This paper aims to perform a multi-level analysis of the Irish public discourse on Covid-19. Despite widespread agreement that Ireland’s response was rapid and effective, the country’s journey through the pandemic has been no easy ride. In order to contain the virus, the Government’s emergency legislation imposed draconian measures including the detention and isolation of people deemed to be even “a potential source of infection” and a significant extension of An Garda Síochána’s power of arrest. In April 2020, journalists John (...) Waters and Gemma O’Doherty initiated judicial review proceedings before the High Court to challenge such legislation, which they defined as unconstitutional, “disproportionate” and based on “fraudulent science”. The proceedings attracted widespread media coverage in what soon became a debate on the legitimacy of emergency legislation and the notion of ‘fake news’ itself. After a brief survey of the legislative background to Ireland’s Covid response, the argumentative strategy is analysed through which the High Court eventually dismissed Mr Waters and Ms O’Doherty’s challenge. Focusing on the process of justification of the judicial decision, the paper provides a descriptive account of the argument structure of the Court’s decision. This sheds light on the pattern of multiple argumentation through which the Court interpreted relevant norms in the Constitution and at once re-established the primacy of “facts” informing political decision-making at a time of national emergency. (shrink)

In this article, we argue for the general importance of normative theories of argument strength. We also provide some evidence based on our recent work on the fallacies as to why Bayesian probability might, in fact, be able to supply such an account. In the remainder of the article we discuss the general characteristics that make a specifically Bayesian approach desirable, and critically evaluate putative flaws of Bayesian probability that have been raised in the argumentation literature.

Le but de cet article est de jeter quelques lumières sur le fonctionnement de la polyphonie dans le discours et l’argumentation juridiques, en insistant sur l’importance des notions-clés d’(in)défaisabilité, de présomption, de polyphonie, d’échelle argumentative. Les premiers linéaments d’une théorie générale de l’argumentation juridique sont ici exposés (1). La théorie en question se veut topique (raisonnements défaisables) et logique (raisonnements indéfaisables). Face aux théories unidimensionnelles (réductionnisme logique ou réductionnisme topique) une théorie bidimensionnelle est souhaitable, qui inclue à la fois le (...) traitement des raisonnements défaisables et indéfaisables. Afin de développer cette esquisse de théorie de l’argumentation juridique, plusieurs notions sont définies (2): la défaisabilité (2.1), la présomption (2.2), la polyphonie (2.3), les échelles argumentatives (2.4). Enfin, un tableau général de quelques marqueurs argumentatifs résume les différents rôles que peuvent jouer les arguments dans la polyphonie du droit (3). (shrink)

This article begins with an introduction to defeasible (nonmonotonic) reasoning and a brief description of a computer program, EVID, which can perform such reasoning. I then explain, and illustrate with examples, how this program can be applied in computational representations of ordinary dialogic argumentation. The program represents the beliefs and doubts of the dialoguers, and uses these propositional attitudes, which can include commonsense defeasible inference rules, to infer various changing conclusions as a dialogue progresses. It is proposed that computational representations (...) of this kind are a useful tool in the analysis of dialogic argumentation, and, in particular, demonstrate the important role of defeasible reasoning in everyday arguments using commonsense reasoning. (shrink)