Why did Copernicus's research programme supersede Ptolemy's?’, Lakatos and Zahar argued that, on Zahar's criterion for ‘novel fact’, Copernican theory was objectively scientifically superior to Ptolemaic theory. They are mistaken, Lakatos and Zahar applied Zahar's criterion to ‘a historical thought-experiment’—fictional rather than real history. Further, in their fictional history, they compared Copernicus to Eudoxus rather than Ptolemy, ignored Tycho Brahe, and did not consider facts that would be novel for geostatic theories. When Zahar's criterion is applied to real history, the (...) results are distinctly different. Finally, most of the historical and conceptual problems in applying Zahar's criterion to the Copernican Revolution primarily arise from a deep difficulty in Lakatos's programme: the necessity of individuating research programmes and identifying their originators. 1 Working closely with David Dahl was crucial in developing this paper. Robert Westman's valiant effort to keep me on the historical straight and narrow drastically limited my tendency to a priori historical pronouncements. The Vassar Philosophy Department, John Tompsich, and Jean Sterling were also helpful. (shrink)

Im Rahmen der Popperianischen Bewährungstheorie spielt der Begriff der Strenge eines Tests eine wichtige Rolle. Einige konkurrierende Vorschläge zur Bestimmung der Teststrenge werden vorgestellt, auf ihre Konsequenzen hin analysiert und miteinander verglichen. Gegen Vorschläge von Popper und Watkins bzw. Lakatos und Musgrave werden schwerwiegende Einwände vorgebracht; durch die Erweiterung einer Idee von Zahar lassen sich deren vertretbare Konsequenzen aber erhalten und sogar erklären. Es wird die Ansicht vertreten, daß es im Zusammenhang mit einer rationalen Theorienpräferenz mehr auf ein Optimum an (...) empirischer Kritik als auf ein Maximum ankommt: ein Test muß zwar streng, aber auch fair sein. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, vol. 52, number 1, pp.44-63. R.M. Nugayev, Kazan State |University, USSR. -/- THE HISTORY OF QUANTUM THEORY AS A DECISIVE ARGUMENT FAVORING EINSTEIN OVER LJRENTZ. -/- Abstract. Einstein’s papers on relativity, quantum theory and statistical mechanics were all part of a single research programme ; the aim was to unify mechanics and electrodynamics. It was this broader program – which eventually split into relativistic physics and quantummmechanics – that superseded Lorentz’s theory. The argument of this paper is (...) partly historical and partly methodological. A notion of “crossbred objects” – theoretical objects with contradictory properties which are part of the domain of application of two different research programs – is developed that explains the dynamics of revolutionary theory change. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to demonstratethat Special Relativity and the Early Quantum Theory were created within the same programme of statisticalmechanics, thermodynamics and maxwellianelectrodynamics reconciliation. I shall try to explainwhy classical mechanics and classicalelectrodynamics were ``refuted'''' almost simultaneouslyor, in more suitable terms for the present congress,why did the quantum revolution and the relativisticone both took place at the beginning of the 20-thcentury. I shall argue that the quantum andrelativistic revolutions were simultaneous since theyhad a common origin -- the (...) clash between thefundamental theories of the second half of the 19-thcentury that constituted the ``body'''' of ClassicalPhysics. The revolution''s most dramatic pointwas Einstein''s 1905 photon paper that laid thefoundations of both Special Relativity and OldQuantum Theory. Hence the dialectic of the oldtheories is crucial for theory change. Modern physicsbegan with Einstein''s reconciliation ofelectrodynamics, mechanics and thermodynamics in 1905and his unification of Special Relativity andNewtonian Theory of Gravity. Or, in a more generalsocial context: progressive scientific change can bedescribed not in Weberian terms of zweckrationalaction forcing out all the other forms of action onlybut in terms of Habermas''s communicative rationalityencouraging the establishment of mutual understandingbetween the various scientific communities also.Einstein''s programme constituted a progressive stepwith respect to its rivals not because it couldexplain more ``facts'''' or was more ``mathematical''''. Itwas better than its rivals because it constituted abasis of communication and interpenetration betweenthree main paradigms of 19-th century physics. Ofcourse in the long run it resulted in empiricalsuccesses. (shrink)

The subject of this essay is the dependence of evidential relations on background beliefs and assumptions. In Part I, two ways in which the relation between evidence and hypothesis is dependent on such assumptions are discussed and it is shown how in the context of appropriately differing background beliefs what is identifiable as the same state of affairs can be taken as evidence for conflicting hypotheses. The dependence of evidential relations on background beliefs is illustrated by discussions of the Michelson-Morley (...) experiment and the discovery of oxygen. In Part II, Hempel's analysis of confirmation and the contrasting model of theory acceptance provided by philosophers such as Kuhn and Feyerabend are discussed. It is argued that both are inadequate (on different grounds) and the problems addressed by each are shown to be more satisfactorily approached by means of the analysis developed in Part I. In Part III, it is argued that if there are objective criteria for deciding between competing theories, these cannot be simply that one theory has greater evidential support than another. Finally, some further methodological questions arising from the analysis are mentioned. (shrink)

History of science, it has been argued, has benefited philosophers of science primarily by forcing them into greater contact with "real science." In this paper I argue that additional major benefits arise from the importance of specifically historical considerations within philosophy of science. Loci for specifically historical investigations include: (1) making and evaluating rational reconstructions of particular theories and explanations, (2) estimating the degree of support earned by particular theories and theoretical claims, and (3) evaluating proposed philosophical norms for the (...) evaluation of the degree of support for theories and the worth of explanations. More generally, I argue that theories develop and change structure with time, that (like biological species) they are historical entities. Accordingly, both the identification and the evaluation of theories are essentially historical in character. (shrink)

A inicios del siglo XX, Albert Einstein y Hendrik Lorentz produjeron explicaciones diferentes acerca de los mismos fenómenos. Sin embargo, rápidamente se produjo un consenso, en favor de Einstein, que ha sido difícil de comprender para historiadores y filósofos de la ciencia. La literatura reciente explica ese éxito señalando conflictos entre algunas ideas de Lorentz y la temprana física cuántica. Sin negar que esos factores pudieron contribuir en la aceptación de la relatividad especial, propongo una explicación complementaria en la que (...) atribuyo el éxito de Einstein al uso de la estabilidad de la medición de la velocidad de la luz. (shrink)