In this paper I explore the extent to which the dialectical approach of Śrīharṣa can be identified as skeptical, and whether or how his approach resembles that of the first century Mādhyamika philosopher Nāgārjuna. In so doing, I will be primarily reading the first argument found in Śrīharṣa’s masterpiece, the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa-khādya. This argument grounds the position that the system of justification that validates our cognition to be true is not outside of inquiry. Closely adopting Śrīharṣa’s polemical style, I am neither (...) proposing a thesis in this paper that Śrīharṣa is a skeptic, nor am I denying such a possibility. I believe we can pursue our arguments on a neutral ground and let the facts speak for themselves. I will outline salient features that define skepticism in the mainstream philosophical discourse so that analyzing Śrīharṣa’s first argument becomes easier. In so doing, I will introduce some of the arguments of Nāgārjuna in light of Śrīharṣa’s position. This comparison, however, is restricted only to the salient features relevant to further the central argument of this paper and is therefore not aimed to encompass the overall positions of these two giants. (shrink)

This paper supports the thesis that nihilistic interpretations of Madhyamaka philosophy derive from generally antirealistic and/or metaphysical approaches to Nāgārjuna’s thought. However, the arguments and many images by way of which the author of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and his Indian commentators defend themselves from the charge of nihilism show limits in these approaches, and rather confirm that Nāgārjuna’s philosophy should be read as a theoretical proposal that is at once realistic and antimetaphysical. The epistemology inherent to the soteriological dimension of the (...) Buddha’s teaching, of which Nāgārjuna presents himself as a faithful continuer, assesses on the one hand the accomplishment of a ‘cognitive revolution’ consisting in the achievement of a new vision of reality and on the other the avoidance of any metaphysical description of the same vision. Comprehension of the Madhyamaka philosophical enterprise through a realistic-antimetaphysical lens seems to hinder and prevent the possibility of any nihilistic interpretation of Nāgārjuna. (shrink)

This paper proposes an interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of the two truths that considers saṃvṛti and paramārtha-satya two visions of reality on which the Buddhas, for soteriological and pedagogical reasons, build teachings of two types: respectively in agreement with (for example, the teaching of the Four Noble Truths) or in contrast to (for example, the teaching of emptiness) the category of svabhāva. The early sections of the article show to what extent the various current interpretations of the Nāgārjunian doctrine of (...) the dve satye—despite their sometimes even macroscopic differences—have a common tendency to consider the notion of śūnyatā as a teaching not based on, but equivalent to supreme truth. This equivalence—philologically questionable—leads to interpretative paths that prove inevitably aporetic: indeed, according to whether the interpretation of śūnyatā is ‘metaphysical’ or ‘anti-metaphysical’, it gives rise to readings of Nāgārjuna’s thought incompatible, respectively, with anti-metaphysical and realistic types of verses traceable in the works of the author of the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK). On the contrary, by giving more emphasis to the expression samupāśritya (“based on”), which recurs in MMK.24.8, and therefore, by epistemologically separating the notion of śūnyatā from the notion of paramārtha-satya (and of some of its conceptual equivalents such as nirvāṇa, tattva and dharmatā), we may obtain an interpretation—at once realistic and anti-metaphysical—of the theory of the two truths compatible with the vast majority (or even totality) of Nāgārjuna’s verses. (shrink)

Some time ago I advanced on the pages of this journal a critique of the interpretation given by Jay L. Garfield and Mark Siderits (hereafter GS) of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of the two truths (Ferraro, J Indian Philos 41(2):195–219, 2013.1); to my article the two authors responded with a ‘defense of the semantic interpretation’ of the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness (GS, J Indian Philos 41(6):655–664, 2013). Their reply, however, could not consider my personal understanding of Nāgārjuna’s notions of śūnyatā and dve (...) satye. My interpretation of these notions was in fact absent in the paper GS responded, and was only related in a second paper of mine (Ferraro, J Indian Philos 41(5):563–590, 2013.2), still unpublished at the time of GS’s drafting of their ‘defense’. Therefore, in the present rejoinder, I found it appropriate, rather than responding point by point to the passages of GS’s reply, to advance a comparison between the semantic interpretation and my ‘realist antimetaphysical’ understanding of Nāgārjuna’s thought. (shrink)

RESUMO Entre os vários pontos da obra de Nāgārjuna que deram origem a análises e discussões, o tema das 'duas verdades' é um dos mais controversos. Com efeito, dentro da ampla bibliografia dedicada a essa temática, são muitas, e amiúde divergentes, as tentativas de explicar o que Nāgārjuna entendesse - no verso 24.8 das suas Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā - com as expressões 'verdade convencional' e 'verdade suprema'. Esses pontos de vista interpretativos, entretanto, frequentemente, parecem prescindir daquele que talvez seja o critério mais (...) confiável para dirimir as controvérsias relativas às MMK: i. e., a leitura dos comentários indianos às mesmas MMK. Em contraste com essa tendência, este escrito objetiva investigar as passagens do Prajñāpradīpa e das Prasannapadā onde encontramos explicações, respectivamente de Bhāviveka e de Candrakīrti, que dizem respeito às duas verdades. O resultado dessa pesquisa se apresentará como nitidamente favorável à interpretação da doutrina das duas verdades que, em outros escritos, chamei de 'pedagógica'.ABSTRACT Among the many passages of Nāgārjuna's work that have generated analysis investigation and discussion, the issue of the 'two truths' is one of the most controversial ones. In fact, within the vast bibliography dedicated to this topic, attempts to explain what Nāgārjuna meant - in verse 24.8 of his Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā - by 'conventional' and 'supreme truth' are many and frequently divergent. However, it often seems that these interpretative views neglect what probably is the most reliable criterion for solving controversies in the MMK: i. e., the reading of Indian commentaries to the MMK. Going against this trend, this paper aims to investigate passages of Bhāviveka's Prajñāpradīpa and of Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā where we find explanations that concern the two truths. The result of this research will look quite favorably on the interpretation of the two truths doctrine that I called, in other works of mine, "pedagogical". (shrink)