growth and strengthening of professional character. (shrink)

In the first part of this article we survey the concept of human rights from a philosophical perspective and especially in relation to the “right to healthcare”. It is argued that regardless of meta-ethical debates on the nature of rights, the ethos and language of moral deliberation associated with human rights is indispensable to any ethics that places the victim and the sufferer in its centre. In the second part we discuss the rise of the “right to privacy”, particularly in (...) the USA, as an attempt to make the element of personal free will dominate over the element of basic human interest within the structure of rights and when different rights seem to conflict. We conclude by discussing the relationship of human rights with moral values beyond the realm of rights, mainly human dignity, free will, human rationality and response to basic human needs. (shrink)